

# **KONDA**

# **Barometer**

***THEMES***

**Living Together**  
***November 2014***

**KONDA**  
— ARAŞTIRMA VE DANIŞMANLIK





## **CONTENTS**

<b>1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2. THEME OF THE MONTH: LIVING TOGETHER.....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1. Conceptual Framework .....	7
2.2. Groups of “Others” .....	8
2.2.1. Distance .....	10
2.2.2. Marginalization across identities .....	11
2.3. Factors that Influence Marginalization .....	17
2.3.1. Contact.....	18
2.3.2. Trust/Living Together .....	19
2.3.3. Evaluating the Characteristics.....	22
2.3.4. Perceiving as a Threat.....	23
2.3.1. Empathy .....	26
2.3.2. Citizenship, Ethnic Identity and Religious Identity .....	27
2.4. Marginalization and Opportunities.....	30
2.5. Evaluation and Comments.....	32
<b>3. RESEARCH ID.....</b>	<b>37</b>
3.1. Overall Description of the Survey .....	37
3.2. The Sample .....	37
<b>4. FREQUENCY TABLES.....</b>	<b>39</b>
4.1. Profile of the Respondents .....	39
4.2. Theme of the Month: Living Together .....	45
<b>5. GLOSSARY of TERMS.....</b>	<b>53</b>





## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey which forms the basis of this report was conducted on November 1-2, 2014 by face-to-face interviews with 2464 individuals in 145 neighborhoods and villages of 103 districts including the central districts of 30 provinces.

### **Theme of the Month: Living Together**

For the aim of understanding the process of polarization and marginalization, the reasons behind the negative feelings or prejudices of the groups with different identities against each other and the barriers to be overcome in order to create the necessary conditions for living together, we chose as the theme of this month the ethnical, sectarian and ideological marginalization of Turks vs. Kurds, Sunnis vs. Alevis and Ak Parti supporters vs. Ak Parti opponents. We submitted these alternatives to the interviewees and used the method of collecting anonymous data in order to determine the group people consider most distant to themselves and found that 80 percent of the society have a group that they marginalize.

One third of the public finds Kurds distant and again one third considers those with the opposite ideology in the axis of the Ak Parti partisanship vs. opposition distant and name them as the least likable group. However, for Kurds supporting HDP, the other side of the marginalization of Kurds is comprised of not Turks but mostly the Ak Parti supporters whereas for the Kurds who support the Ak Parti, it is comprised of the Ak Parti opponents. Accordingly, marginalization is shaped with the dynamics between ethnical and ideological axes. The Ak Parti supporters are found distant by the Ak Parti opponents as well as the Kurds supporting HDP and the Alevis, who consider that the central and majority group is the Ak Parti supporters rather than Sunnis or Turks. On the other hand, sectarian marginalization is very low.

We handled 5 factors to help us understand who marginalizes who and why: Contact, trust, evaluation of characteristics, consideration as a threat and empathy. People have rather low daily contact with those groups that they marginalize, especially with Kurds. The decision of an individual belonging to a group that is considered distant is trusted at low rates in a public institution and in addition, in closer areas such as neighborhood, business partnership and marriage, the desire to live with distant groups is relatively low. When people are asked to evaluate the characteristics of the groups by using various adjectives, adjectives such as aggressive, unreliable and uncultured are used for all groups but mostly for Kurds. Those who consider the Ak Parti supporters distant emphasize that this group is powerful.

Among the factors that shape marginalization, perception as a threat may be the most explanatory factor. Those who consider the Ak Parti supporters, the Ak Parti opponents and Kurds as distant complain that these groups benefit from the national resources unjustly, occupy positions that they do not deserve and disrespect the others because of their identity. However, the complaint about attempts to change people's lifestyles and values has mostly been made against the Ak Parti supporters.



The findings of the survey indicate different possible solution methods for the alleviation of different marginalization. Firstly, half of the society indicate that they try to understand and empathize with the group they marginalize and this shows that if the necessary political means are provided for this aim, there will be progress. In order to decrease the rate of marginalization at the Ak Parti partisanship-opposition axis and creating a common platform for living together, it will be useful to focus on political means for reducing the perception of threat in the access to resources and lifestyle impositions. As for marginalization of Kurds, it is an important finding that the contact with this group is very low and that the prejudices alleviate as the contact increases. More contact may provide a decrease in negative views.

The reasons behind the marginalization of Alevis by 6 percent of the society cannot be explained by distrust, negative evaluations or perception as a threat unlike other groups which signifies that the prejudices may be based on basic religious beliefs. This is the reason why if concrete steps are taken in the Alevi initiative and shown that these will not increase the perception of threat, this may be a good example for minimizing marginalization.



## **2. THEME OF THE MONTH: LIVING TOGETHER**

### **2.1. Conceptual Framework**

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In Turkey, in recent years and particularly during and after the Gezi Park protests, we have been facing an important problem, which we call marginalization or social polarization. Social polarization or marginalizations involves processes during which different identities and values in society are discriminated, with groups of individuals reflecting negative opinions and discriminatory behavior towards individuals with different identities and values. In order to understand the political processes we are currently going through (such as the Kurdish initiative, political polarization in the parliament, Alevi initiative, Kobani demonstrations) and the support for these processes, it is necessary to understand the marginalization processes at work. Marginalization affects some social groups more than others, leading to the suppression of identities and instilling extreme reactions among various social groups. Our social history is marked by examples of violent outbursts by marginalizing groups on certain segments of society (such as the Sivas massacre) or incidents when marginalized groups have taken it to the streets with an overflowing reaction after certain social incidents (such as LGBTI individuals' protests against the murders of transsexual individuals).

In this study, we defined six groups of “others” under three categories based on ethnic identity (Turkish, Kurdish), sect (Alevi, Sunni) and ideology (Ak Parti supporters, Ak Parti opponents), and we endeavored to understand by whom and for what reason these groups are marginalized. Within this context, we tried to comprehend which individuals are marginalized by whom and in which realms (family, immediate social environment and public space), whether degree of piety, nationalism and ideological preferences have any influence on these processes, and which perceived threats posed by the “others” lead to marginalization.



## 2.2. Groups of “Others”

In order to identify the groups which the respondents marginalize based on ethnic identity, sect or ideology, the poll takers gave the card on the right to the respondents and read the following sentences:

“Now, please take a look at this card. Without telling me, please identify the group which you like the least or which you think is the most distant to you. Now, I will ask you a series of questions. I would like to ask you to respond to these questions based on the group which you like the least. You do not need to tell me which of the groups you picked.”

