

# **KONDA**

# **Barometer**

***THEMES***

**Perception on Syrian Asylum-Seekers**  
***February 2016***

**KONDA**  
— ARAŞTIRMA VE DANIŞMANLIK





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## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey which forms the basis of this report was conducted on 6-7 February 2016 by face-to-face interviews with 2649 individuals in 136 neighborhoods and villages of 98 districts including the central districts of 27 provinces.

### **THEME OF THE MONTH: View on Syrian Refugees**

Due to the increasing effect of the Syrian problem on both the political agenda and daily life, we handled as the theme of this month the attitude of the society towards 2.5 million Syrian refugees who came to Turkey within the last 5 years. Starting from the position that the perception of the other is determinative in social relations, we asked our interviewees questions about certain demographic groups that they are in direct contact with in their daily lives as we previously did in the January'16 Barometer Report.

Following the evaluation of Özge Aktaş, Executive Director of TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), on the latest situation as well as some general information on the refugees, we indicated that the position of the refugees should be considered in the framework of a vague “state of exception” as an area which can be taken as neither legal nor extralegal. Even though the society in Turkey generally has certain expectations about foreigners such as education, language, having professions and, partially, being Muslims, they consider the acceptance of Syrians as a responsibility and also a humanitarian mission stemming from the history and the geography of the country. Furthermore, half of the society aided the refugees in some way. However, while embracing this responsibility, more conservative groups showing a tendency to see the refugees as religious fellows believe at higher rates that the refugees will return back to their country once the war ends, whereas more modern groups are more concerned about the undertaking of this responsibility with the belief that the refugees will never return back.

Two out of every three people come across Syrians at least once a week at the market, in their neighborhood or public transportation and of course the most intensive contact happens in the regions at the Syrian border. Most people approve the idea of living in the same city with the refugees whereas this approval rapidly decreases when community, neighborhood and finally home/family are of question. However, those who contact with the refugees more in public life and who generally approach the matter more positively are more open to the idea of contact in these areas of life.

Such contact produces perceptions in people as to the fact that cities are now more insecure, that the economy is harmed and job opportunities decline. The theory that economic uncertainty produces xenophobia is observed through the fact that those who have more difficulty in making a living are more concerned about the economics and the security of the refugees. However, modern clusters are also more concerned and even though the Ak Parti supporters seem less concerned in general, the difference in the attitudes of those who anticipate a crisis and those who don't is obvious.



Moving a step further from the evaluation of the society with regard to the approval, contact and effects in daily life of the refugees, when the integration of the refugees to the society in a legal framework such as working and residence permits is in question, polarization and especially political polarization manifests itself. It is observed that the view on integration is shaped in parallel to opinions on the clashes in the Southeast and the reasons for the current situation in Syria. However, when we handle the right to receive education in one's mother tongue as a sub-title of integration, different clusters start to express their demands. Although the idea that Turkish children living in Germany receive education in Turkish is approved at much higher rates than the idea of Kurdish children receiving education in Kurdish and Syrians receiving education in Arabic in Turkey, it is a very important opportunity for the democratization of Turkey that half of the society support the right to receive education in one's mother tongue for all three groups.

All these findings evaluated together reveal that the society seems to have embraced the state of exception of the refugees however not support the idea of giving permanent rights but rather reaching temporary solutions. It is understood that the society has not yet fully comprehended that a part of the refugees are here to stay and that even one fifth of them are at the age of 0-4, i.e. born in Turkey, and therefore in the game plan they build while looking for a general social resolution, the vague situation of the refugees does not yet exist.



## 2. PERCEPTION ON SYRIAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS

We have asked the respondents to assess the outcomes of the Syria Issue from the respondents in the previous section, and it should not be hard to predict that Turkey is one of the most affected countries from this problem. Syria, which has been ravaged by civil war for quite some time now, has been affecting the entire geography and the actors who have a vested interest in this geography. It is possible to read completely different analyses on the causes of the crisis in the Middle East that is centered on Syria. However, it is not difficult to ascertain that the turmoil is centered on global power struggle more than religious and sectarian conflicts. In this sense, 2016 will show us to what extent Erdoğan, Ak Parti and Turkey can be an actor in this power struggle that has been following a more rational course. However, it should be noted that asylum-seekers are the real problem for Turkey in connection with the crisis in Syria. In this perspective, in the February'16 Barometer, we have reserved the theme section to this topic, and we have endeavored to find out the outlook of the general public on the Syrian asylum-seekers. We have conducted the research by taking the different dimensions and perspectives of this issue into consideration, and arrived at extraordinary findings about the people of Turkey. However, before moving onto the research findings, let's try to get an understanding of the general picture about the Issue of Syrian Asylum-Seekers.

### 2.1. The Latest Status of Syrian Migrants in Turkey and Areas of Study

*Özge Aktaş Mazman, General Director, TESEV*

As of 2016, the Syria crisis has entered its sixth year and it does not look like it will be settled any time soon. Four and a half million people who have run away from Syria are now located in <sup>1</sup> Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt. According to the figures of Directorate General of Migration Management in December 2015, the number of Syrian people registered in Turkey has reached 2.415.494. There are 265.180 Syrian people staying only in the 25 Temporary Refugee Centers that have been established by the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) in 10 provinces. 54 percent of the Syrians in Turkey are made up of children and minors, while one out of every five Syrian is a baby or child between the ages of 0-4. It is known that a significant portion of these babies and children have been born in Turkey. 42 percent of the migrants are between the ages of 18-59.

Syrians in Turkey are under the responsibility of Directorate General of Migration Management of the Ministry of Interior. As Turkey does not accept “refugees” outside of Europe, the legal status of Syrian migrants are determined by the “Temporary Protection Regulation”. “Temporary protection status” offers different rights than those provided by the status of “refugee” or “asylum-seeker”. The initial

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/>



rights provided to Syrians with the temporary protection status include “acceptance into the national borders with the open door policy”, “adherence to the principle of non-refoulement” and “meeting basic and urgent needs of the incoming people”. The biometric records of the Syrian citizens, who are provided protection under the scope of this regulation, are taken and they are provided with an ID card that enables them to benefit from health and basic education services. It has been declared that registered migrants would be granted a work permit in March 2016, but the details of this work permit are not known yet.

The high number of Syrian migrants are creating problems that may be bigger than what Turkey can handle. Health, education and municipality services are insufficient, while the housing problem cannot be solved. Although Syrians under temporary protection have been granted with the right to receive basic education, the capacity of schools in many places are not sufficient to handle the high population, and where it is sufficient language and adaptation problems cannot be overcome. The tension in the labor market, which already has problems of its own, is exacerbated by the supply of cheap labor by the migrants. Syrian migrants in Turkey who do not have work permits, and thus who are unable to work under registration in Turkey are working under extremely disadvantaged conditions, and most of them are living under the poverty line.

The conference on the Management of Syrian Migrants in Turkey, organized by TESEV, has recently showed that all stakeholders are in consensus on the lack of coordination between public institutions and between urban-rural areas in refugee management. Furthermore, neither the Syrians nor the general public are not well informed about the status and the rights granted to Syrians. This predicament is limiting the access of Syrians to certain services and recreating the image of “illegal migrant” for the Syrians in the public eye.

The increasing number of Syrians who try to go to Europe via Turkey has been frequently covered in the news both in Turkey and the world. The overflowing numbers of migrants taking the perilous journey to Europe has underlined the fact that Syria’s neighbors, including Turkey, have reached a saturation point by taking in more migrants than they can handle and/or that the Syrian asylum-seekers prefer to go to Europe instead of staying in their host country. Particularly, the so-called “Western Balkan Route” that follows the route of Turkey – Greece – Macedonia – Serbia – Hungary – Austria – Germany not only poses very dangerous conditions for the migrants, but also violations of migrant rights are encountered in all of the countries traversed during this journey. Even if are able to make it to Greece from Turkey, they have to pass through two non-EU countries in between Greece and Hungary, both of which are EU members, and they are subjected to violations of their rights as migrants throughout the entire journey. It is highly important that Turkey takes urgent measures on “migrant smuggling” on the Turkey-Greece route, which is one of the most dangerous stages of this journey, and where deaths on the sea have greatly increased recently.






In summary, five main problem areas may be proposed for research and political activities on Syrians in Turkey to concentrate on:


- ✓ Informing Syrians and the general public about the status and rights granted to Syrians by the temporary protection regulation and its addendum, and facilitation of Syrians' access to available services
- ✓ Overcome lack of coordination between public institutions and the urban-rural areas in migration management
- ✓ Increasing the access of Syrian children and youth in Turkey to education given the population size of the school-age Syrian children
- ✓ Informing the public, the public sector and Syrians on the work permit expected to be announced in the near future, and working towards increasing the registered employment of Syrians
- ✓ Taking precautions for preventing migrant smuggling

## 2.2. Information on Asylum-Seekers in Turkey





## Shelters for Syrian Asylum-Seekers in Turkey





**Refugee** According to the European Convention On the Legal Status of Migrant Workers; a refugee is a person who has left their country of citizenship for fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and who is unable to or unwilling go back their country of citizenship because of such fear.

