



social structure survey 2006

Copy of this report is based on the series of articles published in *Milliyet* daily on 19-26 March, 2007.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Taking a scientific, unbiased and objective x-ray of Turkey's social fabric instead of depending on estimations carries a vital value for surmounting the country's problems. A KONDA-Milliyet collaboration, the survey conducted in 2721 locations constitutes a significant step in this area. The survey lays out all aspects of the society in Turkey, with all its colors.

1.1.1. Introduction

Starting today and going on for a week in the *Milliyet* daily newspaper, this survey is an important first for Turkey given its subject and scope. What opinionated people will state in their own way and more importantly, with their own sums and figures about what they think about Turkey's social structure, this survey lays out in front of the public in its vast scope. We believe that the survey we are publishing will be helpful in finding solutions to many of Turkey's problems. As such, this survey will serve as a 'cipher box.'

It is known that Turkey is going through serious problems and facing obstacles on its journey of development and modernization. And almost everybody in the country voice their opinions on what can provide a momentum, a rejuvenation. Taking a snapshot of Turkey's social sturcture, most notably of ethnic and religious affiliations, and fleshing out all aspects of identity weigh significantly in formulating solutions.

1.1.2. A Striking Picture

Historically a transit point for peoples spanning three continents, Anatolia did not change in ethnic composition merely as a result of conquests and wars. A thousand years of cultural reconciliation and blending has left a distinctive mark on this composition. Claiming similarly that there exists a single notion of Islam would do injustice to Anatolia which has been a melting and boiling pot for centuries. In fact, countless sects and ethnic groups, small or large, have been in constant interaction, pushing and pulling one another. The existence of each different element has deeply influenced another's way of being. Regardless of their size, each and every group was important for the other. Therefore, every group, no matter how few individuals it comprises of deserves to be in this survey.

1.1.3. A Very Mobile Population

It would be impossible to fully understand today's society without grasping how very mobile it is geographically-speaking. For example, internal migration which began in the 1950's with a movement from villages to cities and continued in the 1970's with

exchange between cities has been transforming the structure of the village, the city and their inhabitants. International emigration and immigration, illegal workers, illegal immigrants and many other population movements can completely overthrow local and societal order, just as shantytowns have. The survey aims to bring such buoyant population movements under its scope.

1.1.4. An Observation Towards Solution

It would not be too ambitious to make the following claim: "Without any exception, it is everybody's desire to live in peace and comfort in this land." We can also easily state that societal peace is the primary condition for surmounting the bottleneck that our society is experiencing today.

Within this framework, taking a crystal-clear and bare snapshot such as the one you will be following in *Milliyet* is crucial.

Thanks to the survey, all decision-makers can put aside estimated figures suiting their interest and start thinking instead with a frame of reference based on unbiased, scientifically-prepared fundamental information.

1.1.5. Self-claimed "Kurds"

This survey entitled "Who Are We?" was conducted to be able to make a complete and objective definition of Turkey's social fabric. The findings expose in an unbiased manner all aspects of the identity structure of Turkey, most notably in terms of ethnicity and religion.

For example, a question often asked but left unanswered is: How many people in Turkey consider themselves to be a "Kurd"? The European Commission's 2004 Progress Report on Turkey states that there are "15 to 20 million Kurds" in Turkey and DTP (Democratic Society Party) co-president Ahmet Türk has claimed that there are 25 million but are these figures accurate? Just as important as the figures is another question: "What do the Kurds want and what do they think about issues of identity?"

Or what do other ethnic groups deem fit for the Kurds? Such questions have been answered up until now to suit personal or political interests but the most truthful answers will be exposed thanks to this survey.

1.1.6. Turkish, Laz, Alewite

It is also unknown how many people consider themselves to be "Turkish" or "Muslim." What is the true figure for those who define themselves as "Laz" or "Arab" or "Circassian"? How many define themselves as "Sunnite", "Alewite" or "Turkish Muslim" and what it is they want?"

Or how do they feel about each other? Politicians love the phrase "In our country where 99 % of the population is muslim..." but does that figure reflect the reality? This survey will define ethnic and religious affiliations, determine their geographic distribution, their mobility and the social dynamics that they create. All these

definitions are also examined from different angles: social security, education and income.

Obtaining the peoples' opinions on domestic peace and reconciliation in such a complicated social structure is another objective of the survey. Because no matter how small, any difference is part and parcel of the more general identity of Turkey.

2. SAMPLE AND FIELD ORGANISATION

Over 1500 people were employed for the most comprehensive non-government survey ever conducted in Turkey and 47,958 randomly chosen people were interviewed face to face.

The sample distribution based on interviews	
Province	79
District	488
Number of neighborhood and villages	2.685
Urban	2.286
Rural	399
Number of interviews	47.958

The sample distribution based on interviews

The number of subjects reaching 50,000 means that this survey has 10 to 20 times as much volume as other public opinion surveys and therefore provides that much more "detailed" information. The one factor that deserves most care and influences all results in such surveys is the sample, which is the process of determining where and with whom the interviews will be conducted. In fact, despite the high numbers of subjects, it is still difficult to represent such a large society.

The initial stages of the survey were sample preparation, literature scan and field organisation. Then, three separate samples were prepared, with one representing Turkey, one representing the 12 regions of Turkey and the third one representing the 13 cities where the population will reach 1 million by the year 2010, according Turkish Statistics Institute projections. For the sample to be statistically reliable, it was crucial that it represent the society accurately. Therefore intersection points of the samples were selected as locations for the interviews. The samples were also stratified by rural and urban population, size of settlements, level of education, 2002 election results, women's participation in worklife and land prices. With all the above mentioned parameters in mind, a large sample was prepared and a target of 49 thousand interviews in 2721 locations was set. In every village or neighborhood, 18 people were interviewed. Age and gender quotas were adhered to. The result is a huge piece of work that both represents the society and allows for detailed deductions to be made.

**Classification of the Statistical Regions of Turkey
(Supplement to Law No 5449)**

İstanbul

- 1- İstanbul

West Marmara

- 1- Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ
- 2- Balıkesir, Çanakkale
- 3-

Aegean

- 1- İzmir
- 2- Aydın, Denizli, Muğla
- 3- Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Manisa, Uşak

East Marmara

- 1- Bilecik, Bursa, Eskişehir
- 2- Bolu, Düzce, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova

West Anatolia

- 1- Ankara
- 2- Karaman, Konya

Mediterranean

- 1- Antalya, Burdur, Isparta
- 2- Adana, Mersin
- 3- Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye

Central Anatolia

- 1- Aksaray, Kırıkkale, Kırşehir, Niğde, Nevşehir
- 2- Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat

West Black Sea

- 1- Bartın, Karabük, Zonguldak
- 2- Çankırı, Kastamonu, Sinop
- 3- Amasya, Çorum, Samsun, Tokat

East Black Sea

- 1- Artvin, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Ordu, Rize, Trabzon

Northeast Anatolia

- 1- Bayburt, Erzincan, Erzurum
- 2- Ağrı, Ardahan, Iğdır, Kars

Central East Anatolia

- 1- Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Tunceli
- 2- Bitlis, Hakkari, Muş, Van

Southeast Anatolia

- 1- Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Kilis
- 2- Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa
- 3- Batman, Mardin, Şırnak, Siirt

2.1.1. The Survey Reached Everyone

While generally no more than 3000 subjects are used for polls seeking the country's inclination, why were 50.000 people interviewed? The first and foremost reply is obviously "sensitivity." But as our survey has demonstrated, it is simply impossible to generalize on people's situation, on their attitudes and behaviours, on their values and preferences. Through its modernization process, Turkey is experiencing many changes simultaneously. Therefore individuals' attitudes and behaviors depend largely on where they are in the change process, how much they are part of the economic development. Another fact the survey has revealed is that the social structure and people's preferences are shaped by their region and their ethnic and religious identities as much as their gender and education. For example, ethnic affiliation may play a much stronger role in a certain preference than level of education. The survey aims to determine the perception and tendencies of all segments of the society. Such detailed information was only possible with such a large number of subjects.

The sample size of the survey also allowed us to reach groups which constitute one in ten thousand of the total population.

2.1.2. 1500 Researchers

The part of the survey where 50 thousand people were interviewed face to face in their homes, namely the "field work," required 1500 people to work all over Turkey. Of these, 22 were regional leaders, 150 were team leaders and 1400 worked as interviewers or controllers. 47,958 interviews were conducted in almost 3000 locations in all four corners of Turkey over a span of one month and the survey was completed in October 2006.

3. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

3.1. Half of the poorest live in Southeast Turkey


According to the survey, going from the west of Turkey to the east, going from the cities to the villages, both education levels and income decrease. Paralel to this, the size of the household increases.

3.2. The Latest Situation of the Population and Education in Numbers


Demographic information (structure of the population) are normally the control elements of such a study. In other words, the demographic information obtained from the survey is compared to information from other institutions. But since the survey is highly representative, it provides up-to-date information by itself. Therefore the data and figures provided here should be viewed as fresh information.

Looking at the graphs about the level of education in Turkey, the most delightful result is how much the situation of girls' education has improved. While 41.28 % of women over 44 have primary school education, this rate is 13.71 % among women between the ages 29 to 43 and goes down to 6.37 % for women aged 18 to 28. The gap between men and women for secondary school and higher education seems to closing fast (10.76 % of younger women having higher education versus 15.59 % of younger men). With recent campaigns such as "*Haydi Kizlar Okula*" (Come On Girls, to School) or "*Baba Beni Okula Gonder*" (Dad, Send Me to School), it can be predicted that problems in girls' education will be solved in the near future.

Age and Gender Distribution of Adults



Educational Level of Adults



3.3. Half the Population Have Primary Education or Less

The second most significant finding among the demographic data was that 12.48 % of the population still have no diploma, meaning they have not completed even 5-year primary school. Or from another viewpoint, more than half of the population (52.31 %) either have primary education or no diploma. The third important finding shows that vocational training is far below Turkey's need (2.85 % of total population). These figures are low all over the country showing no regional differences.

Educational Attainment by Age and Gender


	Illiterate	Literate-No Diploma	Primary School	Secondary School	Vocational School	High School	Higher Education
Women Aged 18 - 28	3,54	2,83	29,79	17,16	2,67	33,24	10,76
Women Aged 29 - 43	8,33	5,38	50,21	13,28	1,24	14,44	7,12
Women Aged 44 or More	29,37	11,91	42,1	6,29	0,79	6,79	2,75
Men Aged 18 - 28	1,05	1,14	16,55	18,41	6,66	40,6	15,59
Men Aged 29 - 43	1,52	1,72	36,63	21,11	3,89	23,47	11,66
Men Aged 44 or More	7,28	7,21	52,84	13,27	2,06	10,86	6,47
Turkey	8,39	5,09	38,83	14,94	2,85	20,94	8,96

3.4. Huge Regional Difference in Level of Education

The survey provides striking data about the regional differences in education. Beginning with Central Anatolia, all eastern regions fare much lower than the country averages of education levels. Those who have 8-year primary education or less constitute 79.45 % of the Southeast Anatolian region, 75.45 % of the Northeast Anatolian region and 73.17 % of Eastern Black Sea region. The two regions with the highest levels are Western Marmara and Istanbul.

Southeast Anatolia is the Region with the Lowest Level of Education

	Illiterate	Literate-No Diploma	Primary School	Secondary School	Vocational School	High School	Higher Education	Total
Turkey	8,52	5,15	38,79	14,98	2,86	20,77	8,93	100,00
Southeast Anatolia	22,81	8,63	35,34	12,67	1,03	14,93	4,59	100,00
Central East Anatolia	14,53	6,92	37,30	13,99	1,86	19,74	5,67	100,00
Northeast Anatolia	13,61	8,90	34,70	18,24	2,14	17,26	5,16	100,00
Eastern Black Sea	10,07	6,68	41,80	14,62	1,96	18,89	5,97	100,00
Western Black Sea	10,28	5,01	40,27	15,68	2,73	19,26	6,77	100,00
Central Anatolia	10,99	5,42	39,09	13,62	1,78	20,20	8,90	100,00
Mediterranean	8,45	4,43	40,53	14,22	2,76	20,58	9,03	100,00
Western Anatolia	6,77	3,85	36,89	15,34	2,87	22,68	11,60	100,00
Eastern Marmara	3,62	3,95	39,04	17,02	3,68	22,08	10,60	100,00
Aegean	5,45	5,18	41,61	14,45	4,08	20,67	8,56	100,00
Western Marmara	3,26	4,50	44,00	15,87	4,32	20,55	7,50	100,00
Istanbul	5,04	3,60	36,42	15,01	3,07	24,14	12,73	100,00




3.5.3 to 5 Person Household for 61 % of the Population

The number of people per household is crucial for understanding the changing population structure and related parameters. 61 % of the population live in household with 3 to 5 people. The further east one goes, the bigger the household. The survey shows that 16.47 % of the households in the Southeast Anatolian region have 9 people or more. The figure is 15.97 % for Central Eastern Anatolia and 14.16 % for Northeastern Anatolia.