After asking all of the questions about the group and the theme selected, the poll takers asked the respondents to mark the group they picked in the designated section on the survey form and to cover this section with tape. Thus, the respondents were not required to inform the poll takers about the group they picked. The sections concealed with tape were then opened by the individuals responsible for data entry who had never seen the respondents in person.

<b>1 The Turkish</b>
<b>2 The Kurdish</b>
<b>3 Sunni Muslims</b>
<b>4 Alevi Muslims</b>
<b>5 Ak Parti Supporters</b>
<b>6 Ak Parti Opponents</b>
<b>7 Other</b>

It should be emphasized that the majority of the respondents were eager to state which group they picked to the poll takers without any hesitation, although they were provided with the opportunity to conceal their responses.

Group least liked or deemed most distant from	Percentage
Turkish	3.1
Kurdish	29.1
Sunni Muslims	1.3
Alevi Muslims	6.1
Ak Parti supporters	17.1
Ak Parti opponents	11.1
Other	10.9
I do not want to respond	13.8
No answer	7.3
Total	100





The table above presents the distribution of the responses. One fifth of the respondents did not respond to the question. This finding indicates that these respondents either do not identify any social group(s) as the “other” or they were reluctant to respond despite the fact that there is indeed a group or groups which they identify as the “other.” In any case, when the question was directed in this manner, it was revealed that four fifths of the general public identify a social group as the “other”, and deem themselves distant from such groups.

In the July'12 Barometer we had asked a similar open-ended question within the scope of the monthly theme, “Perception of ‘Others’ in Daily Lives”: *“Are there any groups which you think are ‘different from you’ and which you think are ‘others’ based on being Turkish/Kurdish, Sunni/Alevi, Leftist/Rightist or their lifestyle, preferences and opinions? Can you tell who they are?”* At the time, 64 percent of the respondents did not provide an answer to the question and 10 percent stated that they do not exclude any groups. It is apparent that the method we followed when asking the question this month demonstrates the cases of social marginalization more clearly.

Furthermore, the greater discussion of marginalized identities among society over the last two years and that decreasing reluctance of people in general to disclose their position with respect to the prevalent polarization, have led to an increase in the rate of groups perceived as the “other” among society.

When we take a look at the distribution of the responses, we can see that 29.1 percent of the respondents do not like the Kurdish, 17.1 percent do not like Ak Party supporters, and 11.1 percent do not like Ak Parti opponents. Along with the 6.1 percent who find Alevis distant from themselves, minorities like the Turkish and Sunni Muslims the least and find themselves most distant from them. In response to the question, 10.9 percent of the respondents identified a group other than those listed on the card. Among these were PKK, foreign powers, HDP, MHP, idealists, opponents, the Gülen movement; and the response rate for none of these responses went above 2 percent.

In summary, we can state that almost one third of the general public have problems with the Kurdish, and almost one third are marginalized based on being Ak Parti supporter or opponent. As we will mention in the following sections, the marginalization processes are not only shaped by ideology or ethnic identity, but also by the dynamics between the two types of polarization. According to the findings of the research, marginalization based on sects is not common.




### 2.2.1. Distance

We first asked the respondents how distant they feel themselves to the group they think deem themselves distant from. When asked to define this personal distance, two thirds (38.9 percent) of the respondents stated that the group they find distant from themselves is indeed completely distant from them.

How distant do you feel yourself from this group? (grouped)	Percentage
0 (Not distant)	5.5
1-49	5.3
50	19.6
51-99	14.1
100 (Distant)	38.9
No answer	16.6
Total	100.0

The graph below was generated based on the average scores of each group. The respondents, who think that they are distant from Ak Parti supporters, specify the distance as 80 on a scale of 0-100. The respondents, who think that they are distant from the Kurdish, specify the distance at an average of 77.7. The groups which are considered distant by a higher rate of the respondents are also perceived as more distant at a greater distance.



\*Attention: The number of the respondents who feel themselves distant from Sunni Muslims is only 28.



### **2.2.2. Marginalization across identities**

Before we investigate the reasons behind why these groups are marginalized, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of marginalization across these groups. Due to the fact that marginalization is defined based on ethnic identity, sect and ideologies, we will initially focus on these factors.

The first graph below presents the groups which the voter groups of the four parties in the parliament find distant from themselves. Accordingly, the findings below are worth noting:

- Among Ak Parti voters, 30 percent feel themselves the most distant from the Kurdish and 21 percent from Ak Parti opponents.
- Among CHP voters, 45 percent feel themselves the most distant from Ak Parti supporters and 26 percent from the Kurdish.
- Among MHP voters, 49 percent feel themselves the most distant from the Kurdish and 19 percent feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters.
- Among HDP voters, 31 percent feel themselves the most distant from Ak Parti supporters.

These findings reveal that Ak Parti, CHP and MHP voters meet at a common denominator against the Kurdish, while CHP, MHP and HDP voters share the same opinion in terms of being distant from Ak Parti supporters. Although CHP and MHP voters feel themselves distant from the same two groups, CHP voters' distance from Ak Parti supporters and MHP voters' distance from the Kurdish are rather dominant.


The groups to which voter groups feel themselves distant from are in parallel with the graph on the parties that voters would never consider voting for presented in the previous section of the report on politics.

- Among Ak Parti voters, 29 percent state that they would never consider voting for HDP and 31 percent state that they would never vote for CHP.
- Among CHP voters, 62 percent express that they would never vote for Ak Parti.
- Among MHP voters, 41 percent state that they would never consider voting for HDP and 31 percent state that they would never vote for Ak Parti.
- Among HDP voters, 45 percent state that they would never consider voting for MHP and 31 percent express that they would never consider voting for Ak Parti.

Consequently, the response rates above imply same pattern where all voters other than Ak Parti voters feel themselves distant from Ak Parti and the all voters other than HDP's feel themselves distant from HDP.




### Groups which voters feel themselves distant from by voter group






When we analyze the graph below about the groups which voters feel themselves distant from by ethnic identity, 35 percent of the Turkish state that they feel themselves distant from the Kurdish. However, the Kurdish do not feel distant from the Turkish in general. This shows that marginalization is not mutual (the number of respondents who belong to other ethnic identities were very few; and therefore, were not included in the evaluation). Although only 4 percent of the Kurdish state that they feel themselves distant from the Turkish, the existence of Kurdish respondents who feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters (19 percent), Ak Parti opponents (15 percent) and Alevi (14 percent) is remarkable.





When we separate the Kurdish respondents based on their political preferences in order to better understand the reasons behind why they marginalize these different groups, the numbers decrease: The number of the respondents who are HDP voters with a Kurdish identity is 153, and who are Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish identity is 93. Although this makes it difficult to make an accurate evaluation, it may provide us with an idea on the differences. It is observed that HDP voters with a Kurdish identity feel themselves distant from Ak Parti opponents, while Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish identity feel the same about Ak Parti opponents and Alevis. Particularly the high rate of the respondents who feel themselves distant from Alevis implies that Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish identity have adopted Ak Parti's political discourse; and that consequently they have prioritized their political identity over their ethnic identity.


### Groups which the Kurdish feel themselves distant from





As mentioned before, the fact that Sunni Muslims and Alevi Muslims do not marginalize each other proves that marginalization based on sectarian difference only occurs within a small group. Sunni Muslims, which correspond to the 90 percent of society in Turkey, state that they feel themselves most distant from the Kurdish at 30 percent, and Alevi Muslims state that they feel themselves most distant from Ak Parti supporters at 43 percent. We can explain why Alevis feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters in two ways. Alevis may be prioritizing ideological issues over their identity; and thus, they may be marginalizing Ak Parti supporters, who are oppressing their beliefs and who are the dominant group within society. They may also be indirectly expressing their distance to Sunni Muslims who constitute the majority in society through Ak Parti supporters.

**Groups which voters feel themselves distant from by sect**






We come across findings similar to those from the previous Barometers when we leave aside ethnic identities, sects and political preferences aside and analyze marginalization within demographic groups. As shown below, findings on lifestyle, degree of piety and educational attainment level reveal a predictable graph. The respondents who are modern, non-believer and more educated feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters, while the respondents who are religious conservative, pious and less educated state that they feel themselves distant from Ak Parti opponents. Although there are certain groups, which are marginalized based on lifestyle, degree of piety and educational attainment level, the opinions among these demographic groups are not homogeneous. For example, some of the respondents who are modern state that they feel themselves distant from Ak Parti opponents, while some of the pious feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters.





### Rates of marginalizing Ak Parti supporters and opponents



### 2.3. Factors that Influence Marginalization

In order to understand the reasons why the respondents feel themselves distant from certain groups, we also directed several questions about their relationship with and opinions on these groups. We performed a factor analysis on the data, which categorizes the questions based on the similarity of the topic they inquire about. Based on the results of the factor analysis, we classified the questions in the following categories: contact, trust felt towards the group and the desire for living together, evaluation on the characteristics of the group, perception of the group as a threat, and empathy. In addition, we also considered perceptions on citizenship, ethnic identity and religious



identity, which may cause the respondents to feel themselves distant from a certain group.


Due to the low number of the respondents who feel themselves distant from the Turkish and Sunni Muslims, these groups were omitted in the evaluations.

### 2.3.1. Contact


In Turkey, individuals “rarely” or “sometimes” share the same space or shop from the same stores with the groups which they feel themselves distant from. Therefore, we can reach the conclusion that their contact with marginalized groups is limited.

Although they identify the frequency as “sometimes”, the respondents who feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters express that they have contact with this group. The contact between Ak Parti opponents and the respondents who feel themselves distant from them occurs on a less frequent basis. It is observed that the contact between Alevis and the Kurdish, and the respondents who feel themselves distant from these two groups is quite rare. It is a remarkable finding that although one third of the general public feel themselves very distant from the Kurdish, they may seldom share the same space, become friends or shop from their stores.

**How often do you share the same space (house, work, neighborhood, etc.) with the members of this group?**




**How often do you become friends or chat with the members of this group?**





### How often do you shop from the stores/stalls owned by the members of this group?




### 2.3.2. Trust/Living Together

Moving one step further than the issue of contact, when we inquire about how the respondents would react in case they contact with the group they marginalize, it is observed that they do not trust the members of these groups and they are not willing to live together with the members of these groups.

The respondents state that they would not trust a decision maker who belongs to a group they marginalize in case they have to show up in court/police station (2.7 points). However, the level of trust is influenced by which specific group people feel themselves distant from. The respondents who feel themselves distant from Ak Parti opponents trust this group at a level higher than the average in Turkey (3.1), while the respondents who feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters trust this group at a very lower level (2.4-2.5). Likewise, the level of trust shown towards the Kurdish by the respondents who feel themselves distant from the Kurdish is quite low (2.5-2.6).


The respondents who marginalize Alevis trust Alevis at a rate above the average. The relatively higher levels of trust towards these two groups may be due to the fact that it is not very likely for the members of these groups to be at the decision making position in the courts/police stations. In other words, the trust level may be higher than expected because the respondents are evaluating a hypothetical scenario.

### I would trust a court verdict even if the judge was a member of this group.





**I would trust the behaviors and decisions of a police officer even if he is a member of this group.**




When the respondents are inquired about neighborhood, business partnership and marriage, which are realms that require closer contact than the courts/police stations, we can observe that the respondents react in a similar way and they are not willing to be in contact with the groups they marginalize. The respondents who feel themselves distant from the Kurdish avoid the possibility to be neighbors with the Kurdish or to rent their properties to the Kurdish (2.2). The respondents who marginalize other groups have a rather positive attitude; however, no one takes a hesitant stand.


When it comes to marriage, ethnic identity and sect are observed to be quite influential. Although supporting or opposing Ak Parti has an impact on the majority of the respondents, it is less influential on shaping the opinion on inter-marriage in comparison to ethnic identity and sect. Moreover, the respondents who marginalize Ak Parti supporters or opponents are less enthusiastic about business partnerships with these groups in comparison to marriages.




**I would rent my house to the members of this group/I would like a member of this group to be my neighbor.**



**I would become business partners with a member of this group.**



**I would not oppose if my daughter/son wants to marry a member of this group.**






### 2.3.3. Evaluating the Characteristics


When we asked the respondents to choose between certain adjectives that define the groups they marginalize, the evaluations varied by the group in question. All of the respondents think that the groups they feel themselves distant from are unreliable. Similarly, when the respondents are asked to choose between the adjectives of 'pacifist' and 'aggressive', they are inclined to define the groups they marginalize as aggressive. Also, the respondents prefer the adjective 'uneducated' to 'well-educated' to define the groups they feel themselves distant from. However, when they are asked to choose between 'powerful' and 'weak,' the respondents who marginalize Ak Parti supporters think that this group is powerful in contrary to the remainder of the marginalized groups. The Kurdish are commonly defined as aggressive and unreliable.

Although the respondents who find themselves distant from Alevi tend to choose negative adjectives to define Alevi, their opinion on the characteristics of Alevi is more positive in comparison to their opinion on the other marginalized groups. In other words, among the marginalized groups, Alevi stand out as the most reliable, the most pacifist and the most educated. On the other hand, when the fact that the respondents who marginalize Alevi trust the decisions taken by an Alevi in the court/police station at relatively higher levels, it becomes difficult to understand the factors behind why Alevi are perceived as distant and favored less.

**How reliable do you think the members of this group are?**




**How powerful do you think the members of this group are?**






### How aggressive or pacifist do you think the members of this group are?



### How educated do you think the members of this group are?




#### 2.3.4. Perceiving as a Threat

Individuals may perceive the groups they find themselves distant from, as a threat to their own existence or their access to existing resources. In other words, they may be defining a certain group as distant based on tangible factors that affect their daily lives instead of abstract reasons such as beliefs or low levels of contact.


Based on the statements we used to understand this, it is possible to observe a significant relationship between perceiving a group as a threat and identifying them as distant from oneself. The graph below presents that the respondents have similar opinions on different groups they feel themselves distant from, that these groups enjoy positions they do not deserve and advantage of unfair access to the resources in the country. There is a strong belief among society that Ak Parti supporters and the Kurdish pose such a threat. However, the opinion that the Kurdish break the social peace is more common among the respondents who feel themselves distant from the Kurdish. The respondents who perceive Ak Parti opponents distant from themselves believe that Ak Parti opponents pose a threat at high rates. Although the respondents who feel themselves distant from Alevis have negative opinions on Alevis' access to ranks and resources, it is more accurate to claim that they are rather hesitant.




**I think that the members of this group possess seats they do not deserve.**



**I think that the members of this group enjoy an unfair access to the resources in the country.**



**I think that the members of this group break the social peace.**




The respondents who see themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters and Ak Parti opponents state that they feel that the members of the respective group endeavor to change their lifestyles and that they do not feel respected by the members of the respective group at the highest rates. The fact that political polarization evolved into a polarization of lifestyles is an observation that we emphasize frequently, and it is






quite apparent in the responses provided to these statements. Despite the fact that Ak Parti supporters are defined as very powerful and the decisions made by Ak Parti opponents are evaluated as more reliable, the conflict between these two groups originates primarily from lifestyles. The imposition on lifestyles is not the main problem between Alevi and the Kurdish, and the respondents who feel themselves distant from Alevi and the Kurdish feel that they do not respect them because of their identities.

**I think that the members of this group endeavor to change my lifestyle and value judgment.**




**I think that the members of this group do not respect me because of my ethnic, religious or ideological identity.**






### 2.3.1. Empathy

We included two statements in the survey in order to understand if the respondents empathize with the members of the groups they marginalize. 48 percent of the respondents stated that they agree with the statement, “I try to understand the feelings of the members of this group,” and 48 percent agree with the statement, “I try to understand why the members of this group think different.” In other words, the members of society in Turkey define their perceived distance from the groups they marginalize as 73 on a scale of 0-100. On the other hand, half of society also tries to put themselves in the place of the group they marginalize.




The graph below presents the average reactions of the respondents who feel themselves distant from different groups. As demonstrated by the graph, although the average attitudes do not change dramatically, those who see themselves distant from the Kurdish seem to show the least effort to empathize (3.0).





**I try to understand why the members of this group think different.**



The fact that half of society attempts to understand how the marginalized groups feel creates a significant opportunity to establish social peace. If these individuals are provided with the right political tools, consensus between the groups which marginalize each other may indeed become possible.

**2.3.2. Citizenship, Ethnic Identity and Religious Identity**

Marginalization may originate not only from individuals' opinions on the groups which they marginalize but also from their judgments on their own identities and the essential requirements of living together. To serve this purpose, we also included statements on citizenship, ethnic identity and religious identity in the survey.

The individuals in Turkey think that the most important element of their identity is Turkish citizenship, religious beliefs or ethnic identity, in the provided order. As anticipated, Turkish and Sunni Muslim respondents attach more importance to Turkish citizenship than the Kurdish and Alevis. Both the Turkish and Kurdish attach equal importance to ethnic identity.


Two statements that question the relation between living together and politics based on identities received significant approval of society. In average, the general public in Turkey approves both the statement, "everyone should acknowledge that they are citizen of the Turkish Republic and should give up putting emphasis on their ethnic identities/religious beliefs/political identity or differences" and the statement, "in order to live in peace, all of us should remember that we are all humans, and we should not occupy our minds with ethnic groups, sects and ideological groups." The rate of Kurdish and Alevi respondents who approve these statements is lower; but in average they also agree with these statements.

The general public in Turkey also agrees with the statement about including the history of different social groups in the school curriculum. This statement receives higher support from the Kurdish and Alevis. The high level of support given to this statement by both the majority and minority ethnic and religious groups may be evaluated as a demand for the normalization of the politics based on identities by integrating it to the educational system and for the resolution of the problems that originate from politics based on identities and the emphasis on differences.



In addition, it is also notable that the support level to the relatively tangible statement on the inclusion of different groups' histories in the curriculum is lower in comparison to the two statements which are rather abstract. Based on this finding and the high rate of marginalization within society, we may speculate that the respondents had difficulty in understanding the two statements on living together.

### Citizenship, ethnic identity and religious identity





	Ethnicity		Religion/sect		The least favored group				Turkey
	Turkish	Kurdish	Sunni Muslim	Alevi Muslim	Kurdish	Alevi Muslims	Ak Parti supporters	Ak Parti opponents	
Turkish citizenship constitutes an essential part of my identity.	4.3	3.3	4.1	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.1
My ethnic origin constitutes an essential part of my identity.	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.8
My religious beliefs constitute an essential part of my identity.	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.6	4.0	4.2	3.6	4.2	4.0
Everyone should acknowledge that they are citizens of the Turkish Republic and should give up putting emphasis on their ethnic identities/religious beliefs/political identity or differences.	4.2	3.2	4.1	3.8	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
In order to live in peace, we should all remember that we are all humans, and we should not think too much about ethnic groups, sects and ideological groups.	4.0	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1	3.9	4.1	4.0
In order to achieve social peace, cultural background and histories of different groups should be included in the curriculum.	3.4	4.0	3.4	3.6	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5



## **2.4. Marginalization and Opportunities**

When we take a look at the reasons behind why each group is marginalized individually, we come across clues on what the sensitive issues are and how marginalization can be eliminated to achieve social peace. Such an approach also provides the opportunity to emphasize once again that ethnic, sectarian and ideological segregation do not have equal weight and that all three intersect with each other.

### **Marginalization between Ak Parti supporters-opponents:**

Among the marginalized groups, Ak Parti supporters are evaluated as the most distant by the respondents who think that they are distant from them. Ak Parti supporters are marginalized and perceived distant not only by their political opponents (CHP and MHP voters), but also by HDP voters with a Kurdish identity and Alevis. In other words, the stand taken against Ak Parti supporters is not solely based on ideological views but also on ethnic and sectarian identities. It is not very difficult to understand the reasons behind the marginalization of Ak Parti supporters: The respondents who state that they find Ak Parti supporters distant from themselves and that they do not favor them think that the members of this group are powerful, enjoy unfair access to resources, do not show respect to others and endeavor to change others' lifestyles.

When we take a look at the reasons behind why the respondents marginalize Ak Parti opponents, we can see that the factors behind marginalization are not any different and the prejudice towards Ak Parti opponents is less significant. The respondents who marginalize Ak Parti opponents have more contact with this group, and they find them more reliable. Yet, their opinions on Ak Parti opponents' access to resources and imposition of a certain lifestyle are in common with the respondents who marginalize Ak Parti supporters.

Thus, in order for these two groups, one of which is more powerful and central, it is required to change the situation or at least alter the perceptions on several issues: Resources in the country should be fairly distributed, these two groups' efforts to change each other's lifestyles and values should be toned down, and these two groups should show respect to each other for their identities.

### **Marginalization of the Kurdish:**

As we mentioned earlier in this section, one third of the general public in Turkey (29 percent) expressed that they find themselves distant from the Kurdish and that they like the Kurdish the least. It should be reminded that the field survey for this research was conducted shortly after the demonstrations on October 6-7 and that reactions towards the Kurdish during such periods is harsher than usual. The findings of the research reveal that the marginalization of the Kurdish does not only revolve around ethnic identity, and Ak Parti, CHP and MHP voters who diverge from each other in terms of political views and ideologies meet at the common denominator when it comes to the marginalization of the Kurdish. On the other hand, the Kurdish marginalize others based on ideological views rather than ethnic identity. Besides, it is not possible to detach the marginalization of the Kurdish from marginalization based on ideological views and being Ak Parti supporter-opponent.



The most remarkable finding on the marginalization of the Kurdish is that they compose the group which is marginalized by the highest number of the respondents and which is defined by the most negative adjectives. In addition, the Kurdish has the least contact with the individuals who marginalize them. Indeed, the research reveals that increased contact leads to a decrease in the distance the respondents feel to the group they marginalize, and it has a positive impact.

The research, therefore, identifies lack of contact between groups as the main cause of the marginalization of the Kurdish by a certain segment of society, and emphasizes that increasing contact between these groups would have favorable outcomes.

### **Marginalization of Alevis:**

The findings of the research hint that there are important opportunities for decreasing the marginalization of Alevis. First of all, a very small rate of the respondents marginalize others based on their sects; only 6 percent of the respondents state that they find themselves distant from Alevis. Moreover, Alevis themselves do not marginalize Sunni Muslims, but instead express that they feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters whom they identify as the central power.

When we investigate the reasons behind the marginalization of Alevis, we have difficulty in putting our finger on the exact reason. Although the respondents who state that they feel themselves distant from Alevis do not have extensive contact with them, they tend to use more positive adjectives to define Alevis, they find Alevis more reliable, they are less disturbed of their access to the resources and they do not feel any threat that Alevis impose a certain lifestyle on them. Based on the fact that the reasons behind the marginalization of Alevis are not quite clear, we may draw the conclusion that this marginalization essentially based on religious beliefs and/or prejudices. Thus, it appears that decreasing the marginalization of Alevis could indeed be a comparatively easier task to undertake. From this perspective, an inclusive approach towards Alevis would constitute a major opportunity to communicate to society that different groups may very well live together, provided that certain lifestyles and religious beliefs are not imposed on society.



## 2.5. Evaluation and Comments

Associate Professor Ayşe Betül Çelik, Sabancı University, Political Science and Conflict Resolution

Assistant Professor Rezarta Bilali, New York University, Department of Applied Psychology

### Main Findings:

Defining “others” and distancing away from them in public and private spaces are as common in the world as it is in Turkey. However, the rate of individuals in Turkey who identify a certain group as “others” is quite high (78.9% of the respondents identify a certain group as “others”) and they are not pleased that “others” enter into certain realms of their lives. Among the identity groups defined in the survey, the Kurdish (29.1%), Ak Parti supporters (17.1%) and Ak Parti opponents (11.1%) are the groups that respondents feel themselves the most distant from<sup>1</sup>; in other words, there is a major fault line in ethnic identities and ideological views. However, marginalization based on ethnic identity only affects the Kurdish, while the parties involved in marginalization based on ideological views have negative attitudes towards each other.

Similar negative feelings, opinions and behavior patterns towards a group have different reasons behind them. Studies conducted in other countries present that ethnic groups pose “real threats,” in other words they are marginalized as they are perceived as an economic and political threat. On the other hand; the perception of sexual preferences and religious and sectarian differences a symbolic threat to lifestyle and values, leads to fear among certain segments of society that such differences may break the social peace. However, in Turkey, people identify marginalized groups as both a real and a symbolic threat.

Individuals do not only marginalize groups that they know and dislike; they may also marginalize groups that they do not know based on any prejudices and opinions they may have about them. The findings of this research reveal that individuals in Turkey are not pleased with the existence of “others” that they are not acquainted with, do not know and do not interact with. But a certain differentiation between the groups that are marginalized by the respondents is worth specific attention. The respondents who identify the Kurdish, Alevi and Ak Parti opponents (in other words the groups which are distant to the power groups) as “others” do not want these groups to exist in their close environment. On the other hand, the respondents who identify Ak Parti supporters as “others” do not respect the decisions taken by these groups in the public realm (such as police officers or judges). These findings imply that the respondents who are among the political minority feel that the current political atmosphere entails an “unfair” power structure. Unfortunately, the groups which possess central power do not socially interact or communicate with these groups to enable a positive change, and therefore, these two realities continue to nurture each other. In addition, considering the high rate of “marginalization” in Turkey, it is not possible to affirm that the outlook would have been more positive if current political minorities were had access to the central power.

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<sup>1</sup>6.1% of the respondents identify Alevi as “others.”





## **Nationalism, Piety, Political Preferences and Marginalization**

Studies conducted in Turkey and other countries prove that some ideologies marginalize on the basis of identity. Unfortunately, the situation is not much different in Turkey. The rate of marginalization is expected to be high in societies where the definition and practices of citizenship are not outlined to acknowledge the differences of all identity groups and to enable the survival of these groups along with their cultures and where the dominant groups insist on such an understanding. In this research, it is observed that individuals who put different identities aside and emphasize “unity,” particularly marginalize the Kurdish. It is also observed that the respondents who think that religious identity constitutes an essential part of their identities also feel themselves distant from all other groups. In fact, individuals subsist with different identities. Any particular emphasis they put on a certain identity (particularly on religious or ethnic identities) and an attitude that excludes certain identities intensifies marginalization.

When we evaluate the groups which are marginalized by the respondents' political preferences, we come across an interesting distribution. The highest rate of non-voters and the voters groups other than HDP's identify the “Kurdish” as others, and the highest rate of the voters other than Ak Parti's identify “Ak Parti supporters” as others. Although it should be taken into consideration that the field survey was conducted shortly after the Kobani demonstrations, this finding is remarkable as it indicates how important it is for the Kurdish initiative to gain a social base to enable increased support to the peace process. More interestingly, HPD and Ak Parti voters respectively identify Ak Parti supporters and the Kurdish as “others.” Similarly, individuals who identify themselves as Turkish state that they feel themselves the most distant from the Kurdish, and individuals who identify themselves as Kurdish state that Ak Parti supporters are the most distant group to them. These findings demonstrate that during social dialog should be established between HDP and Ak Parti voters during the Kurdish initiative and the ruling party should provide more detailed information about the process to its voters.

Unfortunately, neither educational attainment level nor economic conditions and age have influence on the groups which “marginalize” others. In other words, the likelihood of a respondent to identify the Kurdish as the “other” does not vary significantly by increasing educational attainment level. However, individuals who have a university degree do not “marginalize” groups other than the “Kurdish” and “Ak Parti supporters,” but the distance they feel from these groups is quite high (23.8% of the respondents feel themselves distant from the Kurdish, 28.5% feel themselves distant from Ak Parti supporters). This finding implies that university education includes methods and materials that lead to increase in the feelings and opinions, which ignite the marginalization of these groups. In terms of demographic data, the most significant relation is observed between lifestyle and marginalization. The “moderns” identify these two groups as the most distant groups to them. Although lifestyle does not have much influence on the “marginalization” of the Kurdish (all of the lifestyle clusters marginalize the Kurdish at the highest rate), being religious conservative has a significant impact on the rate of the individuals who identify Ak Parti opponents as “others.”



### **Understanding “others” and avoiding the language of discrimination:**

The most important conclusion drawn by this research is that the necessity to abandon the language of marginalization and similar practices in education by conducting research on political and social grounds. Especially in light of the above findings, it is necessary to establish a new system in universities that will eliminate any exclusive, racist and discriminative mechanisms, and promote human rights.

This research presents that all of the groups other than the Turkish and Sunni Muslims are marginalized at quite high rates. Despite this fact, the fact the rate of marginalization of the Kurdish and ideological groups (Ak Parti supporters and opponents) higher than others is significant in terms of the ongoing peace process. As discussed above, the results of this research underline once again the importance of disseminating the peace process to the entire society in order to ensure the success and permanence of this process. Within this context, both HDP and Ak Parti voters should abandon their marginalizing language and the parties should convey positive messages to their voters. In addition, these findings reveal the importance of the legislation on discrimination and the boards for monitoring discrimination, which were raised throughout the discussions during the Kurdish initiative. Abandoning the language of marginalization and the eliminating it from both written and verbal resources (press, education, etc.) will prevent the negative social consequences of these processes. Non-governmental organizations may also serve as an agency to monitor and oversee this process<sup>2</sup>.

For this purpose, introducing democratic and transparent practices in the public realm, listening to the opinions of individuals from different groups and corresponding to these opinions by public officers are very important. Especially, the introduction of participatory mechanisms in the public realm will lead to increased confidence in the practices of Ak Parti supporters among the individuals who are distant from the central power. In the long run, the implementation of the policies on multiculturalism by public and private entities would decrease the social distance felt by different groups.

In the social sphere, the groups which “marginalize” each other need to have increased contact with each other. According to the approach known as the “Contact Theory” in social sciences, negative prejudices about “others” can be eliminated by providing opportunities to different social groups to interact with each other under equal conditions. This approach highlights the importance of projects that will bring together individuals who have different lifestyles, political preferences and identities. Such projects will facilitate the mutual understanding between groups who have clashing values and enhance the respect they feel towards each other.

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<sup>2</sup>Within this context, the work of Hrant Dink Foundation on monitoring the hate speech in the media may be enhanced and popularized.



In conclusion, the reduction of the negative consequences of “marginalization” and the dissemination of democracy should be encouraged by a social and political agenda. Any educational material that “marginalizes” others should be removed from the curriculum, the groups which “marginalize” each other should be brought into contact with each other through carefully designed projects and all these processes should be backed by a strong political will.





### 3. REASEARCH ID

#### 3.1. Overall Description of the Survey

The survey that this report is based on was conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.).

The field survey was conducted on 1-2 November 2014. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey within the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and monitor trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey.

The margin of error of the survey is +/- 2 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.6 at 99 percent confidence level.

#### 3.2. The Sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the population data and educational attainment level data of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address-Based Population Registration System (ADNKS), and the results of the June 12, 2011 General Elections in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 2464 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 145 neighborhoods and villages of 103 districts -including central districts- of 30 provinces.

Provinces visited	30
Districts visited	103
Neighborhoods/villages visited	145
Number of respondents	2464

Among the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas on age and gender were enforced.

Age group	Female	Male
Between 18-28	3 respondents	3 respondents
Between 29-44	3 respondents	3 respondents



44 and above	3 respondents	3 respondents
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	Level 1 (12 regions)	Provinces visited
1	İstanbul	İstanbul
2	Western Marmara	Balıkesir, Edirne, Tekirdağ
3	Aegean	İzmir, Denizli, Kütahya, Uşak
4	Eastern Marmara	Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli
5	Western Anatolia	Ankara
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri,Sivas
8	Western Black Sea	Samsun, Tokat, Zonguldak
9	Eastern Black Sea	Trabzon
10	Northeastern Anatolia	Erzincan
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	Elazığ, Malatya, Van
12	Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Siirt, Şanlıurfa

The distribution of respondents according to the regions and place of residence is shown in the table below.

	Region where the survey was conducted	Rural	Urban	Metropolitan	Total
1	İstanbul			20.2	20.2
2	Western Marmara	2.1	3.7		5.7
3	Aegean	4.1	6.5	5.1	15.7
4	Eastern Marmara	1.5	2.9	5.2	9.6
5	Western Anatolia			7.9	7.9
6	Mediterranean	3.4	2.1	6.6	12.1
7	Central Anatolia	1.2	2.2	1.4	4.8
8	Western Black Sea	2.8	3.7		6.4
9	Eastern Black Sea	1.3	2.2		3.4
10	Northeastern Anatolia	1.5			1.5
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	1.5	2.1		3.5
12	Southeastern Anatolia	1.2	3.6	4.5	9.3



Total	20.3	28.9	50.9	100.0
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## 4. FREQUENCY TABLES

### 4.1. Profile of the Respondents

Gender	Percentage
Female	45.0
Male	55.0
Total	100.0

Age	Percentage
Between 18 - 28	27.9
Between 29 - 43	34.9
44 and above	37.2
Total	100.0

Educational attainment level	Percentage
Illiterate	5.1
Literate without degree	2.1
Primary school degree	33.8
Secondary school degree	16.3
High school degree	27.1
College degree	14.3
Masters/PhD	1.3
Total	100.0

Monthly household income	Percentage
TRY300 or less	2.0
TRY301 - 700	4.6
TRY701 - 1200	33.1
TRY1201 - 2000	35.6
TRY2001 - 3000	15.2
TRY3001 or more	9.4
Total	100.0



<b>Employment status</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Public officer	4.9
Private sector	5.5
Worker	11.3
Small retailer	8.4
Merchant/businessman	1.3
Self-employed	3.1
Farmer, agriculturist, stock breeder	3.1
Employed, other	6.5
Retired	11.3
Housewife	29.6
Student	9.1
Unemployed	4.5
Disabled	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

<b>Lifestyle Cluster</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Modern	27.7
Traditional conservative	46.5
Religious conservative	25.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

<b>Head cover</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
No head cover	27.6
Headscarf	48.3
Turban	6.6
Chador	0.9
Bachelor male	16.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>





<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Turkish	79.2
Kurdish	14.0
Zaza	1.0
Arab	2.0
Other	3.8
Total	100.0

<b>Religion/Sect</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Sunni Muslim	90.6
Alevi Muslim	5.6
Other	3.7
Total	100.0

<b>Piety</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Non-believer	2.7
Believer	29.6
Religious	55.3
Pious	12.4
Total	100.0



<b>TV channel preferred to watch the news</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
ATV	14.1
CNN Turk	2.3
Fox TV	11.8
Habertürk	3.7
Halk TV	3.8
Kanal 7	2.8
Kanal D	12.6
Kanaltürk	0.9
NTV	3.8
Roj TV/Nûçe/Sterk	2.6
Samanyolu	3.0
Show TV	6.4
Star	5.7
TRT	11.3
Ulusal	3.3
Local channels	2.0
Other channels	9.8
Total	100.0

<b>Household size</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
1-2 person(s)	16.9
3-5 people	66.6
6-8 people	13.5
9 people or more	3.0
Total	100.0

<b>Car ownership</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	39.7
No	60.3
Total	100.0



Type of housing	Percentage
Traditional house	36.7
Squatter	7.7
Apartment flat	50.6
Luxury residence	4.9
Total	100.0

Place of residence	Percentage
Rural	20.3
Urban	28.9
Metropolitan	50.9
Total	100.0

Region where the survey was conducted	Percentage
İstanbul	20.2
Western Marmara	5.7
Aegean	15.7
Eastern Marmara	9.6
Western Anatolia	7.9
Mediterranean	12.1
Central Anatolia	4.8
Western Black Sea	6.4
Eastern Black Sea	3.4
Northeastern Anatolia	1.5
Middle Eastern Anatolia	3.5
Southeastern Anatolia	9.3
Total	100.0



<b>Place of birth</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
İstanbul	6.8
Western Marmara	6.0
Aegean	14.0
Eastern Marmara	5.9
Western Anatolia	5.7
Mediterranean	12.7
Central Anatolia	7.3
Western Black Sea	10.2
Eastern Black Sea	6.5
Northeastern Anatolia	4.9
Middle Eastern Anatolia	6.0
Southeastern Anatolia	13.0
Abroad	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

<b>Father's birthplace</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
İstanbul	2.6
Western Marmara	5.9
Aegean	13.1
Eastern Marmara	4.8
Western Anatolia	4.8
Mediterranean	12.0
Central Anatolia	8.6
Western Black Sea	11.5
Eastern Black Sea	8.5
Northeastern Anatolia	5.8
Middle Eastern Anatolia	6.6
Southeastern Anatolia	13.8
Abroad	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>



## 4.2. Theme of the Month: Living Together

How distant do you feel yourself from this group?	Percentage
0 (not distant)	5.5
1-49	5.3
50 (in the center)	19.6
51-99	14.1
100 (very distant)	38.9
No answer	16.6
Total	100.0

How reliable do you think the members of this group are?	Percentage
Definitely unreliable	39.2
Unreliable	31.8
Neither reliable, nor unreliable	18.5
Reliable	7.9
Definitely reliable	2.6
Total	100.0

How powerful do you think the members of this group are?	Percentage
Definitely weak	16.1
Weak	28.4
Neither weak, nor powerful	25.3
Powerful	23.9
Definitely powerful	6.3
Total	100.0

How aggressive or pacifist do you think the members of this group are?	Percentage
Definitely aggressive	30.3
Aggressive	36.8
Neither aggressive, nor pacifist	22.4
Pacifist	8.0
Definitely pacifist	2.5
Total	100.0



<b>How educated do you think the members of this group are?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Definitely uneducated	22.2
Uneducated	32.2
Neither well-educated, nor uneducated	28.6
Well-educated	14.0
Definitely well-educated	3.0
Total	100.0

<b>How often do you share the same space (house, work, neighborhood, etc.) with the members of this group?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Never	22.0
Seldom	27.6
Often	26.6
Frequently	16.3
Always	7.4
Total	100.0

<b>How often do you become friends or chat with the members of this group?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Never	29.5
Seldom	26.5
Often	25.9
Frequently	11.9
Always	6.2
Total	100.0

<b>How often do you shop from the stores/stalls owned by the members of this group?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Never	27.6
Seldom	25.0
Often	28.1
Frequently	13.6
Always	5.8
Total	100.0



<b>I try to understand the feelings of the members of this group.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	9.4
Disagree	21.6
Neither agree, nor disagree	21.0
Agree	41.1
Strongly agree	6.9
Total	100.0

<b>I would trust the behaviors and decisions of a police officer even if he is a member of this group.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	20.3
Disagree	28.5
Neither agree, nor disagree	20.2
Agree	25.6
Strongly agree	5.3
Total	100.0

<b>I would not oppose if my daughter/son wants to marry a member of this group.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	27.5
Disagree	24.9
Neither agree, nor disagree	23.6
Agree	20.0
Strongly agree	4.0
Total	100.0

<b>I would become business partners with a member of this group.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	28.5
Disagree	31.5
Neither agree, nor disagree	19.1
Agree	18.1
Strongly agree	2.8
Total	100.0



<b>I would rent my house to the members of this group/I would like a member of this group to be my neighbor.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	24.1
Disagree	27.9
Neither agree, nor disagree	21.0
Agree	23.2
Strongly agree	3.9
Total	100.0

<b>I would trust a court verdict even if the judge was a member of this group.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	20.4
Disagree	25.4
Neither agree, nor disagree	21.8
Agree	26.5
Strongly agree	5.9
Total	100.0

<b>I try to understand why the members of this group think different.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	8.8
Disagree	19.2
Neither agree, nor disagree	24.1
Agree	41.1
Strongly agree	6.8
Total	100.0

<b>I think that the members of this group endeavor to change my lifestyle and value judgment.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	9.8
Disagree	26.6
Neither agree, nor disagree	20.4
Agree	30.3
Strongly agree	13.0
Total	100.0





<b>I think that the members of this group possess seats they do not deserve.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	4.5
Disagree	14.0
Neither agree, nor disagree	20.4
Agree	33.9
Strongly agree	27.2
Total	100.0

<b>I think that the members of this group enjoy an unfair access to the resources in the country.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	3.3
Disagree	11.4
Neither agree, nor disagree	14.9
Agree	37.3
Strongly agree	33.1
Total	100.0

<b>I think that the members of this group break the social peace.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	4.3
Disagree	9.2
Neither agree, nor disagree	14.4
Agree	36.8
Strongly agree	35.3
Total	100.0

<b>Everyone should acknowledge that they are citizens of the Turkish Republic and should give up putting emphasis on their ethnic identities/religious beliefs/political identity or differences.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	2.5
Disagree	8.0
Neither agree, nor disagree	7.0
Agree	47.7
Strongly agree	34.8
Total	100.0



<b>Turkish citizenship constitutes an essential part of my identity.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	1.6
Disagree	4.7
Neither agree, nor disagree	8.0
Agree	52.0
Strongly agree	33.6
Total	100.0

<b>I think that the members of this group do not respect me because of my ethnic, religious or ideological identity.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	7.8
Disagree	25.5
Neither agree, nor disagree	23.6
Agree	30.0
Strongly agree	13.2
Total	100.0

<b>In order to live in peace, we should all remember that we are all humans, and we should not think too much about ethnic groups, sects and ideological groups.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	1.1
Disagree	6.0
Neither agree, nor disagree	13.8
Agree	47.6
Strongly agree	31.5
Total	100.0

<b>My ethnic origin constitutes an essential part of my identity.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	2.4
Disagree	10.2
Neither agree, nor disagree	16.9
Agree	48.8
Strongly agree	21.7
Total	100.0



<b>In order to achieve social peace, cultural background and histories of different groups (ethnic, ideological, religious, etc.) should be included in the school curriculum.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	8.2
Disagree	14.5
Neither agree, nor disagree	18.3
Agree	41.7
Strongly agree	17.3
Total	100.0

<b>My religious beliefs constitute an essential part of my identity.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	2.2
Disagree	7.3
Neither agree, nor disagree	12.6
Agree	47.8
Strongly agree	30.0
Total	100.0





## 5. GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents, interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how pious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms.

Term	Explanation
<b>Alevi Muslim:</b>	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim
<b>Lower middle class:</b>	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car
<b>Lower class:</b>	Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment
<b>Arab:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab
<b>Headscarf:</b>	A woman whom herself wears a headscarf or a man whose spouse wears a headscarf
<b>Chador:</b>	A woman whom herself wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a chador
<b>Religious:</b>	A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion
<b>Religious conservative:</b>	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative
<b>Traditional conservative:</b>	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative
<b>Ideological:</b>	A person who states that it is the party closest to his/her political view
<b>Believer:</b>	A person who believes the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them
<b>Non-believer:</b>	A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion
<b>Urban area:</b>	Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
<b>Rural area:</b>	Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
<b>Kurdish:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish
<b>Leader follower:</b>	A person who states that he/she trusts in/favors the leader of a certain party



<b>Metropolitan:</b>	Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)
<b>Modern:</b>	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern
<b>No cover:</b>	A woman whom herself does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head
<b>Non-partisan:</b>	A person who states that none of these parties represent him/her
<b>Pious:</b>	A person who completely fulfills the requirements of the religion
<b>Late decider:</b>	A person who states that he/she makes a decision based on the election campaigns
<b>Sunni Muslim:</b>	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim
<b>Partisan:</b>	A person who states that he/she/they always vote for that party
<b>Turban:</b>	A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a turban
<b>Turkish:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish
<b>Upper class:</b>	Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment
<b>New middle class:</b>	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment and which own a car
<b>Zaza:</b>	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza

Questions and response options which establish the basis for the terms:

<b>Which of the three lifestyle clusters below do you feel you belong to?</b>
Modern
Traditional conservative
Religious conservative
<b>Do you cover your head or does your spouse cover her head when going out of your home? How do you cover your head?</b>
No head cover
Headscarf
Turban
Chador
Bachelor male



**We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you belong to?**

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

**Which religion or sect do you feel you belong to?**

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

**Which of the below describes you in terms of piety?**

A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

A person who believes the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

A person who completely fulfills the requirements of the religion

**Which of the reasons below influence/determine your political preferences?**

I/we always vote for that party.

It is the party closest to my political view.

I trust/favor its leader.

None of these parties represent me.

I make a decision based on the election campaigns.

**Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample)**

Rural

Urban

Metropolitan



**Economic classes (determined by using household size, household income and car ownership)**

Lower class

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper class