KONDA

Barometer

THEMES

Trust and the Kurdish Issue
September 2015

KONDA
ARAŞTIRMA VE DANIŞMANLIK

CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey that forms the basis to this report was conducted on 5-6 September by face-to-face interviews with 3486 individuals in their homes in 200 neighborhoods and villages of 136 districts including the central districts of 30 provinces.

THEME OF THE MONTH: TRUST AND KURDISH PROBLEM
A society without trust
Only 7 percent of the society believe in general that people can be trusted. This rate was the same in 2012. Even though people are rather distrustful to people they meet for the first time, they nevertheless tend to trust more if they have the same religion. Ethnic identity is also an important reference point although not as significant as religion. People have less trust to those with different religions or ethnic identities.

Both the core of the Ak Parti and Kurds now trust the government less
Comparing the current situation with that of September 2012, we observe that the trust for the government decreased (from 2.9 to 2.6 in the scale of 1 to 5). This loss of trust is especially apparent among the Ak Parti supporters (from 4 to 3.6), housewives, people who cover their heads and lower income groups as well as the Kurds. However, this loss of trust stems mainly from the Kurds who support the Ak Parti rather than HDP-supporting Kurds who have increased in number but have already been very distrustful.

In the perception of the Kurdish problem, living together and terror are conceived as separate matters
By eluding daily conflict and terror events, we posed questions that handled the general view of the society regarding the Kurdish problem and the sources of the problem as well as questions that examined the possibility to live together upon which we observed that even though in the matter of recognizing the Kurdish identity constitutionally, the support increased slightly, Turks approach the matter with deliberation. In addition, even though the belief that the problem can be solved by eliminating terror has decreased since 2010, this belief is nevertheless affected by political polarization. On the other hand, the society reflects a very open attitude towards living together stating that the Turks and Kurds have similar family values and that inter-marriages are common. Further, even though Turks believe that the state does not discriminate between the Turks and Kurds, they believe almost as much as Kurds do that there must be no difference in terms of rights, power and wealth between the Turks and Kurds. Therefore, we may claim that the society has a clear mind about distinguishing the belief that the Turks and Kurds can live together from the matter of terror and rights.

Kurds are more distrustful and care about their ethnic identity more
Yet, it is alarming that within this period, distrust among the Kurds has increased and the Kurds have felt the need to hold on to their ethnic identity at a greater extent. Their trust towards people of different ethnic identities decreased more than the decrease in their trust towards the Kurds since 2012. In other words, their distrust in terms of ethnicity increased. We observe that the Kurds are distrustful in terms of not only

ethnicity but also religion and that they have less trust to people they meet for the first time. This distrustfulness is more apparent among those Kurds who indicate that their ethnic identity defines them. Further, for 41 percent of the Kurds, ethnic identity is the most important factor and a twofold increase occurred in this rate which had been 20 percent in 2012.

Society has become closer to solution and to confront the Kurdish problem

When we asked the interviewees how to solve the Kurdish problem as an open-ended question and grouped the answers, we observed firstly that the rate of those who suggest constructive solutions has increased whereas solutions that ignore demands for rights such as development and education have lost popularity. Still, with the influence of the situation of conflict, there is nevertheless an increase in the rate of those who suggest destructive and unrealistic solutions. However, when we analyzed the suggestions for solution as to which stage they are in terms of "5 stages of grief" we observed that since 2012 there has been no change in the dimension of the cluster that denies the Kurdish problem and is in anger and that there is a decrease in the next stage which is the bargaining stage. The greatest change occurs in the depression stage, i.e. those who lost hope for a solution decreased in half and they converted to the acceptance stage which is the final one. The rate of those who completely accepted the Kurdish problem and believe that it can be solved through democracy and human rights has increased from 27 percent to 38 percent within three years. Therefore, especially from 2010 up till now, we, as a society, have progressed a great deal about confronting the Kurdish problem.

2. TRUST AND THE KURDISH ISSUE

2.1. Conceptual Framework

In the September'12 Barometer we had focused on the theme of "Trust in Daily Life" with the attempt to understand the level of interpersonal trust, the grounds on which individuals do or do not trust each other and the relation between interpersonal trust and personal past experiences, risk and politics. The research confirmed the findings of the World Values Survey (WVS) which had documented that lack of trust in Turkey is much lower than the global average. WVS had also revealed that religion and ethnic identity are critical references in trusting others.

The available literature on trust indicates that a strong sense of trust in societies plays a key role in steady economic growth, effective governance and well-being and leads to flourishing social, political and economic collaborations. Furthermore, sense of trust nurtures interpersonal trust and enables individuals to collaborate and make a difference in politics.

The escalation of conflict and terrorism after the election triggered discontent among society and the concern that all that was gained through the peace process had been lost. For instance, about half of society now state that they would never consider voting for HDP. In this month's survey, we repeated the trust-themed research conducted in 2012 in part, with the intention to identify how the current atmosphere and the last 3 years of the Kurdish issue affected the trust between the Turkish and the Kurdish and their desire to live together. In other words, we tried to answer the questions below: "Do the Turkish and the Kurdish trust each other more than before or less than before?" "Does the importance attached to ethnic identities have any influence on the trust between the members of different ethnic groups?"

We also endeavored to identify the readiness in society to face the Kurdish issue. With this perspective, we went beyond the recent developments and addressed issues such as constitutional recognition, termination of terrorism, family values and intermarriage in different ethnic groups, and inquired about the solutions the respondents offered for the solution of the Kurdish issue.

2.2. Influence of Religion and Ethnic Identities on Trust

In order to understand the level of interpersonal trust, we first asked a question commonly used in international studies that we had also used in 2012. In response to the question, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" 7.1 percent of the respondents stated that "most people can be trusted." At 6.3, the corresponding rate in 2012 was quite close.

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

	Most people can be trusted.	Can´t be too careful.
Sep'12	6,3	93,7
Sep'15	7,1	92,9

0 %   50 %   100 %

■ Most people can be trusted.   ■ Can´t be too careful.

Only a small segment of society thinks that most people can be trusted. Furthermore, we do not see many particular factors that can generate such trust. However, we can clearly see that the level of trust decreases as individuals become more religious and fulfill religious requirements more frequently. The respondents who perceive the recent developments as a sign of political crisis trust others less than the respondents who think that things are running their normal course. Other than these observations, it is not possible to speak of any particular social factor that can be clearly observed in 2012 or in 2015.

On the other hand, religion and ethnic identity become quite important when it comes to trust in other communities and institutions.

In order to further expand on the concept of trust, we asked the respondents whether they would trust people they meet for the first time, people from the same ethnic group or religion, people from other ethnic groups or religions. We also inquired about their level of trust in various institutions. The responses to these questions enable us to analyze the influence of certain demographic characteristics on the level of interpersonal trust. The graph below presents the findings of this month's survey, along with the results from 2012.

Trust in other groups and institutions (Comparison of 2012 and 2015)

Category	Year	Not at all	Not very much	Don't know	Somewhat	Completely
In people met for the first time	2012	41,0	29,2	17,3	11,8	0,6
	2015	40,9	29,9	15,9	11,6	1,6
In people from the same religion	2012	11,0	14,8	27,9	35,5	10,8
	2015	13,7	19,7	27,0	28,1	11,6
In people from other religions	2012	24,8	24,8	29,1	18,2	3,1
	2015	28,3	27,0	26,7	14,0	4,0
In people from the same ethnic group	2012	15,1	20,1	29,7	30,5	4,6
	2015	16,7	24,4	28,0	24,3	6,6
In people from other ethnic groups	2012	25,1	25,7	28,8	18,3	2,0
	2015	25,5	28,5	27,5	15,0	3,5
In the government	2012	30,2	13,3	13,2	23,7	19,6
	2015	37,5	16,6	12,6	17,7	15,6
In political parties	2012	34,9	26,6	19,3	15,7	3,5
	2015	35,1	27,3	20,6	14,0	3,1
In the broadcast and print media	2012	45,1	24,5	14,4	14,0	2,1
	2015	44,9	22,3	16,6	12,7	3,5

Legend: Not at all — Not very much — Don't know — Somewhat — Completely

People from the same religion or the same ethnic group are most trusted, respectively.

Roughly 13 percent of the respondents express that they would "somewhat" or "completely" trust people they meet for the first time. There is no significant difference between the findings of 2012 and 2015. However, respondents are more likely to trust others whom they know more about. People from the same religion are trusted the most. People from the same ethnic group are the second most trusted group. Even so, these groups can win the trust of less than 50 percent of society. When people are aware that someone is from another religion or another ethnic group, the level of interpersonal trust for this person decreases by almost half. In summary, the impact of religion and ethnic identity on interpersonal trust is the most striking finding deduced from the graph.

In comparison to 2012, we cannot observe any change in the responses provided to the question on overall trust and the question on trusting people met for the first time. However, the rate of the respondents who trust people from the same religion or from the same ethnic group decreased noticeably over 3 years. For example, in comparison to 2012, the rate of those who trust people from the same religion declined from 46 percent to 40 percent. Likewise, the rate of those who trust people from the same ethnic group decreased from 21 percent to 18 percent.

It is also worth noting in the graph that, over 3 years, the rate of those who trust in the government decreased by 10-points, slumping from 43 percent to 33 percent. The level of confidence in political parties decreased by 2 points, while the degree of trust in the already least trusted broadcast and print media remained the same.

2.2.1. Impact of religion and ethnic identity on trust

Certain changes are observed in opinions in the context of trust and ethnic identity over the past 3 years. When addressed in conjunction with the Kurdish issue, it is critical to identify the groups whose opinions have changed and the direction of these changes in order to understand how the overall attitude of society towards the Kurdish issue has changed over the last 3 years.

The level of trust in people from the same group is more important than the level of trust in people from other groups

Analyzing the level of trust in people from different groups by itself is not sufficient to understand the level of interpersonal trust. If the a person is not confident in people in general or does not trust people from the same group, the fact that he/she does not trust in people from other groups does not necessarily imply that he/she is intolerant to others. However, if an individual does trust the people from the group he/she belongs to and is not confident in those from other groups at the same time, it would be a problematic attitude. Thus, the *difference* between the level of trust in people from one's own group and the level of trust in people from different groups deserves to be analyzed. For instance, it would be a problem if the Turkish were to trust the Turkish very much, but not the Kurdish at all. On the other hand, lack of trust in the Kurdish does not constitute a problem if the Turkish do not trust the Turkish in the first place.

Different segments of society present similar behaviors when it comes to trusting others based on religion and ethnic identity. In other words, although factors such as educational attainment level, degree of piety and age may be influential to a certain extent, the behaviors of different segments are quite similar. The graphs on the following two pages provide further insight on the impact of religion and ethnic identity and how it has changed over the last 3 years. These graphs show the level of trust in people from the same group and in people from different groups among Sunni Muslims, Alevi Muslims, the Turkish and the Kurdish. The graphs also provide a comparison of 2012 and 2015.

Change in the level of trust among different groups (2012-2015)

Legend: ■ Not at all ■ Not really ■ Don't know ■ Somewhat ■ Completely

Sunni Muslims

	Not at all	Not really	Don't know	Somewhat	Completely
People from a different religion — 2015	29	27	26	14	4
People from a different religion — 2012	25	25	29	18	3
People from the same religion — 2015	13	20	27	29	12
People from the same religion — 2012	11	15	27	36	11
People from a different ethnic group — 2015	26	25	27	15	3
People from a different ethnic group — 2012	25	26	28	18	2
People from the same ethnic group — 2015	17	25	28	24	6
People from the same ethnic group — 2012	15	20	29	30	5
People met for the first time — 2015	41	31	16	11	2
People met for the first time — 2012	41	29	17	12	1

Alevi Muslims

	Not at all	Not really	Don't know	Somewhat	Completely
People from a different religion — 2015	21	24	32	18	6
People from a different religion — 2012	19	20	37	21	3
People from the same religion — 2015	18	21	30	22	10
People from the same religion — 2012	15	13	40	26	6
People from a different ethnic group — 2015	19	23	29	22	7
People from a different ethnic group — 2012	21	27	32	20	0
People from the same ethnic group — 2015	15	22	24	30	9
People from the same ethnic group — 2012	12	21	34	32	2
People met for the first time — 2015	38	24	20	16	2
People met for the first time — 2012	36	33	18	13	0

Change in the level of trust among different groups (2012-2015)

The following observations are noteworthy:

- Sunni Muslims only tend to distrust people they meet for the first time, but also their level of trust further declines when they learn the religious and ethnic groups of others.
- The Turkish present a similar attitude to the Sunni Muslims in terms of trusting people they meet for the first time; and their level of trust in people from the same religious or ethnic group has decreased over the last 3 years. However, their level of trust in people from different religions or different ethnic groups decreased only slightly to remain at a similar level.
- Among the Kurdish, the level of trust in all of the groups has decreased, including the people they meet for the first time. In the following sections, we will elaborate further on this situation and its relation to political preferences and the Kurdish issue.

Although the graphs indicate a general decrease in the level of trust in people from other groups, it is critical to take a look at the variation between the level of trust within the same group and the level of trust in other groups. In other words, we should be asking the following question: Among the Turkish, did the variation between the level of trust in the Turkish and in the Kurdish in 2012 increase or decrease in 2015?

The average values presented in the table below provides the answer to this question. The first row in the table shows that, in 2012, the individuals in Turkey trusted people from the same group at the level of 2.9 points, in other words, they neither trusted them nor mistrusted them. Their level of trust to people from different ethnic groups was slightly lower at 2.5. The variation between these two figures was -0.4. In 2015, however, the level of confidence to people from the same ethnic groups decreased to 2.8, and the level of trust in people from different ethnic groups is at 2.4. Thus, the variation between these figures decreased by 0.1 points. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about a change in the level of trust between 2012 and 2015. The table indicates a similar outlook for the Turkish as well.

	Trust in 2012			Trust in 2015			Change in the level of trust (2012-2015)
	same ethnic group	different ethnic group	Difference	same ethnic group	different ethnic group	Difference	
TURKEY	2.9	2.5	-0.4	2.8	2.4	-0.4	-0.1
Turkish	2.9	2.4	-0.5	2.8	2.4	-0.4	-0.1
Kurdish	3.0	2.7	-0.3	2.9	2.4	-0.5	0.2

In 2012, the Kurdish trusted in the Kurdish at the level of 3.0, while they trusted people from other ethnic groups at the level of 2.7.Thus, the variation between the two was -0.3

points. In 2015, their level of trust in the Kurdish decreased to 2.9 and their level of trust in people from other ethnic groups dropped to 2.4 to make the variation -0.5 points. In other words, their level of trust in people from other ethnic groups decreased more than their level of trust in each other.

The changes in the level of trust between the different groups other than the Turkish and the Kurdish since 2012 are presented in the summary table below. The table demonstrates the variations between the level of trust in the same religious/ethnic group and the level of trust in people from other religious/ethnic groups in 2012. The columns where the numbers are bold indicate how much the variations increased/decreased from 2012 to 2015.

	Trust in different ethnic groups				Trust in different religious groups		
	Variation in 2012	Variation in 2015	Difference		Variation in 2012	Variation in 2015	Difference
TURKEY	-0.4	-0.4	**-0.1**		-0.7	-0.7	**0.0**
Political preference							
Ak Parti	-0.4	-0.4	**0.0**		-0.9	-1.0	**-0.1**
CHP	-0.4	-0.3	**-0.1**		-0.2	-0.3	**-0.1**
MHP	-0.7	-0.5	**-0.2**		-0.7	-0.8	**-0.1**
HDP	-0.3	-0.5	**0.2**		-0.7	-0.3	**0.3**
Swing voters	-0.4	-0.3	**-0.2**		-0.6	-0.6	**0.0**
Non-voters	-0.4	-0.1	**-0.2**		-0.5	-0.5	**0.1**
Ethnic identity							
Turkish	-0.5	-0.4	**-0.1**		-0.6	-0.7	**0.0**
Kurdish	-0.3	-0.5	**0.2**		-0.8	-0.9	**0.0**
Religion / sect							
Sunni Muslim	-0.4	-0.4	**0.0**		-0.7	-0.7	**0.0**
Alevi Muslim	-0.4	-0.2	**-0.2**		-0.2	-0.2	**0.0**
Head cover status							
No head cover	-0.4	-0.3	**-0.1**		-0.3	-0.3	**0.0**
Headscarf	-0.5	-0.4	**0.0**		-0.9	-0.9	**-0.1**
Turban	-0.7	-0.4	**-0.2**		-0.9	-1.3	**-0.4**
Which best describes your identity?							
Turkish citizenship	-0.4	-0.3	**-0.1**		-0.6	-0.6	**0.0**
My ethnic identity	-0.4	-0.6	**0.2**		-0.7	-0.5	**0.2**
My religion/sect	-0.5	-0.5	**0.0**		-0.9	-1.0	**-0.1**
Monthly household income							
TRY 700 or less	-0.6	-0.4	**-0.1**		-0.9	-1.3	**-0.4**
TRY 701 - 1200	-0.6	-0.4	**-0.2**		-0.8	-1.1	**-0.4**

TRY 1201 - 2000	-0.5	-0.4	**-0.1**	-0.6	-0.8	**-0.1**
TRY 2001 - 3000	-0.4	-0.3	**0.0**	-0.5	-0.6	**-0.2**
TRY 3001 - 5000	-0.4	-0.3	**0.0**	-0.4	-0.4	**0.0**
TRY 5001 or more	-0.1	-0.4	**0.3**	-0.7	-0.3	**0.4**

2.3. Trust in the Government

In addition to the level of interpersonal trust, we also addressed the level of trust in various institutions in the monthly theme, and we compared the findings with those in 2012. As presented in the graph below, less than half of the general public trusts the government, political parties, and the broadcast and print media. At 34 percent, the government is trusted the most by the respondents. The second most trusted entity is political parties at 17 percent, followed by the broadcast and print media, which is trusted by 16 percent of the respondents. 67 percent of the respondents express that they do not trust the broadcast and print media "at all" or "very much".

Trust in institutions (2102 - 2015)

The comparison between the findings of 2012 and the current month reveals that the already low level of trust in political parties and in the broadcast and print media remained at the same level, while the level of trust in the government decreased, and the rate of the respondents who do not trust the government increased. As emphasized earlier in this section, the overall decline in the level of trust in the government from 2012 to 2105 is striking. When we analyze how the level of trust in the government changed over the past 3 years by demographic groups, we obtain even more interesting findings. Although groups who already tend to have weak confidence in the government did not change much, the level of trust among the groups which generally have confidence the government decreased considerably. We can observe significant variance in the level of trust among the core voter groups of

Ak Parti such as housewives, workers, low-income groups, and most particularly the Kurdish.

The rate of the respondents who state that they "somewhat" or "completely" trust the government decreased from 44 percent in 2012 to 34 percent in 2015. On the other hand, the rate of the respondents who state that they do "not really" or "not at all" trust the government increased from 43 percent in 2012 up to 55 percent in 2015. On a scale of 1-5, the level of trust in the government decreased from 2.9 points in 2012 to 2.6 points in 2015. Such a decrease is observed in the majority of the demographic groups. The two graphs below present that the decrease in trust levels among the respondents who are housewives, who cover their head, who are religious, who have a low income or who live in squatter settlements is above the overall average in Turkey. It is evident that these are the groups from which Ak Parti has been receiving the majority of its votes and among which Ak Parti's popularity has declined according to our analyses prior to the June 7th General Election. Along with the decrease in the number of Ak Parti voters, the level of trust in the government among Ak Parti voters also decreased from 4 points to 3.6 points. Ak Parti's vote loss in the June 7th General Election may be associated to the declining trust among its voters.

Change in the level of trust in the government (2012 - 2015)

Category	Group	2012	2015
Lifestyle	Modern	2,3	2,0
	Traditional cons.	2,9	2,6
	Religious cons.	3,5	3,2
Political preference	Ak Parti	4,0	3,6
	CHP	1,8	1,6
	MHP	2,1	2,0
	HDP	1,6	1,5
	Swing voter	2,7	2,4
	Non-voter	2,0	2,1
Head cover	No cover	2,3	2,0
	Headscarf	3,3	2,8
	Turban	3,6	3,1
Piety	Non-believer	1,7	1,6
	Believer	2,3	2,2
	Religious	3,1	2,7
	Pious	3,5	3,1

<< Not at all   Completely>>

The Kurdish prove to be another group among which the level of trust in the government declined above average. The level of trust in the government among the Kurdish decreased from 2.8 points to 2 points. In other words, in 2012, an average citizen with a Kurdish ethnic identity would state that he/she "neither trusts nor does not trust in the government"," in 2015, the same person would opt for the response option, "not very much." Given the findings of this research as well as the conclusions drawn from other studies and sources, this alarming change in the trust levels may not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, if we elaborate on the decrease in the level of trust among the Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity and HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity separately, we can clearly observe how the relationship between the Kurdish and the government has evolved over the last 3 years.