**Asylum-seeker** is a person who has left their country of citizenship with the self-claim of being a refugee, but who has not been granted a refugee status yet (A refugee is someone whose application for asylum has been accepted).

**Migrant** is someone who has left their country of their citizenship out of own volition for economic reasons to pursue better living conditions. A refugee, on the other hand, has left their country of citizenship for compulsory reasons to find a safe haven. A refugee is someone who cannot benefit from protection from their own country and whose safety is jeopardized, while a migrant is someone whose safety is not jeopardized and who is able to benefit from protection of their own country.

### **2.3. Theoretical Framework: Ghost Citizens**

One out of every three people in Turkey agrees with the statement, “No more asylum-seekers should be allowed into Turkey from now on.”

One of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century, Jacques Derrida, in his book *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*<sup>2</sup> (1999) argues that hospitality constitutes the foundation of modern ownership (Melda Yeğenoğlu (2016))<sup>3</sup>. We have to take two different meanings of ownership into consideration. On the one hand, Derrida argues that the separation between the host and the guest establishes the boundary between private property and public property. In this sense, when the separation between the two realms is eliminated, private property would become an impossibility. On the other hand, it could also be argued that Derrida is providing a definition of the modern state (and thus property). In the post-colonial world, human migration and mobility has made it necessary for the state to define who is a host and thus permanent (i.e. citizen) and who is a guest and thus temporary (i.e. migrant). This demarcation has resulted in the state to shape its entire legal system on the basis of the separation between those who are subject to the law and those who are excluded from its jurisdiction.

One of the greatest thinkers of our century, Giorgio Agamben argues in his book *The State of Exception*<sup>4</sup> (2005) that in the legal system of the modern state a yet unnamed third sector exists between the dichotomy of legal-illegal. In this respect; states have created a space which has not been covered completely by their jurisprudence, but one that is also not illegal (in other words, both within and outside the law). Declarations of State of Emergency, Statutory Decrees and Emergency Decrees all

<sup>2</sup> Jacques Derrida (1999) *A Dieu to Emanuel Levinas* (ed.) Werner Hamacher and David E. Welberry. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.

<sup>3</sup> Melda Yeğenoğlu (2016). *Islam, Migrancy and Hospitality in Europe* Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları: İstanbul.

<sup>4</sup> Giorgio Agamben (2005). *State of Exception* University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL.



indicate a state of exception, while visas allowing third country citizens freedom to travel for a specified period of time, temporary protection status granted to asylum-seekers or the suspension, and not outright denial, of basic rights (with the claim that the suspension will be on a temporary basis) such as shelter, travel and educational rights to asylum-seekers. The *state of exception*, in both of its meanings, may be defined as a playfield that the modern state has opened up for itself in where it is outside the jurisdiction of the law, without acting against the law.

As noted in the previous section, as of 2016, the Syria crisis has entered its sixth year, and 2.5 million of the 4.5 million people who have run away from Syria are living in Turkey. **The theme of February'16 Barometer was not determined only with the purpose of making the conditions and demands of Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey heard, but also in order to focus on the issue of asylum-seekers in Turkey in general, and in connection with that, the course of Turkish foreign policy in particular.** Our main aim was to understand the opinions and feelings of citizens, whose relationship with the state is based on a legal framework, and who are thus defined by the law, on asylum-seekers whose relationship with the state is ambiguous, and who are defined on the basis of exception.

The concept of “ghost citizen” that has been used in naming this section of our report was not formulated by us, but by Nermin Saybaşıllı. In Saybaşıllı’s book, *Borders and Ghosts: Migratory Hauntings in Contemporary Visual Cultures* (2011), this term is used to underline the “non-existence” of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in the legal sphere, and their only existence in a *state of exception*, by which they indeed made up a new community.<sup>5</sup> For this reason, the place where they have been living has become very foreign by those who see themselves as both citizen and host (age: 21). On the other hand, migrants in turn transform the state by existing in this state of exception which is at once both within and outside legality. For the last 50 years, we have been observing the transformation of the “land-based state” into a “population-based state” initially emphasized by Michel Foucault (re. Saybaşıllı (2011)). The population-based state has spread the complex and extremely detailed property ownership arrangements which have evolved throughout centuries into regulations on the legal status, rights and responsibilities of the people living within its borders. In other words, the modern state has abolished the agents and agencies between the landowners and the state legally, in terms of the argument of by whom and how the land will be owned. In the aftermath of this process, the process of classifying the people who live on the state-owned land permanently and those who live on it on a temporary basis, under the scope of a legal framework, and the identification of different rights and responsibilities for different communities has begun. In addition to land, the state has also excluded agents from the legal process for all kinds of people it shelters under its roof. In this respect, the legal framework that defines how, in which degree and with what duration citizenship, refugee or even tourist status and rights have become more decisive than ever in the world history.

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
<sup>5</sup> Nermin Saybaşıllı (2011). *Borders and Ghosts: Migratory Hauntings in Contemporary Visual Cultures* Metis Yayınları: İstanbul.



Ayşe Çavdar, in her article penned for Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, claims that the capacity of communities to include foreigners says a lot of society in general (2016)<sup>6</sup>. Based on the conceptual/theoretical framework we have shared above, we agree with the opinion that the issue of Syrian asylum-seekers say a lot about our society. As you will see in the following pages of our report, this issue sheds light on our approach to rights and freedoms as a society, our understanding of public and private space, our political party preferences, and even the deep relationship of international affairs with domestic politics.


We would like to share three main findings from the outset. In order to carry out a preliminary examination to determine how widespread Syrian asylum-seekers are among society, in the field survey for the January'16 Barometer, we have asked the respondents whether they have come across any Syrians in their immediate environment or not within the past month, and 8 out of every 10 people said "yes".

**Have you come across any Syrian asylum-seekers  
in your immediate environment during the past month?  
(January 2016)**



For the February'16 Barometer, we have directed a more detailed version of this question, as it can be seen in the graph. 6 out of every 10 people have pointed out that they have seen asylum-seekers frequently (either every day or a few times a week).

**How often do you come across Syrian asylum-seekers?**




Finally, when asked the opinion of the respondents on Syrian asylum-seekers 6 out of every 10 people stated that "asylum-seekers are people fleeing from tyranny". However; as you'll see in the following pages of the report, this opinion does not necessarily mean that citizens directly share a conscientious or emotional state of

<sup>6</sup> Ayşe Çavdar (2016). "Community of Ghosts: People of Turkey Reflected on Syrians" *Saha* (2):32-35 January 2016



being. Rather, it may be perceived as an indicator of their evaluation of the conflict in Syria as a context in which the regime and various armed groups are committing atrocities on their own people.

### Which of the below best describes your opinion on Syrians in Turkey?




Various demographic and political data demonstrate that the general public is not in consensus, but instead deeply divided on the issue of what kind of policies on migrants and asylum-seekers should be developed in Turkey. The differences of opinion among the general public the future of migrants and asylum-seekers in Turkey are also reflected on their statements. You can find a detailed analysis of this in the following pages of the report.

## 2.4. Outlook on Foreigners: Selecting Migrants


Before proceeding with our examination of the general outlook on Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey, we wanted to understand their perspective on foreigners in general, and their overall attitude towards potential incoming migrants. Therefore, we have directed four general questions to the respondents on living together with migrants and foreigners. When we take a detailed look at the responses to the questions on how important or insignificant it is for foreigners, who have come to Turkey to live here, to be able to speak Turkish, to have had a good education, to hold an occupation particularly needed in Turkey and to be Muslim or not, the first remarkable finding we come across is the high-level of expectation we have for foreigners who come to Turkey for the purpose of living here. Three out of every four people stated that it is important, at a varying extent, for foreigners in Turkey to speak Turkish well, to have a good education and to hold an occupation that is needed in Turkey. However, in contrary to the general presumption, foreigners residing in Turkey are less expected to be Muslim.



### Characteristics expected from foreigners choosing to reside in Turkey



First of all, we should note that the results of the factor analysis conducted on the responses to survey questions are in confirmation with our above-mentioned observations. The factor analysis indicates that the three questions on (occupation, education and language) make up a strong factor in unison, in other words, when they are evaluated together, each question brings out similar social trends in terms of measuring a particular attitude. In short, this factor may rightly be called the “functional migrant factor”.



Based on the graph above, we observe that the concepts of migrant and asylum-seekers are indeed differentiated in the minds of individuals in Turkey. As you will see later in the report, although 7 out of every 10 people think that it is a humanitarian duty to admit Syrian asylum-seekers into Turkey, different expectations are observed in consideration of the same for “foreigners”. The foreigners coming into Turkey are suddenly expected to have positive characteristics, and they are expected to possess qualifications that will contribute to the country.




### 2.4.1. Differentiation Outlook on Foreigners: Perception of Migrants Within the Context of Lifestyle Clusters and Political Parties

Polarization is once again observed clearly in the outlook on migration and foreigners. Usually, CHP and HDP voters make up one pole, while Ak Parti and MHP voters make up the other pole. CHP voters are more likely to be more accepting of foreigners than the other voter groups. For example, at least one fourth of CHP voters do not find it important for a foreigner residing in Turkey to know Turkish. The corresponding rate for MHP or Ak Parti voters is quite different. Knowing Turkish or not is not important for 40 percent of HDP voters, and expectedly, MHP voters care about this the most, with 85 percent of this voter group finds it important for a foreigner living here to know Turkish.

The expectation of the incoming foreigners to be Muslim is another indicator of differentiation. 60 percent of CHP and HDP voters do not find it important for a foreigner wishing to live in Turkey to be Muslim, Ak Parti voters care about this the most, with 75 percent considering this as an important factor. Similarly, 72 percent of MHP voters find it important for an incoming foreigner to be Muslim.

**Characteristics most desired in foreigners / Political preference**







#### **2.4.2. Changing Perception of Migrants by Educational Attainment and Economic Conditions**

As demonstrated by many international research studies on the subject, people's attitudes towards migration of foreigners varies greatly by their educational attainment level. Throughout the world, people with lower educational attainment level are more likely to have a more reserved outlook on foreigners categorically. Lesser educated groups of people are even against the migration of better educated foreigners who do not pose a threat to their own employment status.<sup>7</sup> Better educated groups, on the other hand, are more open to migrants in general, and they support the migration of more educated and qualified foreigners, even if this would pose a threat to their own employment. In Turkey, we observe that the attitude towards also follows the same course with respect to educational attainment level. Better educated people are more likely to take a more rational outlook on the migration of foreigners, and we could think that they take their potentially positive contribution to the economy into consideration in making this evaluation.


The answers to the question on whether the migrating foreigner should be Muslim or not also differentiate from each other by these parameters. When we compare the responses from different educational attainment clusters to each other, our findings are in parallel with the results we have for the overall country.

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<sup>7</sup> Hainmueller, J. and Hiscox, M. (2007), 'Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe', *International Organization* 61, Spring 2007, pp. 399–442.



### Characteristics most desired in foreigners / Educational attainment level



Similarly, the better educated segments of society are less likely to find it important for a foreign migrant to know Turkish or to be Muslim. And expectedly, the opposite holds true for the lesser educated.


#### 2.4.3. Economic Uncertainty and Aversion to Foreigners

The observation that economic uncertainty in a country generally leads to increased xenophobia and more anti-migrant policies is a widely-accepted contention. As the followers of European politics would know, extreme rightist parties are going through a recent resurgence since the global economic crisis. In order to test the validity of the same condition in Turkey, we have compared the responses to the questions about the outlook on foreigners by those who expect and do not expect an economic crisis. Nevertheless, as of February 2016, the rate of those who expect an economic crisis in Turkey is around 55 percent.

The most striking finding here is that the opinion on foreigners and crisis expectation move in different directions, in contrary to what is commonly observed in Europe. When we observe the responses to the importance attached to the religious status of the



foreign migrant as Muslim, we see that nearly half of those who expect a crisis think that it is not important for the incoming migrant to be Muslim, while the same rate among those who do not expect a crisis is less than one third.



#### **2.4.4. Comparison of the Opinion on Foreigners - Turkey vs. Europe**

The questions we have taken into consideration in our evaluation of the opinion on foreigners were also asked in the European Social Survey (ESS), as part of a survey conducted in many European Countries in 2014. In the ESS, the question directed to the respondents inquired about how important it was for a migrant to be a Christian, to have a good educational attainment level, to have an occupation needed by the country, and to adapt to the everyday life in the country.

Turkey has always been a country that has been giving off migrants to continental European countries, and it is accustomed discrimination, racism and xenophobia from its citizens who have migrated to such European countries. There is an established opinion among the general public there are anti-Muslim sentiments and mistreatment of Turkish migrants in Europe. The data we have enables us not only to make a more realistic assessment of the conditions in European countries deemed to be racist, discriminatory or xenophobic, but also allows us to see where Turkey stands in comparison to these countries. Among the 15 countries for which we have data available, we have decided to focus on Germany, Austria, Belgium, France and Holland, all of which have been top destinations for Turkish migrants.

In terms of the overall responses to these five questions, we can rank these countries in terms of their open-mindedness: Holland is the most open-minded and most likely to accept foreigners, followed respectively by France, Germany and Belgium. Austria, on the other hand, is more closed to foreigners.

In terms of finding it important for foreign migrants to have good educational qualifications, Turkey would rank second after Austria in being closed to foreigners. 81 percent of Austrians say education is important, while the same rate for Turkish citizens is 78.1 percent. Turkey is followed by Belgium with 77.7 percent. In Holland, this rate goes down to below 70 percent.




25 percent of the people in Turkey do not think that it is important for the incoming foreign migrant to know Turkish, the corresponding figure for the native language in Germany is around 21 percent. The factor at work here could be thought of as the existence of large communities who speak a native tongue that is different from the official language of the country concerned. However, as these groups do not have the potential to influence the average figures due to their comparatively small size within the whole population, in any of the countries involved, we may arrive at the conclusion that the respondents in Turkey and Germany have adopted a more candid approach in their responses to the questions.

The main difference between Turkey and the European countries that are deemed to be discriminatory and Islamophobic is observed in the importance they attach to the religion (Muslim/Christian) of the incoming migrant. Among the European countries, Austrians are most concerned about foreign migrants to be Christian, with 30 percent finding this as an important criterion. However, people in Turkey far surpass even Austria in terms of being closed to migrants, with 48 percent stating that being Muslim is an important criteria for the incoming foreign migrants. This corresponding rate for the other countries is much lower, and only 15 percent emphasize that they find it important for the emigrating foreigner to be Christian.



### Characteristics most desired in asylum-seekers / By country (ESS data)






## 2.5. Social Acceptance / Status of Asylum Seekers

The questions we asked about the Syrian asylum-seekers covered topics such as on Turkey's acceptance to these asylum-seekers, its provision of assistance to them, and their status in Turkey. A little more than half of society believes that it is a historical and geographic responsibility for Turkey to accept asylum-seekers, and about three fourths of this half see accepting asylum-seekers as a humanitarian duty, and thinks that asylum-seekers should not be discriminated. Furthermore, three fourths of society also believe that the assistance provided by the state to asylum-seekers is insufficient. Similarly, three out of every four people believe that asylum-seekers should be able to adapt to daily life in Turkey. On the other hand, nearly half of society believes that asylum-seekers will return to their country of origin when the war is over.

**Opinion on acceptance of asylum-seekers**




Opinions on acceptance of asylum-seekers, their status in Turkey, their return to their country of origin vary the most by lifestyle, and particularly the degree of piety. More religious people are more likely to emphasize the responsibility based on shared history and geography and humanitarian duty at the same time, to find the assistance provided to the asylum seekers as insufficient, and to believe that asylum-seekers will go back to their country of origin when the war ends.

The Kurdish seem to have a different perspective on this issue. Although they are not more likely to believe that asylum-seekers will go back to their country of origin, they are more likely to emphasize the responsibility and humanitarian aspect of accepting asylum-seekers, and to find the level of assistance insufficient.





### Have you provided any assistance to Syrian asylum-seekers directly or through an organization?



In addition to the aid and assistance provided to asylum-seekers by the state, numerous NGOs and individuals have been helping the Syrians in Turkey since their initial arrival, and our field survey results demonstrate that half of society have also been helping the Syrian asylum-seekers, through both formal organizations and informal channels, such as neighbors and acquaintances. Interestingly, we do not observe any significant impact of the opinion on the sufficiency of state aid and assistance on the likelihood of making personal contributions. In other words, finding state support for asylum-seekers insufficient does not directly influence the tendency to help Syrian asylum-seekers on a personal level. However, we should also underline that those who are helping asylum-seekers through informal channels are more likely to find level of state support insufficient.

The overall opinion of people on accepting asylum-seekers into Turkey or the level of state support reflects that the general public does not have a problem with acceptance of Syrian asylum-seekers into Turkey.

### 2.6. Areas of Contact


In this section of our report, we will focus on main areas of contact between Turkish citizens and Syrian asylum-seekers. In our survey, we have asked the respondents about where and how frequently they encounter Syrian asylum-seekers or under which circumstances they avoid encountering Syrian asylum-seekers.

As we have noted earlier in the Conceptual Framework section, as part of our survey for previous month's report, we had asked the respondents whether they come across Syrian asylum-seekers in their immediate environment or not. 8 out of every 10 people stated having come across Syrian asylum-seekers.






### Have you come across any Syrian asylum-seekers in your immediate environment during the past month? (January 2016)



This month, we have asked the respondents how frequently they come across asylum-seekers. 6 out of every 10 people stated that they come across asylum-seekers very frequently (every day or several times a week).


### How often do you come across Syrian asylum-seekers?



In light of these findings, when we examine the rate of those encountering asylum-seekers on a daily basis by region, we expectedly find that people in the Eastern Mediterranean region, which includes the province of Hatay bordering Syria, are the most likely to come across Syrian asylum-seekers on a daily basis. Following the Syrian border, through which asylum-seekers first step into Turkey, we see that people from the Southeastern Anatolia region make up the second most likely group to encounter Syrian asylum-seekers daily. İstanbul is the third and the provinces of the densely populated and highly industrialized provinces of Kocaeli, Bursa and Eskişehir in the Eastern Marmara region are the fourth most likely places where people come across Syrian asylum-seekers on a daily basis.




### The rate of those who “come across Syrian asylum-seekers on a daily basis” by region



When we asked the respondents about where get into contact with asylum-seekers, only one out of every ten people have said that they did not have any contact with the asylum-seekers. People get into contact with asylum-seekers the most in bazaars and shopping areas, second most in their neighborhood and out on the streets, and third most in public transportation.

### Where do you come across asylum seekers?




The responses to this questions clearly reveals the fact that asylum-seekers have become an undeniable part of public life in Turkey. However, it should also be noted that in Turkey, public space and private space are often very intertwined with each other, and thus the neighborhood and social relations in one's immediate residential vicinity tend to designate the areas of close contact with asylum-seekers, as much as the family and having the same place of origin.



**70 percent are open to having asylum-seekers in the same city, and 14 are open to having asylum-seekers in one's own family**

70 percent of the respondents report that they agree with living in the same city with asylum seekers, while the same rate drops sharply as we move towards closer areas of contact, such as the neighborhood (75 percent), neighbors and friendship (41 percent) and family (14 percent). In other words, four out of every ten people agree with interacting with asylum-seekers as friends, only one out of every ten people are open to sharing the same residence or family with asylum-seekers.




The boundaries of contact areas in which we directly interact with others in society are first and foremost determined by one's relations in the neighborhood and immediate residential vicinity. The family is imagined as the most private and intimate area of contact, while close contact at larger scale, such as in the city and the country in general leads to a lower level of discomfort. As such, the attitudes on the question of Syrian asylum-seekers not only provide insight on the perception of Turkish general public on the distance-proximity to Syrian asylum-seekers, but also reveal the coordinates of spaces inhabited by citizens in their lives.

The responses to the question on which groups they interact with the most frequently are in confirmation with our observation above. The great majority in Turkey, which is 7 out of every 10 people in Turkey get into with their neighbors or people from their



immediate vicinity most frequently. This is followed by colleagues at 30 percent, and people from the same place of origin with 21 percent.




In Turkey, half of the population lives in metropolitan areas with 800 thousand or more people, while one fourth live in rural areas and villages with a population of less than 4.000 people. This fact leads us to two main findings. First; the distribution of population reflects a 2 to 1 ration in favor of densely population areas over rural areas. Undoubtedly, ongoing domestic migration is the main reason behind this distribution. 21 percent of the people living in metropolitan areas were already raised in metropolitan areas, whereas 42 percent of the urban population were raised in villages. Therefore, in connection with contact and interaction in metropolitan areas, we may conclude that connections based on shared place of origin do not necessarily lead to shared areas of contact, at least to the extent it is portrayed in popular culture or perceived by the general public, and that the population piled up in big cities mostly tend to interact with people from their immediate surrounding environment first.

For this reason, understanding where people get into contact with Syrian asylum-seekers and where they do not, also helps us to understand the boundaries of our life and areas we move in. As we have emphasized in our earlier **February'15 KONDA Lifestyles** and **January'16 The Average Turkish Person** reports, people's opinions on interacting with foreigners and other people they come across in their daily lives (whether they are Syrian or not) provide an idea of those people's immediate environment.




### Which of the below best describes your opinion on Syrians in Turkey?



As we have demonstrated in the “Introduction-conceptual framework” section, the respondents we have interviewed tend to see asylum-seekers as “people fleeing from tyranny”. Opinions on asylum-seekers offer insight into the daily contact of people in Turkey with asylum-seekers from Syria. In other words, the acceptance of the Syrians really depends on depends on how people see them. As it can be seen in the graph, those who think that asylum-seekers are fleeing tyranny are more inclined to be open to contact with them in different area, those who see them as a burden are less inclined for interaction.

### Which of the below best describes your opinion on the Syrians? What do you think is your relationship with Syrian asylum-seekers?






The existence of a prevalent social opinion is the first thing that catches our attention regarding the issue of Syrian asylum-seekers. As we move from urban areas to the neighborhood, and from the neighborhood to the family, we observe that different social clusters are behaving with the same tendency. Urban areas prove to be the most acceptable venue for interaction with asylum-seekers, while the family is generally considered to be an area, least desired for being contact with asylum-seekers. However, while the existence of a prevalent trend among society should be noted, we should also underline that the various social groups differentiate from each other in terms of the extent they approve contact with asylum seekers or avoid contact with them. As revealed by our research, the desire to get into contact and the avoidance of contact, and the extent of their expression are determined five main criteria: frequency of contact with asylum-seekers, gender, lifestyle cluster, political preference and ethnic background.

When we evaluate these criteria together, different segments of society may have different opinions on relationship with people from the same place of origin, the same immediate environment and the same neighborhood, we can see that they are in consensus about their take on accepting asylum-seekers within the family. In other words, living in the same city or neighborhood with Syrian asylum leads to different attitudes among different social clusters, while the domain of “family” is an area of contact where the opinions of people from different social clusters are more similar to each other.


As demonstrated by the graphs, different demographic clusters state their agreement with the contact of Syrian asylum-seekers with their family at similar rates. In terms of such direct contact, society is in consensus about their family’s interaction with the outside world.

### What do you think is your relationship with Syrian asylum-seekers?






### What do you think is your relationship with Syrian asylum-seekers?




### What do you think is your relationship with Syrian asylum-seekers?



However, we may talk about two exceptions here. The main social trend is similar, yet we also observe that certain clusters are more favorable in terms of their outlook on contact with asylum-seekers, while certain clusters are more inclined to avoid getting into contact with asylum-seekers. At this point, it is noteworthy that the Kurdish are more likely to approve contact than the Turkish. We may associate this tendency with the fact that the Kurdish are in more of a direct contact with asylum-seekers since the areas bordering the Syrian border are predominantly populated



by the Kurdish. Secondly, they do not make up a statistically significant group, it is remarkable that the Arab minority have the most negative outlook on contact with asylum-seekers in Turkey. Although Arabs are generally located in close proximity to the border, similar to the Kurds, it seems that the influx of asylum-seekers into their environment has produced a more negative impact on their perspective. We know very well from similar academic and professional research studied conducted around the world that in contexts where groups with a similar ethnic background migrate to a country in large numbers, the same ethnic group in the host county may not tend to be very aspirant for contact and shared experiences with these asylum-seekers. Citizens with an Arabic ethnic background may very well discriminate people with the same ethnic background when the latter are asylum-seekers. Therefore, addressing migration only through the perspective of migration may not be very illustrative of the actual conditions.




When we take a closer look to the voter profiles, we observe that HDP voters, preferred predominantly by the Kurdish are the most likely group to approve contact with asylum-seekers. HDP voters are three times more likely to be open to contact at the level of family with asylum seekers than CHP or MHP voters.

#### Arabs in Turkey

Turkey has a sizable Arab minority. According to six-years of Barometer data, Arabs make up 1.6 percent of the adult population in Turkey, trailing behind the Turkish and the Kurdish as the third largest ethnic group in Turkey. 43 percent of Turkish citizens with an Arabic ethnic background live in the Southeastern Anatolia region, while 34 percent live in the Mediterranean and 12 percent live in İstanbul. It is also well known that the Arab population and culture is prevalent in the provinces of Urfa, Kilis, Gaziantep, Mardin and Hatay. It would have been very illuminating to examine the outlook of Turkish citizens with an Arabic ethnic background on Syrian asylum-seekers. However, we were only able to interview 45 respondents who stated their ethnic origin as Arab, in the field survey for the February'16 Barometer. Although the ratio of respondents with an Arabic ethnic background to the entire sample corresponds to the overall rate of Turkish citizens with an Arabic ethnic background in Turkey, this figure is not high enough to generate statistically meaningful results. Nevertheless, we have endeavored to share the opinions of





Thus; we can talk about a general state of polarization among society in terms of getting into contact with asylum-seekers, in the same city or within the context of neighborhood relations. Women, CHP and MHP voters, Moderns, the Turkish and the respondents who stated that they never contacted asylum are more likely to be against any contact with the asylum-seekers. On the other hand, males, Ak Parti voters, conservatives and the respondents who contact asylum-seekers every day are more positive about being in contact with asylum-seekers.


At this point, we should note that the difference between discourse/values and practices, which we have frequently emphasized in previous Barometers and Lifestyles reports<sup>8</sup> is yet again observed when it comes to Syrian asylum-seekers. Men who have more direct contact with asylum-seekers in comparison to women, Conservatives who are more tolerant based on religious brotherhood in comparison to Moderns, the Kurdish who live along the Syrian border in comparison to the Turkish, HDP voters in comparison to other voter groups and the respondents who contact asylum-seekers on a daily bases in comparison to the respondents who do not have daily contact with asylum-seekers are more tolerant in terms of contact. It is necessary to note that the respondents who put emphasis on religious brotherhood includes 10 percent of the respondents who indicate that they contact asylum-seekers in the mosque, and thus, religious brotherhood has a justification based on daily life practices.

<sup>8</sup> The field survey for the KONDA 2015 Lifestyles Research was conducted in February 2015, and research itself focused on lifestyles, modern and traditional values, and practices in Turkey. The 7 lifestyle clusters we have formulated by carrying out face-to-face interviews with 5222 people in 39 provinces helps both to understand different social groups and to portray sociological differences among socioeconomic status (SES) groups.



## 2.7. Influence of Asylum-seekers on Economics and Security

A series of questions about Syrian asylum-seekers addressed the influence of Syrians on the daily life practices in Turkey, and the overall attitude seems to be quite negative. **Three thirds of the respondents think that cities are less secure because of Syrian asylum-seekers, that Syrian refugees are a threat to the economy in Turkey, that they lead to a decrease in employment opportunities and that Syrians do not have a similar culture to us.** In addition, one out of every three people in Turkey agrees with the statement, “No more asylum-seekers should be allowed into Turkey from now on.”




The factor analysis indicates that the 5 statements in the graph above are quite similar to each other in terms of measuring a certain attitude, and thus, they create a factor in unison. We preferred to call this factor as “impact on economics/security factor”. For the purposes of this factor, 1 signifies a positive stance towards the impact of Syrians on economics and security while 6 signifies a negative stance. The average score in Turkey stands at 4.4 which demonstrates a negative outlook.

Four factors are critical in whether the respondents think that asylum-seekers have a negative impact on economics and security: lifestyle, contact with asylum-seekers, their opinions on asylum-seekers and the Syrian issue, and their income and economic conditions.



### Influence of asylum-seekers on economics/security



The respondents who identify themselves as Modern, who do not cover their head as well as CHP and MHP voters are quite concerned about the impacts of asylum-seekers on economics and security. On the other hand, Ak Parti voters, Religious Conservatives and those who cover their head take a more positive stance than the rest of society.

When we consider the hierarchy of the areas of contact, increased rate of approval for direct contact from city-scale to household-scale leads to decrease in the rate of concern. In other words, the respondents who are in favor of direct contact with asylum-seekers are less concerned. For instance, the higher rate of concern among the respondents who live in rural areas implies to a similar situation.


How the respondents identify Syrian asylum-seekers leads to significant differences. The respondents who think that Syrian asylum-seekers are opportunists are rather





which is actually a technical and objective evaluation, has been influenced by political preferences and partisanship. The discourse that revolves around the interest-rate lobby and economic conspiracies adopted by the ruling party has been acclaimed by the masses, and these groups may neglect economic crisis. For instance, two thirds of Ak Parti voters do not anticipate a crisis in Turkey in the near future. Ak Parti voters account for 30 percent of the entire sample. Thus, they have a significant effect on the average figures.

### Asylum-seekers' impact on economic conditions / Crisis expectation (Except Ak Parti voters)



Indeed, when we remove the respondents who stated that they voted for Ak Parti in the November 1st General Election from the sample, xenophobia - which is influenced by crisis expectation - in the remainder of the sample proves to be consistent with the theory mentioned above. In response to statements such as “asylum-seekers should only dwell in the camps”, “no more asylum-seekers should be allowed into Turkey” and “employment opportunities have decreased”, there is a significant difference between how those who do and who do not expect a crisis after Ak Parti voters are left out of the sample. As we mentioned before, anti-migration attitude and xenophobia intensify when individuals feel threats to their lives and feel uncertainty.



For instance, half of those who do not anticipate a crisis think that asylum-seekers should only dwell in the camps, while the corresponding rate exceeds 60 percent among those who expect a crisis. Likewise, the difference between the rates of those who agree with the statements “no more asylum-seekers should be allowed into Turkey” and “asylum-seekers are a threat to the economy in Turkey” in these two groups is almost 15 percent. The difference between these two groups reaches 20 percent when it comes to the rate of those who agree that employment opportunities decreased due to asylum-seekers.

At this point, the responses provided in response to the statements about migration policies by Ak Parti voters who do and do not anticipate an economic crisis indicate that economic factors hold the potential to overpower polarization and susceptible responses. 80 percent of Ak Parti voters who anticipate an economic crisis in Turkey agree that employment opportunities have decreased because of the Syrian asylum-seekers, while the corresponding rate among Ak Parti voters who do not anticipate an economic crisis is 55 percent. The rate of those who think that cities are less safe than before because of asylum-seekers is similar to each other.

Three out of every four Ak Parti voters who anticipate an economic crisis think that no more asylum-seekers should be allowed into Turkey, while less than half of those who do not anticipate an economic crisis agree with this statement.

### Asylum-seekers' impact on economic conditions / Crisis expectation (Only Ak Parti voters)



In short, Ak Parti voters differ from other voter groups in terms of crisis expectation in Turkey. The majority of Ak Parti voters do not anticipate economic hardship. Due to the fact that Ak Parti voters constitute a significant part of the sample, it appears as if the overall trend regarding migration policies and attitude to migrants is extremely




different than what we know. However, when we leave Ak Parti voters out of the sample and when we make analyze Ak Parti voters in isolation, it becomes evident that the respondents who anticipate an economic crisis take a stand against asylum-seekers and migration.



## 2.8. Opinions on Integration

In the scope of the study, we also inquired about what the respondents think about granting work permits or residence permits to asylum-seekers in order to ensure that they are fully integrated to society in Turkey in the long-term. The factor analysis revealed a similar outlook for the question on whether asylum-seekers should only dwell in the camps or not. Therefore, we created a new factor named “opinion on integration”.

Respondents' opinions on granting asylum-seekers with work permits and residence permits and allowing asylum-seekers roam freely out of the camps clearly demonstrates how the respondents perceive the state of exception and legal relations as outlined in the Conceptual Framework section. The previous chapters addressed the acceptance of asylum-seekers in the country (in other words, their initial relation with the state), the spheres where the citizens of Turkey and asylum-seekers contact each other and the relation between the citizens of Turkey and asylum-seekers by observing the respondents' opinions on the influence of the contact on their daily lives. Thus, these chapters provided an assessment of the current conditions. On the other hand, this section on integration once again refers to the issues regarding how the relation between the state and asylum-seekers should be in the future (or until they return to their countries if that is the case) and reveals what the respondents' opinions on what status should be given to asylum-seekers.



44 percent of the respondents agree that asylum-seekers should be granted a work permit, while 37 percent think that they should be granted a residence permit. 43 percent of the respondents disagree that asylum-seekers should only remain in the camps. The respondents who take a pro-integration stand in all three questions make up one fifth of the respondents. When we merge these three questions and create a factor where 1 signifies an anti-integration and 6 signifies a pro-integration stance, we can observe that the average score in Turkey is 3.1 meaning that society in Turkey is not inclined to support integration.






In this context, we first analyzed the responses provided to the statement about the granting of work permits to asylum-seekers given that economic uncertainty has a significant influence on xenophobia. Our findings indicated that the employment status of the respondents does not have a significant influence on the opinions of the respondents about granting work permits to asylum-seekers. The opinions of the respondents do not differ from each other regardless of whether they are employed or unemployed.

As anticipated in light of the previous findings, higher income and better economic conditions lead to a positive turn in how the respondents perceive being in contact with asylum-seekers and what they think about the integration of asylum-seekers. Support for integration increases significantly as the rate of approval for the existence of asylum-seekers increase from city-scale to household-scale.

### Opinion on the integration of asylum-seekers




There is a certain separation in society, which cannot be identified as polarization, and such separation is primarily related to political preferences. First of all, the rate Ak Parti and HDP voters who are in favor of the integration of asylum-seekers is higher than the corresponding rates among CHP and MHP voters. On the other hand, the respondents who state that they would vote “yes” in a potential referendum on the presidential system and the respondents who believe that the conflict with PKK will come to an end when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan becomes the president show more support for integration. While the respondents who think that the conflict in Syria broke out due to the failed foreign policies of Turkey support the integration of



asylum-seekers at lower rates. These findings imply that the issue of integration is addressed in alignment with political actions in a broader sense.

### Opinion on the integration of asylum-seekers




#### 2.8.1. The right to receive education in mother tongue

Education is a fundamental human right; thus, it is possible to address it in the scope of the integration of the asylum-seekers. Syrian migrants and asylum-seekers run into the difficulty that their children are deprived of the right to receive education in their mother tongue. When we asked the respondents whether they agree or not with the statement, “The Syrian children in Turkey should receive education in their mother tongue Arabic”, half of the respondents expressed their support for the statement, and half stated otherwise. Thus, the average figures reveal that an average person in Turkey does not take a stand in favor of either side.



### The Syrian children in Turkey should receive education in their mother tongue Arabic.




Ak Parti voters, the pious, Religious Conservatives, the Kurdish and the audience of İMC TV support the right to education in Arabic at higher rates. On the other hand, CHP and MHP voters, Moderns, Alevis, non-believers and believers show less support. The fact that the respondents' opinions differ by degree of piety implies that the respondents might have viewed the statement from a different perspective by referring to education in Arabic, and thus, might have responded with reference to another ongoing debate in Turkey.

### The right to receive education in mother tongue





### The right to receive education in mother tongue (June 2012)



In addition to the respondents' opinions on what they think about Syrian children receiving education in Arabic, we also inquired whether the respondents agree with similar statements about the Kurdish children in Turkey receiving education in Kurdish and the Turkish children in Germany receiving education in Turkish. It is evident that half of society support that education in Kurdish should be provided for the Kurdish children in Turkey. When it comes to the Turkish children in Germany, however, four out of every five voters agree that they should be granted the right to receive education in Turkish. Our subscribers might remember that we addressed the same issue in June 2012; and it is not possible to observe considerable difference since then. In any case, the rate of the respondents who "strongly" agree that the Kurdish children should receive education in their mother tongue has slightly increased.

Responses provided to all three statements indicate that roughly half (49 percent) of the respondents are in favor of education in mother tongue. **However, it is apparent that the respondents take a different stance depending on the group they are inquired about (Turkish children in German, Kurdish children in Turkey and Syrian children in Turkey). Thus, it is possible to draw the conclusion that they do not necessarily support education in mother tongue, but they take a different stance depending on their political affinity to the group they are inquired about.**

In general, the majority of social and political groups show higher support for education in Turkish in Germany in comparison to education in Kurdish and Arabic in Turkey. Yet, certain groups have different opinions than others. For instance, among Moderns, the rate of support for the right to education in mother tongue for the Kurdish and Syrian children is lower than average. In addition, support from the Modern for the right to education in Turkish in Germany is also below average. On the other hand, Religious Conservatives agree with all three statements at higher rates.

Among MHP voters, support for education in Arabic and particularly in Kurdish is much lower than average. HDP voters present a different attitude by showing the highest support for education in Kurdish for the Kurdish in Turkey followed by education in Turkish for the Turkish in Germany, followed by education in Arabic for the Syrian in Turkey at the bottom of the list. The Kurdish also prove to show the highest support for education in mother tongue. Among Alevis, the rate of support for education in Arabic for the



Syrians is lower, while the rate of support for education in Kurdish is higher than average. It is also striking that the pious, who agree that the Syrians in Turkey should be granted the right to receive education in Arabic, shows the highest support for education in Turkish for the Turkish in Germany.

In Turkey, the right to education in mother tongue is only granted for those non-Muslim minority groups that are defined in the Treaty of Lausanne. The fact that the Kurdish are not provided with the same right constitutes the basis for the Kurdish in their demands. It is evident that voters who are inquired about right to education in mother tongue and the rights of asylum-seekers react in alignment with their own challenges and demands, and they express their demands as a “citizen” by means of the responses they provide.



## 2.9. Conclusion

As we frequently observed in our previous reports, a certain characteristic of society in Turkey is yet again observed in how the respondents respond to the Syrian asylum-seekers. **The general public in Turkey does not regard international issues apart from domestic issues; the developments in Turkey's foreign relations are always deemed associated to the domestic developments.** Thus, political polarization is equally critical in how the respondents' react towards domestic politics and foreign politics. Similar to the Kurdish issue, the Syrian issue requires that the perspectives on domestic and foreign politics are considered altogether due to the fact that the actors involved are spread all around the world and it triggers the movement of a huge number of people within the country. The ongoing conflict in Syria also affects the bilateral relations between Turkey and other countries such as Russia and the United States.

### **The debates about the rights granted to asylum-seekers cannot be separated from that about the rights of a citizen of Turkey**

At the same time the debates on the rights, future status and integration of the two and a half million asylum-seekers who took refuge in Turkey as a direct consequence of the clashes in Syria brings along debates in society that reveal the opinions of the citizens in Turkey on their own rights. Thus, the debates on “the rights of others” causes individuals to mull over “their own rights”. In other words, citizens think over how the relation between the state and others may influence their own lives and space.

### **The lacking legal status of asylum-seekers**

Therefore, we believe that the issue should be addressed through a comprehensive perspective without making a distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. To put in better words, while this issue is handled, the influences and consequences of the regulations regarding the rights and responsibilities that are not yet defined by law which we referred to as the *state of exception* based on the introduction/conceptual framework section, should not be neglected.

When we conducted in-depth interviews with some of the respondents, it was possible to observe that the respondents have actually adopted the *state of exception*, and they do not agree that the Syrian asylum-seekers and migrants should not be granted with *permanent* rights. In this respect, the general public in Turkey is also in favor of *temporary* solutions.

*“These people need shelter; that's why they came to Turkey, they took refuge here. In my opinion, it is good and necessary that Turkey takes care of them. It is not acceptable if we claim that we cannot do anything and cannot accept the people who are facing difficulties. [...] [However, granting them with work permission] is not normal. If you perceive this as a lasting incident, then you would have to grant such rights. But I think that is not acceptable. That would jeopardize the future of our country.”*  
(62, male university graduate, HDP voter)



*“They should be allowed to work until the conflict is resolved; then, they should return back.”*  
(27, male, primary school graduate, Ak Parti voter)

*“They can work illegally. If they are granted an official permission, then they would have to continue working. They would also receive all of the associated social benefits. I don't know if that would make any good to them. Well, maybe. But they should not be granted with that many social benefits. At one point, they should not have the same rights with the citizens of Turkey.”*  
(38, male, secondary school graduate, MHP voter)

### **Priorities are opposing, not opinions**

The theme titled **Average Person in Turkey** we presented last month, precisely addressed how the perception of others influenced how individuals locate themselves in society. Respondents' opinions on Syrian asylum-seekers assist us in understanding the similar dynamics in Turkey. Both of these indicate the fact that the perception of “other” is shaped by politics and social polarization – and the overall attitude of the citizens in Turkey towards any political or social matter is shaped by polarization. Yet, at this point, the fact that very different social groups may reach the same conclusion with different motivations should not go unnoticed. Therefore, polarization should be defined as opposing priorities rather than clashing opinions. Respondents' attitudes towards Syrian asylum-seekers presents the most evident examples of this fact.

For example, the previous sections of this report revealed that both the Kurdish and the religious agree that asylum-seekers should be granted the right to received education in their mother tongue. When doing so, the Kurdish prioritize the recognition of their own rights and the rights of the oppressed, while the religious are more concerned about religious brotherhood. It is possible to observe another distinction between how the Kurdish and the religious interpret the future of asylum-seekers: The Kurdish do not believe that the asylum-seekers will return to their countries, while the religious think otherwise.

CHP voters, MHP voters, Alevis and Moderns share the same opinion with the Kurdish and indicate that asylum-seekers will not return to their countries – however, they state quite different opinions on how this should be handled. In contrary to the Kurdish, these groups think that the state has to bear far less responsibilities in terms of the recognition of certain rights and taking responsibility. In summary, the anticipation that asylum-seekers will not return to their countries may be leading to the desire that asylum-seekers might choose to leave Turkey if the state does not claim much responsibility.

It is possible to observe the extent of social polarization when we analyze the responses provided to the question that inquired about the level of contact with asylum-seekers. The respondents who have daily contact with asylum-seekers in comparison to those who do not, the conservatives in comparison to the modern, HDP voters in comparison to CHP voters, the Kurdish in comparison to the Turkish,



Sunnis in comparison to Alevis show a more positive attitude towards being in contact with asylum-seekers.

Increase in the rate of approval for direct contact with asylum-seekers leads to a statistically significant increase in the rate of those who support the integration of the migrants by granting them with rights. Particularly the respondents' attitude towards education in mother tongue sheds light on the political and social dynamics in Turkey. Support for the right to receive education in Kurdish has increased over the past 5 years; yet, the overall attitude towards the issue has not changes significantly. There is still a considerable difference between the respondents' attitudes towards the rights of the Turkish in Germany and the rights of the Kurdish and the Syrians in Turkey. The rate of those who agree that the Turkish in Germany should be granted with further rights is much higher than the rate of those who think the same for the Kurdish and the Syrians in Turkey. The similarity in the attitudes towards the Kurdish who are actually citizens of Turkey and the Syrians who are not citizens reveals that a certain percentage of the general public does not support the right to receive education in mother tongue. Even so, one out of every two (49 percent) of the respondents agree that all three groups (i.e. the Turkish in Germany, the Kurdish in Turkey and the Syrians in Turkey) should receive education in their mother tongues. At this point, we should decide whether we will look at the bright side or otherwise and establish social peace starting from this point of view. Support from half of the general public for the right to education in mother tongue may imply to an opportunity that should not be missed.

After all, based on an overall evaluation, we can suggest that the attitude of the respondents towards asylum-seekers reveals the general picture of society in Turkey. Respondents' opinions on the 2.5 million asylum-seekers in Turkey and on living together with them uncovers a broader issue. The presence of asylum-seekers, which will definitely have consequences on each individual's life in the country, implies that society in Turkey will discuss about the relation between the state, the government and citizens in detail. It is evident that the voters in Turkey does not have a well-defined and comprehensive game plan regarding asylum-seekers; however, they are quite clear about what they demand regarding this issue. The opinions of voters on the level of contact they would like to have with asylum-seekers, the extent to which they would allow the integration of the asylum-seekers and the extent of the rights that would be granted for the asylum-seekers may differ based on certain parameters. However, there is not a huge variation in opinions. In other words, opinions on asylum-seekers does not vary based on political polarization. Particularly over the past year, we have been emphasizing that, when responding to the current developments in Turkey, voters are polarized based on whether they support Ak Parti or they oppose Ak Parti. However, throughout this report, we demonstrated that the general public in Turkey has an overall opinion about the Syrian asylum-seekers, and this opinion does not change in a specific fashion based on political preferences.





On the other hand, when we analyze the respondents opinions on political issues and the matters related to terror, at least one third of society falls into a pessimistic mood and does not rely on the government for the a solution.

### **Asylum-seekers are not yet a part of society's game plan**

The majority of the respondents believe that the asylum-seekers in Turkey will eventually return to their countries. However, they do not take into account the fact that one fifth of the Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey are between the ages of 0-4 who were born in Turkey. Thus, they fail to realize that the Syrian asylum-seekers will indeed remain in their lives; however, they do not have a game plan that refers to the permanent existence of the asylum-seekers. In the 2015 Annual Report, we emphasized that the different segments of society are quite clear and explicit in what they demand; however, they have difficult in expressing how these demands will be realized and they fail to come up with a strategy for a solution based on reconciliation. If the pessimist attitude towards the capabilities of the government, the state and the political actors to offer a solution intensifies, society in turkey might face a chaos due to the Syrian asylum-seekers



### 3. RESEARCH ID

#### 3.1. Overall Description of the Survey

The surveys that this report is based on was conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.).

The field survey was conducted on February, 6-7, 2016. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, within the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and to monitor trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey. The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.3 at 99 percent confidence level.

#### 3.2. The Sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the data on population and educational attainment level of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS), and the results of the 2011 General Elections in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 2649 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 136 neighborhoods and villages of 98 districts - including central districts - of 27 provinces.

Provinces visited	27
Districts visited	98
Neighborhoods/villages visited	136
Number of respondents	2649

Among the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas on age and gender were enforced.

Age group	Female	Male
Between 18-28	3 respondents	3 respondents
Between 29-44	3 respondents	3 respondents
44 and above	3 respondents	3 respondents



	Level 1 (12 regions)	Provinces visited
1	İstanbul	İstanbul
2	Western Marmara	Balıkesir, Çanakkale, Edirne
3	Aegean	Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya, Uşak
4	Eastern Marmara	Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli
5	Western Anatolia	Ankara, Konya
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri, Sivas
8	Western Black Sea	Samsun, Tokat
9	Eastern Black Sea	Trabzon
10	Northeastern Anatolia	Erzincan
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	Malatya
12	Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa

The distribution of respondents by region and place of residence is shown in the table below.

	Survey location	Rural	Urban	Metropolita n	Total
1	İstanbul			18.2	18.2
2	Western Marmara	2.0	3.5		5.4
3	Aegean	4.1	6.4	4.9	15.4
4	Eastern Marmara	1.4	2.8	5.7	9.9
5	Western Anatolia	0.7		10.4	11.1
6	Mediterranean	3.2	2.9	5.7	11.7
7	Central Anatolia	1.2	2.0	1.4	4.6
8	Western Black Sea	2.9	3.2		6.1
9	Eastern Black Sea	1.4	2.1		3.5
10	Northeastern Anatolia	1.3			1.3
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	1.4	2.1		3.5
12	Southeastern Anatolia	2.2	2.8	4.3	9.3
	Total	21.7	27.8	50.5	100.0



## 4. FREQUENCY TABLES

### 4.1. Profile of the Respondents

Gender	Percentage
Female	47.1
Male	52.9
Total	100.0

Age	Percentage
Between 18-28	23.9
Between 29-43	35.3
44 or above	40.8
Total	100.0

Educational attainment level	Percentage
Illiterate	4.3
Literate without degree	1.9
Primary school graduates	29.3
Secondary school degree	15.3
High school degree	32.6
University degree	15.3
Masters/PhD	1.3
Total	100.0

Household size	Percentage
1-2 person(s)	17.4
3-5 people	66.1
6-8 people	13.8
9 people or more	2.7
Total	100.0



<b>Birthplace (region)</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Istanbul	7.7
Western Marmara	5.4
Aegean	13.6
Eastern Marmara	6.1
Western Anatolia	8.1
Mediterranean	11.2
Central Anatolia	7.5
Western Black Sea	9.7
Eastern Black Sea	7.1
Northeastern Anatolia	3.4
Middle Eastern Anatolia	5.7
Southeastern Anatolia	13.3
Abroad	1.2
Total	100.0

<b>Employment status</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Civil servant	6.2
Private sector	6.0
Worker	6.7
Small retailer	8.0
Merchant/businessman	0.8
Self-employed	1.7
Farmer, agriculturist, stock breeder	4.4
Employed, other	9.0
Retired	14.2
Housewife	28.4
Students	9.0
Unemployed	5.1
Disabled	0.5
Total	100.0



Lifestyle Cluster	Percentage
Modern	26.8
Traditional conservative	48.6
Religious conservative	24.6
Total	100.0

Head cover status	Percentage
No head cover	29.3
Headscarf	49.5
Turban	7.4
Chador	1.1
Bachelor male	12.7
Total	100.0

Ethnic identity	Percentage
Turkish	81.8
Kurdish	12.2
Zaza	1.6
Arab	1.7
Other	2.6
Total	100.0

Religion / Sect	Percentage
Sunni Muslim	93.0
Alevi Muslim	4.9
Other	2.1
Total	100.0

Piety	Percentage
Non-believer	2.7
Believer	22.5
Religious	61.3
Pious	13.5
Total	100.0



<b>TV channel preferred to watch the news</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Does not watch	4.8
A Haber	5.3
ATV	15.3
CNNTürk	2.1
Fox TV	17.3
Habertürk	2.0
Halk TV	1.8
İMÇ	3.4
Kanal 7	1.5
Kanal D	9.0
Kanaltürk	0.1
NTV	2.4
Roj/Nuçe/Sterk	0.4
Samanyolu	0.1
Show TV	4.0
Star	4.5
TRT	11.7
Ulusal	0.8
Local channels	4.1
Other channels	9.4
Total	100.0

<b>Monthly household income</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
TRY 700 or less	4.6
TRY 701 - 1200	15.8
TRY 1201 - 2000	42.7
TRY 2001 - 3000	21.8
TRY 3001 - 5000	12.1
TRY 5001 or more	3.1
Total	100.0



Type of housing	Percentage
Squatter / apartment without external plastering	7.5
Single family, traditional house	29.7
Apartment	55.5
Housing complex	6.2
Very luxurious apartment, villa	1.1
Total	100.0

#### 4.2. Syrian Asylum-seekers

Which are the groups of people you most interact with?	Percentage
Neighbors, people from the immediate vicinity	67.1
Class/School mates	18.6
Religious community (Mosque community)	6.8
Colleagues	30.7
People with shared place of origin	21.8

How important is it for incoming foreign migrants to have a good educational level?	Percentage
Very unimportant	7.3
Unimportant	6.8
Partially unimportant	8.6
Partially important	13.1
Important	26.7
Very important	37.5
Total	100.0

How important is it for incoming foreign migrants to speak Turkish?	Percentage
Very unimportant	6.7
Unimportant	5.6
Partially unimportant	10.1
Partially important	15.6
Important	30.2
Very important	31.7
Total	100.0





<b>How important is it for incoming foreign migrants to be Muslim?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Very unimportant	17.4
Unimportant	11.6
Partially unimportant	10.5
Partially important	11.9
Important	20.1
Very important	28.5
Total	100.0

<b>How important do you think it is for foreigners in Turkey to hold an occupation that is needed in Turkey?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Very unimportant	8.5
Unimportant	6.9
Partially unimportant	11.4
Partially important	17.8
Important	26.9
Very important	28.3
Total	100.0

<b>How often do you come across Syrian asylum-seekers?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Never	12.5
Once every few months	5.8
Once a month	6.4
A few times a month	7.5
Once a week	8.6
A few times a week	15.2
Every day	44.0
Total	100.0



<b>Where do you come across asylum seekers?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
In my neighborhood, on my street	50.2
In the market	64.5
In my place of work	10.9
At school	3.6
In the mosque	12.1
On public transportation	30.9
No contact	10.6

<b>The Kurdish children in Turkey should receive education in their mother tongue Kurdish.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	28.0
Disagree	12.7
Somewhat disagree	8.9
Somewhat agree	9.8
Agree	16.0
Strongly agree	24.7
Total	100.0

<b>The acceptance of Syrian asylum-seekers is Turkey's responsibility based on the history, and geography of our country.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	16.6
Disagree	11.8
Somewhat disagree	13.7
Somewhat agree	17.4
Agree	21.3
Strongly agree	19.1
Total	100.0

<b>Asylum-seekers are a threat to the economy in Turkey.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	8.3
Disagree	9.2
Somewhat disagree	10.7
Somewhat agree	13.5
Agree	21.0
Strongly agree	37.3
Total	100.0



<b>Asylum-seekers should be granted a work permit.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	27.0
Disagree	14.6
Somewhat disagree	14.2
Somewhat agree	14.2
Agree	16.2
Strongly agree	13.8
Total	100.0

<b>Asylum-seekers should be granted a residence permit.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	32.0
Disagree	17.0
Somewhat disagree	13.6
Somewhat agree	12.5
Agree	12.5
Strongly agree	12.4
Total	100.0

<b>The Syrian children in Turkey should receive education in their mother tongue Arabic.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	26.5
Disagree	12.7
Somewhat disagree	9.4
Somewhat agree	10.7
Agree	21.2
Strongly agree	19.4
Total	100.0

<b>The state provides sufficient aid for the Syrian asylum-seekers.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	8.7
Disagree	9.2
Somewhat disagree	8.8
Somewhat agree	13.2
Agree	20.6
Strongly agree	39.5
Total	100.0



<b>Syrian asylum-seekers will return to their country of origin when the war is over.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	22.7
Disagree	13.9
Somewhat disagree	11.9
Somewhat agree	11.9
Agree	18.1
Strongly agree	21.5
Total	100.0

<b>I think Syrians have a similar culture to us.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	37.1
Disagree	18.4
Somewhat disagree	13.8
Somewhat agree	14.4
Agree	10.3
Strongly agree	5.9
Total	100.0

<b>The Turkish children in Germany should receive education in their mother tongue Turkish.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	5.0
Disagree	3.1
Somewhat disagree	7.6
Somewhat agree	10.9
Agree	28.5
Strongly agree	44.8
Total	100.0



<b>Which of the below best describes your opinion on Syrians in Turkey?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
They are opportunists who came to Turkey with economic motivations.	9.7
They are a burden on our shoulders.	6.8
They are our religious brothers/sisters.	10.6
They are guests in our country.	14.0
They are people fleeing from violence.	58.9
Total	100.0

<b>Is it OK if there are Syrians in your city?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	72.4
No	27.6
Total	100.0

<b>Is it OK if there are Syrians in your neighborhood, in your place of work or at your school?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	57.1
No	42.9
Total	100.0

<b>Is it OK if there are Syrians in your apartment building or in your friends circle?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	40.8
No	59.2
Total	100.0

<b>Is it OK if there are Syrians in your household or in your family?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Yes	13.7
No	86.3
Total	100.0



<b>Employment opportunities decreased because of the Syrian asylum-seekers.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	9.8
Disagree	8.8
Somewhat disagree	9.9
Somewhat agree	10.4
Agree	20.8
Strongly agree	40.3
Total	100.0

<b>No more asylum-seekers should be allowed into Turkey from now on.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	13.1
Disagree	12.4
Somewhat disagree	11.9
Somewhat agree	13.5
Agree	15.4
Strongly agree	33.5
Total	100.0

<b>Accepting asylum-seekers is a humanitarian issue. They should not be segregated.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	7.7
Disagree	6.9
Somewhat disagree	12.7
Somewhat agree	16.9
Agree	25.7
Strongly agree	30.0
Total	100.0



<b>Asylum-seekers should only dwell in the camps.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	16.2
Disagree	15.0
Somewhat disagree	12.3
Somewhat agree	11.7
Agree	17.8
Strongly agree	27.1
Total	100.0

<b>Asylum-seekers should keep up with the daily life in Turkey.</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly disagree	7.3
Disagree	4.6
Somewhat disagree	10.6
Somewhat agree	16.0
Agree	29.4
Strongly agree	32.0
Total	100.0

<b>Have you provided any assistance to Syrian asylum-seekers directly or through an organization?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
I donated money, food, clothing via an organization.	14.3
I helped the Syrians whom I saw in my neighborhood.	33.2
I did not offer any help.	52.6
Total	100.0

<b>What do you think is the reason behind why the conflict in Syria broke out?</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Assad's oppression on the Syrians	34.4
Sectarian conflicts	7.5
Emergence of ISIS	13.3
The claim for independence stated by the Kurdish in Syria	1.6
Failed foreign policies of Turkey	10.3
Plots set up by Western countries on the Middle East	32.8
Total	100.0



How do you think the outcome of the conflict in Syria will affect Turkey? (grouped)	Percentage
Other answers	7.0
“Will make a positive impact”	5.1
“Will make a negative impact”	82.8
“Will not affect Turkey at all”	5.1
Total	100.0





## 5. GLOSSARY

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms.

Term	Definition
Alevi Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim
Lower middle class:	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car
Lower class:	Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment
Arab:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab
Headscarf:	A woman who wears a headscarf or a man whose spouse wears a headscarf
Chador:	A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a chador
Religious:	A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion
Religious conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative
Traditional conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative
Ideological:	A person who states that it is the party closest to his/her political view
Believer:	A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely
Non-believer:	A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion
Urban area:	Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Rural area:	Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Kurdish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish
Leader follower:	A person who states that he/she trusts in/favors the leader of a certain party



Metropolitan:	Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)
Modern:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern
No cover:	A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head
Non-partisan:	A person who states that none of these parties represent him/her
Pious:	A person who completely fulfills the requirements of the religion
Late decider:	A person who states that he/she makes a decision based on the election campaigns
Sunni Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim
Partisan:	A person who states that he/she/they always vote for that party
Turban:	A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a turban
Turkish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish
Upper class:	Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment
New middle class:	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment and which own a car
Zaza:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza

### **5.1. Questions and response options which establish the basis for the terms:**

**Which of the three lifestyle clusters below do you feel you belong to?**

Modern

Traditional conservative

Religious conservative

**Do you cover your head or does your spouse cover her head when going out of your home? How do you cover your head?**

No head cover

Headscarf

Turban

Chador

Bachelor male



**We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you belong to?**

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

**Which religion or sect do you feel you belong to?**

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

**Which of the below describes you in terms of piety?**

A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

A person who completely fulfills the requirements of the religion

**Which of the reasons below influence/determine your political preferences?**

I/we always vote for that party.

It is the party closest to my political view.

I trust/favor its leader.

None of these parties represent me.

I make a decision based on the election campaigns.

Total

**Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample)**

Rural

Urban

Metropolitan



**Economic classes (determined by using household size, household income and car ownership)**

Lower class

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper class