

KONDA

Barometer

THEMES

Authoritarianism and Political Identities
June 2014





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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey which forms the basis for this report was conducted on June 7-8, 2014 by face-to-face interviews with 2590 individuals in 149 neighborhoods and villages of 104 districts including the central districts of 30 provinces.

THEME OF THE MONTH: AUTHORITATIVENESS IN THE SOCIETY

Political Identities

It is a frequently expressed opinion that the society needs a powerful leader and therefore is inclined to authoritativeness in the framework of this powerful leadership. Is this presumption really true? For the aim of answering this question, we chose authoritativeness as the theme of this month and tried to understand the extent of authoritativeness in terms of demographic, economic, sociological and cultural clusters. In this regard, perhaps one of the most explanatory features for authoritativeness may be political identities. Therefore, in addition to the theme of authoritativeness, we also questioned identities as we considered it useful for explaining the attitudes towards authoritativeness.


Majority of the society define themselves as pacifists in the dichotomy of militarist-pacifist, egalitarians in the dichotomy of elitist-egalitarian, open in the dichotomy of openness-closeness and also as nationalists and seculars. Conservative identity is more preferred against liberalism, universalism against locality, authoritarian against anti-authoritarianism and rightist against leftist as political identities.

Men are more prone to authoritativeness than women. Young people are more prone to both ends than old people are and find both “authoritativeness” and “anti-authoritativeness” suitable for themselves at the highest rates. As the educational level increases and as the residential area shifts from villages to metropolises, anti-authoritativeness increases but if the childhood residential area is a town or a district and if the educational level is high school, then the rate of authoritativeness increases. Anti-authoritativeness radically increases as the maternal educational level increases.

Authoritativeness noticeably increases in the new middle class, in towns versus metropolises and among conservatives versus modern people.



Authoritativeness in Society



The analysis of the questions on authoritativeness in view of the findings leads to four axes. The graph above shows the averages of all data. In each axis, 1 stands for anti-authoritativeness whereas 5 stands for tendency to authority at a grading system from 1 to 5.

On the subject of “Legitimizing social order and the limitations for the sake of social order,” majority of the society seem to support use of force when necessary. As the education level increases and the level of conservative lifestyle increases, the extent of legitimizing use of force increases. The increase in the level of maternal education brings about a negative approach towards use of force.

Regarding the matter of “use of force,” majority of the society seem to support use of force when necessary. As the education level increases and the level of conservative lifestyle increases, the extent of legitimizing use of force increases.

The national average is rather low on the subject of “tolerance to ethnic differences and legitimizing prohibitions on the rights of minorities.” Yet, as the educational level, especially the maternal educational level increases and the childhood residence shifts towards metropolises, the rates significantly decrease.

In the axis of “taking the side of power in the relationships between individuals and power,” none of the demographic or cultural differences generate any difference. Only the increase in the maternal educational level and political preferences slightly decrease the approval of use of power.



Based on these findings, it is safe to state that the society has a tendency towards authoritativeness. Upon a clustering analysis conducted with all findings, we may analyze and explain a cluster of 63 percent with a tendency towards authoritativeness and a further cluster of 37 percent with relatively distant approach towards authoritativeness.

Another finding is that nationalism and conservatism go hand in hand with authoritativeness.

“Cluster with a tendency to conservativeness – nationalism – authoritativeness” is more among women than men and in older people than young people. However, a more explicit differentiation is observed in terms of educational level in that “liberal – anti-nationalist – anti-authoritarian” cluster has higher weight among clusters with university education. Lifestyle also emerges as one of the most significantly determining and differentiating features. Another interesting finding is about the new middle class. Unlike what is claimed in theory and in the media, the new middle class seems to have a tendency towards the “conservative – nationalist – authoritative” identity as much as the lower classes do. The weight of the “liberal – anti-nationalist – anti-authoritative” cluster slightly increases parallel to metropolization.





2. THEME OF THE MONTH: AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITIES

This month we picked authoritarianism as the theme of the month to address in order to gain a better understanding of society in Turkey. The long-running Ak Parti rule, intolerance of Ak Parti proponents to any criticism towards the ruling party, and the complaints of the individuals who feel themselves alienated that they cannot demand for their rights were the factors that led us to question the public perception of authority.

2.1. Political Identities


We directed several questions to observe the relation between the public perception of 'authoritarianism', and various demographic, sociological and cultural differences and political identities. We asked respondents about their demographic characteristics such as maternal and paternal educational attainment levels and the place where they grew up (village/town/district/city/metropolitan area). With the same purpose, we provided respondents with the form in the picture below and asked them to mark the extent to which each political identity listed on the form describes them. Before we dive into our findings on authoritarianism and its relation to political identities, we can briefly summarize our findings on political identities.

<i>Please mark the identity you would use to describe yourself.</i>						
	describes me very well	describes me well	no opinion	describes me well	describes me very well	
Political	1	2	3	4	5	Apolitical
Liberal	1	2	3	4	5	Conservative
Right-winger	1	2	3	4	5	Left-winger
Anti-authoritarian	1	2	3	4	5	Authoritarian
Anti-secular	1	2	3	4	5	Secular
Outward looking	1	2	3	4	5	Self-enclosed
Warmonger	1	2	3	4	5	Pacifist
Egalitarian	1	2	3	4	5	Elitist
Anti-nationalist	1	2	3	4	5	Nationalist
Universal	1	2	3	4	5	Local
European	1	2	3	4	5	Asian

The majority of the respondents identify themselves as 'pacifist', 'egalitarian', 'outward looking' and, at the same time, as 'nationalist' and 'secular'. 'Conservative' vs. 'liberal', 'universal' vs. 'local', 'authoritarian' vs. 'anti-authoritarian' and 'right-winger' vs. 'left-winger' are the identities that were accepted at higher rates.



Political identities



2.1.1. Who Are the Authoritarians?


Women tend to identify themselves as authoritarian to a greater extent than men. The rate of respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian is higher among younger respondents than those who are older.

The rate of respondents who identify themselves anti-authoritarian rises in parallel to higher educational attainment level, and particularly among those whose mothers have a higher level of educational attainment and those who grew up in metropolitan areas. However, the rate of respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian is also quite high among high school graduates.


The rate of respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian increases significantly among the new middle class, as well as in cities in comparison to metropolitan areas, and among conservatives in comparison to moderns.



Demographic characteristics - Anti-authoritarian / Authoritarian



Demographic characteristics - Anti-authoritarian / Authoritarian






2.1.2. Who Are the Nationalists?

In the theme report on nationalism in the December'10 Barometer, we established that nationalist sentiments do not differ by demographic groups, and that the notion of nationalism is based on superficial knowledge memorized during formal education. The findings we obtained about the definitions of nationalism and anti-nationalism in the June'14 Barometer are quite similar. It is not possible to observe specific differences by age, gender or even by educational attainment level. Differences occur in relation to level of income, lifestyle clusters and maternal educational attainment level.

The rate of respondents who identify themselves as nationalist is higher among the new middle class in comparison to other classes. Similarly, the traditional conservatives see themselves as nationalist to a greater extent than the modern and even the religious conservatives. The same pattern is repeated among the respondents who grew up in places other than metropolitan areas; and among those with better educated mothers. In other words, nationalism is more prevalent among the new middle class and the traditional conservatives, and respondents whose mothers are less educated and those who grew up in rural areas tend to identify themselves as nationalist to a greater extent.



Demographic characteristics - Nationalist



2.1.3. Who Are the Conservatives?


When respondents are asked to where they would locate themselves on the liberal/conservative axis, their responses clearly vary according to various demographic and sociological characteristics. Higher personal, and particularly maternal educational attainment level leads to lower self-identification as conservative and higher self-identification as liberal.

Similarly, self-identification as conservative decreases and self-identification as liberal increases among those who were raised in and/or who live in metropolitan areas, as well as those who are modern.

Surprisingly, the new middle class is as notably conservative as the lower class.



Demographic characteristics - Liberal / Conservative



In summary, educational attainment level, place of birth, place of current residence, economic class and lifestyle are the factors that influence whether or not the respondents identify themselves as authoritarian, nationalist or conservative.




2.1.4. Political Identities by Core Voter Groups

62 percent of MHP voters and 57 percent of Ak Parti voters describe themselves as authoritarian. On the other hand, 47 percent of BDP voters and 43 percent of CHP voters identify themselves as anti-authoritarian.

95 percent of MHP voters, 73 percent of Ak Parti voters, and 66 percent of CHP voters respectively identify themselves as nationalist.

64 percent of Ak Parti voters and 56 percent of MHP voters identify themselves as conservative, while 59 percent of CHP voters describe themselves as liberal.

Self-definitions preferred by the voters are in parallel to the discourses of the party they support.



2.2. Public Perception of Authoritarianism

The factor analysis¹ on the data performed on the data collected through the questions that were directed to the respondents under this month's theme of authoritarianism (the complete list of questions can be viewed in the table below), reveals four different dimensions. We provided the following definitions for the four dimensions, on the basis of the questions which make up each dimension:

- ✓ Social order,
- ✓ The use of force,

¹Factor analysis is a statistical method that reduces and summarizes a large number of variables into a small number of dimensions in order to facilitate the detection and interpretation of the correlations within a large set of variables.



- ✓ Attitude towards ethnic differences,
- ✓ The relation between individuals-power.

Questions on authoritarianism	Factors			
	1	2	3	4
The political institutions in Turkey are the best in the world.	.745	.199	.088	-.042
Our lifestyle is at least as good as that of other societies.	.688	.180	-.068	.017
People who consume alcohol should not dine in the same place with people who perform salat.	.618	.015	.410	.087
People who have bad habits should not live in the same place with the good people.	.560	.028	.417	.136
In incidents such as protests, strikes etc. the governors may obstruct transportation if they deem necessary.	.496	.273	.244	.093
The best way to prevent war is being as powerful as the enemy.	.092	.709	.011	.144
Use of armed forces should be allowed for maintaining law and order.	.140	.706	.112	.001
Use of force may be necessary to preserve our traditional lifestyle.	.280	.572	.186	-.083
Political parties/groups which endanger the social order may be banned from politics.	.020	.544	.125	.413
The majority may abolish the minority rights, if they desire to do so.	.120	.515	.363	.046
Patriotism and commitment to society's lifestyle are prerequisites to being a good citizen.	.237	.478	-.074	.419
Legislation prohibiting inter-ethnic marriages may be introduced.	.202	.061	.688	-.131
Instruction of minority languages and cultures at schools should be forbidden, and minority groups should be forbidden from opening separate schools.	-.034	.288	.652	.166
Respect for privacy diminishes by the day.	.053	-.148	.072	.734
Turkey is in need of determined and dedicated leaders more than laws and political programs.	-.016	.143	-.121	.613
Freedom of speech does not justify the instruction of separatist opinions at schools.	-.009	.316	.080	.547

Moreover, we asked the respondent the three questions listed below in order to observe the differentiations between values and daily life practices, and between personal life and social life.

Questions on daily life practices
Pregnancy is a topic which only concerns women. The government or public institutions should not interfere.
The president or the prime minister of a country may be jeered.
My daughter/son may marry someone from a different ethnic background.



2.3. Social Order

All of the questions which were categorized under the 'social order' factor inquire about how common lives of the people who live together may be arranged and characterized.

53 percent of the respondents do not agree with the statement, 'the political institutions in Turkey are the best in the world'. The rate of respondents who agree with this statement is only 22 percent. Meanwhile, the rate of respondents who believe that 'the political institutions in Turkey are the best' is lower among younger and more educated respondents. Similarly, higher maternal educational attainment level, living in metropolitan areas and being modern lead to a significant decrease in the belief that 'the political institutions in Turkey are the best'. While Ak Parti voters display a positive attitude in response to this statement, other voter groups are generally in disagreement with the statement.


41 percent of the respondents agree that 'the lifestyle in Turkey is at least as good as that of other societies', while 36 percent think otherwise. Positive attitudes towards statements on the lifestyle and the political institutions in Turkey shift are parallel to each other, and the same demographic clusters react the same way to both of the statements, which we may identify as an issue of 'dignity' of 'pride'.

26 percent of the respondents think that 'people who consume alcohol should not dine in the same place with people who perform salat', while 59 percent disagree with this statement. Similarly, 35 percent of the respondents believe that 'people who have bad habits should not live in the same place with others who have good habits'. Lower educational attainment level and higher degree of piety lead to an increase in the rate of respondents who agree with this statement.

Society is divided into two in response to the statement, 'in incidents such as protests, strikes etc. the governors may obstruct transportation if they deem necessary'. While 39 percent of the respondents agree with the statement, 43 percent disagree. This statement evokes the decisions that city officials took on May 1st and on the anniversary of the Gezi Park protests, and thus, we should emphasize that opinions on this statement are at least partially derive from the political polarization. In this respect, it is not difficult to anticipate that Ak Parti voters agree with the statement at higher rates and other voter groups disagree. Even so, respondents who are younger, more educated, Kurdish, Alevi, and who live in metropolitan areas disagree with the statement at high rates.



Social order - Distribution of responses




2.3.1. Social Order: Averages and Differences

When we analyze the responses provided to the questions which make up the social order factor altogether, observing the differences between the groups becomes easier. The survey, in its entirety, shows that demographic characteristics such as maternal and paternal educational attainment levels and the place where respondents grew up (village/town/district/city/metropolitan area) lead to as significant differences as those that are caused by demographic characteristics (such as educational attainment level and age) and ethnic/sectarian differences.

The graph below presents that confidence in the social order and restrictiveness for the sake of maintaining the social order in Turkey is low (2.7 on a scale of 1-5). The levels of trust and restrictiveness decrease among the respondents who are younger, more educated and were raised in metropolitan areas.




Differences Between Average Scores for the Use of Force



As the graph below presents, Ak Parti voters and other voter groups differ from each other greatly in terms of their perspectives on the issue of social order. While Ak Parti voters are in favor of restrictions on social life, other voter groups are against restrictions. The level of confidence in the social order and restrictiveness for the sake of maintaining social order present great differences by lifestyle and maternal educational attainment.

Differences Between Average Scores for the Use of Force






2.3.2. Social Order Axis and Identities

Under the scope of the social order factor, anti-nationalists and liberals are respectively less confident in the social order and support social restrictions at lower rates than nationalists and conservatives.

The respondents identify themselves as secular present a rather interesting finding. A higher rate of respondents who describe themselves as secular defend the social order and the restrictions on social life. However, the exact opposite would be anticipated from nationalists and conservatives/liberals by definition. This behavior is in parallel to the behavioral codes of the 'concerned modern' cluster, defined in the KONDA Lifestyles Survey, and of the anti-Ak Parti cluster outlined in the KONDA Polarization Index.

Differences Between Average Scores for the Use of Force






2.4. The Use of Force

Questions grouped under the second factor, the use of force, includes topics such as the legitimacy of using armed forces, the use of force by the majority on the minorities, the use of force to preserve the traditions, and the restriction of freedom of speech through various methods such as disbandment of political parties.

Two thirds (65 percent) of the general public think that the best way to prevent war is to be as powerful as the enemy. Slightly more than half (52 percent) of the respondents defend that the use of armed forces should be allowed for the purpose of maintaining law and order, whereas almost one third (30 percent) think otherwise. 40 percent of the respondents think that force may be used to preserve our traditional lifestyle, whereas 40 percent stand against this statement. Two thirds (66 percent) of the general public defend that political parties which may endanger the social order may be banned from politics. While half of the general public agree that the majority may abolish the minority rights, one third (37 percent) disagree. 80 percent of the respondents think that patriotism and commitment to society's lifestyle are prerequisites for being a good citizen.

In general, the general public is in favor of the use of force. Indeed, when these questions are grouped together under the 'use of force' factor, it appears that Turkey supports the use of force on average, at a score of 3.4 out of 5.

The use of force - Distribution of responses






2.4.1. Differentiation on the Use of Force


The majority of the respondents within different demographic groups take a stand in favor of the use of force. Improved educational attainment level and a more conservative lifestyle lead to an increase in the rate of the respondents who support the use of force. Higher maternal educational attainment level is reflected by a more negative outlook on the use of force.

Differences Between Average Scores for the Use of Force



Even the Kurdish find the use of force acceptable on average. However, the opinions of BDP voters and Alevis differ from others, and they are more inclined to disapprove of the use of force.

Differences Between Average Scores for the Use of Force






2.4.2. The Use of Source and Identities

All of the respondents, except those who identify themselves as anti-nationalist, stand in favor of the use of force. A higher rate of respondents who identify themselves as nationalist, anti-secular, authoritarian and conservative are in favor of using force in comparison to the respondents who respectively identify themselves as anti-nationalist, secular, anti-authoritarian and liberal. In terms of how they approach the use of force, nationalists and authoritarians differ from conservatives and, particularly, from seculars. Nevertheless, the respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian and anti-secular support the use of force at the highest rates.

Differences Between Average Scores for the Use of Force






2.5. Attitude Towards Ethnic Differences

Two questions which inquired the respondents' opinions on how ethnic identities should be accommodated in society and how much say the majority should have on ethnic minorities establish the third factor, 'attitude towards ethnic differences'.

Only 16 percent of the respondents agree that legislation prohibiting inter-ethnic marriages may be introduced, while 70 percent take a stand against this statement.

Although 34 percent of the general public think that 'instruction of minority languages and cultures at schools should be forbidden, and minority groups should be forbidden from opening separate schools', 48 percent express their disagreement.

Attitude towards ethnic differences - Distribution of responses




2.5.1. Attitude Towards Ethnic Differences: Averages and Differences

The approval rate of restrictions on ethnic groups and minority rights in Turkey is at a rather low rate (2.5 points). Yet, this rate further decreases among the respondents whose maternal educational attainment level is higher and among those who grew up in metropolitan areas.


A higher percentage of Alevis vs. Sunnis, the Kurdish vs. Turkish, and moderns vs. conservatives disapprove the restrictions on ethnic groups and minority rights. In comparison to other voter groups, voters of Ak Parti and MHP find the restrictions legitimate at higher rates.



Differences Between Average Scores for Attitude Towards Ethnic Differences



Differences Between Average Scores for Attitude Towards Ethnic Differences






2.5.2. Attitude Towards Ethnic Differences: Averages and Identities

The respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian and conservative approve the restrictions on ethnic groups and minority rights at the highest rates.

The respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian, conservative, nationalist, and anti-secular consider the restrictions on ethnic groups and minority rights legitimate at higher rates than those who respectively see themselves as anti-authoritarian, liberal, anti-nationalist and secular. Although the respondents, regardless of their political identities, are against restrictions on average, it is remarkable that those who identify themselves as authoritarian and conservative are inclined to take a stand in favor of restrictions.

Differences Between Average Scores for Attitude Towards Ethnic Differences






2.6. Relations Between Individuals and Power

The questions which are categorized under the factor, 'relations between individuals and power', may seem irrelevant with each other at first. However, they meet on the grounds of private life, freedom of speech, and the individual's relations with society and power by way of leadership.

Four fifths of the general public think that respect to privacy diminishes day by day. Also, more than four fifths (85 percent) of the general public think that 'Turkey is in need of determined and dedicated leaders more than laws and political programs'. Three thirds of the general public think that 'freedom of speech cannot justify the instruction of separatist opinions at schools'. In other words, the majority of the respondents do not consider the instruction of separatist opinions within the boundaries of freedom of speech. Responses provided to the questions grouped under this factor reveal that the respondents show sentiments of discontent with interference in their private lives. However, their reactions towards freedom of speech and their preference of a powerful leader over law and order imply that they take a stand in favor of authoritarianism.

Distribution of responses for relations between individuals and power




2.6.1. Relations Between Individuals and Power: Averages and Differences

Under the scope of relations between individuals and power, demographic or cultural characteristics do not lead to differences in attitudes. The approval rate of the use of



power slightly decreases due to different political preferences and improved level of maternal educational attainment.




2.6.2. Relations Between Individuals and Power: Averages and Identities

Under this factor, which does not present significant differences based on demographic or cultural characteristics, the respondents who identify themselves as nationalist, authoritarian and conservative approve the use of power at very close rates to each other.



Authority on daily life practices




When we analyze the responses with respect to identities, we can clearly observe the difference between the respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian and those who see themselves as anti-authoritarian. In comparison to the respondents who identify themselves as anti-authoritarian, the respondents who see themselves as authoritarian oppose the statements on inter-ethnic marriages, and on pregnancy and women at higher rates.

The same groups also differ from each other in terms of their reactions towards the statement, 'the president and the prime minister of a country may be jeered', while the respondents who identify themselves as authoritarian clearly stand against jeering a country's president.

The respondents who describe themselves as nationalist, conservative and anti-secular take a similar stand to authoritarians in their daily lives.



Daily Life Practices in terms of Identities






2.8. Authoritarianism, Clusters and Differences

2.8.1. Clusters

Performing cluster analysis² on the dataset of the June'14 Barometer reveals two clusters, which are meaningful in terms of identities and authoritarianism, and useful for understanding the data. 63 percent of the respondents compose the first cluster that leans towards 'conservatism - nationalism - authoritarianism', and 37 percent of the respondents form the second cluster that leans towards 'liberalism - anti-nationalism - anti-authoritarianism'.




In comparison to men, the size of the cluster which leans towards 'conservatism - nationalism - authoritarianism' is slightly larger among women. It is also larger among younger respondents in comparison to older. However, the most significant difference is observed in terms of educational attainment level. Among the respondents with a college degree, the weight of the cluster which leans towards 'liberalism - anti-nationalism - anti-authoritarianism' is higher in comparison to the weight of the 'conservatism - nationalism - authoritarianism' cluster.

²Cluster analysis is a group of methods which enables grouping unknown units, variables or both within a dataset into categories that are similar to each other. Cluster analysis classifies data into meaningful and useful categories.




Demographics of the clusters



Ak Parti and MHP voters are apparently different from the other voter groups, and they reflect similar profiles to each other. Within both of these voter groups, the weight of the cluster which leans towards 'conservatism - nationalism - authoritarianism' is quite high. On the other hand, the weight of the 'liberal - anti-nationalist - anti-authoritarian' cluster is higher particularly among CHP and among BDP voters.

Demographics of the clusters




Along with educational attainment level, lifestyle cluster is also a determinant factor. As we move from the modern towards the religious conservative along the axis, the weight of the 'conservative - nationalist - authoritarian' cluster increases.



In addition, the distribution within the new middle income class also presents interesting findings. In contrary to what is identified in theory and media, the rate of respondents who lean towards 'conservatism - nationalism - authoritarianism' among the new middle class is almost the same as the rate of those from lower class, and they form the majority by making up two thirds of the cluster.

The weight of the 'liberal - anti-nationalist - anti-authoritarian' cluster also increases in metropolitan areas.

Demographics of the clusters




2.8.2. Clusters and Authoritarianism

The members of the two clusters identified with the cluster analysis have different and almost opposite preferences in response to the questions on authoritarianism.

As presented in the table below, the respondents in the 'conservative - nationalist - authoritarian' cluster are in favor of authoritarianism, and the members of the 'liberal - anti-nationalist - anti-authoritarian' cluster take a stand against authority.

Authoritarianism preferences of the clusters






2.8.3. Clusters, Differences, Authoritarianism

As presented in the radian graph below, the behaviors of the clusters present very illustrative findings.

The clusters do not differ from each other in terms of the behavior they present on the relation between individuals and power. However, they take different attitudes in response to the questions on social order and restrictiveness, the use of force, and ethnic differences.





An obvious differentiation occurs by lifestyle clusters. As presented in the graph below, moderns take an anti-authoritarian stand. Traditional conservatives and religious conservatives present similar attitudes in response to other issues; however, the attitude of religious conservatives is inclined towards authoritarianism in response to the statements on public order and restrictiveness.




In addition, educational attainment level of the respondents and maternal educational attainment level are quite illustrative in explaining the differentiation of attitudes on authoritarianism. The graph below presents that the degree of authoritarianism changes with respect to educational attainment level. It can be observed that higher level of educational attainment leads to increased anti-authoritarianism.




Political preferences also illuminate the attitudes towards authoritarianism. Ak Parti and MHP voters take a stand in favor of or quite parallel to authoritarianism. Compared to MHP voters, a higher rate of Ak Parti voters approve the enforcement of restrictions for the sake of maintaining the social order.

Although the preferences of CHP and BDP voters are quite similar to each other, BDP voters are slightly more inclined towards authoritarianism/restrictiveness in response to the questions on public order, while CHP voters take an authoritarian/restrictive attitude due to their responses on ethnic differences.



Another remarkable finding is shown in the graph below. In contrary to what is widely accepted, the members of the new middle class are inclined towards authoritarianism in all three of the factors.



2.9. Authoritarianism and Its Dimensions

Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya

The notions of 'modern authoritarianism' and 'post-modern authoritarianism' are used frequently in recent articles and reports on the government's practices regarding the rights and freedom in Turkey. Current debates revolve around the government's doctrine on the



struggle against domestic and foreign conspirators, its restrictions on the rights and freedoms as well as the discriminating and alienating conduct of public officials. It is argued that policies that are inclusive of all segments of society, based on the will and values of the majority, are being adopted and civilization is being rebuilt. However, the policies of the government cannot be evaluated in isolation from the opinions of the general public. International scientific studies prove that societies defend the fundamental rights and freedoms in theory, but give less support to any steps taken in practice.

Instead of the 'F scale' invented by Adorno et al. (1950) in order to measure authoritarianism (which puts emphasis on conventionalism, authoritarian submission, anti-intellectualism, superstition and stereotypes, power and 'toughness', destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex), Altemeyer (1996) claimed that authoritarianism is a social attitude which is learned, and characterized authoritarianism with "authoritarian submission", "authoritarian aggression" and "conventionalism". Particularly a chronic perception of external 'threat' and intolerance to ambiguity determine the degree of authoritarianism. Individuals who greatly value authoritarianism perceive incidents as 'black' or 'white', and they are intolerant and cynical. This adversely influences cognitive processes and diminishes behavioral flexibility of individuals. Therefore, while negative emotions restrain the relation between thoughts and actions, positive emotions promote critical thinking and creativity.

It is possible to make the following observations by analyzing the responses provided to the 'authoritarianism' sequence that is composed of 19 statements which represent Altemeyer's tripartite approach, and which were collected through the field survey conducted by KONDA in June 2014, with the participation of 2590 respondents.

First of all, three of the identities expressed in response to the question on self-identification are significant: Liberal/Conservative, Anti-authoritarian/Authoritarian and Anti-secular/Secular. Although how each respondent defines these notions is not known to us, 63 percent of the respondents identified themselves as secular, 45 percent as conservative and 45 percent as authoritarian (prior to distributing the undecided respondents). It can be argued that social identity in Turkey on average is very secular, quite conservative and somewhat authoritarian. In contradiction to the analysis below, it is common that the general public self-identifies as outward looking, egalitarian, pacifist and also nationalist. As well as representing the characteristics that individuals aspire to possess, such self-identifications are also a reflection of the social structure and, in particular, a consequence of the structured thinking imposed by formal education.

When we analyze the groups of statements which we will identify as 'customary conditions/social order/preservation of the conventional', we can observe that a significant rate of the respondents stand in favor of the restrictions on freedoms and approve of the use of (armed) force. At the present time, when external threats have escalated, perception of the 'enemy' and the power of the armed forces are viewed as important. Moreover, more than two thirds of the respondents approve of the use of force for maintaining law and order, and banning associations and political parties, which endanger the social order. In particular, the responses in favor of banning political parties show the respondents' negative attitudes towards the freedom of association and diversity of organization. When the preservation of traditional lifestyle is in question, 60 percent of the respondents support the



use of power. 80 percent of the respondents emphasize 'patriotism' and 'conventionalism' (commitment to society's lifestyle) as important values. However, it is necessary to analyze the conditions under which these attitudes (patriotism and conventionalism) emerged and the targets to which they are directed at.

The respondents are divided in two groups based on their attitudes towards the statements grouped under the second factor of the sequence, 'intolerance to differences and external groups' (particularly, towards the statements, 'If they desire, the majority may abolish the minority rights', 'Freedom of speech cannot justify the instruction of separatist opinions at schools' and 'Legislation that prohibits inter-ethnic marriages may be introduced'). The positive outlook on inter-faith and inter-cultural marriages turns into an extremely restrictive stance in response to the instruction of separatist opinions at schools. Despite the recent political actions taken towards the instruction of the minority languages and cultures, slightly more than half of the respondents stand in favor of cultural pluralism in education. About 60 percent of the respondents are against the development of 'pluralist' processes, based on the will of the 'majority'. Finally, the indicators under this factor are inversely related to 'patriotism' and 'conventionalism' (commitment to society's lifestyle). In other words, social order and the preservation of traditions, which are subsets of patriotism and conventionalism, hinder the advancement of pluralist thinking.

Among all indicators, 'the need for a leader' received approval from 85 percent of the respondents. On the one hand, leadership is a 'practical' need in daily life, and on the other, it is a requirement for the realization of patriotism and traditionalism. 'Commitment to the leader' in social life and daily life, leader's 'dedication' to society, and leadership networks are sustained in a political culture, which is inevitably centralist, intolerant and authoritarian.

Results provided by the rotated factor analysis show that there are two dimensions of 'authoritarianism': social order and preservation of traditions (1st component), and patriotism and leadership (2nd component). There are 10 indicators (items) under the first component. Indicators that imply the preservation of social order and traditions by the use of force are the most influential indicators. The second component consists of 4 indicators, which emphasize patriotism, dedication of the leader, intolerance to separatist opinions and physical separation of people who have good habits from those who have bad habits.

Preservation of social order is a consequence of individuals' quest for security, assurance and stability. Also, the instruction of the monistic and centralist attitude of the governing ideology by formal education leads to the emergence of a more homogeneous structure and the adoption of the values and attitudes of the majority. Within this context, differences can be tolerated as long as people remain committed to patriotism and the lifestyle of the majority. Such an attitude needs an authority which is systematic, powerful and organized in accordance with the 'common goals' of the majority. The need for authority can be realized by a powerful state, a powerful leadership or both. In other words, the authority of a leader, who is 'a patriotic and good individual' and respects social values, becomes the instrument of individuals' quest for security, assurance and stability. In conclusion, when individuals do not have personal power, they need a leader who, on their behalf, will watch for and protect their present status. When it becomes necessary, the leader is obliged to preserve the existing order by the use of force, just like the individuals do in their personal lives.









3. RESEARCH ID

3.1. Overall Description of the Survey

The survey that this report is based on was conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.).

The field survey was conducted on June 7-8, 2014. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, within the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and to monitor trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey.

The margin of error of the survey is +/- 2 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.6 at 99 percent confidence level.

3.2. The Sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the population data and educational attainment level data of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address-Based Population Registration System (ADNKS) and the results of the June 12, 2011 General Elections in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 2590 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 149 neighborhoods and villages of 104 districts -including central districts- of 30 provinces.

Provinces visited	30
Districts visited	104
Neighborhoods/villages visited	149
Number of respondents	2590



Within the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas regarding age and sex were considered.

Age group		Female	Male
Between 18-28		3 respondents	3 respondents
Between 29-44		3 respondents	3 respondents
44 and above		3 respondents	3 respondents
	Level 1 (12 regions)	Provinces visited	
1	İstanbul	İstanbul	
2	Western Marmara	Balıkesir, Çanakkale, Edirne	
3	Aegean	İzmir, Denizli, Kütahya, Uşak	
4	Eastern Marmara	Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli	
5	Western Anatolia	Ankara, Konya	
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin	
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri, Niğde, Sivas	
8	Western Black Sea	Samsun, Tokat	
9	Eastern Black Sea	Trabzon	
10	Northeastern Anatolia	Erzincan	
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	Elazığ, Malatya, Van	
12	South Eastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa	



The distribution of respondents according to the regions and place of residence is shown in the table below.

	Region where the survey was conducted	Rural	Urban	Metropolitan	Total
1	İstanbul			19.2	19.2
2	Western Marmara	2.1	3.4		5.5
3	Aegean	3.9	6.3	5.5	15.7
4	Eastern Marmara	1.1	2.8	4.7	8.6
5	Western Anatolia	0.7		9.7	10.4
6	Mediterranean	3.1	2.7	6.0	11.9
7	Central Anatolia	1.3	2.1	1.0	4.4
8	Western Black Sea	2.7	3.5		6.2
9	Eastern Black Sea	1.4	2.1		3.5
10	Northeastern Anatolia	1.4			1.4
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	1.4	2.1		3.5
12	South Eastern Anatolia	2.1	3.5	4.2	9.7
		21.1	28.5	50.3	100.0





4. FREQUENCY TABLES

4.1. Profile of the Respondents

Gender	Percentage
Female	48.8
Male	51.2
Total	100.0

Age	Percentage
Between 18 - 28	28.7
Between 29 - 43	34.9
44 and above	36.4
Total	100.0

Educational attainment level	Percentage
Illiterate	4.7
Literate without degree	2.7
Primary school degree	31.1
Secondary school degree	15.3
High school degree	30.9
College degree	14.0
Masters/PhD	1.4
Total	100.0

Paternal educational attainment level	Percentage
Illiterate	14.0
Literate without degree	7.5
Primary school degree	47.4
Secondary school degree	13.5
High school degree	13.0
College degree	4.2
Masters/PhD	.4
Total	100.0



Maternal educational attainment level	Percentage
Illiterate	31.8
Literate without degree	8.1
Primary school degree	42.7
Secondary school degree	8.5
High school degree	7.0
College degree	1.8
Masters/PhD	.1
Total	100.0

Employment status	Percentage
Public officer	5.0
Private sector	6.7
Worker	10.2
Small retailer	7.5
Merchant/businessman	1.1
Self-employed	1.7
Farmer, agriculturist, stock breeder	5.1
Employed, other	4.2
Retired	11.7
Housewife	31.9
Student	10.0
Unemployed	4.3
Disabled	.7
Total	100.0



Lifestyle Cluster	Percentage
Modern	29.2
Traditional conservative	47.7
Religious conservative	23.1
Total	100.0

Head cover	Percentage
No cover	27.8
Head cover	48.8
Turban	8.6
Chador	.4
Bachelor men	14.4
Total	100.0

Ethnicity	Percentage
Turkish	79.5
Kurdish	13.6
Zaza	1.1
Arab	2.1
Other	3.7
Total	100.0

Religion/Sect	Percentage
Sunni Muslim	91.6
Alevi Muslim	6.0
Other	2.4
Total	100.0

Piety	Percentage
Non-believer	2.5
Believer	29.8
Pious	56.8
Devout	10.9
Total	100.0



TV channel preferred for watching the news	Percentage
ATV	12.9
CNN Turk	2.5
Fox TV	7.5
Habertürk	3.6
Halk TV	5.2
Kanal 7	3.5
Kanal D	13.2
Kanaltürk	.7
NTV	3.6
Roj TV	.8
Samanyolu	4.8
Show TV	5.1
Star	6.6
TRT	10.7
Ulusal	1.7
Local channels	1.7
Other channels	7.3
No answer	8.6
Total	100.0

Monthly household income	Percentage
TRY300 or less	1.3
TRY301 - 700	7.5
TRY701 - 1200	28.2
TRY1201 - 2000	33.9
TRY2001 - 3000	16.6
TRY3001 or more	12.4
Total	100.0



Household size	Percentage
1 - 2 person(s)	17.8
3 - 5 people	67.8
6 - 8 people	12.4
9 people or more	2.0
Total	100.0

Car ownership	Percentage
Yes	42.1
No	57.9
Total	100.0

Where did you grow up?	Percentage
Village	31.2
Town	5.8
District	25.3
City	26.1
Metropolitan area	11.5
Total	100.0

Place of birth	Percentage
Istanbul	7.7
Western Marmara	5.1
Aegean	15.6
Eastern Marmara	6.7
Western Anatolia	6.6
Mediterranean	12.3
Central Anatolia	7.4
Western Black Sea	9.2
Eastern Black Sea	6.4
Northeastern Anatolia	4.0
Middle Eastern Anatolia	5.6
South Eastern Anatolia	12.3
Abroad	1.2
Total	100.0



Father's birthplace	Percentage
Istanbul	2.9
Western Marmara	5.6
Aegean	14.3
Eastern Marmara	5.9
Western Anatolia	6.2
Mediterranean	11.8
Central Anatolia	8.9
Western Black Sea	10.0
Eastern Black Sea	8.0
Northeastern Anatolia	5.5
Middle Eastern Anatolia	6.1
South Eastern Anatolia	12.9
Abroad	1.9
Istanbul	100.0

Type of housing	Percentage
Traditional house	39.0
Squatter	4.4
Apartment flat	51.8
Luxury residence	4.8
Total	100.0

Place of residence	Percentage
Rural	21.1
Urban	28.5
Metropolitan	50.3
Total	100.0



Region where the survey was conducted	Percentage
Istanbul	19.2
Western Marmara	5.5
Aegean	15.7
Eastern Marmara	8.6
Western Anatolia	10.4
Mediterranean	11.9
Central Anatolia	4.4
Western Black Sea	6.2
Eastern Black Sea	3.5
Northeastern Anatolia	1.4
Middle Eastern Anatolia	3.5
South Eastern Anatolia	9.7
Total	100.0



4.2. Theme of the Month: Authoritarianism

Are you affiliated with any associations?	Percentage
No affiliation	87.3
Affiliation with an NGO	4.3
Affiliation with a political party	6.6
Affiliation with a professional chamber	2.2

The majority may abolish the minority rights, if they desire to do so.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	10.8
Wrong	26.0
Neither right nor wrong	12.6
Right	45.4
Absolutely right	5.1
Total	100.0

The best way to prevent war is being as powerful as the enemy.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	3.7
Wrong	15.5
Neither right nor wrong	13.8
Right	51.6
Absolutely right	15.3
Total	100.0

Use of armed forces should be allowed for maintaining law and order.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	7.7
Wrong	21.8
Neither right nor wrong	18.2
Right	41.4
Absolutely right	10.9
Total	100.0



Political parties/groups which endanger the social order may be banned from politics.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	5.3
Wrong	14.1
Neither right nor wrong	12.3
Right	52.3
Absolutely right	16.0
Total	100.0

The political institutions in Turkey are the best in the world.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	17.5
Wrong	37.3
Neither right nor wrong	23.0
Right	18.7
Absolutely right	3.5
Total	100.0

Use of force may be necessary to preserve our traditional lifestyle.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	10.8
Wrong	29.2
Neither right nor wrong	19.4
Right	35.5
Absolutely right	5.1
Total	100.0

Freedom of speech does not justify the instruction of separatist opinions at schools.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	4.4
Wrong	15.7
Neither right nor wrong	20.1
Right	49.0
Absolutely right	10.8
Total	100.0



Patriotism and commitment to society's lifestyle are prerequisites to being a good citizen.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	1.9
Wrong	6.4
Neither right nor wrong	11.4
Right	58.0
Absolutely right	22.2
Total	100.0

Our lifestyle is at least as good as that of other societies.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	9.4
Wrong	26.5
Neither right nor wrong	22.7
Right	36.5
Absolutely right	4.9
Total	100.0

Legislation prohibiting inter-ethnic marriages may be introduced.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	26.9
Wrong	42.9
Neither right nor wrong	14.1
Right	13.3
Absolutely right	2.8
Total	100.0

Instruction of minority languages and cultures at schools should be forbidden, and minority groups should be forbidden from opening separate schools.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	12.5
Wrong	35.2
Neither right nor wrong	18.8
Right	26.8
Absolutely right	6.6
Total	100.0



Turkey is in need of determined and dedicated leaders more than laws and political programs.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	1.3
Wrong	4.9
Neither right nor wrong	8.9
Right	54.0
Absolutely right	30.9
Total	100.0

People who have bad habits should not live in the same place with the good people.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	13.8
Wrong	35.3
Neither right nor wrong	15.6
Right	30.1
Absolutely right	5.2
Total	100.0

Respect for privacy diminishes by the day.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	1.3
Wrong	7.4
Neither right nor wrong	11.4
Right	56.6
Absolutely right	23.3
Total	100.0

People who consume alcohol should not dine in the same place with people who perform salat.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	21.0
Wrong	38.1
Neither right nor wrong	14.3
Right	20.3
Absolutely right	6.3
Total	100.0



In incidents such as protests, strikes etc. the governors may obstruct transportation if they deem necessary.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	15.5
Wrong	27.2
Neither right nor wrong	18.7
Right	33.6
Absolutely right	4.9
Total	100.0

The president or the prime minister of a country may be jeered.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	8.5
Wrong	24.2
Neither right nor wrong	12.6
Right	38.2
Absolutely right	16.5
Total	100.0

Pregnancy is a topic which only concerns women. The government or public institutions should not interfere.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	5.4
Wrong	15.0
Neither right nor wrong	15.0
Right	43.5
Absolutely right	21.1
Total	100.0

My daughter/son may marry someone from a different ethnic background.	Percentage
Absolutely wrong	4.6
Wrong	12.4
Neither right nor wrong	16.4
Right	48.2
Absolutely right	18.4
Total	100.0



Political / Apolitical	Percentage
Political – Describes me very well	20.9
Political – Describes me well	26.8
No opinion	30.1
Apolitical – Describes me well	11.1
Apolitical – Describes me very well	11.1
Total	100.0

Liberal / Conservative	Percentage
Liberal- Describes me very well	10.8
Liberal- Describes me well	14.3
No opinion	27.5
Conservative - Describes me well	25.9
Conservative - Describes me very well	21.5
Total	100.0

Right-winger / Left-winger	Percentage
Right-winger- Describes me very well	22.0
Right-winger- Describes me well	23.0
No opinion	30.9
Left-winger - Describes me well	12.2
Left-winger - Describes me very well	11.8
Total	100.0

Anti-authoritarian / Authoritarian	Percentage
Anti-authoritarian - Describes me very well	11.2
Anti-authoritarian - Describes me well	11.9
No opinion	29.7
Authoritarian - Describes me well	28.2
Authoritarian - Describes me very well	18.9
Total	100.0



Anti-secular / Secular	Percentage
Anti-secular - Describes me very well	4.7
Anti-secular - Describes me well	6.8
No opinion	22.8
Secular - Describes me well	31.0
Secular - Describes me very well	34.8
Total	100.0

Outward looking / Self-enclosed	Percentage
Outward looking - Describes me very well	36.3
Outward looking - Describes me well	29.6
No opinion	22.5
Self-enclosed - Describes me well	7.6
Self-enclosed - Describes me very well	4.0
Total	100.0

Aggressive / Pacifist	Percentage
Aggressive - Describes me very well	.8
Aggressive - Describes me well	1.9
No opinion	10.6
Pacifist - Describes me well	30.5
Pacifist - Describes me very well	56.2
Total	100.0

Egalitarian / Elitist	Percentage
Egalitarian - Describes me very well	52.6
Egalitarian - Describes me well	30.4
No opinion	9.8
Elitist - Describes me well	4.0
Elitist - Describes me very well	3.2
Total	100.0



Anti-nationalist / Nationalist	Percentage
Anti-nationalist - Describes me very well	8.7
Anti-nationalist - Describes me well	5.8
No opinion	15.9
Nationalist - Describes me well	29.6
Nationalist - Describes me very well	40.0
Total	100.0

Global / Local	Percentage
Universal - Describes me very well	30.8
Universal - Describes me well	20.7
No opinion	20.6
Local - Describes me well	13.7
Local - Describes me very well	14.2
Total	100.0

European / Asian	Percentage
European - Describes me very well	17.4
European - Describes me well	16.3
No opinion	33.0
Asian - Describes me well	14.5
Asian - Describes me very well	15.1
Total	100.0