The Number of Crowded Households Increase in the East and Southeast

	1-2 Persons	3-5 Persons	6-8 Persons	9+ Persons
Turkey	15,95	60,94	18,56	4,55
Southeast Anatolia	9,00	40,21	34,33	16,47
Central East Anatolia	8,49	45,64	29,91	15,97
Northeast Anatolia	11,20	43,91	30,73	14,16
Eastern Black Sea	15,97	59,89	21,12	3,02
Western Black Sea	17,11	55,58	20,79	6,52
Central Anatolia	14,31	59,24	23,28	3,17
Mediterranean	17,78	65,74	14,63	1,84
Western Anatolia	17,45	64,78	16,07	1,69
Eastern Marmara	15,96	65,33	16,79	1,93
Aegean	19,18	66,68	12,94	1,21
Western Marmara	24,96	65,40	9,20	0,44
Istanbul	15,49	68,51	14,04	1,96




3.6. Huge Income Gulf

The survey once again verifies the well-known imbalance of income distribution. The income ranges used in the survey were grouped as monthly household income below 300 YTL, 300 to 700 YTL, 700 to 1200 YTL, 1200 to 3000 YTL and above 3000 YTL. From this perspective, our graph lays open the difference and imbalance of the various income levels.


The lowest income group with less than 300 YTL per month represent 16.40 % of the population, while the second lowest with 300-700 YTL per month constitute 44 %. Overall, 87 % of the total population earn a below average income, with 1200 YTL or less monthly for the household. Only 2 % of the population have a monthly household income of 3000 YTL or more.

How the National Income is Divided



3.7. Unemployment at 16.3 %

While 41.63 % of the subject interviewed were working, 48.12 % stated that they were housewives, retirees, students or unable to work and 8.11 % that they were unemployed. Calculating those who could be part of worklife but are not (i.e. putting housewives, retirees and students aside), the unemployment rate comes up to 16.3 %.



3.8. Lowest Income Levels

Examining household income differences by region, we can see that the Southeast Anatolia region accounts for 45 % of the lowest income group. 36.38 % of this groups is accounted for by the Northeast Anatolian region and 32.90 % by the Central East Anatolia region. Istanbul, East and West Marmara stand out among regions with the highest level of incomes. Slicing the data in terms of rural and urban setting, it is shocking to see that the percentage of the poorest group in rural areas is always at least twice as much as that in urban areas. More strikingly, this difference in percentage can go up to 7-fold in the Aegean region (6.37 % of the cities are the poorest while 39.33 % in villages are the poorest) and 5-fold in the West Marmara region (7.05 % in cities versus 37.65 % in villages).

3.8.1. All Villages Equally Poor

Looking at income data form the urban-rural perspective, the most significant result is that even in regions where poverty in diminishing, increase in income is limited to urban areas. In other words, poverty increases as we go east but also as we go from urban areas to rural areas even if these areas are in the Western regions. Resultantly all villages are in a similar situation.

Income Distribution by Regions

	Poorest Segment	2nd Income Segment	Middle Income Segment	4th Income Segment Dilimi	Highest Income Segment
Turkey	16,4	44	26,65	11,06	1,9
Istanbul	3,32	35,89	35,66	21,02	4,1
Western Marmara	15,63	48,2	25,45	10,12	0,6
Aegean	14,66	44,04	30,72	9,57	1,01
Eastern Marmara	7,74	49,57	30,75	10,52	1,42
Western Anatolia	8,74	44,06	28,67	16,03	2,51
Mediterranean	20,53	48,08	21,22	9,25	0,92
Central Anatolia	21,2	47,5	21,8	7,12	2,37
Western Black Sea	11,49	54,25	22,91	7,78	3,57
Eastern Black Sea	18,33	48,56	25,05	7,29	0,77
Northeast Anatolia	36,38	35,02	22,61	5,05	0,95
Central East Anatolia	32,9	44,3	18,91	3,63	0,26
Southeast Anatolia	44,73	39,1	12,39	3,38	0,4

4. ETHNIC IDENTITY

4.1. 55 MILLION PEOPLE ARE "ETHNICALLY" TURKISH

The survey shows that people have no restraints in expressing their ethnic identity. Of the total population of 73 million, 55 million 484 thousand are ethnically Turkish. There are 11 million 445 thousand Kurds living in Turkey.

The survey that KONDA conducted for Milliyet under the direction of Tarhan Erdem brings to light critical findings regarding the ethnic identity distribution of Turkish citizens, a topic much discussed with a variety of figures.

In the survey which approximately 50.000 people were interviewed face-to-face, instead of commonly used labels, people's own terms and definitions of themselves were emphasized.

Therefore, no choices were offered on questions on identity and they were in no way guided.

4.1.1. Over 100 Responses

Interviewers were asked to write down the subject's first response. Subjects gave over 100 different responses to this question. Later on, the frequency and similarity of responses were studied and grouped together in statistically meaningful groups. The question for the most sought-after findings of the survey was formulated as follows:

"We are all Turkish citizens, but we may be from different territories and origins. What do you know or feel yourself to be?"

The table below shows the identity groups according to subjects' responses and the percentage with which these identities were uttered by subjects.

Identity Groups Used in the Survey	Total %	Identity Categories Said by Subjects	Total %
Turkish	81,33	Turk	81,33
Local Identity	1,54	Manav	0,59
		Laz	0,28
		Turkmen	0,24
		Region name in Turkey	0,22
		Yörük	0,18
		Anatolian Turkish Tribes	0,03
Asian Turk	0,08	Tatar	0,04
		Azeri	0,03
		Central Asian Turkish Tribes	0,01
Of Caucasian Origin	0,27	Circassian	0,19
		Georgian	0,08
		Chechnian	0,004
Of Balkan Origin	0,22	From Balkan countries	0,12
		Bosnian	0,06
		Bulgarian Turk	0,04
Immigrants	0,4	Migrant (<i>Muhacir</i>)	0,22
		Balkan immigrant	0,16
		Region name abroad	0,02
Muslim Turkish	1,02	Muslim	0,58
		Muslim Turkish	0,44
Alevi	0,35	Alevi	0,35
General Definitions	0,36	From Turkey (<i>Türkiyeli</i>)	0,23
		World citizen	0,12
		Ottoman	0,01
Kurdish-Zaza	9,02	Kurdish	8,61
		Zaza	0,41
Arab	0,75	Arab	0,75
Non-muslim	0,1	Armenian	0,08
		Greek (<i>Rum</i>) and Christian	0,01
		Jewish	0,004
		Assyrian (<i>Süryani</i>)	0,004
Roma	0,03	Roma	0,03
From Other Countries	0,05	European	0,02
		Other Asian	0,01
		Russian	0,01
		Iranian	0,004
		American-African	0,004
Citizen of the Republic of Turkey	4,45	Citizen of the Republic of Turkey	4,45
Total			100

4.2. How do Adults Define Themselves Ethnically?

Having included the information provided by mother tongue data as a control, the resulting figures show that adults in Turkey defined themselves as follows: 78,1 % Turkish, 13,4 % Kurdish, 1,5 % local identities such as "Laz" and "Turkmen", 0,1 % Asian Turkish, 0,3 % of Caucasian origin, 0,2 % of Balkan origin, 0,4 % immigrants, 0,9 % Muslim Turkish, 0,2 % Alevi, 0,3 % with general terms such as "I am from Turkey; I am a world citizen" etc., 0,7 % Arab, 0,1 % non-muslim, 0,03 % Roma, 0,05 % from other countries and 3,8 % as citizen of the Republic of Turkey.

As the survey was conducted only with people above the age of 18, the above percentages are for that population. The Turkish Statistics Institute (TSI) estimates the adult population for 2006 to be 48 million and 709 thousand, which means that among them 38 million 43 thousand are Turkish and 6 million 524 thousand define themselves as Kurdish. The table below summarizes the raw data, the rectified data as explained above and the corresponding adult population of ethnic groups.

However, it must be noted that for all groups less than 1 % the margin of error is rather high.

Identities	% By Identities Said by Subjects	% By Data as Rectified by KONDA	Adult Population by Data as Rectified by
Turkish	81,33	78,1	38.043
Local Identities	1,54	1,5	743
Asian Turkish	0,08	0,1	45
Of Caucasian Origin	0,27	0,3	133
Of Balkan Origin	0,22	0,2	111
Immigrants	0,4	0,4	193
Muslim Turkish	1,02	0,9	437
Alevi	0,35	0,2	77
Self-Defined in General Terms	0,36	0,3	126
Kurdish - Zaza	9,02	13,4	6.524
Arab	0,75	0,7	358
Non-muslim	0,1	0,1	51
Roma	0,03	0	17
From Other Countries	0,05	0	21
Citizen of the Republic of Turkey	4,45	3,8	1.829
Total	100	100	48.709

4.3. 15.6 % of the population in Kurdish

The percentage among the adult population who call themselves Kurdish or Zaza amounts to 13,4 %. However when the population below 18 is added to the figures, this percentage comes up to 15,6 % equaling 11 million 445 thousand.

In order to see the ethnic identity distribution of the 72 million 975 thousand, i.e. the total population of Turkey, the population below 18 must be included in the calculations with the correct proportions.

While there are "33 children for every 66 adults" in Turkey overall, this ratio is different for the Kurds whose fertility rates are known to be higher. Based on the household size data in the survey, the population growth of provinces and the age cohorts of the Kurds, it would be safe to assume this ratio to be "47 children for every 53 adults" among Kurds. The following calculations which take this approach into account show that Turks make up 55 million 484 thousand with 76 %, Kurds make up 11 million 445 thousand with 15.6 % and all other ethnic groups make up 6 million 46 thousand with 8,3 %.

The 13,4 % Kurdish-Zaza population among the adult population reaches 15,68 % in all of Turkey when the population below 18 was added.

Estimates on the Kurdish and Zaza population in Turkey have ranged between 7 and 25 million. In view of these estimates, KONDA maintains that based on its latest survey and on TSI data, the figure of 11 million 445 thousand is more realistic for the total population (children, teenagers and adults) for the Kurdish and Zaza population living in Turkey as of late 2006.

KONDA conducted a similar survey in Istanbul in 1993. In response to the question "We are all Turkish citizens, but we may be from different origins. What do you feel yourself to be?", 25,15 % had said "Muslim" or "Muslim Turkish." In this current survey, this percent is a mere 1,02 %. Even though the sample universe was Istanbul for one survey and Turkey for the other, the main reason for the sizeable difference is that in the 1993 survey, there were no questions on religious affiliation. In this current survey however, right before the identity question, the subjects were asked about their religion and sect. In other words, the subjects first provided information about their religion and sect and then for the identity question, understood that it was about an affiliation other than religion and responded knowingly. The question being understood this way has been beneficial for evaluating the ethnic structure. The Alevi group has been included in the ethnic groups as well as the religious groups as this might shed light on the debates on the definition of Alevism.

Ethnic Identity Distribution in Turkey	%
Turkish	76
Kurdish-Zaza	15,7
Turkish Origin	2,8
Arab	0,7
Self-Defined in General Terms	3,9
Others	0,8
Total	100

4.4. No Hiding of Ethnic Identity

The "No Response" rate for the ethnic identity question was the same as other questions – 2 to 3 %. This rate demonstrates that the people basically have no problem revealing their identities.

However, in an environment where the Southeastern and Kurdish problem continues some people may be heedy of revealing their identity and it was thus necessary to derive indirect information about their identity. To this end, subjects' mother tongues were taken as an indication of their ethnic identities and ethnic identity percentages were rectified accordingly. For example if a person's mother tongue is Arabic and defines himself as "Turkish," this person was considered to be "Arab" and percentages were changed according to such considerations. This also provided the chance to determine more correctly the ethnic identity of people who defined themselves as "Muslim" or "citizen of the Turkish Republic." Even though this rectification seems to be disadvantageous for the dominant identity and the dominant language, it may be said that it brings us closer to the truth about ethnic identities.

4.5. 85 % OF TURKEY SAYS "TURKISH IS MY MOTHER TONGUE"

Mother Tongue Distribution	%
Turkish	84,54
Kurdish – Zazaki	12,98
Arabic	1,38
Other	1,11

Comparing mother tongue and ethnic identity data bears importance for determining ethnic identity accurately and consistently. The mother tongue for 85 % of people living in Turkey is Turkish... Second is Kurdish and Zazaki with 13 % of the population.

Two separate questions were asked to the subjects in order to determine the mother tongue and the spoken language. These questions were: "What is your mother tongue, that is the language that you learned from you mother?" and "What language is spoken in daily life, in your family?" According to the responses to these questions, Turkish is the mother tongue for 85 % of the inhabitants of Turkey. The second most common mother tongue is Kurdish and Zazaki with 13 % and the third is Arabic, with 1,38 %. Comparing mother tongue and ethnic identity data bears importance for determining ethnic identity accurately and consistently. In our survey, some of those who stated their identity to be Turkish said their mother tongue was Kurdish (4.08 %). Also, among those whose identities were "Kurdish" or "Zaza", 8,82 % said that their mother tongue was Turkish.

Among those who identified themselves as “citizen of the Turkish Republic,” the mother tongue of 14 % of them is Kurdish or Zazaki. It is a fact that some of the Kurdish define themselves as “Turkish”, that, in other words, they have assimilated. Yet, it is obvious that ethnic identity should be determined after having resolved such discrepancies. In the part on identity, this approach has been applied with certain assumptions.

In the following tables, we can see how identities are intermingled and blended and how mother tongues have been caught up and dissolved between identities.

Language	% as Mother Tongue
Turkish	84,54
Kurdish	11,97
Zazaki	1,01
Arabic	1,38
Armenian	0,07
Greek	0,06
Jewish Languages	0,01
Balkan Languages	0,23
Caucasian Languages	0,07
Laz	0,12
Circassian	0,11
Turkic Languages	0,28
Romani language	0,01
West European Languages	0,03
Other	0,12
Total	100

Distribution of Ethnic Identities by Mother Tongue								
Identity	Turkish	Kurdish-Zazaki	Arabic	Muslim Lang.	Balkan	Caucasian-Asian	Other	Total
Turkish	94,41	4,08	0,66	0,04	0,18	0,49	0,12	100
Kurdish-Zaza	8,82	90,65	0,49	0,05				100
Citizen of Republic of Turkey	83,28	14	2,11	0,3	0,2	0,1		100
Local Identities	94,33	1,98	0,28	0		2,83	0,57	100
Muslim Turkish	86,96	11,3	0,87	0,43			0,43	100
Arab	18,24	2,35	78,82	0,59				100
Immigrants	98,89	0	0	0	1,11	0		100
Self-Defined in General Terms	67,09	25,32	3,8	2,53		1,27		100
Alevi	37,18	53,85	7,69	1,28				100
Of Caucasian Origin	66,13					33,87		100
Of Balkan Origin	73,08				23,08		3,85	100
Non-Muslim	45,83			50			4,17	100
Asian Turkish	80,95	4,76				14,29		100
From Other Countries	27,27	18,18				0	54,55	100
Roma	75	0				12,5	12,5	100
Total	85,05	12,57	1,32	0,13	0,22	0,56	0,16	100

4.6. Education Among Kurds Below Average

The survey intended to find out the different economic and social situations, the attitudes and viewpoints of people with different identities. Looking at the educational level, while in the general population, 67,4 % have less than high-school level education, this rate goes up to 78 % among the Kurds. Also the overall 9 % rate of higher-educated people, falls to 5,5 % among the Kurds. The educational level of those who define themselves with general terms and those from "other" ethnic identity groups seems to be a little better than average.

Size of Household (person)					
	1-2	3-5	6-8	9+	Toplam
Turkish	17,1	64	16,5	2,5	100
Of Turkish Origin	17,8	63,6	16,3	2,2	100
Kurdish	8,6	40,8	32,9	17,6	100
Arab	10,2	51,4	26,2	12,1	100
Self-Defined in General Terms	16,7	67,1	14,2	1,9	100
Other Ethnic Identities	16,2	64,9	16,2	2,7	100
Turkey	15,7	60,3	19,1	4,9	100

4.7. The Laz, Circassians and Immigrants

When the population below the age of 18 is added to the findings of ethnic identity distribution among adults in Turkey by subjects' responses, the population of Arabs is calculated as 550.000. The same calculation reveals that the numbers of immigrants may be 310.000, Laz 220.000, those of Caucasian origin (Circassian, Chechnian and Georgian) 210.000 and Roma people 30.000. The number of non-muslims were estimated to be 80.000. But these figures depend on very low percentages and the high margin for error in these calculations must be kept in mind.

4.7.1. The Situation of The Younger Generation

It must be taken into account that the younger generation among these groups is less keen on expressing their ethnic identity.

4.8. In the Poorest Segment, Kurdish-Zaza is the Largest Group

Regarding the income situation of ethnic identities, the Kurdish and Zaza seem to be most crowded group in the lowest income segment. Following them are the Arabs. The "other" ethnic groups seem to be in the higher income level less than average and most of them take their place in the 2nd lowest income level.

4.8.1. Kurds and Zazas

It must be noted that in the findings of the survey, the term Kurdish includes those whose have identified themselves as Zaza. While some believe that the Zaza are Kurdish, others maintain that they should be considered as completely different ethnic groups. The results show that the Zaza population is much lower than the Kurdish population and that they are different in some respects. Among the adult population in Turkey, those who feel themselves to be Kurdish make up 8,61 % of the population, those identifying themselves as Zaza make up 0,41 %. Examining the Kurdish and Zaza population together, the Zaza make up 4,5 % of this group. The table below summarizes, with approximate percentages, their differing situation and viewpoints.

	KURDS	ZAZAS
Their Religious Sects	4/10 Hanafi, 4/10 Shafii, 1/10 Alevi	2/10 Hanafi, 6/10 Shafii, 2/10 Alevi
Social Security Status	3/10 have no security	2/10 have no security
"Southeastern or Kurdish problem is due to Provocation of Foreign Countries"	% 45 agree	% 57 agree
Would vote for CHP if elections were tomorrow	5%	11%
Would vote for DTP if elections were tomorrow	23%	12%

4.9. Kurds and Arabs are Poorer and Live in More Crowded Households

Looking at the household size among various ethnic groups, one can see that the Kurds and Arabs live in more crowded households. 17,6 % of Kurds and 12,1 % of Arabs seem to be living in households with 9 or more people.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME (YTL)						
	Poorest segment	2nd income segment	Mid-level income segment	4th income segment	Highest income segment	Total
Turkish	15,7	43,8	27,1	11,5	1,9	100
Turkish Origin	15,2	41,1	28,8	12,5	2,5	100
Kurdish	23,8	44,1	22,7	8,2	1,2	100
Arab	21,9	49,4	20,2	6,9	1,7	100
Self-Defined in General Terms	17,3	43,5	25,8	10	3,4	100
Other Ethnic Identities	16,7	53,1	24,9	4,8	0,5	100
Turkey	17,1	43,9	26,2	10,9	1,9	100

4.10. Comparing the Findings with Censuses From 1927 to 1965: The Figures Match the Historical Development

In the 7 censuses that the State Statistics Institute (former name of Turkish Statistics Institute) conducted from 1927 to 1965, the "mother tongue" and "second language spoken" were questions asked to citizens. Those saying "My mother tongue is Kurdish" or "My second language is Kurdish" during these 7 censuses made up 8,07 % at the lowest and 9,88 % at the highest – and Zaza speakers are not included in these figures. Doubtlessly, as these censuses were conducted by the state's civil servants, some people have again not responded to the question and hidden their identities.

In KONDA's survey for Milliyet, those whose "mother tongue" or "second language known" is Kurdish make up 11,97 % of the adult population. And in the ethnic identity question, 8,61 % of the population have defined themselves as Kurdish. As can be seen, the findings of our survey are consistent with the historical development.

Kurdish Speakers According to 7 Censuses			
	Kurdish (1000)	Population (1000)	Percent (%)
1927 SSI	1184	13629	8,69
1935 SSI	1595	16157	9,87
1945 SSI	1594	18790	8,48
1950 SSI	2070	20947	9,88
1955 SSI	1942	24065	8,07
1960 SSI	2317	27755	8,35
1965 SSI	2817	31391	8,98
2007 KONDA	8735	72975	11,97

4.11. 3 Million Turks and Kurds Relatives Through Marriage

The social fabric of Turkey is not mere percentages of religious and ethnic identities. A focus on marriages between ethnic identities demonstrates that marriages between the Turks and the Kurdish-Zaza makes up for 3,7 % of the population. In other words, 2 million 708 thousand Kurdish people have Turkish relatives (meaning also that that many Turkish people have Kurdish relatives). So 2 million 708 people have kinship in their family due to a Turkish-Kurdish marriage. Also between Turks and "other" ethnic groups, 3,6 % or 2 million 611 thousand people seem to have kinship through marriage. As for kinship through marriage between Kurdish-Zaza and "other" ethnic groups, it makes up 0,5 % of the population or 353 thousand people. These kinship relations denote that the social fabric of Turkey is formed by intermingling relationships between different group living together, marrying one another and creating a common culture.

5. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

5.1.4.5 million say "I am Alevi"

According to the survey data, the Alevi population corresponds to 2 million 895 thousand people among adults. When the population under 18 is included in the calculation, the number of Alevis in all of Turkey comes to 4.5 million.

Conducted for Milliyet under the direction of Tarhan Erdem, KONDA's survey aimed to reveal with scientific data the distribution of religious and sect affiliations in Turkey.

Examining people's responses to the question of which religion and sect they felt affiliated with, one can see that 99 % of the population is Muslim and by sect, 82 % are Sunnite Hanafi and 5,73 % are Alevi-Shiite.

Accordingly the commonly guessed Alevi population equals 2 million and 895 thousand people among adults. If the population below the age of 18 is added to the adults, one reaches the conclusion that the total Alevi population in Turkey nears 5 million (4 million and 587 thousand). Another remarkable finding is that 9.06 of the population are Sunnite Shafii.

Region	%
Istanbul	34,1
Western Marmara	23,2
Aegean	14,2
Eastern Marmara	6,8
Western Anatolia	6,3
Mediterranean	5,1
Central Anatolia	3,6
Western Black Sea	2
Eastern Black Sea	1,7
Northest Anatolia	1,6
Central East Anatolia	1,3
Southeast Anatolia	
Total	100

A Third of Alevis in Istanbul

5.1.1. Geographical Distribution

The geographical distribution of Alevis is quite different than what is commonly known by conviction / what we have learn to recite. A third of them living in Istanbul, Alevis also densely populate Central Eastern Anatolia (Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Tunceli, Bitlis, Hakkari, Muşi, Van) and the Mediterranean region. When asked how long they have been living where they currently live, it is revealed that

the Alevi population is much more mobile than the rest of Turkey. Out of 10 people in Turkey, six live where they were born. For Alevis, this figure is 4 out of 10. In other words, six out of every 10 Alevis do not live in their hometown.

Although the economic and social situation of Alevis is not very different than the rest of society, their opinions on some matters are. They have been living in the same place for shorter time periods and they feel less settled than others. While they own less property where they live, they have more property in their hometowns.

View of Sect on Marriage with Someone from Another Religion, Ethnic Background or Country

	Your Future Daughter-In-Law, Son-In-Law or Spouse								
	From Another Religion			From Another Ethnicity			From Another Country		
	Can Be	Maybe	Cannot Be	Can Be	Maybe	Cannot Be	Can Be	Maybe	Cannot Be
Sunni Hanafi	28,6	10,9	60,5	40	13,7	46,3	30,2	10,7	59,1
Suni Shafii	36,8	8	55,3	60,7	11	28,2	38	9	53
Alevi	63,4	10,1	26,5	66,3	12,3	21,4	61	9,9	29,1

Other People Can Live Their Identity Freely	Yes	Have Some Problems	Have Legal Obstacles	Have Social Obstacle	Total
Sunni Hanafi	57,7	30,7	7,0	4,6	100
Suni Shafii	36,7	36,8	21,4	5,1	100
Alevi	20,9	43,6	25,7	9,7	100

5.1.2. Open to Other Groups

Compared both to other religious and ethnic identities, Alevi prove to be the most open-minded group about their prospective daughter-in-law, son-in-law or spouse being from another religion, sect, background or country. Among Alevis, 63,4 % say that "their prospective daughter-in-law, son-in-law or spouse" can be "from another religion"; 66,3 % say they can be "from another ethnic background"; and 61 % say they can be "from another country."

Regional Distribution of Religious Faith Groups	Istanbul	Western Marmara	Aegean	Eastern Marmara	Western Anatolia	Mediterranean	Central Anatolia	Western Black Sea	Eastern Black Sea	Northest Anatolia	Central East Anatolia	Southeast Anatolia	Total
Sunni Hanafi	15	4,2	14	9,5	11	14	7	7	6	3,6	2,8	7,5	100
Sunni Shafii	11	0,3	4	2	2,6	6,9	1	0		12	21,5	38,9	100
Sunni other	32	8,8	8,8	12	12	12	2	2		6,6		3,3	100
Alevi	34	1,3	6,8	2	5,1	14	2	4		1,7	23,2	6,3	100
Nusayri	4,2	4,2		4,2	8,3	71				8,3			100
Shiite	9,8		1,2	4,3		1,2	2			79	0,6	2,4	100

Other Muslim	16	21	23	8,9	6,6	4,6	5	9	5	0,8	0,6	0,4	100
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Size of Household	1-2	3-5	6-8	9+	Total
Sunni Hanafi	16,7	62,7	17,3	3,3	100
Sunni Shafii	5,7	39,1	32,9	22,3	100
Sunni other	16,3	64,0	16,3	3,5	100
Alevi	13,3	65,0	19,5	2,2	100
Nusayri	14,3	57,1	28,6	0,0	100
Shiite	13,0	50,8	32,2	4,0	100
Other Muslim	18,8	61,3	18,0	1,9	100
Christian and Jewish	46,7	46,7	6,7	0,0	100
Other	36,2	55,2	3,8	4,8	100

5.2. In Distress About Exercising Their Beliefs

On the other hand, while 53 % of Alevis state that they can freely live their identity, it is noteworthy that only 20,9 % agree that others can live their identity freely. Holding such differing views about themselves and about others demonstrates that they prefer to express their own distress through others. Alevis seems to be the group facing the most difficulty in living their own identity. Moreover, 89,6 % of Alevis approve of state support to ethnic groups and 90,5 % to religious groups. While being a muslim is viewed as a prerequisite for citizenship in most groups, Alevis disagree, with only 27,1 % saying it is a prerequisite.

EXPERT VIEW

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Why are data on Alevis so different?

One of the interesting findings of the survey is that the percentage saying they are Alevi-Shiite is rather low (5,7 %). In order to better evaluate this finding, It will be beneficial to examine other research. Two previous surveys conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak for TESEV in 1999 and 2006 are available. When religious identity and sect affiliation are asked directly, 3,9 % of the subjects in 1999 and 6,1 % of the subjects in 2006 state that they are Alevi. Moreover, the 2006 survey with a few additional questions reaches the conclusion that in fact 11,4 % of subjects might be Alevi. Obviously, various studies present different figures about Alevis. We may explain this situation as follows:

- First of all, the method, the sample and the way the questions are posed are critical in such surveys on sensitive subjects. Each of these effects the validity and reliability of the findings.
- Secondly, an important part of Alevis are heedy about exposing their identity publicly. As the survey has also demonstrated, the dominant religious identity in Turkey is the Sunnite Hanafism. Also, Hanafism is heavily supported by the state on an institutional basis. This situation causes Alevis to be subjected to pressure, discrimination and exclusion in numerous ways and thus prevents them from comfortably voicing their identity. As a matter of fact, the survey itself has revealed that those living their identity freely is lowest among Alevis.
- Thirdly, the survey shows that Alevis are highly mobile, that a third of them live in Istanbul, that their households are quite small and that the educational level has risen. These findings point to urbanisation of Alevis. The indifferent and relatively freer environment of larger cities cause religious and denominational identities to become de-emphasized from time to time.
- Fourthly, in public spaces where the citizenship-based values of the republic are deeply-rooted, Alevis feel no need to stress their own identities. In other words, Alevis and Sunnites have created a common culture of existence in which the fundamental values of the republic are upheld. Alevis believe that any strong emphasis on their own identity may harm this common culture of existence. For this reason, they are especially reluctant to emphasize their identity.

5.3. The Poorest Religious Group is the Shafii

Shafiis make up the largest sect after the Hanafis. Not only are their educational and income levels below average, but a third of them are also in the lowest income group.

The economic and social situation of the Shafiis is quite noticeable as their level of education, the size of their households and their household income are behind the society's average.

The percentage of those with higher education is merely 4.5 % among the Shafiis. 40 % of the Shafiis are in the lowest income group. Shafiis with no social security or having a Green Card are 62.4 %. Households with 9 or more people make up 22.3 % of the Shafii population. Among the Kurdish Shafiis, this percentage goes up to 27.57 %. However, quite interestingly, the size of household decreases, not as income increases but as level of education increases.

Owning less property than the rest of society, Shafiis are also more willing to move than the nation's average. Shafiis are quite open to the idea of daughter- or son-in-law having a different identity. Only half (54.5 %) of the Shafiis think that they can live their identity freely. They strongly believe in state support for ethnic and religious groups with 91 % and 92.8 % rate of approval respectively.

Income Distribution By Sect	Less Than 300 YTL	301-700 YTL	701-1200 YTL	1201-3000 YTL	3000+ YTL
Sunni Hanafi	15,3	45,1	26,6	11,0	1,9
Sunni Shafii	31,0	39,1	21,5	7,3	1,1
Sunni other	5,6	35,2	29,6	29,6	0,0
Alevi	16,8	38,5	31,2	11,8	1,7
Nusayri	0,0	42,9	57,1	0,0	0,0
Shiite	41,6	28,0	24,2	5,0	1,2
Other Muslim	8,7	47,6	29,7	12,7	1,2
Christian and Jewish	0,0	40,0	40,0	12,0	8,0
Other	2,1	25,5	25,5	41,5	5,3

5.4. Cause of Poverty Not Their Sect

In debates on sects, it is often claimed that not only Alevis but also non-Hanafite Sunnites are also subject to exclusion. The data on Shafiis, the largest sect after Hanafis, might be interpreted by some people as findings which imply that truthfulness of this claim. However, in the three eastern regions where 72 % of the Shafiis live, lack of education, low income, regional underdevelopment are so very intermingled that it is impossible to base differences on sects. Even though the survey did not aim to figure out whether differing viewpoints within the Sunni sect

existed, it showed that both the Hanafis and the Shafiis are quite devout and that Sunnism plays a unifying role.

Education Attainment by Sect	Less than HighSchool	Vocational School or High School	University or College
Sunni Hanafi	67,5	23,7	8,8
Sunni Shafii	79,1	16,4	4,5
Sunni other	57,0	24,4	18,6
Alevi	63,3	27,1	9,6
Nusayri	42,9	28,6	28,6
Shiite	73,7	21,1	5,1
Other Muslim	63,4	26,3	10,3
Christian and Jewish	43,3	46,7	10,0
Other	13,5	34,6	51,9

What are the two Sunnite sects of Hanafism and Shafism?

Two of the four "Ahl ul-Sunna" schools of Islam, Hanafi and Shafii sects differ in daily life practices, such as matter on what annuls ablution. The information provided by te Meydan Larousse encyclopedia is summarized as follows:

Hanafism: Founded by Al-Imam al Azam Abu Hanifah. His followers Abu Yusuf Yakub Muhammed İbn-ül-Hasan-üş-Şeybani (died 805) ve İmam Abu Yusuf, have been more influential its becoming a school. Developing mostly in Iraq, it became the principle fiqh school of the state during the Abbasi rule. It spread east and improved in Khorasan and Mawara'un Nahr. Although it became less influential when the Abbasi state collapsed, with the Ottomans it regained . Today Turks in Turkey and the Balkan countries, muslims of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Acara, Greece, Poland, Bulgaria and Rumenia, Circassians and Georgians of the Caucaus, Daghistani Turks and Turk os Northern Caucasia are almost all Hanafi.

Shafism: Founded y Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Idris Shafii (767-820). It has spread predominantly among the muslims of Eygpt, Iran, Iraq, Indonesian islands, Sri Lanka, Indochina and Australia. There are also followers of this sect in the east of Anatolia, in Daghistan and some regions of Central Asia. The predominance of the Shafii sect in the Eygptian region began following the collapse of the Fatimis with the Ayyubid rule. During the Mamluk period Sultan Zahir Baibars appointed qadi's from all four schools but Shafii dominance lasted. In the Ottoman period, Mehmed Ali Pasha's rule accepted Hanafism as the official state sect but Shafism continued among the people.

5.5. Out of Every 10 Alevis, 6 are Turkish and 2 Kurdish-Zaza

Interesting data on the relationship between faith groups and ethnic background were also obtained. 72 % of society consists of Hanefi Turks. Among the Alevis, 61,2 % are Turkish, 22 % are Kurdish or Zaza, 7,8 % are of Turkish origin.

So what about the relationship between other sects and ethnic groups? Although sects and ethnic identities seems to be closely related, any sect seems to be comprised of people from various ethnic background and similarly any ethnic groups has members from different religious sects. For example,, 61,2 % the Alevi are Turkish, 22 % are Kurdish or Zaza, 7,8 % are of Turkish origin and the rest from other ethnic origins.

Distribution of Religious Faith Groups by Ethnic Identity					
Religious faiths	Turkish	Those of Turkish Origin	Kurdish – Zaza	Arab	Other
Sunni Hanafi	87,8	3,32	3,16	0,22	0,56
Sunni Shafii	32,68	0,9	58,43	4,17	0,25
Sunni other	76,74	4,65	8,14	3,49	3,49
Alevi	61,19	7,85	22,1	2,74	0,18
Nusayri	33,33	16,67	0	45,83	0
Shiite	91,19	1,89	3,14	0	1,89
Other Muslim	88,14	5,72	0,64	0	2,54
Christian and Jewish	26,67	0	10	0	63,33
Other	65,42	3,74	18,69	0	5,61

Distribution of Ethnic Groups by Religious Faiths					
Religious faiths	Turkish	Those of Turkish Origin	Kurdish – Zaza	Arab	Other
Sunni Hanafi	88,78	80,66	28,66	24,4	67,11
Sunni Shafii	3,59	2,38	57,51	49,4	3,29
Sunni other	0,36	0,53	0,35	1,79	1,97
Alevi	3,69	11,39	11,96	17,86	1,32
Nusayri	0,04	0,53	0	6,55	0
Shiite	0,8	0,4	0,25	0	1,97
Other Muslim	2,29	3,58	0,15	0	7,89
Christian and Jewish	0,04	0	0,15	0	12,5
Other	0,39	0,53	0,99	0	3,95
Total	100	100	100	100	100

5.5.1. 58,43 % of Shafiis are Kurdish-Zaza

The Shafii population is 58,43 % Kurdish or Zaza, 32,68 % Turkish, 4,17 % Arabic and the remaining percentage from other ethnic backgrounds. These figures demonstrate a close tie between being Shafii and being Kurdish.

Sunni Hanafis who represent 82 % of society appear to be the most comfortable group about living their own identity. 87,2 % of them have replied this question positively. This group seems to be a bit stricter regarding other issues. Sunni Hanafis are more opposed than average to the idea of their daughter- or son-in-law being

from a different religion, sect, ethnic background or country. Sunn Hanafis also less approving of the state supporting ethnic and religious groups.

5.5.2. 72 % of Society Hanafi Turkish

Examining religious identities collectively, one remarkable observation is that viewpoints seems to differ not only on religion but on feeling settled, on the prerequisites of citizenship and on the Southeast and Kurdish question.

In any case, we may say that people seems to be devote to their religion, to uphold religious values but without manifesting conservatism in a negative sense. For example the fact that people are more open to a daughter- or son-in-law from a different ethnic background than to one from a different religion implies that religion is sincerely valued.

72,2 % of the society is Hanafi Turkish. With the remaining 27,8 % belonging to a myriad of different religious and ethnic background, it is rather difficult to argue that the social fabric of the population is not a colorful one.

5.6. The Majority is Devout but not Conservative

Considering the relationship between identity, religion and the state, one can see the emphasis of religious faith in social life. For example, 54 % of the population says "Being a Muslim is a prerequisite of being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey." Similarly, the majority of society (76 %) are in favor of the state supporting religious groups.

In defining themselves, religion and/or sect once again comes up, as one of the two most prominent aspects of identity. Here, religion is more valued as a marker of identity than place of birth, ethnic background or profession. However, this emphasis on religion should be interpreted "devotion to religion" and not as "conservatism" or "reclusion." Because even if only one in a hundred marriages is between sects (this data based on question on mother and father's religious and sect), one in three people say that their future daughter-, son-in-law or spouse "can be from a different religion or sect."

6. MIGRATION

6.1. Highest Number of Kurds live in Istanbul

According to the Turkish Statistics Institute, 11,622,000 people live in Istanbul. Based on KONDA's calculations on the survey data, Kurds and Zazas in Istanbul number 1,571,000. Considering Diyarbakır's population (677,000 according to TSI, KONDA's calculation shows the number of Kurds and Zazas in this city to be 618,00. The level of the Kurdish population in Istanbul is a striking data demonstrating the high percentage of ethnic mixing among society and how inseparable ethnic groups are.

6.2. A Third of the Population Has Moved with Migration

Only 62 % of the subjects still live in their place of birth. This means that 38 % of the population has migrated at least once. 13 % have moved within the last 10 years.


Population mobility as a result of migration highly influences the social structure. The society can not only move about easily but also shape its identity by this ability to move. As with the following statements, it is possible to view an incredible circulation of the population that is not unique to Turks. Migration which itself can be based on a myriad of reasons becomes an influential factor the notions of homeland and compatriotism (*hemşehrilik*) as well as perceptions of identity and citizenship.

6.3. Istanbulites Make up 28 % of Istanbul

One piece of information we were looking forward to extract from the survey was how many people still lived where they were born or from another perspective which regions received the least migration. Looking at those who state the same region for their place of residence and place of birth, Eastern Black Sea (96,54 %) and Southeastern Anatolia (95,35 %) seem to have the highest rates. It can be said that these two regions do not seem to have received any migration, not at least in the last 50 years. It is also not difficult to guess that Istanbul is the most cosmopolitan region, with the highest immigration rates. A mere 28,45 % of Istanbul inhabitants were born in Istanbul.


Distribution of Istanbul Residents by Place of Birth	%
Istanbul	28,45
Western Marmara	3,47
Aegean	2,14
Eastern Marmara	3,63
Western Anatolia	2,37
Mediterranean	3,20
Central Anatolia	7,45
Western Black Sea	14,25

Eastern Black Sea	10,99
Northeast Anatolia	8,03
Central East Anatolia	7,21
Southeast Anatolia	6,06
Abroad	2,73




6.4. 62 % Live in Their Homeland

Among the subjects representing the whole of Turkey 62.03 % have been living in the same place since birth. About 25 % have been living where they live for the past 10 years or longer. 6.10 % came to their current residence in the past 5 to 10 years and for 6.97 % this time period is less than 5 years. According to this data, 13 % of the population in Turkey have moved within the last ten years. Another important finding is that 45.03 % of society have some sort of property in their homeland. This implies that people in Turkey still have strong ties with their place of birth.




Own property in place of residence?		Own property in place of birth?	
Yes	No	Yes	No
62,09	37,91	45,03	54,97



6.5. People Feel They Belong Where They Were Born

The mobility of the population leads to surprising findings about where people feel like they belong. 59.47 % of people define themselves as belonging to, as coming from their place of birth and not their place of residence. When Istanbul inhabitants are asked "Where are you from?", 68 % of them will say they are from outside of Istanbul, from their hometown. The majority of people in West Marmara (64.10%) and Western Black Sea (66.08 %) regions will identify themselves with their place of birth. In a similar survey conducted by KONDA in 1993 only 17 % defined themselves as Istanbulites. Thirteen years later, the self-claimed Istanbulites in this survey have risen to 24.15 % (even though 28.45 % are born in Istanbul).

Responses to "Where Are You From Originally?"	Place of Residence	Place of Birth	3rd place
Turkey	36,71	59,47	2,81
Southeast Anatolia	43,11	53,69	1,35
Central East Anatolia	45,53	51,52	1,44
Northeast Anatolia	53,88	42,82	0,85
Eastern Black Sea	44,21	55,51	0,19
Western Black Sea	31,62	66,08	1,49
Central Anatolia	41,40	56,01	1,96
Mediterranean	35,58	62,44	1,51
Western Anatolia	38,21	55,91	3,92
Eastern Marmara	41,80	54,85	2,31
Aegean	36,77	60,37	2,17
Western Marmara	33,73	64,10	1,72
Istanbul	24,15	68,08	6,90



6.6.21 % of the Society Would Like to Move

Although it seems that in some regions only people who were born there are living there, there seems to be a social problem of "not being able to settle" due to several reasons.

10.47 % do not consider themselves to be settled; 28.37 % clearly do not wish their children to settle in the same place; and 21.2 % openly declare that they would be willing to migrate. These data demonstrate that the society has serious problems of settling, or in other words of "habitat."

Young people with university education stand out as the most mobile segment. Of these, 24.78 % of young women and 21.33 % of young men have been in the same place for 5 years or less. Those with secondary education or less seem to be more settled. The more settled, the more people want their children to stay. But still, all groups envision the future of children elsewhere, not where they live. The replies of "Do Not Want Children to Settle Here" and "Can Settle Depending on Conditions" are


lowest among people aged 44 or older. This percentage is highest however among well-educated people less than 29. In this group, women saying "Do Not Want Children to Settle Here" and "Can Settle Depending on Conditions" is 64 % and men saying the same is 61 %.

The desire to move decreases as age increases and decreases as education increases. In response to the question "Would you like to move away from here from this city?", 35.38 % of young well-educated women and 36.27 % of young well-educated men answer "yes".

No regional difference seems evident for "feeling settled." Those who least consider themselves to be settled live in Central East Anatolia (15.88 %) and Istanbul (% 13.60).

Central East Anatolia (36.18 %) and West Marmara (32.70 %) are the two regions which have the highest percentage of people who clearly do not wish their children to settle in the same place. Those who would like to migrate in the future are highest in Northeastern Anatolian (34.86 %) and Central Anatolia (28.58 %) regions.

Outlook on and Acceptance of Place of Residence	Yes	No	Depends on Conditions
Wants to Move in the Future	21,2	29,37	46,69
Wants Children to Settle in Same Place	47,26	28,37	24,37
Feels Settled	87,17	10,74	0



6.7. Out of every thousand people, 373 have migrated

Most striking findings of the survey are on migration:

The first finding is that out of every 1000 adult, 627 of them still live where they were born but 373 have migrated elsewhere. In other words, a third of the population do not live in their place of birth. The second important finding is that out of the 373 people who have moved at some point, 243 came to their current place of residence 10 years before or even earlier, 60 came 5 to 10 years ago and 69 of them came in the past 5 years or later. The third crucial finding is that 254 of the 373 people still identify themselves as belonging to their place of birth. In other words, when asked "Where are you from?" they still quote their hometown's name. Most notably, among the 243 who have moved 10 years ago or earlier, 160 of them still do not feel they belong where they live; their hearts still lie in their hometown.

1000 persons	Where They Feel They Are From			
How Long They Have Lived There	Place of Residence	Place of Birth	3rd Place	Total
5 - Years	15	50	3	69
6-10 Years	15	43	2	60
10+ Years	76	160	7	243
Total of Thosed Moved	106	254	13	373
Since Birth	0	613	14	627
Grand Total	106	867	27	1000

7. DEFINING CITIZENSHIP

7.1. The Primary Prerequisite of Citizenship: LOVING TURKEY

A most remarkable finding of the survey was the view on bond of citizenship. 82 % of the subjects said that loving Turkey is a prerequisite for being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Ethnic background was the prerequisite stated the least.

In the "social fabric" survey conducted for Milliyet's "Who Are We?" series, astonishing data was obtained regarding which factors would count as a bond of citizenship to the Republic of Turkey. A majority of the subjects place "Loving Turkey" above all other proposed prerequisites for citizenship. Regarding bond of citizenship, a heavily argued subject these days, the following question was posed:

Some people say that the following are prerequisites to truly be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Some people say that they are not. In your opinion, are each of the following a must or not?

- *Is it a prerequisite to be ethnically Turkish?*
- *Is it a prerequisite to claim one is from Turkey, regardless of ethnic background?*
- *Is it a prerequisite to be a Muslim?*
- *Is it a prerequisite to love Turkey?*

Which of the following are prerequisites for being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey?

Being Ethnically Turkish			Saying "I am from Turkey"			Being muslim			Loving Turkey		
Is a Prerequisite	Neither	Not a Prerequisite	Is a Prerequisite	Neither	Not a Prerequisite	Is a Prerequisite	Neither	Not a Prerequisite	Is a Prerequisite	Neither	Not a Prerequisite
45,64	9,85	44,51	63,80	11,49	24,71	54,31	10,03	35,66	82,00	6,52	11,49

7.2. The Primary Prerequisite is Loving Turkey

As seen in the graph, 82 % of the public believes that loving Turkey is a prerequisite for being a Turkish citizen. 63.88 % think that claiming one is from Turkey, regardless of ethnic background, is a must; 54.31 % believe that one must be a Muslim; and 45.64 % believe that one must be being ethnically Turkish. Revealed here is the fact that this country's people prefer to emphasize feelings and beliefs rather than background. Of those who view ethnic background and religious belief as prerequisites for citizenship, most of them have an educational level below secondary school. All our people love their country without stressing ethnic identity and this love seems to be the prerequisite of bond of citizenship.

View on bond of citizenship by gender	Being Ethnically Turkish		Saying "I am from Turkey"		Being muslim		Loving Turkey	
	Is a Prerequisite	Not a Prerequisite	Is a Prerequisite	Not a Prerequisite	Is a Prerequisite	Not a Prerequisite	Is a Prerequisite	Not a Prerequisite
Female	47,72	42,26	62,90	25,14	57,13	33,05	80,93	12,01
Male	43,88	46,43	64,54	24,40	51,85	37,95	82,98	10,98

7.3. Bond of Citizenship According to Background

Breaking down the responses by ethnic background reveals different results. While people of Turkish origin largely disagree that being ethnically Turkish is a must for citizenship (only 29 % agree), they agree with others on the other proposed prerequisites.

Arabs think like the rest of society in other issues, but when it comes to the prerequisite of being ethnically Turkish they mostly disagree. 29,8 % of Arabs who view ethnic Turkishness as a condition for citizenship. Kurds agree with the society at large regarding muslimness as a prerequisite for citizenship but they think differently about ethnic background. 76,3 % of Kurds think that being ethnically Turkish is not a prerequisite of citizenship and 40,3 % of them think of saying "I am from Turkey" regardless of ethnic background as a prerequisite. As for loving Turkey, 52,5 % of Kurds view it as a must. Those who least view muslimness as a condition are the remaining ethnic groups. Only 38,5 % identifying themselves in these groups say that it is a must.

Which of the following are prerequisites for being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey? (Distribution by ethnic background)

	Being Ethnically Turkish is a Prerequisite	Saying "I am from Turkey" is a Prerequisite	Being muslim is a Prerequisite	Loving Turkey is a Prerequisite
Turkish	48,6	66,6	54,6	84,9
Turkish background*	46,8	63,7	58,9	82,8
Kurdish / Zaza	14,6	39,2	51,3	52,5
Arab	29,8	63,1	55,7	80,0
Self-defined in general terms	50,5	63,2	53,8	82,3
Others	29,5	57,9	38,5	69,4
All of Turkey	45,8	64,2	54,4	82,2

* Balkan, Caucasian migrants etc. ** World citizen etc. *** Greek, Armenian etc.

Definition of Citizenship According to the Constitution

The 66th article of the "Political Rights and Duties" chapter of the constitution of Turkey defines Turkish citizenship as follows: "Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk."

8. ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE STATE

One of the significant findings of the survey focused on peoples views on whether the state should or should not provide support so that ethnic groups are protected and citizens are allowed to exercise the religious beliefs as they wish. The following questions were posed:

Should the state support ethnic groups so that they can protect their customs and traditions?

Should the state provide support so that citizens can freely exercise their religious beliefs according to their own rules and manner of worship?

Our people have approached the question of state support for other groups quite tolerantly (Once this question is asked for a specific group, this approach changes). State support to ethnic groups is approved by 66,58 % and to religious groups by 76,45 %. Women have been more approving than the general public. As education increases and age decreases, state support is further promoted. Support to religious groups is more acceptable than to ethnic groups.

Should the State Support the Protection of Different Identities?				
	Support to Ethnic Groups		Support to Religious Groups	
	In Favor	Against	In Favor	Against
Turkey	66,58	33,42	76,45	23,55
Female	69,96	30,04	78,75	21,25
Male	63,84	36,16	74,63	25,37

8.1. Support to Ethnic Groups by Region

Studied by region, support to religious groups is more acceptable than support to ethnic groups. State support to ethnic groups is accepted by 90,72 % in the Central East Anatolian region (Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Tunceli, Bitlis, Hakkari, Muş and Van provinces) and by 86,30 % in the Southeast Anatolian region, but only 46,02 % in the Eastern Black Sea region and 50,22 % in the Aegean region.

View on State-Citizen Relationship by Ethnic Background				
	Should Support Ethnic Groups	Should Not Support Ethnic Groups	Should Support Religious Groups	Should Not Support Religious Groups
All of Turkey	66,4	33,6	76,4	23,6
Others	82,8	17,2	83,3	16,7
Self-defined in general terms	69,9	30,1	76,3	23,7
Arab	81,2	18,8	84	16
Kurdish and Zaza	96,3	3,7	95,7	4,3
Turkish background	66,6	33,4	77,1	22,9
Turkish	62,9	37,1	74,4	25,6

8.2. Percentage of Acceptance of State Support

Views on state support also change according to people's ethnic identities. While Kurds almost unanimously endorse state support for ethnic and religious groups, Turks are least in favor of this. Support to ethnic groups is accepted mostly by Kurds (96.3 %), then other ethnic groups (82,8 %), then Arabs (81,2 %), then those who use general terms instead of any ethnic affiliation (69,9 %), then those of Turkish origins such as migrants from the Balkans and Caucasian regions (66,6 %) and least by Turkish people (62,9 %).

9. EXPRESSION OF IDENTITIES

9.1. The Majority Says "I am from Turkey First and Foremost"

The subjects were offered seven choices for expressing their identity. 59.14 % of them stated that they would rather be identified as "from Turkey." Religion and set was the second choice after this with 42.11 %. Ethnic background was fourth however, with 13.96 %.

In the survey that was conducted in 3000 locations all over Turkey with a staff of over 1500 people, 47,958 people were interviewed face-to-face. The aspects people prefer or stress more when defining their own identities for this "social fabric" survey bears a lot of significance.

In order to extract this data, the subjects were presented the following options and asked which ones they would prefer to use when expressing their own identity:

- City or village of birth
- Being from Turkey (*Türkiyelilik*)
- Gender
- Ethnic background
- Religion/sect
- Age group (young/old)
- Attire
- Profession

We presented these options to the subjects one by one and asked how important they thought they were.

9.1.1. Religion Ranks Second

A most significant finding in this section is that in all demographic segments, "religion" receives more emphasis than "ethnic background." Thus in Turkey expressing one's religion is more important than expressing one's ethnicity. However, in all groups, "being from Turkey" stood out as the most important identity element. It must be noted that this finding fits perfectly with the finding that "loving Turkey" came up as the most important prerequisite for "being a citizen of the Turkish Republic."

Following "being from Turkey" were the responses "religioun", "city or village of birth", "ethnic background" and "gender." "One's age group" and "one's attire" were the least important identity elements.

When this data is sliced into educational segments, "being from Turkey" still seems to be an important element for those with less than high school education. However, for this group "religion-sect" is the most important identity element.

9.1.2. Place of Birth Important

The subjects were also asked for a second most important identity element among the choices. This method allowed to extract not only their preferences but also their tendencies. According to this question, "being from Turkey" (59,14 %) and "religion-sect" (42,11 %) were the two most important identity elements. "One's city or village of birth" fell slightly behind "religion-sect" with 40.78 %.

Who defines his/her identity with what?	Turkey	Women	Men
Being from Turkey	59,14	54,20	59,56
Religion-Sect	42,11	42,12	39,45
City or Village of Birth	40,78	39,77	38,95
Ethnic Background	13,96	12,82	14,02
Profession	11,46	9,44	12,50
Gender	7,74	8,10	6,89
Attire	2,52	2,95	2,02
Age Group	2,15	2,29	1,89

9.1.3. Ethnic Background Not in First Three

Another remarkable finding was that "ethnic background" was not among the first three identity elements and preferred only by one thirds of the first three (13,96 %). For this country's people, "ethnic background" is only as important as an identity element as "one's profession." Women quoted "being from Turkey" (54,20 %) and "religion-sect" (42,12 %) as the first two important elements. Women identify themselves by their place of birth by 39,77 % and the significance they place on "ethnic background" seems to be the same as for the general public (12,82 %). As for men, the identity elements rank as follows: "being from Turkey" (59,56 %), "religion-sect" (39,45 %), "city or village of birth" (38,95 %) and "ethnic background" (14,02 %).

9.2. Ethnic Background Stands Out in Two Regions

In Southeast Anatolia and Central East Anatolia, it was "ethnic background" and not "being from Turkey" that stood out as the most important identity element.

In Istanbul, West Marmara, Aegean, West Anatolian, Central Anatolian and Western Black Sea regions, "being from Turkey" and "religious-sect" were the two most important elements.

However in the Eastern Marmara, Mediterranean, East Black Sea and Northeast Anatolian regions, the second most important identity was "one's place of birth" after "being from Turkey."

9.2.1. Regions Saying "Religion"

The regions where "religion-sect" surpasses "being from Turkey"--that is, where the percentage for religion is the highest-- are Central Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia. Regions where "ethnic background" was cited as the most important identity element were Central Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia.

9.2.2. Kurds and "being from Turkey"

Dividing the data by ethnic identity, there are significant differences in ranking. "Being from Turkey" which ranks first overall falls to third place among the Kurds. For this group, the most important identity element is "ethnic background" with 81,4 %. "Religion-sect" is just as important as ethnic background for Kurds at 81 %. As with the general population, "religion-sect" is the second ranking identity element among ethnic groups following "being from Turkey." "Religion" comes before "being from Turkey" for Arabs and ranks first. Ethnic background is most important for Kurds (81,4 %) and Arabs (78,8 %).

9.3. An Unostentacious Patriotism

People's emphasis on being from Turkey and on religion-sect was one of the most interesting findings. As ethnic background is relatively low in preference and in percentage and as "being from Turkey" ranks first, this can be evaluated as an indication that people have patriotic feelings in which pretention and showing off are down-played.

Noticeable and worthy of an explanation here is the emphasis on "being from Turkey." The survey contained no detailed question about what subjects understood of the term "being from Turkey." While this survey had to suffice with subjects' responses, new research into and more detailed information about this issue is necessary. Yet it is our opinion that, with an emphasis on "being from Turkey", people were describing a society not based on ethnic identity and expressing a heartfelt love of nation and country through this choice. However the extent to which this emphasis translates to an emphasis on being from Turkey as in the political terminology needs to be examined and measured.

10. LOYALTY TO IDENTITIES AND VIEW ON OTHERS

10.1. Eastern Black Sea Strictest in Loyalty to Identity

In response to the question "Can your future daughter-in-law, son-in-law or spouse be from a different religion, ethnicity or country?", the most negative answers came from the Eastern Black Sea region and from uneducated men over 44.

Another tendency that the survey set out to measure was people's attachment to their identities. In order to determine the feelings of loyalty to one's identity, a personal question was directed to the subjects: "Can your future daughter-in-law, son-in-law or spouse be from a different religion, ethnicity or country?" The first point to be noticed is that people are rather strict in their attitudes regarding this subject. Those who emphasize "being from Turkey" and "religion-sect" rather than "ethnic background" in defining their identity are the same people who are less compromising about becoming family with people from another country or religion. Generally speaking, people are more accepting of marriage with someone from another ethnic background but refuse such proximity when it's someone from another country.

10.1.1. Women are More Tolerant

Examining this group of questions by gender, women seem to be more lenient than men in all age groups. Dividing them into demographic groups, the results are quite striking. For example, people with university degrees approve more highly of such marriages. The group with the highest percentage of "can be" responses is middle-aged or older women with university degrees at a rate of 65 %.

The highest rate of "no" to "daughter-in-law from another religion" comes from uneducated men aged 44 or older at 69,93 % and from uneducated women aged 44 or older at 66,96 %.

The most positive groups are university-educated men (69,66 %) and women (66,06 %) between the ages 29 and 44. The least tolerant groups were again uneducated men (55,22 %) and women (54,47 %) aged 44 and over.

Your Daughter-in-Law, Son-in-Law or Future Spouse	From Another Religion			From Another Ethnicity			From Another Country		
	Can be	Maybe	Cannot be	Can be	Maybe	Cannot be	Can be	Maybe	Cannot be
Turkish	30,2	11,1	58,7	40,8	14	45,3	31,3	10,9	57,7
Of Turkish Origin	29	8,5	62,5	48,1	10,7	41,2	30,5	9,5	60
Kurdish or Zaza	47,4	8,9	43,7	66,3	11,3	22,4	48,6	9,4	42
Arab	37,7	7	55,3	60,5	11,4	28,1	35,2	5,6	59,3
Self-Defined in General Terms	39,7	7,9	52,4	50	10	40	38,8	8,5	52,8
Other	39,9	13,7	46,4	58,6	12,4	29	43,8	10,7	45,6
Total	31	10,3	55,1	42,2	12,9	41,3	31,8	10,2	53,9

10.2. Most Tolerant Regions

Splitting the responses by region, Central East Anatolia (46,22 %) and Istanbul (42,70 %) seem to be the two regions with the highest rate saying "daughter- or son-in-law can be from another religion" while Eastern Black Sea (15,96 %) and Central Anatolia (23,98 %) have the lowest rates.

As for the idea of "daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic background," Central East Anatolia (60,74 %) and Istanbul (53,09 %) are again the most favorable regions but Eastern Black Sea (25,64 %) and Aegean (33,70 %) people are not in favor of this idea. Central East Anatolia (48,78 %) and Istanbul (42,59 %) have high rate of people saying they are open to a daughter- or son-in-law from another country and Eastern Black Sea (20,11 %) and Central Anatolian (24,45 %) people are generally against the idea of setting up a family with citizens of other countries.

10.2.1. Turks are More Closed

When citizens' loyalty towards their identities are examined according to the ethnic structure, interesting findings are revealed. "Turks" give more conservative replies to these questions. Even though the territory they come from ranges from Central Asia to the Balkans and they have, despite being ethnically Turkish, expressed their own identity with a range of terms (Turkmen, immigrant (*muhacir*), Muslim Turkish, Manav etc.), "those of Turkish origin" were the group most against (62,5 %) the idea of daughter- or son-in-law from another religion. This group does not seem to approve of marriage with someone from another country either (60 % against). Arabs and other ethnic group members seem to be somewhat more inclined toward the idea of the future daughter- or son-in-law or spouse being from another religion, ethnicity or country.

More Closed to Other Religion or Other Country than Other Ethnicity in Choice of Spouse, or In-Law	Can Be	Maybe	Cannot be
From Another Religion	32,15	10,71	57,13
From Another Ethnicity	43,76	13,40	42,84
From Another Country	33,18	10,67	56,15

10.3. The Situation Among Kurds and Zaza

The Kurdish-Zaza are more open to other groups than the rest of society and they gave higher rates of positive responses to these questions. The suggestion of a daughter- or son-in-law or spouse from another religion gathers 47,4 % approval (overall rate is 31 %); if it's from another ethnic background, the rate is 66,3 % versus the overall rate of 42,2 % and if it's from another country, the rate is 48,8 % versus 31,8 % overall. Regardless of how important ethnicity is for the Kurds, they still do not see it as an identity issue preventing marriage and blending with other groups.

10.3.1. Alevi are More Open

Looking at the same questions by religious affiliation, it seems evident that Alevi are much more tolerant in marriages than all other religious and ethnic groups. While Alevi support inter-religious, inter-ethnic and inter-country marriages by 60 to 65 %, the Hanafis' support rate are between 28 to 40 %.

Examining all responses to this question group together reveals that people are most tolerant to marriage with someone from a different ethnic identity. Being from another religion is the least acceptable difference. People seem to see ethnic identity and differences in ethnicity as less important than their religious identity and religious differences.

11. LIVING ONE'S IDENTITY

11.1. Living One's Identity is Controversial

While 82,55 % of the survey subjects stated that they can comfortably live their identity, the rate of positive responses to the question "Can others live their identity?" falls to 53,57 %.

After having brought to light the different identity definitions, it was also necessary to mete out the social circumstance about how free people are to live out these identities. The correct method for this requires two phases. First the subjects were asked whether they could freely and peacefully live the identities that they saw "descriptive of themselves." Then they were asked whether "other people could live their own identities." A vast majority, namely 82,55 %, of the subjects said that they could live their own identities. Only 3,91 % who thought they had legal problems. 11,93 % stated that they face some problems but they could live their identities and 1,61 % said they faced social obstacles.

However, the question "Can others live their identity?" revealed a rather different picture. This time 53,57 % said "Yes." In other words, the rate of people thinking that others have problems living their identities is higher. Similarly, 31,91 % of the subjects thought that other people had some problems, 9,38 % that they faced legal obstacles and 5,14 % that they faced societal obstacles.

11.1.1. Identity Problem for Women

When sliced by age and gender, the findings draw attention to the viewpoint of educated young women. Among the university-level educated women between the ages of 18 and 29, 25,74 % state that they cannot live their identities but regarding others' identities, this rate reaches 68 %. The higher the level of education, especially in the younger cohorts, the more people admit to having problems. Yet they see others as having problems about three times as much as themselves. Based on the same table of findings, women seem to stress societal obstacles more than men.

The view of different ethnic groups on living their own identity lies, as can be expected, on a wide range of approaches. Those who define themselves as ethnically Turkish are a bit more comfortable living their identities (86,8 % say "Yes") and their view on others having problems is a bit more optimistic. The view of those of Turkish origin is not very different than the average of Turkey.

However, none of the ethnic identity groups have a stance as clear and as different as that of the Kurds. Whereas people in Turkey believe that they can live their own identity (82,5 %) and other can live it (at 53,57 %), only 39,2 % of Kurds say that

they can live their identity and only 24,9 % say that other can live their identities freely.

Can You Freely and Peacefully Live Your Identity?					
	Yes	Have Some Problems	Legal Obstacles	Social Obstacles	Total
Turkish	86,8	9,7	2,2	1,3	100
Of Turkish Origin	81,1	12,2	3,8	2,9	100
Kurdish or Zaza	39,2	33,4	22,7	4,7	100
Arab	77,6	17,2	2,6	2,6	100
Self-Defined in General Terms	83,5	11,5	3,7	1,3	100
Other	74,6	20,7	3,6	1,2	100
Total	82,5	11,9	3,9	1,6	100

Can You Live Your Identity?			
Yes	Have Some Problems	Legal Obstacles	Social Obstacles
82,55	11,93	3,91	1,61

Can Others Live Their Identity?			
Yes	Have Some Problems	Legal Obstacles	Social Obstacles
53,57	31,91	9,38	5,14

11.2. Alevis in Distress

One very striking finding is that Alevis stand out as the religious group who feel most distressed about living their own identity freely. While only 53 % of Alevis express that they can live their own identities, 47 % state that they face problems.

Compared to other groups, Alevis have a much higher percentage of members who believe that "others cannot live their own identities" (79,1 %). As for the Sunni Hanafis, 87,2 % can live their identity freely and 57,2 % say others can.

When the two questions can taken into consideration together, the most important finding is that people are aware that "others" have problems regarding identity issues. Data demonstrates that the public is well aware of the identity debates and identity-related problems.

12. THE SOUTHEAST AND KURDISH ISSUE

12.1. The Majority of Society says: "Kurdish problem is Provoked by Foreign Countries"

An 87 % of society see the cause of the Southeast and Kurdish problem as "a provocation of foreign countries." Also 80 % says that for a solution, "the only way is to end terrorism."

The survey conducted for Milliyet under the direction of Tarhan Erdem with 47,958 people face to face, aimed to attain reliable figures about Turkey's social fabric. Understanding how the social fabric affects public opinion and how people think were other objectives.

As part of this context, survey subjects were asked for their opinions on the Southeast and Kurdish issue. To be able to obtain the real opinions of people on such a sensitive issue, two carefully selected questions were phrased in the following manner:

1- Do you believe the following views on the Southeastern or Kurdish issue are true or false?

- *It is the Kurds' identity problem, their problem of getting their identity accepted.*
- *It is caused by the state treating them differently.*
- *It is caused by Kurds' desire to establish a separate state.*
- *It is due to provocation from foreign countries.*
- *General problems are presented as if they are only Kurds' problem.*

2- For the solution of the Southeastern or Kurdish issue, do you find the following policies to be correct or wrong?

- *Kurds must be granted their right to education in their own language.*
- *Kurds must be granted their right to broadcasting in their own language.*
- *Councils of municipalities and special provincial administrations must be elected by plebiscitary vote and granted extensive authority.*
- *The state must provide support so that the Kurdish customs and traditions can develop and live on.*
- *The parliamentary election threshold must be removed.*
- *The only way is to end terror.*

The responses show the primary reason of the Southeastern and Kurdish issue to be provocation of foreign countries (87,03 %) and the secondary reason to be Kurds' desire to establish a separate state (74,53 %). The regions with the highest

percentage of people saying that the cause is "Kurds' identity issue" are Central Eastern Anatolia at 60,99 % (Hakkari, Bitlis, Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya, Muş, Tunceli, Van) and Southeastern Anatolia at 56,61 % (Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak). Believing that it is caused by "the state treating Kurds differently" are Central Eastern Anatolian (49,66 %) and Southeastern Anatolian regions (44,99 %).

12.1.1. Rate Rises in Black Sea

For the causes of the problem, Eastern Black Sea (92,60 %) and Western Marmara (84,65 %) regions say it is due to "Kurds' desire to establish a separate state and Eastern Black Sea (97,02 %) and Western Black Sea (93,45 %) regions say it is due to "provocation of foreign countries." As with other issues, serious and noteworthy differences of opinion exist between Istanbul and the eastern regions.

Causes of the Southeastern and Kurdish Problem	Correct	Wrong
Identity Problem of Kurds	53,76	46,24
State Treating Kurds Differently	33,45	66,55
Kurds' Desire to Establish a Separate State	74,53	25,47
Provocation of Foreign Countries	87,03	12,97
General Problems Being Presented as if Kurds' Problems	57,69	42,31

For education in own language, the majority says "it would be wrong"		
	Correct	Wrong
Turkish	27,5	72,5
Kurdish and Zaza	85	15
Other Languages	47,7	52,3
Turkey	35	65,1

Suggestions for Solution by Ethnic Identity												
	Kurds' Right to Education in Own Language		Kurds' Right to Broadcasting in Own Language		Extensive Authority to Elected Councils		State Support to Kurdish Customs and Traditions		Removing Threshold at Parliamentary Elections		The Only Way is To End Terror	
	Correct	Wrong	Correct	Wrong	Correct	Wrong	Correct	Wrong	Correct	Wrong	Correct	Wrong
Turkish	28	72	29,3	70,7	44,6	55,4	36,2	63,8	34,2	65,8	83	17
Of Turkish Origin	35	65	32,8	67,2	51,5	48,5	43	57	40,5	59,5	77,2	22,8
Kurdish	93,2	6,8	94,7	5,3	84,1	15,9	94,9	5,1	81,6	18,4	52,1	47,9
Arab	66,3	33,8	66,7	33,3	64,1	35,9	64,3	35,7	57,1	42,9	80	20
Self-Defined in General Terms	42,7	57,3	44,1	55,9	50,9	49,1	47,7	52,3	38,9	61,1	80,9	19,1
Other	45,3	54,7	38,4	61,6	59,1	40,9	52,1	47,9	48,1	51,9	79,4	20,6
Turkey	35	65,1	36,3	63,8	48,3	51,7	42,4	57,6	38,8	61,2	80,3	19,7

12.2. The Problem by Ethnic Identities

When views on the Southeastern and Kurdish issue are examined on the ethnic identity axis, important differences become apparent. When the views of ethnic groups are roughly compared to the views of the whole of society, one can see that they are more likely to see the issue as an identity issue and due to "different treatment of the state" and less likely to see its cause as "Kurds' desire for a separate state" or as "provocation of foreign countries." Turks give less support to all suggestions for solution except for "ending terror."

The thinking of "those of Turkish origin", namely people whose place of origin extend from Central Asia to the Balkans and who despite their Turkish ethnicity define themselves with various terms such as Turkmen, *muhacir*, Muslim Turk, Manav, seems to be parallel with the rest of society. Yet when it comes to the Southeastern or Kurdish issue, they think it is caused by "their need for identity acceptance" (79,7 %) and "the state treating them differently (78,1 %) and support by only half the ideas that causes are "provocation by foreign countries" and "general problems being shown as if only Kurds' problems."

12.3. Approval of Suggestions Change by Background

For the solution of the Southeastern and Kurdish issue, the most common response all over Turkey is "ending terror" at 80,30 %. Following that, "extended authority to local administrations" (48,33 %) and "state support to Kurdish customs and traditions" (42,37) are mentioned.

It is quite interesting to note that people are in favour of state support to ethnic groups as a general suggestion (by 66,58 %), but this rate drops to 42,37 % when the same question about state support is asked specifically about the Kurds. In other words, among the people who approve of the general idea of state support to ethnic groups, only 47 % of them also believe that the state should support the Kurds.

What to Do Towards a Solution?	Correct	Wrong
Kurds must be granted their right to education in their own language.	34,95	65,05
Kurds must be granted their right to publication in their own language.	36,25	63,75
Councils of municipalities and special provincial administrations must be elected by plebiscitary vote and granted extensive authority.	48,33	51,67
The state must provide support so that the Kurdish customs and traditions can develop and live on.	42,37	57,63
The parliamentary election threshold must be removed.	38,84	61,16
The only way is to end terror.	80,3	19,7

12.3.1. The Situation by Regions

Viewpoints on the solution to the problem vary dramatically by regions. While Central Eastern Anatolia (64,41 %) and Southeastern Anatolia (62,17 %) say "Yes" to the suggestion "Kurds must be granted their right to education in their own language", Eastern Black Sea supports this suggestion by 8,45 %. Support to broadcast in their own language is at 67,82 % in Central Eastern Anatolia and 67,38 % in Southeastern Anatolia but 9,75 % in the Eastern Black Sea. The suggestion of "extended authority to local administrations" is thought to be correct by 78,72 % in the Central East Anatolian region and 73,45 % in the Southeast Anatolian region but in the Eastern Black Sea region, this rate falls to 17,75 %. "State support for Kurdish customs and traditions to develop" is highly approved in Central Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern Anatolia but this support goes down to 15,56 % in the Eastern Black Sea region.

Regional differences are not so great about the suggestion of "ending terror." In all regions, more than half of the population believe that "ending terror" is correct as a solution.

12.4. Kurds see the Problem and the Solution Differently

Among the Kurds, the percentage of people thinking that the problem is "caused by Kurds' desire to establish a separate state" is 34,4 %. For the general public this figure is 74,5 %. Kurds' approach to the solutions are again different. Kurds are 80 to 95 % in favor of the suggested solutions. "The only way is to end terrorism" finds support all over Turkey at 80,30 % but among the Kurds this percentage is 52,1 %. Objections to this suggestion should not be evaluated as "advocacy of terrorism" but as a view that "ending terror will not be sufficient as a solution."

To see whether having a mother tongue other than Turkish affected people's view on granting Kurds the right to education in their own language, the relationship between subjects' mother tongue and their response to this suggestion was examined. Having a mother tongue other than Turkish does in fact increase the likelihood of support for this suggestion. When asked, "people whose mother tongue is Turkish" support the suggestion by 27,5 %, those whose mother tongue is Kurdish or Zaza by 85 % and those whose mother tongue is other than these by 47,7 %.

As for the suggestion "Kurds must be granted their right to broadcasting in their own language," those with Turkish mother tongue support it by 28.3 %, those whose mother tongue is Kurdish or Zaza support it by 89,5 % and those with other mother tongues support it by 47,6 %.

12.4.1.A Great Change is Evident

In order to better understand and evaluate what the views on the Kurdish issue really mean, the findings were compared to a previous survey conducted by KONDA. The Kurdish issue was taken up in this earlier survey which was conducted in Istanbul in 1993, and the public's opinion on the causes and solutions of the problem was obtained.

Some of the questions were posed in the exact same way in the two surveys. To compare the data, the initial step was to compare the current Istanbul sample with the current Turkey sample. Seeing that there were no significant differences, we decided that it was possible to compare the findings of the 1993 Istanbul survey with the 2006 Turkey survey and that meaningful results could be extracted.

Comparing the two surveys, most remarkable was a shift from 1993 to 2006 in Kurds' views on the matter. Among the Kurds, the replies of "Correct" to "The Southeastern or Kurdish problem is caused by Kurds' desire to establish a separate state" has fallen from 41 % to 34,4 % and negative responses have risen from 33 % to 65,6 %.

As for the suggestion "It is caused by provocation of foreign countries", those saying "Correct" increased from 23 % to 51,8 % and those saying "Wrong" increased from 41 % to 48,2 %. Most remarkable is the shift on the view "Local administrations should be granted more extensive authority." This suggestion had 32 % support among Kurds in 1993 and now it has risen to 84,1 % and those who were against this suggestion fell from 23 % to 15,9 %.

What is the Cause of the Problem According to Kurds; Is Increasing Local Authority a Solution?	Correct		Wrong	
	1993	2006	1993	2006
Kurds' Desire to Form a Separate State	41	34,4	33	65,5
Provocation of Foreign Countries	23	51,8	41	48,2
Extended Authority to Local Administrations	32	84,1	23	15,9

	Undecided	Will Not Vote + None	Other Parties	DTP	DYP	MHP	CHP	AKP
Women Aged 18-28	16,26	20,77	12,43	21,60	8,28	9,20	14,76	14,17
Women Aged 29-43	18,22	15,43	13,13	12,11	13,80	10,63	14,76	17,80
Women Aged 44 +	17,54	13,69	12,40	12,60	13,58	8,08	15,30	16,46
Men Aged 18-28	12,81	17,53	18,81	21,28	15,12	25,37	15,39	13,87
Men Aged 29-43	15,26	17,34	20,37	21,44	19,54	27,74	18,15	17,38
Men Aged 44+	19,91	15,23	22,87	10,97	29,69	18,97	21,64	20,32

12.5. Women are closer to AKP

Question aiming to determine the political tendencies of people with different ethnic and religious identities revealed that support for AKP is stronger among women and support for CHP, MHP and DTP is stronger among men.

The two following were posed to the subjects:

- *Which party or leader would you vote for if there was a general election tomorrow?*
- *Which party did you vote for at the 2002 general elections?*

These questions did not aim to forecast the election results. Rather, the aim was to obtain clues about political tendencies of people with different ethnic and religious identities and from different demographic segments. Therefore, the frequencies (the raw response rates) of these questions, especially of the "hypothetic election tomorrow" question have not been included in the evaluations. The results were used in outlining the political tendencies of different identities and demographic segments and in drawing profiles of voters and partisans.

12.5.1. Women's Choices

Women are either more supportive of AKP or more undecided or more likely to say "none of the parties" than men. Men seem to support CHP, MHP and DTP more than women. While 26,46 % of women say "Undecided," among men this rate is 20,76 %. Women below the age of 29 have a tendency to say they will not vote for any party (14,68 %) or they are undecided (25,76 %). Education attainment does not change women's decisiveness on whether to vote or to vote for a certain party, but as education increases the likelihood of voting for CHP increases and that for AKP decreases. The 29 to 43 age group women seem to have the same political tendencies as the younger cohort but their AKP support is a little higher (34,63 %). Fewer women in this group say they support none of the parties (10,28 %). CHP receives the highest support from university level educated women between 29 and 43 whereas AKP receives the highest support from women between 29 and 43 with only primary education. While women over 44 have the same general tendencies, CHP support reaches its peak with university-level educated ones among them (35,89 %). In this group, AKP support is parallel with the general trends (35,89 %).

12.5.2.Men's Choices

Men below 29 cite their political preferences to be for AKP at 27,77 %, for MHP at 13,84 % and for CHP at 10,78 %. While education does seem to matter, in this group of men it does not for MHP.

Support of men between 29 and 43 go to AKP (27,77 %), MHP (12,89 %) and CHP (10,84 %). As for men over 44, the distribution is 31,58 % for AKP, 11.76 % for CHP and 8,03 % for MHP.

Among men over 44 with university degrees, AKP support falls three-folds and CHP support doubles.

12.5.3.Partisanship by Region

Support for AKP is higher than average in the following regions: West Anatolia (34,02 %), Central Anatolia (38,88 %), Northeastern Anatolia (52,17 %), Central Eastern Anatolia (34,71 %) and Southeastern Anatolia (38,78 %). AKP support is lowest in West Marmara (22,48 %) and the Mediterranean (25,91 %) regions. While West Marmara (14,05 %) and Aegean (14 %) regions stand out with the highest level of support for CHP, the lowest level of support for this party comes from Northeastern Anatolia (6,80 %) and Southeastern Anatolia (7,08 %). MHP support comes from Central Anatolian (15 %) and West Anatolia (12,51 %) but not so much from Southeastern Anatolia (3,54 %).

Is AKP the alternative for DTP? (Distribution of Kurds' Votes by Party)	AKP	CHP	MHP	DYP	DTP	Other	Undecided	Total
Kurdish and Zaza	30,3	6,3	0,3	1,7	38,3	7,1	16,0	100

Distribution of Party Support by Background					
	AKP	CHP	MHP	DYP	DTP
Turkish	83,8	84,9	92,3	85,6	11,9
Of Turkish Origin	3,4	4,5	3,9	5	1,7
Kurdish and Zaza	6,8	4	0,2	2,4	84,3
Arab	0,7	0,7	0,2	0,1	0,2
Self-Defined in General Terms	4,8	5,1	2,9	6,3	1,8
Other	0,6	0,7	0,5	0,5	0,2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

12.6. PROFILE OF PARTISANS

12.6.1.AKP Partisans

- # 48,34 % are women, 51,66 % are men.
- # 27,99 % are aged less than 29, 35,18 % are between 29 and 43, 36,83 % are 44 or older.
- # 18,12 % are the poorest, 45,88 % have lower middle income, 25,84 % have mid-level income, 8,81 % have upper middle income and 1,35 % are from the richest.
- # 75,92 % have primary education or less, 18,58 % have graduated from high school, 5,49 % have university degrees.
- # 36,12 % housewife, 10,91 % worker, 10,89 % retired, 9,55 % agricultural worker, 9,11 % unemployed.
- # 83,8 % Turkish, 6,8 % Kurdish or Zaza, 3,4 % of Turkish origin.
- # 86,9 % Sunni Hanafi, 9,4 % Sunni Shafii.
- # 78,24 % voted for AKP in the 2002 elections, 9,38 % did not vote by choice or could not vote due to age in 2002.

12.6.2.CHP Partisans

- # 44,75 % women, 55,25 % men.
- # 30,10 % are aged less than 29, 32,85 % are between 29 and 43, 37,05 % are 44 or older.
- # 13,07 % are the poorest, 38,20 % have lower middle income, 30,49 % have mid-level income, 15,07 % have upper middle income and 3,17 % are from the richest.
- # 56,27 % have primary education or less, 29,52 % have graduated from high school, 14,21 % have university degrees.
- # 26,60 % housewife, 15,84 % retired, 9,65 % unemployed, 8,75 % worker.
- # 84,9 % Turkish, 5,10 % defining themselves with "general terms" such as "world citizen," 4,5 % of Turkish origin, 4 % Kurdish or Zaza.
- # 74,4 % Sunni Hanafi, 19,20 % Alevi.
- # 72,04 % voted for CHP in the 2002 elections, 11,45 % did not vote by choice or could not vote due to age in 2002.

12.6.3.MHP Partisans

- # 27,69 % women, 72,31 % men.
- # 34,55 % are aged less than 29, 38,40 % are between 29 and 43, 27,05 % are 44 or older.
- # 13,84 % are the poorest, 41,64 % have lower middle income, 30,68 % have mid-level income, 10,90 % have upper middle income and 2,94 % are from the richest.
- # 58,81 % have primary education or less, 31,80 % have graduated from high school, 9,39 % have university degrees.
- # 18,27 % housewife, 14,72 % worker, 14,34 % agricultural worker, 7,87 % student.
- # 92,3 % Turkish, 3,9 % of Turkish origin, 0,2 % Kurdish or Zaza.
- # 95 % Sunni Hanafi, 1,6 % Sunni Shafii.
- # 61 % have voted for MHP in the 2002 elections, 19,06 % have voted for AKP in 2002.

13. ANNEX 1 – EVALUATION OF SURVEY BY METU SOCIOLOGISTS

March 25, 2007, Milliyet

METU Professors Evaluated the Survey Data: Alevi-Sunni Borders Soften in the Cities

Providing important data on social change, the survey reveals that bond of citizenship (sense of being from Turkey - "*Türkiyelilik*") stand out as a result of urbanisation. The data point to another important change: Urban life is softening the traditional borders between Alevis and Sunnis, creating spaces for a common life.

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Basing our analysis on the KONDA survey data, we have strived to outline the main trends relating to national, ethnic, religious and local identities rather than focusing on exact numeric values.

In Turkey and throughout the world, as a general trend, the emphasis on ethnic and religious trends is increasing especially after the Cold War era. In the last few years, not only in Turkey but in many countries, from Russia to France, from Iran to Bolivia, nationalism is rising.

Before discussing the issue, we would like to point out that ethnic and religious identities are only two factors of the social structure and political culture. Identities are not stagnant, their borders shrink and expand depending on conditions. They are not stagnant because their content can be re-interpreted and can change.

The answers to the questions on identity in the survey point toward four main trends. The first and most fundamental trend is the bond of citizenship (*Türkiyelilik*) becoming an important identity element. Expressed in daily language, most of the subjects define themselves as "people of this country."

The City Blends

We may view the strengthening of the bond of citizenship as a result of transformation from a rural society to a more urban one. Groups which previously lived more separately are now, along with migration and urbanisation, in intensive, constant and multi-faceted interaction. Contrary to popular belief, urbanisation actually contributes to social integration and to the creation of a common culture of life because new common spaces and relationships are formed in cities. Individuals from different backgrounds come together at school, at the workplace, during worship, at markets or at recreational spaces and form relationships as neighbors,

friends and buddies. Also, institutions such as education and media play a fundamental role in the creation and spread of common values.

Those Highlighting Religion

Even though it falls a good twenty points behind country and citizenship identities, the second strongest trend is religious and sect identity. This segment accepts Sunni Islam as its base. The data does not provide us the chance of understanding whether national and religious identities are competing with or complementing each other. Nonetheless, several researches conducted previously imply that approximately 10 percent of the total population of Turkey is in favor of the rule of Sharia, i.e. a state based on Islamic law. Taking this view into account, we may posit that only a quarter of those highlighting religion have Islamist tendencies.

Alevi-Sunni Softening

In the survey, three points stand out regarding the Alevis. Firstly, Alevis are geographically the most mobile group. The majority of Alevis now live in urban areas. The educational level, the household size and the income level suggest that Alevis are quickly urbanising. Secondly, quite differently from other groups, most of Alevis state that they cannot freely live their identities. This viewpoint seems to be the result of facing multi-faceted pressure, discrimination and exclusion. Thirdly, Alevis stand out as the group most open to marriages with other groups. Urban life softens the traditional borders between Alevis and Sunnis and creates common living spaces. On the other hand, the borders between Alevis and certain fundamentalist groups of Islam are becoming even more acute.

Support of "Fellow Townsman" in the City

Localism and fellow townsmanship is another important dimension of identity. There exists, on the one hand, a population who still live in the village or town they were born and identify themselves first and foremost with this locality. On the other hand, there are people who have moved. This migrant population strives to preserve their local identity in the city. Sometimes this situation is perceived as "an inability to urbanise" as in the phrase "villagers in the city." Townsman associations' efforts to maintain relations with the village and conserve traditions give the impression that such a perception is in fact correct. Yet, fellow townsmanship is not merely about missing the village and complaining about the city but also about a very pragmatic calculations because townsmanship is about material support as much as it is a morale support. Many circumstances ranging from finding a room in a hospital to getting paperwork done at the mayor's office, from borrowing money to finding employment require fellow townsmen's support.

Fellow townsmanship is not as binding and exclusive as one may think. On the contrary, it is easy to enter and leave these groups and group members have freedom of movement. As townsmanship does not compete with national, religious, ethnic or political identities, it can go hand-in-hand with these. Emphasis on local identities whether in the village or town environment or in the city reflects the significance they have in the subject's daily life.

Kurds Votes Divided in the West

Religious identity is in the foreplan for Kurds in the east and AKP and DTP are competing. Yet in the west, Kurds' votes are divided.

People emphasizing their ethnic identity are only 14 % of the subjects. The survey does not provide data that would pinpoint a Turkish nationalism which upholds blood or shows an exclusivist attitude towards people from different backgrounds. As people from ethnic backgrounds such as Laz, Circassian, Bosnian, Georgian or Arab represent very small percentages in the survey results, it is impossible to make any evaluation. An important part of those who have identified themselves as "Kurdish" are clearly separate from other ethnic groups in terms of their approach to political issues.

East and Religious Identity

This group expresses its distress about living their identities. Three main trends can be underlined about this group.

- First of all, one in every four persons whose mother tongue is Kurdish has stated that his/her identity is "Turkish," not "Kurdish".
- Secondly, especially among the Kurds living in Southeastern Anatolia and Central Eastern Anatolia, religious identity is much stronger than it is in all other ethnic groups. As for voting behaviour, AKP is the only party that can compete with DTP. However, in the western regions votes of Kurds go to other parties as well as these two.
- Thirdly, at least a third of those who consider themselves to be "Kurdish" have opinions in parallel with the rest of society and thus fall apart from other Kurds.

Three Main Trends

Taking these data into account, we may point to three trends which seem to carry equal weight, numerically-speaking:

- Firstly, a certain trend exists among people of Kurdish origin which can be defined as "Kurdish nationalism."
- Secondly, some of people of Kurdish origin prefer to emphasize the country and citizenship bond rather than the Kurdish identity.
- Lastly, we may mention those who emphasize the ethnic and cultural basis of the Kurdish identity without a nationalist starting point.

New research is required to study these three trends in more detail.

East Black Sea Draws Attention

Some findings of the survey about the East Black Sea region are quite noteworthy. People have migrated heavily from this region. But it has also not pulled any migration because of its slow economic growth. In short, this region is relatively secluded to the outside and somewhat underdeveloped socioeconomically. Despite a population of various ethnic backgrounds, a pronounced emphasis on being Turkish and Muslim is noticeable.

Multiple Identities and Tolerance is Widespread

Among ethnic and religious groups, there are segments which define these identities in a very strict and excluding manner. Nonetheless, for many people, other identities are also important. We may state that multiple identities and tolerance is in fact more prevalent. In conclusion, intermixed identities deserve as much attention as separate identities. Values shared with other identities are as important as values of background identities. Numerous groups and individuals strive to bring together and reconcile different identities, to develop new common definitions without renouncing the other. There are wide areas of negotiation within and between different identities. This lively interaction takes place in daily life as much as it does in the media and maybe even more so.