First of all, we will take a look at the rate of the Kurdish who identified themselves as Ak Parti voters or BDP/HDP voters in the fields surveys conducted in September 2012

and this month. According to the graph below, in September 2012, BDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity accounted for 3.2 percent of the respondents. In September 2015, the rate of HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity climbed up to 9.2. While the rate of Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity was 5 percent in 2012, the current rate is 3.4 percent.

Rate of voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity

HDP voters with a Kurdish identity in 2012	**3,2**
HDP voters with a Kurdish identity in 2015	**9,2**
Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish identity in 2012	**5,0**
Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish identity in 2015	**3,4**

0   5   10

Several social dynamics led to this variance: The shift of Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity to HDP, the decrease in the rate of swing voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity, the popularity of HDP among the first-time voters, and the decrease in the rate of Kurdish respondents who refrain from disclosing their ethnic identity to the poll takers. Thus, when making a comparison between the trust levels over the past three years, we actually address two clusters with quite different profiles. Even so, the graph below clearly shows the change in the level of trust in the government among the Kurdish.

Change in the level of trust in the government among the Kurdish

		Not at all	Not very much	Don't know	Somewhat	Completely
Kurdish	2012	37	9	8	25	21
	2015	57	15	6	10	11
HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity	2012	73	9	8	8	3
	2015	69	17	6	6	2
Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity	2012	8	6	7	36	43
	2015	26	9	4	22	40

■ Not at all ■ Not very much ■ Don't know ■ Somewhat ■ Completely

The graph below gives us the opportunity to analyze the same data on average.

Change in the level of trust in the government among the Kurdish (2012 - 2015)

	2012	2015
TURKEY	2,9	2,6
Turkish	2,9	2,7
Kurdish	2,8	2,0
Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish identity	4,0	3,5
HDP voters with a Kurdish identity	1,6	1,5

The already low levels of trust among the HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity, declined further despite the voters who shifted from Ak Parti. Meanwhile, the level of trust in the government among the Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity, which is already a diminished core group, also declined.

We are not quite certain about to what extent the respondents associated the term "government" with Ak Parti when they heard the question about their level of trust in the government. It is possible that the respondents may have addressed the term "government" as a broader concept and referred to it as the state. Regardless of whether the respondents with a Kurdish ethnic identity have associated the term "government" with Ak Parti or not, the relationship between the Kurdish and the government acquired a turbulent character. In short, whether they support HDP or Ak Parti, the Kurdish who were already uncertain about trusting the government according to the findings of 2012, have become less trusting of the government over the past three years. It is indisputable that the conflicts that broke out after the election played an important role in this.

The level of trust in political parties among the respondents has not changed considerably; nevertheless, a 0.04-point decrease is observed. On the other hand, the level of trust in political parties recovered by 0.4 points among the Kurdish and by 0.3 points among the respondents who define themselves by their ethnic identity. It is particularly interesting that the level of trust in political parties increased in these two groups over the last 3 years, while it declined within all other groups. It is worth paying closer attention that, among HDP voters, trust levels in the government did not change, while their trust levels in political parties improved. The recovery in the trust levels in political parties among HDP voters may be associated with the fact that HDP passed the electoral threshold and entered the parliament as a party. This implies that HDP voters attach importance to being politically represented in the parliament.

Out of the various groups and institutions we inquired about in the field survey, the broadcast and print media recorded the lowest levels of trust. The low trust levels in the broadcast and print media have been persistent since 2012. Over three years, an increase that accounts for 0.3 points or above in the level of trust in the broadcast and print media has been recorded for only 3 groups: the respondents who wear the turban (0.5-point increase), the pious (0.3 point increase) and the respondents who live urban areas (0.3 point increase).

2.4. Trust in the Broadcast and Print Media

Although trust in the broadcast and print media is very low and the outlook remains more or less the same in different demographic groups, the TV channel preference of the respondents to watch the news provide us with an interesting finding on the trust in the broadcast and print media. As presented in the graph below, regardless of their TV channel preference, the respondents express distrust in the broadcast and print media.

Level of trust in the broadcast and print media by news source

News source	Trust level
Turkey	2,1
Does not watch	1,9
Kanal 7	2,5
Kanal D	2,3
Star	2,3
Samanyolu	2,3
Show TV	2,3
ATV	2,2
Halk TV	2,1
Fox TV	2,1
TRT	2,1
Habertürk	2,0
CNNTürk	2,0
NTV	1,9
Ulusal	1,6
İMÇ	1,4
Roj/Nuçe/Sterk	1,3

<< Not at all   Completely>>

Although the question we ask does not specifically mention any specific channel and inquires about the "broadcast and print media" in general, which is inclusive of pro-government and anti-government media organizations, the audiences of pro-government channels tend to trust the broadcast and print media more than the audiences of anti-government channels. The ranking of different audiences does not necessarily reflect the polarization as usual. We can predict that factors such as educational attainment level are making an impact on the results. It is worth noting that, among the audiences who do not trust the broadcast and print media, the audiences of channels such as Roj, Nuçe, Strek and İMÇ are at the top of the list.

This indicates that the respondents refer to the conventional channels when they are inquired about trust in the broadcast and print media. In other words, although we did not attempt to make a comparison between the digital, broadcast and print media, we can suggest that it is expected to observe lower levels of trust in the broadcast and print media among the respondents who have more confidence in social media and the internet.

2.5. The Kurdish Issue

Terror and conflict resurged following the heated debates on the peace process prior to the June 7th General Election, the statement of President Erdoğan that he does not recognize the consensus reached in the Dolmabahçe Palace, and PKK's attacks.

Discussions centered around who brought the peace process to an end, who first pull a gun on the other and who the actors are. However, we believe that this is a matter of how we can reach a consensus on "living together." Although it is expected that debates will focus on the actors on account of the approaching snap elections, we highly doubt that such debates will offer any constructive solution for the future of the country.

Thus, it is important to understand what kind of changes the peace process and the resurgence of terror and conflict brought about in terms of voter opinions. With this perspective, we addressed the Kurdish issue in the September'15 Barometer in order to look beyond the recent developments and to identify on what grounds a new social consensus can be achieved. At this point, it is necessary to note that the field survey was conducted before the Dağlıca attack and the incidents that followed. In other words, the current research does not reflect any social milestone or changes observed in the aftermath of the Dağlıca attack.

2.5.1. Voter self-identification

Given that the politicians are very much focused on "the issue of identity," it is appropriate to begin with the responses provided to the question, "Which best describes you? Which of the identities below comes first?" Out of the three response options provided, two thirds (64 percent) of the respondents stated that "Turkish citizenship" defines them. While 23 percent of the respondents prioritized their "religious/sectarian identity," 13 percent stated that their "ethnic identity" comes first.

Which best describes you? Which of the below comes first?

When we analyze the responses by ethnic identity and religion, it is observed 70 percent of the Turkish prioritize "Turkish citizenship," while only 27 percent of the Kurdish think alike. Among the Kurdish, 41 percent state that their ethnic identity supersedes the other response options. In addition, 32 percent of the Kurdish mention that sense of religious belonging is the most important.

According to the September'12 Barometer, Turkish citizenship was the most popular response with a preference rate of 65 percent.

Which best describes you? Which of the below comes first?

	Turkish citizenship	My ethnic identity	My religion/sect
Turkey	64	14	23
Turkish	70	8	21
Kurdish	27	41	32
Zaza	65	15	20
Arab	74	8	18
Other	77	5	17
Sunni Muslim	63	13	24
Alevi Muslim	67	19	14
Other	82	12	7

When we make a similar analysis by religion/sect, it is observed that the rate of those who prioritize "Turkish citizenship" is higher among Alevi Muslims than among Sunni Muslims. Sunni Muslims, however, think that their religious identity comes first.

Which best describes you? Which of the below comes first?

	Turkish citizenship	My ethnic identity	My religion/sect
Turkey	64	14	23
AK Parti	62	6	32
CHP	83	8	9
MHP	68	15	17
HDP	21	53	27
Other parties	74	9	17
Swing voter	68	12	21
Non-voter	62	16	22

The analysis of the responses by political preferences reveal that 83 percent of CHP voters, 68 percent of MHP voters and 62 percent of Ak Parti voters attach the highest importance to "Turkish citizenship." As anticipated, 53 of HDP voters prioritize their ethnic identity.

Which best describes you? Which of the below comes first?

There is one major difference between the findings of the September'12 Barometer and the September'15 Barometer. The preferences of the Turkish respondents did not change over the last three years. Yet, among the Kurdish, the rate of the respondents who stated that their "ethnic identity" comes first increased considerably. In 2012, only 20 percent of the Kurdish responded that ethnic identity defines them the most. However, this month, the corresponding rate reached 41 percent.

These findings imply that the Kurdish struggle to preserve their identity and a considerable part of the Turkish prefer to identify themselves as "citizens of Turkey" rather than prioritizing their ethnic identity, implying that they are aware of how the Kurdish feel themselves suffering.

2.5.2. Identity and trust are most important factors

In the previous section on trust, where we addressed the factors that influence interpersonal trust, we analyzed the impact of ethnic identities on interpersonal trust and how the level of interpersonal trust diverged among the Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni Muslims and Alevi Muslims. Having knowledge about the identity that individuals prioritize enables us to explore the relation between their self-perceived identity and the level of interpersonal trust. In other words, we can seek for answers to questions such as: "In comparison to the Kurdish who prioritize their religious identity, do the Kurdish who prioritize ethnic identity have a negative attitude toward the Turkish?" "Does an MHP voter who prioritizes Turkish citizenship over ethnic identity have a more positive attitude toward the Kurdish?"

Prioritizing Turkish citizenship minimizes ethnic differences.

The first graph below presents the level of interpersonal trust in people from different ethnic groups and in people from the same ethnic group among the respondents who prioritize Turkish citizenship, ethnic identity or religious identity. It is observed that the respondents who define themselves with Turkish citizenship attach less importance to ethnic identity when trusting others. These respondents trust people from the same ethnic group at the level of 2.7-points, while they trust people from other ethnic groups at the level of 2.5-points, where the variation between these two figures is 0.2-points. Among the respondents who prioritize their ethnic identity or religion, the variation is higher (0.5 points). The low variation among the respondents who prioritize Turkish citizenship implies that these respondents consider Turkish citizenship as an identity that is above ethnic differences.

Impact of ethnic identity on the level of interpersonal trust by identity prioritized

Turkey	2,8 / 2,4
Turkish citizenship	2,7 / 2,5
My ethnic identity	2,9 / 2,4
My religion/sect	2,9 / 2,4

<< Not at all   Completely>>

■ in people from the same ethnic group   ■ in people from other ethnic groups

In a similar fashion, the following graph presents the level of interpersonal trust in people from a different religion and in people from the same religion among the respondents who prioritize Turkish citizenship, ethnic identity or religious identity. Among the respondents who state that they define themselves with Turkish citizenship or with their ethnic identity, the variation between the level of trust in people from the same religion and the level of trust in people from a different religion is similar to the overall average in Turkey. On the other hand, this variation is higher among the respondents who prioritize their religion or sect (0.9 points). Put in other words, individuals who prioritize their religious/sectarian identity are less likely to trust people from a different religion.

Impact of religious identity on the level of interpersonal trust by the identity prioritized

Turkey	3,0	
	2,4	
Turkish citizenship	3,0	
	2,5	
My ethnic identity	2,8	
	2,2	
My religion/sect	3,2	
	2,3	

<< Not at all   Completely>>

■ in people from the same religion   ■ in people from other religions

At this point, and particularly within the context of the Kurdish issue, the variation between interpersonal trust in people from a different ethnic group among the Turkish and the Kurdish might arouse curiosity. To be more precise, do Turkish who prioritize their Turkish ethnic identity and the Kurdish who prioritize their Kurdish ethnic identity distrust the other ethnic group? In the current atmosphere where ethnic identity has become a critical factor in politics, how does prioritizing identities such as citizenship, ethnic origin or religion affect the relation between the Turkish and the Kurdish? Also, can we speak of any differences that occurred over the past 3 years?

The tables below present the average level of interpersonal trust in people from a different ethnic group or from a different religion among the Turkish and the Kurdish in both 2012 and 2015, the variation between the figures, and the difference in the variations in 2012 and 2015. The last column, which indicates the difference in the variations in 2012-2015, implies that the level of interpersonal trust in people from different ethnic group or from a different religion among the Kurdish has changed over the 3 years.

| Which best describes you? Which of the below comes first? | | 2012 | 2015 | 2012 | 2015 | 2012 | 2015 | Difference in variation 2012-2015 |
		trust in people from other ethnic	trust in people from other ethnic	trust in people from the same	trust in people from the same	Variation	Variation	
Turkey	Turkish citizenship	2.5	2.5	2.9	2.7	-0.4	-0.3	0.1
	My ethnic identity	2.8	2.4	3.1	2.9	-0.4	-0.6	-0.2
	My religion/sect	2.3	2.4	2.8	2.9	-0.5	-0.5	0.0
Turkish	Turkish citizenship	2.5	2.4	2.9	2.7	-0.4	-0.3	0.1
	My ethnic identity	2.6	2.2	3.0	2.7	-0.4	-0.5	-0.1
	My religion/sect	2.2	2.4	2.8	2.9	-0.5	-0.5	0.1
Kurdish	Turkish citizenship	2.6	2.6	3.0	2.7	-0.4	-0.1	0.3
	My ethnic identity	**3.1**	**2.5**	**3.4**	**3.1**	**-0.2**	**-0.6**	**-0.4**
	My religion/sect	2.6	2.2	2.9	2.8	-0.3	-0.6	-0.3

| Which best describes you? Which of the below comes first? | | 2012 | 2015 | 2012 | 2015 | 2012 | 2015 | Difference in variation 2012-2015 |
		trust in people from other ethnic groups	trust in people from other ethnic	trust in people from the same ethnic group	trust in people from the same	Variation	Variation	
Turkey	Turkish citizenship	2.6	2.5	3.2	3.0	-0.6	-0.6	0.0
	My ethnic identity	2.7	2.2	3.2	2.8	-0.5	-0.7	-0.2
	My religion/sect	2.3	2.3	3.3	3.2	-1.0	-0.9	0.1
Turkish	Turkish citizenship	2.5	2.4	3.2	3.0	-0.6	-0.6	0.0
	My ethnic identity	2.5	2.1	3.1	2.7	-0.6	-0.6	0.0
	My religion/sect	2.2	2.3	3.2	3.2	-1.0	-0.9	0.1
Kurdish	Turkish citizenship	2.6	2.5	3.3	3.1	-0.7	-0.6	0.0
	My ethnic identity	3.2	2.2	3.7	3.0	-0.5	-0.8	-0.4
	My religion/sect	2.4	2.0	3.6	3.0	-1.1	-1.0	0.2

In these quite sophisticated tables, the most important finding is presented in the second row from the bottom. The highest increase over the past 3 years is recorded for the variation in the level of interpersonal trust in people from different ethnic groups

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among the Kurdish who prioritize their ethnic identity. The graph below focuses on this finding in isolation and provides further clarification:

Level of trust in people from different ethnic identities among the Kurdish who prioritize their ethnic identity

2012	from the same ethnic group	3,4
	from other ethnic groups	3,1
2015	from the same ethnic group	3,1
	from other groups	2,5

<< Not at all   Completely >>

Back in 2012, the Kurdish who prioritized their ethnic identity trusted not only the Kurdish (3.4 points), but also people from other ethnic groups (3.1 points). The variation between these two figures (0.2 points) was quite low. In 2015, however, the same group of respondents (who now account for 41 percent of the Kurdish respondents in the sample rather than the 21 percent back in 2012) state that they trust both the Kurdish (3.1 points) and people from other ethnic groups (2.5 points) to a lesser degree. It is striking that the decrease in the level of trust in people from another ethnic group is higher in comparison to the decrease in the level of trust in people from the same group. In other words, the 0.2-point variation in 2012 reached 0.6 points in the current month.

The fact that the Kurdish, who prioritize their ethnic identity at the highest rate, show lower levels of trust in people from other ethnic groups gives clues on the current political atmosphere. However, the decrease in trust levels among the Kurdish is not only associated with ethnic identity. The Kurdish also show lower levels of trust particularly in people from a different religion. In addition, in the earlier sections of the report, we have mentioned that their trust levels in people they meet for the first time as well as in the government have decreased. Thus, rather than the importance the Kurdish attach to their ethnic identity, it may be useful to analyze the overall distrust among the Kurdish as well as why and how the trust levels declined among the Kurdish during the last three years.

2.6. Opinion on the Constitutional Recognition of the Kurdish Ethnic Identity

The responses to the statement, *"The constitution should be amended to include constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity"*, holds the clues as to why the rate

of Kurdish who prioritize their ethnic identity doubled. 33 percent of the respondents 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with this statement, while 51 percent disagree and 16 percent are undecided.

The constitution should be amended to include constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity.

Strongly disagree; 24	Disagree; 27	Neither agree nor disagree; 16	Agree; 21	Strongly agree; 12

0 %　　　　　　　　　　50 %　　　　　　　　　　100 %

Although it looks like the majority of the respondents are against the "constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity," the course of the responses over the last five years reveal that **the rate of the respondents who are in favor of "constitutional recognition" has increased.**

The constitution should be amended to include constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity.

■ Strongly disagree　■ Disagree　■ Neither agree nor disagree　■ Agree　■ Strongly agree

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Sep'15	24	27	16	21	12
Jul'14	22	37	13	20	8
Sep'12	29	30	16	17	8
Jul'10	29	30	16	17	8

0 %　　　　　　　　　　50 %　　　　　　　　　　100 %

When we take a closer look at different voter groups, we observe that 32 percent of CHP voters, 26 percent of Ak Parti voters and 18 percent of MHP voters agree that the Kurdish identity should be recognized in the constitution. On the other hand 75 percent of MHP voters, 58 percent of Ak Parti voters and 52 percent of CHP voters disagree with this statement.

95 percent of HDP voters are in favor of constitutional recognition.

The constitution should be amended to include constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Turkey	24	27	16	21	13
AK Parti	26	32	17	19	7
CHP	23	29	16	23	9
MHP	41	34	7	13	5
HDP	1	2	2	34	61
Other parties	50	20	9	13	9
Swing voter	19	25	26	23	8
Non-voter	23	23	24	18	12

In recent years, it has been argued that the young Kurdish people are different and are more radical than ever. In order to seek for clues on whether such a difference exists, we performed further analyses by age and educational attainment level, and reached the conclusion that the rate of respondents who support or oppose constitutional recognition does not differ among the Kurdish or among the Turkish by age or educational attainment level. In other words, when we analyze the respondents who agree or disagree with this statement by age and educational attainment and in isolation by their ethnic identity, no considerable difference is observed between different groups. The difference is between the Turkish and the Kurdish.

In addition, increased educational attainment levels lead to higher rate of respondents who are in favor of constitutional recognition among the Kurdish and among the Turkish, although not as easily discernible among the latter. Furthermore, younger Kurdish agree that constitutional recognition should be granted at higher rates than other cohorts. Among the Turkish, however, the rate of those who oppose constitutional recognition is higher among younger respondents.

The constitution should be amended to include constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity.

Turkish	Below high sch.	2,5
	High school	2,4
	University	2,5
Kurdish	Below high sch.	4,0
	High school	4,1
	University	4,2
Turkish	Between 18 - 28	2,4
	Between 29 - 43	2,4
	Above 44	2,5
Kurdish	Between 18 - 28	4,2
	Between 29 - 43	3,9
	Above 44	3,9

1. Strongly Disagree   3.Neither agree Nor disagree   5.Strongly Agree

2.7. The Issue of Terrorism

57 percent of society believes that "Termination of terrorism is the only solution to the Kurdish issue." While 27 percent of the respondents do not agree with this statement, 16 percent are undecided.

The rate of the respondents who believe that termination of terrorism is the only solution to the Kurdish issue remained at the same level over the last three years. In the July'10 Barometer, the rate of the respondents who are in favor of this statement was 69 percent; the corresponding rate dropped to 55 percent in September 2012 and remained at the same level in the current month despite the resurgence of terrorist incidents in recent months.

Termination of terrorism is the only solution to the Kurdish issue.

Legend: ■ Strongly disagree ■ Disagree ■ Neither agree nor disagree ■ Agree ■ Strongly agree

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Sep'15	9	18	16	35	22
Sep'12	10	20	15	35	20
Jul'10	5	16	10	43	26

70 percent of MHP voters, 65 percent of Ak Parti voters and 53 percent of CHP voters agree that termination of terrorism is the only way to solve the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, 30 percent of CHP voters, 19 percent of MHP voters and 17 percent of Ak Parti voters disagree with this statement.

Among HDP voters, 65 percent disagree that termination of terrorism is the only way to solve the Kurdish issue, and 22 percent think otherwise.

Termination of terrorism is the only solution to the Kurdish issue.

Legend: ■ Strongly disagree ■ Disagree ■ Neither agree nor disagree ■ Agree ■ Strongly agree

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Turkey	9	18	16	35	22
AK Parti	5	12	16	41	26
CHP	8	22	17	36	17
MHP	4	15	11	34	36
HDP	34	31	12	15	7
Other parties	2	28	11	19	40
Swing voter	6	20	22	35	17
Non-voter	10	25	15	32	17

53 percent of the Turkish believe that termination terrorism is the only solution to the Kurdish issue, while 31 percent of the Kurdish think alike. 51 percent of the Kurdish and 23 percent of the Turkish disagree with this statement.

Termination of terrorism is the only solution to the Kurdish issue.

		1. Strongly Disagree		3.Neither agree Nor disagree		5.Strongly Agree
Turkish	Below high sch.				3,7	
	High school				3,5	
	University				3,4	
Kurdish	Below high sch.			2,7		
	High school			2,6		
	University			2,4		
Turkish	Between 18 - 28				3,6	
	Between 29 - 43				3,6	
	Above 44				3,6	
Kurdish	Between 18 - 28			2,5		
	Between 29 - 43			2,6		
	Above 44			2,9		

When we analyze the findings by age and educational attainment level by using averages, a clear differentiation can be observed between the Turkish and the Kurdish. Furthermore, the rate of those who think that termination of terrorism is the only solution to the Kurdish issue is higher in the less educated and older groups among the Kurdish.

2.8. The Difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish: Is there a difference? Should there be one?

37 percent of the respondents agree with the statement, *"In this country, there is a significant difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state,"* 70 percent of the respondents agree that *"There should not be any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in terms of rights, power and wealth."*

When the respondents express their opinions by considering what is correct and ideal, three fourths of society thinks that there should not be any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state. However, based on their evaluations on the reality and daily practices and on their personal evaluations, one third of the respondents believe that there is difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state.

45 percent of society believes that there is no difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state; however, 15 percent of the respondents believe that there should indeed "be a difference" between the Turkish and the Kurdish. In other words, almost one out of every 6 people agree that there should be a difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in terms of rights, power and wealth. 7-8 percent of the respondents think both that there is a significant difference between

the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state and believe that there should be a difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in terms of rights, power and wealth. On the other hand, 30 percent of the respondents (i.e. almost one out of every three respondents) agree that there is difference between these ethnic groups in the eyes of the state; yet, they believe that there should not be any difference between the groups in terms of the opportunities they have.

In this country, there is a significant difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state.

Strongly disagree; 18	Disagree; 27	Neither agree nor disagree; 18	Agree; 25	Kes. doğru; 12

0 %　　　　　　　　　　　50 %　　　　　　　　　　　100 %

There should not be any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in terms of rights, power and wealth.

Str. dis.; 6	Disagree; 9	Neither agree nor disagree; 15	Agree; 45	Strongly agree; 25

0 %　　　　　　　　　　　50 %　　　　　　　　　　　100 %

Is there any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish? Should there be any?

■ There should not be any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in terms of rights, power and wealth.
■ In this country, there is a significant difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state.

		Green	Blue
Turkish	Below high sch.	3,6	2,7
	High school	3,6	2,7
	University	3,8	2,6
Kurdish	Below high sch.	4,1	3,6
	High school	4,2	3,8
	University	4,2	3,4
Turkish	Between 18 - 28	3,6	2,8
	Between 29 - 43	3,7	2,7
	Above 44	3,7	2,7
Kurdish	Between 18 - 28	4,2	3,7
	Between 29 - 43	4,1	3,4
	Above 44	4,2	3,6
Turkish	Ak Parti	3,7	2,5
	CHP	3,8	3,1
	MHP	3,5	2,8
	Other	4,1	2,7
Kurdish	Ak Parti	3,7	2,5
	HDP	4,4	4,1

1. Strongly Disagree   3. Neither agree Nor disagree   5. Strongly Agree

An analysis of the opinions on ethnic discrimination by the variables of age, educational attainment level and political preference reveal the following noteworthy observations:

✓ The Turkish and the Kurdish diverge in opinions on how they evaluate the "current conditions." The Kurdish strongly agree that "there is a significant difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state," while the Turkish think otherwise.

✓ When they evaluate the "ideal condition," both the Turkish and the Kurdish agree that "there should not be any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in terms of rights, power and wealth." However, in comparison to the Turkish, the Kurdish take a stronger stance in favor of this statement.

✓ Both among the Turkish and among the Kurdish, increased educational attainment leads to a slight decrease in the rate of the respondents who think that there is ethnic discrimination in the eyes of the state, while it leads to an increase in the rate of the respondents who think that there should not be any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in terms of the opportunities they enjoy.

✓ Although all of the voters with a Turkish ethnic identity believe that there should not be any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish, HDP and CHP voters with a Turkish ethnic identity take a stronger stance in favor of this statement. Among the Kurdish, the rate of HDP voters are vigorous supporters of this statement.

✓ Voters with a Turkish ethnic identity diverge in their opinions on whether there is a difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state or not. CHP and HDP voters with a Turkish ethnic identity agree that "there is a significant difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish in the eyes of the state," while Ak Parti and MHP voters disagree. Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity also do not agree with this statement.

2.9. Opinion on Family Values and Marriage

In order to evaluate the opinions of the Turkish and the Kurdish about each other and to better understand the root causes of the Kurdish issue, we inquired about 2 statements that are closely related to the daily lives of the respondents.

60 percent of society agrees that "*the Turkish and the Kurdish have similar family values.*" Only 21 percent of the respondents do not agree with this statement. 58 percent of the Turkish and 63 percent of the Kurdish agree that the two ethnic groups have similar family values.

We also asked the respondents whether they would mind if their "*spouse/son-in-law/daughter-in-law comes from a different ethnic background.*" In response to this statement, which is closely related to daily life practices, 66 percent stated that they would not mind if their spouse/son-in-law/daughter-in-law comes from a different

ethnic background, while 19 percent disagree with the statement 81 percent of the Kurdish and 63 percent of the Turkish agree with this statement. Since 2012, no significant change is observed in the level of tolerance/intolerance to a spouse/son-in-law/daughter-in-law from a different ethnic background.

The Turkish and the Kurdish have similar family values.

Str. dis.; 6	Disagree; 15	Neither agree nor disagree; 20	Agree; 45	Strongly agree; 15

0 %　　　　　　　　　　　50 %　　　　　　　　　　　100 %

I would not mind if my spouse/son-in-law/daughter-in-law comes from a different ethnic background.

Str. dis.; 7	Disagree; 12	Neither agree nor disagree; 15	Agree; 46	Strongly agree; 20

0 %　　　　　　　　　　　50 %　　　　　　　　　　　100 %

Is there any difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish?

- ■ The Turkish and the Kurdish have similar family values.
- ■ I would not mind if my spouse/son-in-law/daughter-in-law comes from a different ethnic background.

		Similar family values	Would not mind
Turkish	Ak Parti	3,5	3,5
	CHP	3,6	3,8
	MHP	3,3	3,3
Kurdish	Ak Parti	3,9	4,0
	HDP	3,4	4,0
Turkish	Below high sch.	3,4	3,5
	High school	3,5	3,5
	University	3,6	3,7
Kurdish	Below high sch.	3,5	3,9
	High school	3,5	4,1
	University	3,7	4,3
Turkish	Between 18 - 28	3,4	3,5
	Between 29 - 43	3,5	3,6
	Above 44	3,5	3,5
Kurdish	Between 18 - 28	3,5	4,1
	Between 29 - 43	3,5	3,9
	Above 44	3,6	3,9

1. Strongly Disagree 3.Neither agree Nor disagree 5.Strongly Agree

When we examine the differences by ethnic identity, political preference, age, educational attainment level, we observe the following:

✓ Among the Turkish, the difference between values and practice is lower. On the other hand, the Kurdish are more tolerant in practice.

✓ In comparison to the Turkish, the Kurdish are more pluralist in their opinions on family values and intermarriage.

✓ Among the Turkish, opinions do not diverge by age and educational attainment level. Among the Kurdish, however, more educated and younger respondents are more tolerant.

✓ Among the Turkish, CHP voters are more tolerant. Ak Parti voters rank the second, while MHP voters are the third most tolerant group. Among the Kurdish, Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity are more tolerant than HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity in terms of both values and practice. Although HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity agree with the statement the two ethnic groups have the same family values at lower rates; when it comes to intermarriage, they as tolerant as Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity. Therefore, the divergence between values and practices is higher among HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity.

These findings confirm some of the observations we highlighted in many previous Barometers:

✓ Society maintains its values and practices in two separate mental maps. In its opinions on what should be identified as the right and the ideal, society is more just, egalitarian and pacifist. On the other hand, when it comes to **daily practices and assessment of the existing conditions it is more cautious.** In other words, personal life and public life are evaluated through different perspectives. While individuals are more tolerant in their personal lives, they are less tolerant in public life.

✓ The majority of the respondents believe that the Turkish and the Kurdish have the same family values and state that they would not mind if their spouse/son-in-law/daughter-in-law is from a different ethnic background, thus showing their desire to live together. However, when they are inquired about the resolution of the Kurdish issue, constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity and ethnic discrimination in the eyes of the state, or in other words when they are expected to make an assessment of the current conditions **the Turkish are particularly more cautious.**

2.10.   How Can the Kurdish Issue be Resolved?

In addressing the Kurdish issue, we have asked the respondents the same question we asked in 2010 and 2012: "What should we do to resolve the Kurdish issue?" By asking an open-ended question, we provided the respondents with the opportunity to express their personal suggestions for resolution, without having to choose one of the publicly debated prescriptions for resolution.

Before proceeding with the evaluation of the responses, it should be reminded that this month's field survey was conducted right before the Dağlıca attack on September 6th, and after HDP's entry into the parliament in its own right, the Suruç bombing at the end of June and the mutual termination of the ceasefire. Moreover, it should be taken into consideration that 'Democratic Initiative' was on the agenda when the 'The Kurdish Issue: Perceptions and Expectation' research was carried out in July 2010, while the terror attacks were the major topic in the country in September 2012.

We grouped the responses into 25 categories initially, which we then reduced to 6 main categories, with the intention to derive meaningful analyses from the suggestions of the respondents for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. We observed the same grouping we used in 2010 and 2012. You can see the names of these groups and their contents in the table below.

These groups were created subjectively, within the perspective of KONDA's outlook on the Kurdish issue. For example, inclusion of the responses in the 'Assimilation' category in the group of destructive/unrealistic solutions is based on KONDA's subjective opinion.

What can the Kurdish issue be resolved?		September 2015 "Barometer"	September 2012 "Barometer"	July 2010 "Who Are We?"*
Limited category	Percentage	Percentage	Percentage	Percentage
Destructive / unrealistic solutions	Terror must be eradicated	14.5	11.2	8.8
	PKK must be eradicated	3.6	4.5	6.1
	There is no Kurdish issue	5.6	4.4	1.9
	It cannot be resolved	2.2	2.7	2.4
	It is an obstacle for HDP and it must be resolved	1.6	1.7	
	Foreign powers must be prevented	0.6	1.3	1.8
	No compromise / privilege should be given	0.7	1.3	0.7
	Capital punishment	0.8	1.1	1.1
	Divide /deport them	0.9	1.0	1.4
	The military can solve this issue	0.6	1.0	1.3
	War and slaughter	4.0	4.6	3.2
	Kurds create the problems	0.2	0.8	0.1
	Nurture sympathy for / identification with TR / one state	0.8	0.8	0.6
	Assimilation	0.1	0.4	0.7
	Laying down of arms and reintegration into society	1.4	0.1	0.4
Constructive resolution	Peace / consensus / tolerance	23.4	14.9	16.3
	No assimilation	1.9	2.5	3.5
	Recognition / granting of their rights	2.1	2.0	2.2
	Equality	2.8	1.5	2.3
	Democratization	0.8	0.6	1.0
	Constitutional reform	0.5	0.6	0.7
	Autonomy	0.4	0.4	0.1
Development and education	Development	1.6	3.5	14.0
	Education	1.7	3.4	9.4
Other solutions	Other	3.4	4.2	4.1
	Politicians	8.5	6.6	3.7
	Religion	0.5	0.7	0.5
	No support should be given	0.0	0.5	0.2
	The feudal structure should be eliminated	0.1	0.2	0.4
No opinion	No Opinion	2.7	8.4	4.5
No answer	No Answer	11.8	13.7	6.5

A few changes are observed in the responses since 2010. While the rate of those who believe terror must be eradicated and that there is no Kurdish issue have increased, no change is observed in the rate of those expecting a war. Those who believe that the issue can be resolved by development and education have dwindled, while the rate of those who believe that it can be resolved by peace, negotiation and tolerance have increased. It is noteworthy that the rate of those who expect a solution from the politicians have increased to reach a considerable size at 8.5 percent.

A comparison of the results for the main categories in the graphs reveals significant differences with the results for 2010 and 2012. The most significant change from 2010 to 2012 took place in the rate of those who believe that the issue can be resolved by development and education, in other words, those who do not take democratization and human rights perspective into account in evaluating the question, which fell dramatically from 25 percent to 7 percent. As a result, the number of those who advocate a destructive solution (37 percent) have increased to nearly twice the number of those who favor a constructive resolution (22 percent) in 2012. The number of respondents who did not report an opinion have also increased significantly.

Resolution of the Kurdish issue (open-ended / limited categories)

	Destructive / unrealistic solutions	Constructive solutions	Development and education	Other solutions	No opinion / No answer
JUL'10	31	26	23	9	11
SEP'12	37	22	7	12	22
SEP'15	38	32	3	13	15

- 🟧 Destructive / unrealistic solutions
- 🟦 Constructive solutions
- 🟥 Development and education
- 🟫 Other solutions
- 🟩 No opinion / No answer

The results for 2015 reveal a different outlook. Respondents in favor of development and education have increased, advocates of a destructive solution remained the same since 2012, and proponents of a constructive resolution surged to 10 percent to reach 32 percent.

It is noteworthy that the rate of those in favor of a destructive solution is comparatively close to the rate of those in favor of a constructive resolution, both in 2010 and 2015. The

main difference between 2015 and 2010 is the much lower preference for development and education as the key to resolving the Kurdish issue. According to the figures listed in the table, it seems like the general public acknowledged that the Kurdish issue cannot be resolved by development and education alone by 2012, and the rate of those who are able to propose or favor a resolution decreased, while there appears to be a higher tendency towards a constructive resolution in 2015. It should also be noted that the rate of those who favor a destructive solution not only did not decrease, but also increased throughout this process.

The responses tend to group around the two ends of destructive/unrealistic solutions and constructive resolutions. The increase observed in the consolidated rate of the opposite ends, coupled with the fact that the rate of those with no opinion have also increased, indicates a higher tendency among society to favor a destructive solution.

What changed in the opinion of party voters on the Kurdish issue?

		Destructive / unrealistic	Constructive	Development and education	Other	No opinion
Turkey	2012	37	23	7	12	21
	2015	38	32	3	13	14
Ak Parti	2012	36	23	5	13	23
	2015	47	23	3	12	14
CHP	2012	34	24	11	16	15
	2015	30	35	7	15	13
MHP	2012	61	14	6	7	11
	2015	57	16	3	12	13
HDP	2012	6	65		13	16
	2015	4	77		14	5
Swing voter	2012	35	19	8	10	28
	2015	31	34	2	12	20

Legend:
- Destructive / unrealistic solutions
- Constructive solutions
- Development and education
- Other solutions
- No opinion / No answer

The distribution of the suggestions for the resolution of the Kurdish issue shows that MHP voters are more likely to favor a destructive solution and HDP voters are more likely to favor a constructive resolution, while Ak Parti, CHP and swing voters are more or less around the Turkey average. The following changes are notable in the opinion of party voters on the Kurdish issue since 2012:

- The most significant change among HDP voters is the decrease in those who did not provide an opinion, which led to an increase in the majority in favor a constructive resolution from 65 percent to 77 percent.
- The preference for a destructive resolution among MHP voters, which is the highest among all voter groups, has decreased by 4 points. On the other hand, the tendency to favor 'other resolutions' has increased, which is a category mostly made up of

those who believe that the Kurdish issue should be resolved by the politicians. Therefore, we can conclude that even MHP voters, who generally have the most negative outlook on this issue, have taken a turn towards a more constructive resolution.

- The rate of those who did not report an opinion have decreased among Ak Parti voters, as a result of which the preference for more a destructive resolution have increased from 36 percent to 47 percent. As a result, the number of people in favor of a destructive resolution is now twice the number of those in favor of a constructive resolution.

- Among CHP voters, the preference for a constructive resolution increased by 9 points, while the preference for a destructive resolution decreased by 4 points. There is a 4-point decline in the preference for development and education, an opinion most supported by CHP voters.

Before assessing the changes in the opinion of Ak Parti voters on the Kurdish issue, it should be reminded that a significant part of Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity have become HDP voters between 2012 and 2015. While Kurdish citizens accounted for 13 percent of Ak Parti voters in 2012, the same rate has fallen to 9 percent in 2015. Therefore, the discernible difference in the opinions of Ak Parti voters cannot be explained alone by the ethnic distribution within the voter group.

2.10.1. Resolution proposals by ethnic identity

Voters with a Turkish identity have different perspectives and opinions on this issue than those with a Kurdish identity. Nevertheless, the changes in the opinion of the two ethnic groups since 2010 indicate the likelihood of a social consensus.

Resolution proposals by ethnic identity

	Destructive / unrealistic solutions	Constructive solutions	Development and education	Other solutions	No opinion / No answer
Turkish 2010	34	21	24	9	12
Turkish 2012	41	18	7	12	21
Turkish 2015	44	25	4	12	15
Kurdish 2010	8	56	19	7	10
Kurdish 2012	13	49	3	12	24
Kurdish 2015	9	65	1	18	7

The outlook of voters with a Kurdish ethnic identity clearly reflects a majority in favor of a constructive resolution. We can also observe the same trend among the Kurdish throughout the country: In 2010, one fifth of the Kurdish thought of development and

education as the key to resolution. However, in 2012, one out of every four Kurdish respondents refrained from providing an opinion, possibly out of fear or desperation. In the meantime, the preference to see development and education as the key to the resolution of the issue has dwindled, while the rate of those who provided an opinion has increased, with one out of every three people with a Kurdish ethnic identity advocating a constructive resolution. It should also be noted that one out of every five people with a Kurdish identity indicated a resolution that falls within the 'other solutions' group, which is basically a category characterized by a preference for the politicians to resolve the issue.

Voters with a Turkish ethnic identity seem to have given up on seeing development and education as viable tools to bring about a resolution since 2012, while the tendency of not providing an opinion, which was comparably high at the time, has fallen considerably this year. As a result of these changes, the combined rate of those in favor of a constructive resolution and a destructive resolution have increased from 55 percent in 2010, to 59 percent in 2012, and then to 69 percent among the people with a Turkish identity in this month's research. This result clearly shows that citizens with a Turkish ethnic identity have not remained indifferent to the Kurdish issue, and have taken a side on this issue, regardless of whether it is in favor of a constructive or destructive resolution.

Although a certain increase is observed in the rate of those with a Turkish ethnic identity in favor of a constructive resolution, the sustained increase in the rate of those who favor a destructive or unrealistic resolution, which as a group has approached 50 percent, is quite alarming. It is unfortunate to see that citizens with a Turkish ethnic identity are moving towards an increased preference for a destructive resolution, after acknowledging that development is not the key to the resolution. However, this overall opinion may have been in a mood of desperation. The next section on the 5 phases of the social acknowledgment of the Kurdish issue provides a detailed evaluation of the general opinion of the general public about a potential resolution and where it stands in terms of achieving that resolution.

2.10.2.   By education

A comparison of the responses from 2012 with those from 2015 reveals that support for a constructive resolution has grown bigger in Turkey, in all educational attainment levels. The increase in the number of people supporting a constructive resolution was mainly due to the decrease in the number of people who did not provide an opinion and the decrease in the number of people who propose development and education for resolving the issue. Furthermore, a slight increase is observed in the rate of high-school and university graduates who support a destructive and unrealistic resolution.

The rate of favoring development and education as the key to resolving the Kurdish issue rises in parallel to educational attainment level, and the better educated are more likely to support this view. Nevertheless, even this rate has fallen to 8 percent from 14 percent among the university graduates, within a span of three years.

Resolution preference by educational attainment level

		Destructive / unrealistic solutions	Constructive solutions	Development and education	Other solutions	No opinion / No answer
Turkey	2015	38	32	3	13	14
	2012	37	22	07	12	22
University	2015	38	29	08	14	11
	2012	37	21	14	13	15
High school	2015	41	32	04	11	12
	2012	39	21	08	11	21
Below hihg sch.	2015	36	33	02	13	17
	2012	36	23	04	12	24

■ Destructive / unrealistic solutions ■ Constructive solutions ■ Development and education
■ Other solutions ■ No opinion / No answer

2.11.   The Kurdish Issue and the 'Five Stages of Grief'

As KONDA, we find the Kurdish issue as the most significant problem of the country and society, and believe that it should be addressed separately from the problem of terrorism in seeking a resolution. We believe that it would be immensely beneficial to address the Kurdish issue from different perspectives.

In our following analysis, we evaluated the resolution proposals for the Kurdish issue through a scientifically accepted model based on human psychology that was created 46 years ago. We distributed the open-ended responses to the question on the Kurdish issue into five groups, according to the "5 stages of grief": **Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, Acceptance...**

What are the "Five Stages of Grief"?

"The 5 stages of grief" expounded by Swiss-American psychologist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (1926-2004) in her groundbreaking book *On Death and Dying* (1969) delineates the psychological stages that people go through when they know that they are going to die.

The five stages leading to death also provide meaning insight for understanding the processes of sadness and grief experienced by children whose parents divorce or people who go through a painful breakup. According to the Kübler-Ross model, a person experiencing grief goes through the five stages listed in the table below.

Although this is a scientifically accepted model, there are claims that one can go through only some of these stages or that some of the stages can be repeated for some people.

Denial	The person tends to ignore or deny the fact.	*I feel good. There is no problem. This cannot happen. Not to me!*
Anger	The person feels angry at and judges his/her situation.	*Why me? This is not fair! How can this happen to me? Who should I blame?*
Bargaining	The person tries to reduce the problem to an acceptable level.	*What can I give up on?*
Depression	The person feels sad, lack desire to do anything.	*There is no point in trying. It is not necessary.*
Acceptance	The person finally digests and accepts the situation.	*Everything will be better. I should fight this (If I will die, I should be prepared for this).*

The five stages of grief explained above has been utilized by others before to explain social issues or historical developments. For example, in his book titled *End Times* (2011), Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek explains the 4 major problems endemic to our times (worldwide ecological crisis; imbalances within the economic system; the biogenetic revolution; and exploding social divisions and ruptures) through the 5 stages of Kübler-Ross.

In a similar fashion, we have tried to adapt our categorization of the responses to the question of "How can the Kurdish issue be resolved?" from September'12 and September'15 Barometers into 25 groups, according to the Kübler-Ross model, as shown in the table below.

We have tried to describe how we aligned the stages in the Kübler-Ross model with the phases of the Kurdish issue, (the response option of "no opinion" and the other uncategorized responses grouped under the option of "other" were not included in the distribution).

5 stages of grief	All categories	Percent (2012)	Percent (2015)	5 stages of grief in the Kurdish issue
Denial	There is no Kurdish issue	5.4%	5.6%	Responses which deny the existence of the Kurdish issue correspond to this stage.
	Kurds create the problems	1.0%	0.2%	
Anger	The military can solve this issue	1.2%	0.6%	People at this stage accept the existence of the Kurdish issue, but they angry towards the actors involved in the issue, and they want them to be punished.
	It is an obstacle for HDP and it must be resolved	2.0%	1.6%	
	Divide /deport them	1.2%	0.9%	
	Capital punishment	1.3%	0.8%	
	PKK must be eradicated	5.4%	3.6%	
	War	5.6%	4.0%	
	Terror must be eradicated	13.5%	14.5%	
Bargaining	Assimilation	0.5%	0.1%	People at this stage have left the anger stage behind, but they still think that the issue can be resolved by sacrifice, rather than acceptance. They think that the issue can be resolved by mutual compromise where each party relinquishes something.
	Laying down of arms and reintegration into society	0.1%	1.4%	
	Foreign powers must be prevented	1.6%	0.6%	
	No compromise / privilege should be given	1.6%	0.7%	
	Nurture sympathy for / identification with TR / one state	1.0%	0.8%	
	Education	4.1%	1.7%	
	Development	4.2%	1.6%	
	No support should be given	0.6%	0%	
	The feudal structure should be eliminated	0.2%	0.1%	
	Politicians	8.0%	8.5%	
Depression	It cannot be resolved	3.3%	2.2%	It is difficult to argue that people at the depression stage regarding the Kurdish issue have all finished the bargaining stage with desperation, in a similar fashion to the 5-stage model of grief. However, it is possible to associate the state of thinking that this issue is not resolvable or the failure to propose a solution despite acknowledging the existence of the issue, with the depression stage in the Kübler-Ross model.
	No opinion	10.4%	2.7%	
Acceptance	Constitutional reform	0.7%	0.5%	In the "acceptance" stage of the Kurdish issue, one accepts that this is a problem of human rights and democracy, and is willing to express this acceptance as an opinion.
	No assimilation	3.0%	1.9%	
	Peace / consensus / tolerance	18.0%	23.4%	
	Democratization	0.7%	0.8%	
	Equality	1.8%	2.8%	
	Recognition / granting of their rights	2.4%	2.1%	
	Autonomy	0.4%	0.4%	

The percent column in the table above shows data from the surveys conducted for September'12 and September'15 Barometers. We adapted the same method of distribution into five stages to the responses from the 2010 Who Are We research. Then, we created the graph below by adding up the rates from both data sets for the 5 stages.

Changes in the 5 stages between 2010-2015

Year	Denial	Anger	Bargaining	Depression	Acceptance
2010	2	24	35	8	30
2012	6	30	22	15	27
2015	7	31	19	6	38

■ Denial ■ Anger ■ Bargaining ■ Depression ■ Acceptance

Before proceeding with analyzing this table, it should be noted that the Who Are We research was carried out in June 2010, when the "Democratic Initiative" launched by the Government towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue was being widely discussed among the general public. On the other hand, terror continued to dominate the agenda when the field survey for the September '12 Barometer was conducted. A succession of events such as HDP's entry into the parliament by passing the election threshold, the Suruç bombing, mutual termination of the ceasefire and the ongoing curfew in Cizre should also be taken into consideration before evaluating the results of the field survey for the September'15 Barometer. It should be reminded that it is not possible to see the impact of the Dağlıca attack on the results of the survey that was carried out on September 5th-6th.

According to the 5-stage model of grief, it is possible for some people to skip or relapse into some of the stages.

The graph above reveals that the rate of respondents who are at stage of acknowledging the existence of the Kurdish issue in 2015 has increased to 38 percent. This improvement provides the impression that we, as a society, have made some progress on the 5-stage model.

It would be useful to look at the change between 2010 and 2012 to make better sense of progression (or regression) within the five stages. In 2010, one third of the general public was at the stage of (35 percent) bargaining. We observe that the number of people at the stage of bargaining decreased, while those who relapsed into both denial and anger and depression increased during the two-year period. Accordingly, a certain part of society may have moved into depression from bargaining, thus coming closer to accepting the Kurdish issue, but some people may have relapsed into the preceding stages at the same time. After 2010, when the democratic initiative was the main topic of discussion, the failure of the initiative to bring about a definitive solution may have led a certain part of society to embrace anger, while the termination of the bargaining process may have pushed some people back into the depression stage. The 3-point decrease in the rate of those at the acceptance stage should be regarded as a regression.

We can observe a much different mobility in the results for 2015, in comparison to those for 2012. The 2-point increase in the rate of those at the stages of denial and anger is counter-balanced by the 3-point decrease in the rate of those at the bargaining stage. On the other hand, the rate of those at the depression stage diminished from 15 percent to 6 percent, while those at the acceptance stage increased by 11-points from 27 percent to reach 38 percent.

Generally speaking, the number of people who are ready to acknowledge the Kurdish issue has increased. In other words, in the last three years, one in ten people have progressed from depression by overcoming the belief that the issue cannot be resolved, and by starting to believe that we are ready to acknowledge the Kurdish issue, at least on a personal level. This indication for progress, and the lack of relapse in any group are very encouraging signs for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, the total rate of people at the last 2 stages of grief, namely depression and acceptance, has gradually increased from 38 percent in 2010, to first 42 percent in 2012, and then to 44 percent in 2015.

5 stages of grief by party preference

Party	Denial	Anger	Bargaining	Depression	Acceptance
Turkey	7	31	19	6	38
Ak Parti	8	38	18	7	28
CHP	5	23	25	5	41
MHP	9	48	18	5	20
HDP		13	15		82
Non-voters	6	22	17	10	45
Swing voters (No answer)	9	25	16	11	39

Legend: ■ Denial ■ Anger ■ Bargaining ■ Depression ■ Acceptance

The data for the September'15 Barometer portrays an anticipated picture of where party voters stand in terms of accepting the Kurdish issue, as shown in the graph above. The majority of HDP voters are at the acceptance stage, while the majority of MHP voters are at the stages of denial and anger. 82 percent of HDP voters are located within the last stage of grief, while more than half of MHP voters are consumed by denial and anger. Ak Parti voters are slightly behind the Turkey average, closer to MHP voters than others. Meanwhile, CHP voters are ahead of the Turkey average.

It is notable in the graph that the rate of swing voters and non-voters, who did not specify their political preference in the survey, among the people who are located at the 5th stage of grief, is slightly higher than the Turkey average of swing voters and non-voters.

5 stages of grief by ethnic identity

	Denial	Anger	Bargaining	Depression	Acceptance
Turkey	7	31	19	6	38
Turkish	8	36	19	7	30
Kurdish	2	6	18	1	73

When we examine the stages by ethnic identity instead of party preference, we observe that the majority of citizens with a Kurdish identity (73 percent) are at the acceptance stage, similar to HDP voters, and that more than half of citizens who have a Turkish identity have progressed into the bargaining stage, albeit at a lower rate than the Turkey average.

3. RESEARCH ID

3.1. Overall Description of the Survey

The survey that this report is based on was conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.).

The field survey was conducted on 5-6 September 2015. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, within the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose of determining and monitoring trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population in Turkey.

The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.3 at 99 percent confidence level.

3.2. The Sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the data on population and educational attainment level of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS), and the results of the 2011 General Elections in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 3491 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 196 neighborhoods and villages of 134 districts - including central districts - of 30 provinces.

Provinces visited	30
Districts visited	134
Neighborhoods/villages visited	196
Number of respondents	3491

Among the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas on age and gender were enforced.

Age group	Female	Male
Between 18-28	3 respondents	3 respondents
Between 29-44	3 respondents	3 respondents
44 and above	3 respondents	3 respondents

	Level 1 (12 regions)	Provinces visited
1	İstanbul	İstanbul
2	Western Marmara	Balıkesir, Çanakkale, Tekirdağ,
3	Aegean	Denizli, İzmir, Manisa, Kütahya
4	Eastern Marmara	Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli
5	Western Anatolia	Ankara, Konya
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri, Sivas
8	Western Black Sea	Amasya, Samsun, Tokat
9	Eastern Black Sea	Trabzon
10	Northeastern Anatolia	Kars
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	Malatya, Van
12	Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Mardin, Şanlıurfa

The distribution of respondents according to the regions and place of residence is shown in the table below.

	Survey location	Rural	Urban	Metropolitan	Total
1	İstanbul			19.9	19.9
2	Western Marmara	2.1	3.1		5.2
3	Aegean	4.2	5.6	4.7	14.5
4	Eastern Marmara	1.5	3.1	5.1	9.7
5	Western Anatolia	0.4		7.1	7.5
6	Mediterranean	3.4	3.1	6.2	12.7
7	Central Anatolia	1.0	2.0	1.6	4.6
8	Western Black Sea	2.6	4.2		6.8
9	Eastern Black Sea	1.5	1.5		3.1
10	Northeastern Anatolia	1.0	0.5		1.5
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	1.5	3.6		5.2
12	Southeastern Anatolia	2.6	3.7	3.1	9.4
	Total	21.9	30.4	47.6	100.0

4. FREQUENCY TABLES

4.1. Profile of the Respondents

Gender	Percentage
Female	47.5
Male	52.5
Total	100.0

Age	Percentage
Between 18-28	24.9
Between 29-43	34.1
44 or above	41.0
Total	100.0

Educational attainment level	Percentage
Illiterate	6.7
Literate without degree	2.1
Primary school degree	32.5
Secondary school degree	14.7
High school degree	27.1
University degree	15.3
Masters/PhD	1.6
Total	100.0

Paternal educational attainment level	Percentage
Illiterate	18.9
Literate without degree	7.4
Primary school degree	46.3
Secondary school degree	12.3
High school degree	10.2
University degree	4.4
Masters/PhD	0.4
Total	100.0

Birthplace (region)	Percentage
İstanbul	7.5
Western Marmara	5.0
Aegean	13.0
Eastern Marmara	7.4
Western Anatolia	5.9
Mediterranean	12.2
Central Anatolia	7.3
Western Black Sea	10.1
Eastern Black Sea	6.0
Northeastern Anatolia	4.8
Middle Eastern Anatolia	7.6
Southeastern Anatolia	12.5
Abroad	0.8
Total	100.0

Employment status	Percentage
Public officer	5.6
Private sector	5.9
Worker	8.2
Small retailer	7.8
Merchant/businessman	1.1
Self-employed	2.1
Farmer, agriculturist, stock breeder	5.8
Employed, other	5.3
Retired	13.3
Housewife	29.9
Student	7.6
Unemployed	5.9
Disabled	1.4
Total	100.0

Lifestyle cluster	Percentage
Modern	24.7
Traditional conservative	52.6
Religious conservative	22.7
Total	100.0

Head cover status	Percentage
No head cover	28.7
Headscarf	52.4
Turban	6.9
Chador	1.0
Total	10.9

Ethnic identity	Percentage
Turkish	78.6
Kurdish	15.9
Zaza	0.6
Arab	2.1
Other	2.7
Total	100.0

Religion / sect	Percentage
Sunni Muslim	91.0
Alevi Muslim	5.0
Other	1.9
Total	2.0

Which best describes you? Which of the below comes first?	Percentage
Turkish citizenship	63.6
My ethnic identity	13.5
My religion/sect	22.9
Total	100.0

Piety	Percentage
Non-believer	2.9
Believer	28.2
Religious	55.4
Pious	13.6
Total	100.0

TV channel preferred to watch the news	Percentage
Does not watch	5.3
ATV	13.3
CNNTürk	3.0
Fox TV	15.9
Habertürk	2.7
Halk TV	2.5
İMÇ	4.2
Kanal 7	1.9
Kanal D	9.4
Kanaltürk	0.7
NTV	4.7
Roj/Nuçe/Sterk	1.2
Samanyolu	1.7
Show TV	4.4
Star	5.2
TRT	12.8
Ulusal	1.0
Local channels	1.4
Other channels	8.6
Total	100.0
Does not watch	5.3

Monthly household income (new grouping)	Percentage
TRY 700 or less	8.1
TRY 701 - 1200	31.1
TRY 1201 - 2000	33.0
TRY 2001 - 3000	17.0
TRY 3001 - 5000	8.5
TRY 5001 or more	2.4
Total	100.0

Type of housing	Percentage
Squatter / apartment without external plastering	5.0
Single family, traditional house	41.1
Apartment	49.2
Housing complex	4.4
Very luxurious apartment, villa	0.4
Total	100.0

Have you attended any events in your city in connection with the Gezi protests?	Percentage
Yes.	7.4
No, but I know people who have.	13.6
No.	79.0
Total	100.0

How often do you attend places of worship, except funerals, etc.?	Percentage
Every day	15.3
Once or twice a week	15.6
Once a week	16.7
Once or twice a month	5.5
On special occasions, e.g. religious holidays	21.6
Every once in while	8.9
Never	16.4
Total	100.0

4.2. Trust and the Kurdish Issue

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	Percentage
Most people can be trusted	7.1
Can´t be too careful	92.9
Total	100.0

Do you trust people you meet for the first time?	Percentage
Not at all	40.9
Not very much	29.9
Don't know	15.9
Somewhat	11.6
Completely	1.6
Total	100.0

Do you trust people from the same ethnic group as you?	Percentage
Not at all	16.7
Not very much	24.4
Don't know	28.0
Somewhat	24.3
Completely	6.6
Total	100.0

Do you trust people from other ethnic groups?	Percentage
Not at all	25.5
Not very much	28.5
Don't know	27.5
Somewhat	15.0
Completely	3.5
Total	100.0

Do you trust people from the same religion as you?	Percentage
Not at all	13.7
Not very much	19.7
Don't know	27.0
Somewhat	28.1
Completely	11.6
Total	100.0

Do you trust people from other religions?	Percentage
Not at all	28.3
Not very much	27.0
Don't know	26.7
Somewhat	14.0
Completely	4.0
Total	100.0

Do you trust the government?	Percentage
Not at all	37.5
Not very much	16.6
Don't know	12.6
Somewhat	17.7
Completely	15.6
Total	100.0

Do you trust political parties?	Percentage
Not at all	35.1
Not very much	27.3
Don't know	20.6
Somewhat	14.0
Completely	3.1
Total	100.0

Do you trust the broadcast and print media?	Percentage
Not at all	44.9
Not very much	22.3
Don't know	16.6
Somewhat	12.7
Completely	3.5
Total	100.0

5. GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as "a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements" are shortly identified as "believers" in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms.

Term	Definition
Alevi Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim
Lower middle class:	Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car
Lower class:	Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment
Arab:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab
Headscarf:	A woman who does not cover her head or a man with a headscarf or whose spouse does not cover her head with a headscarf
Chador:	A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a chador
Religious:	A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion
Religious conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative
Traditional conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative
Ideological:	A person who states a party as the closest to his/her political view
Believer:	A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely
Non-believer:	A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion
Urban area:	Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Rural area:	Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Kurdish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish
Leader follower:	A person who states that he/she trusts in or favors the leader of a certain party

Metropolitan:	Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)
Modern:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern
No cover:	A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head
Non-partisan:	A person who states that none of the parties represent him/her
Pious:	A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely
Late decider:	A person who states that he/she makes a decision based on the election campaigns
Sunni Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim
Partisan:	A person who states that he/she/they always vote for that party
Turban:	A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a turban
Turkish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish
Upper class:	Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment
New middle class:	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment and which own a car
Zaza:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza

5.1. Questions and response options which establish the basis for the terms:

Which of the three lifestyle clusters below do you feel you belong to?
Modern
Traditional conservative
Religious conservative

Do you cover your head or does your spouse cover her head when going out of your home? How do you cover your head?
No head cover
Headscarf
Turban
Chador
Bachelor male

We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you belong to?

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

Which religion or sect do you feel you belong to?

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

Which of the below describes you in terms of piety?

A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely

Which of the reasons below influence/determine your political preferences?

I/we always vote for that party.

It is the party closest to my political view.

I trust/favor its leader.

None of these parties represent me.

I make a decision based on the election campaigns.

Total

Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample)

Rural

Urban

Metropolitan

Economic classes (determined by using household size, household income and car ownership)

Lower class

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper class