

elections'07

surveys
on
political
tendencies

summary
18.07.2007



CONTENTS

A.	INTRODUCTION	2
1.	General Description of the Report.....	2
2.	Scope of Surveys.....	2
3.	Sample	2
B.	SUMMARY	5
C.	POLITICAL PREFERENCES OF RESPONDENTS (on July 14th and 15th)	7
1.	General Findings.....	7
2.	Undecided Votes and Their Distribution	8
3.	Who Can Win?	10
D.	VOTER PROFILE OF PARTIES (JULY 14-15).....	11
1.	Vote Distribution by Gender	11
2.	Vote Distribution by Age	11
3.	Vote Distribuion by Education.....	12
4.	Gender-Age-Education.....	13
5.	Vote Distribution By Household Size	14
6.	Vote Distribution by Employment	15
7.	Vote Distribution by Income	16
8.	Vote Distribution by Place of Residence.....	17
9.	Summary	19
E.	VOTE CHANGES FROM 2002 ELECTIONS TO TODAY	20
F.	THE COURSE OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES IN THE SURVEYS	22
G.	COMMENTARY ON THE FINDINGS.....	24
H.	POLITICAL COMMENTARY.....	25
İ.	ANNEX 1: COMMENTARY BY TARHAN ERDEM (<i>Radikal</i> Daily/19.07.2007)	28
J.	ANNEX 2: TABLES.....	32



A. INTRODUCTION

1. General Description of the Report

The surveys that this report is based on were requested by various clients and conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy LLC.

The fieldwork of these surveys took place on 6 weekends starting from February 2nd, 2007 and ending on July 15th, 2007. Two surveys each, with separate samples, were conducted on two of these weekends, totaling 8 surveys.

This report aims at a general evaluation of the survey findings. Our findings on the surveys have been updated with the inclusion of the findings from the July 15th fieldwork.

This report reflects general political tendencies of voters in Turkey on the fieldwork days of July 14th and 15th.

2. Scope of Surveys

Each survey aimed to measure and evaluate the following:

- Voters' tendencies at the general parliamentary elections;
- Voters' expectations about election results;
- Profile of parties' voter base;
- Based on a selected theme in each survey, the general perception, preference and expectations of voters in Turkey on that theme.

3. Sample

The samples of the surveys were based on the 2000 General Census and 2002 General Election results. 46,797 neighborhoods and villages have been grouped and stratified according to province, region, educational attainment level, employment data, census data and election results. The neighborhoods and villages in the sample have been selected randomly by the computer based on population size.

In each survey, the fieldwork took place 137 neighborhoods and 63 villages in 33 to 37 provinces and 120 to 150 districts. The streets to be visited in the neighborhoods have been selected based on average land/property m2 prices constituting the basis for property tax returns.

The building numbers on the streets have been selected so as to follow the series of 1, 3, 4, 6, 7... and only one interview was conducted per building.



In each neighbourhood and village, 18 people were interviewed face-to-face in their homes. Interviewers also adhered to age and gender quotas.

In each survey, 3600 interviews were targeted and in total, over 32000 people were interviewed face to face. After inspections and taking out substitutes, interviews with 25,843 persons in surveys were taken as the basis for the evaluations.

The 12 regions, outlined in the table below, have been defined in the Law of Development Agencies (*Kalkınma Ajansları Yasası*), itself based on economic development levels. (Official Gazette: 08.02.2006, p: 26074)

	Region	Provinces
1	Istanbul	İstanbul
2	West Marmara	Balıkesir, Çanakkale, Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ
3	Aegean	Afyonkarahisar, Aydın, Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya, Manisa, Muğla, Uşak
4	East Marmara	Bilecik, Bolu, Bursa, Düzce, Eskişehir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova
5	West Anatolia	Ankara, Karaman, Konya
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Burdur, Hatay, Isparta, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin (İçel), Osmaniye
7	Central Anatolia	Aksaray, Kayseri, Kırıkkale, Kırşehir, Nevşehir, Niğde, Sivas, Yozgat
8	West Black Sea	Amasya, Bartın, Çankırı, Çorum, Karabük, Kastamonu, Samsun, Sinop, Tokat, Zonguldak
9	East Black Sea	Artvin, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Ordu, Rize, Trabzon
10	Northeast Anatolia	Ağrı, Ardahan, Bayburt, Erzincan, Erzurum, Iğdır, Kars
11	Central East Anatolia	Bingöl, Bitlis, Elazığ, Hakkari, Malatya, Muş, Tunceli, Van
12	Southeast Anatolia	Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak

The table above shows regions and the provinces in these regions. While mostly overlapping, different surveys comprised different provinces.

Most importantly, 200 neighborhoods and villages were included in each survey. Therefore, in the grand total there are 1840 neighborhoods and villages visited (including substitutes; 1600 neighborhood and villages were used for evaluation). As the neighborhoods and villages were selected randomly from the stratified main field, less than 20 neighborhoods and villages were re-visited on separate weekends.

The regional distributions of neighborhoods and villages and of the respondents in the surveys are essentially the same as the distribution of the July 15th survey, with minimal differences.



Region	Distribution of Respondents			2007 Population Distribution		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Istanbul	15.6	2.0	17.6	15.5	1.9	17.4
West Marmara	3.0	2.0	5.0	3.0	1.9	4.9
Aegean	9.4	4.9	14.3	9.4	5.2	14.5
East Marmara	6.5	3.0	9.5	6.7	2.9	9.7
West Anatolia	8.0	2.0	10.0	7.8	2.1	10.0
Mediterranean	7.5	5.0	12.5	7.7	4.9	12.6
Central Anatolia	3.5	2.0	5.5	3.4	2.1	5.5
West Black Sea	4.0	3.0	7.0	4.0	3.1	7.1
East Black Sea	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.2	1.7	3.9
Northeast Anatolia	1.5	1.0	2.5	1.7	1.1	2.8
Central East Anatolia	2.6	1.9	4.5	2.6	1.7	4.3
Southeast Anatolia	5.0	2.5	7.5	4.8	2.4	7.2
Total	68.7	31.3	100.0	68.4	31.6	100.0

The table above demonstrates that the percentage difference between the voter numbers announced by the Higher Election Committee (*Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*) and the figures of survey, i.e. the distribution of respondents by region and by rural/urban regions is +/- 0.3 maximum.

The survey represents the voters of Turkey very accurately and the table above shows that deviations are within margin of error, that the data is reliable.

Additionally, the similarity (within expected margin of error) of the demographic findings of each survey (ANNEX 2, Tables, page 32) and the parallelness (gain within expected margin of error) of the responses to the 3 basic control questions demonstrate the reliability of the survey field, method and findings.



B. SUMMARY

If elections were held on the 15th of July, the 3 parties with the highest votes would have been AKP, CHP and MHP, in that order. Even when the votes of the undecided are distributed, it is still these three parties to gather enough votes to enter the parliament.

During the 7 days until election day - assuming today's conditions continue as is - one can expect a rise or fall in all parties' votes except that of the ruling party, but none big enough to change the general outlook.


If elections were tomorrow, which party would you vote for?	July 15th
	%
AKP	42.6
CHP	17.3
MHP	12.5
DTP- Independent	5.7
DP (DYP)	4.5
GP	3.7
Other	2.6
Undecided	11.1
Total	100.0

AKP seems to be able to reach the sufficient number of parliamentary seats to come to power by itself.

Even though DTP's decision to join the elections with independent candidates will change the MP arithmetics in the parliament, coalition does not seem to be an option.

The number of seats that independent candidates will gain is critical mostly for AKP but also for the arithmetics of the parliament. If votes continue to stay at their current levels, the number of independent member of parliaments is expected to be between 25 and 35. In this case, AKP seats can be expected to number 325 ± 15 . Due to the election system and the "independent candidates" maneuver, it is difficult to convert general percentage of votes to number of seats.

The eight separate surveys conducted by KONDA since February 2007 have findings similar to the general picture above. Unless there are extraordinary developments, the results of a normal election process will be parallel to the above findings.



Examining the table above and the evaluations in the rest of the report as a whole, these following predictions can be made about the July 22nd elections:

- The participation rate of these elections will be quite high.
- About 80-90 % of voters will have the opportunity of being represented in the parliament.
- Even though initially there may be 3 parties and independent MPs in the parliament, one may expect that within one year, independent candidates will form a DTP group and MPs of DSP will break away from CHP, resulting in a 5-party parliament.
- Even though AKP is in power, the upward trend of its votes since the general elections and subsequent local elections seems to continue (after undecided votes are distributed). AKP will gain sufficient number of seats to come to power by itself (310-340).
- CHP share seems to continue somewhat lower than its local election vote share. Contrary to expectations of the public, its alliance with DSP does not seem to have paid off in terms of votes (after undecided votes are distributed).
- None of the other parties stand the chance of passing the election threshold.
- As stated above, even though it is difficult to calculate the distribution of parliamentary seats because of the “independents” issue, one could estimate the number of independent MPs to be between 25 and 35, those of CHP to be between 100 and 120 and those of MHP to be between 70 to 90.

This report aims to update findings of the previous surveys with those on the last week before elections. Also, our political commentary, which binds KONDA alone, is presented at the end of the report.



C. POLITICAL PREFERENCES OF RESPONDENTS (on July 14th and 15th)

1. General Findings

Answers to the question “If there were parliamentary elections tomorrow, who would you vote for? In other words, if the ballot box came in front of you tomorrow, which party, which leader would you vote for?” are shown in the table below.

If elections took place on July 15th, the three parties with the highest votes would have been AKP, CHP, MHP respectively. Even when the votes of the undecided are distributed, still only these three parties would gain enough votes to enter the parliament.

During the 7 days until election day - assuming today's conditions continue as is - one can expect a rise in all parties' votes, especially smaller ones, except the ruling party, but none big enough to change the general outlook.

If elections were tomorrow, which party would you vote for?	%
AKP (Justice and Development Party – Tayyip Erdoğan)	40.8
CHP (Republican People's Party – Deniz Baykal)	16.6
DP (DYP) (Democratic Party – Mehmet Ağar)	4.3
GP (Young Party – Cem Uzan)	3.5
MHP (Nationalist Movement Party – Devlet Bahçeli)	12.0
ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party – Ufuk Uras)	0.1
SP (Felicity Party – Recai Kutan)	1.2
OTHER PARTIES	1.2
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES	5.5
UNDECIDED	10.6
NONE	1.9
WILL NOT VOTE	2.4
Total	100.0

As seen in the table figures, 10.6 % of the subjects, by stating that they are undecided, and 4.3 %, by stating that they will not vote for any party or not vote at all, have not provided any party name. Looking at those who have named a party, 40.8 % of subjects have named AKP and its vote share is ahead of other parties by far.

Taking out non-voters and those voting for none of the parties, grouping together small parties and grouping together DTP and independent candidates, we obtain the following table.



If elections were tomorrow, which party would you vote for?	July 15th
	%
AKP	42.6
CHP	17.3
MHP	12.5
DTP- Ind.	5.7
DP (DYP)	4.5
GP	3.7
Other	2.6
Undecided	11.1
Total	100.0

Voter participation in the elections will be quite high.

Votes about 80-90 % of voters will be represented in the parliament.

AKP seems to reach the number of members of parliament sufficient enough to come to power by itself.

Even though DTP's decision to join elections via independent members will change the MP arithmetics of the parliament, coalition does not seem to be an option.

The percentage of undecided people is rather high. Therefore the method for distributing their votes gains significance.

2. Undecided Votes and Their Distribution

The percentage of the undecided are quite high. In fact, this percentage has been continuing quite high in the eight KONDA surveys. In our opinion, this has three reasons, caused by the character and structure of the political climate: Firstly, the ruling party and the opposing parties have been rather harsh in criticism and in blaming each other during the past year. Voters are worried about this tension and are reluctant to express their political preferences. Secondly, the ruling party is in power in a large part of local administrations and given its general political character, its politically-motivated activities are very pervasive and effective. Daily practice prevents voters from expressing whether they are a subject/target of these efforts or against them so they would rather not express their preference at all. Thirdly, citizens of Kurdish origin may spend special effort, especially in rural regions, not to disclose their preference. While there may be many other reasons for the undecided votes being high, the method for distributing them is an issue also debated publicly.



If elections were tomorrow, which party would you vote for?	July 15th	July 15th
	Including undecided votes	Distributing undecided votes evenly
	%	%
AKP	42.6	47.9
CHP	17.3	19.5
MHP	12.5	14.1
DTP- Ind.	5.7	6.4
DP (DYP)	4.5	5.1
GP	3.7	4.1
Other	2.6	2.9
Undecided	11.1	
Total	100.0	100.0

In the above table, we show the results when undecided votes are distributed evenly between parties. These percentages indicate the upper limits that parties can reach, given voters' tendencies on the field days of the survey.

Due to the general pre-election mood of a distinct separation between AKP and others, it becomes necessary to carry out a different analysis. The general public opinion is that distribution of the undecided votes and their shift towards a decision would be in favor of all parties other than AKP.

Even though there is no political or scientific indicator to support this assumption, in order to assess potential election results nonetheless, we have developed a subjective assumption. Part of the undecided votes will be distributed evenly among all parties including AKP relative to their vote share, while the rest will be distributed among parties except AKP, again relative to their vote share. Still, as this assumption is merely subjective, the percentages have been divided both by a 70 % - 30 % assumption and by a 50 % - 50 % assumption and the resulting vote distributions have been shown in the table below. These differing vote distributions could also be viewed as the upper and lower limits of votes that parties can receive.

If elections were tomorrow, which party?	Statement of respondents	Distributing votes evenly	70-30 assumption	50-50 assumption
	%	%	%	%
AKP	42.6	47.9	45.8	44.3
CHP	17.3	19.5	20.3	20.8
MHP	12.5	14.1	14.6	15.0
DTP- Ind.	5.7	6.4	6.7	6.9
DP (DYP)	4.5	5.1	5.3	5.5
GP	3.7	4.1	4.3	4.4
Other	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.1
Undecided	11.1			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



The above table shows the distribution of undecided votes based on the mentioned assumption.

Thus, the three distributions of undecided votes, be it evenly or based on certain assumptions, could be considered as hints about the upper and lower limits of votes parties may receive.

3. Who Can Win?

Respondents were asked “which party can receive the highest number of votes?” in these elections in order to assess their hope or faith about whether the party they are voting for can come to power.

Which party can receive the most votes?	
	%
AKP	75.4
CHP	13.3
MHP	7.4
DP-DYP	1.6
GP	1.0
Other	1.3
Total	100.0

As shown in the above table, 75.4 % of all voters see AKP rule as evident. Looking at responses to this question by partisanship, almost all AKP voters are certain about their party’s rule.

Also, 37.7 % of CHP partisans, and 42.8 % of MHP voters foresee AKP rule.

Only 60 % of CHP partisans and 50.8 % of MHP partisans expect their own party to come to power. For other parties, this percentage is between 60-90 %.



D. VOTER PROFILE OF PARTIES (JULY 14-15)

1. Vote Distribution by Gender

The female/male distribution of AKP and CHP partisans seem to be parallel to the population distribution.

However, males are more dominant than females among MHP, DP and GP partisans. Also, among the undecided people, the percentage of females is higher.

Considering these two pieces of data and the known life style and structure of our society, it can be understood that a family decision as to which party to vote for has not been made. Therefore, with men being more likely to make the decision, it is possible to forecast that on the day of the elections, voters might make an adjustment in these three parties' votes.

	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
AKP	48.9	51.1	100.0	40.3	38.7	39.4
CHP	48.8	51.2	100.0	16.3	15.8	16.0
MHP	37.7	62.3	100.0	9.1	13.8	11.6
DP-DYP	44.4	55.6	100.0	3.9	4.5	4.2
GP	44.3	55.7	100.0	3.1	3.6	3.4
INDEPENDENT	41.1	58.9	100.0	4.5	6.0	5.3
OTHER	40.2	59.8	100.0	2.0	2.8	2.4
UNDECIDED	57.1	42.9	100.0	12.2	8.4	10.2
No vote–none	54.9	45.1	100.0	8.5	6.4	7.4
Total	47.9	52.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

2. Vote Distribution by Age

The age distribution of AKP partisans is rather close to the general distribution.

Compared to the average, this party seems to receive a bit less support from younger age groups and a bit more support from other older age groups.

Among CHP partisans, the age group above 44 is quite noticeably bigger than average. It is also below average for the other age groups.

Young voters reach the highest rate among MHP supporters. Also among the 44 + age group, MHP support is the lowest.



While a significant percentage of youngest voters choose MHP, those who claim that they prefer “none of the parties” or that they will not cast their vote is also quite high in percentage.

	Ages 18-28	Ages 29-43	Ages 44+	Total	Ages 18-28	Ages 29-43	Ages 44+	Total
AKP	27.4	36.0	36.6	100.0	36.7	40.0	41.2	39.4
CHP	27.6	33.9	38.5	100.0	15.0	15.3	17.6	16.0
MHP	36.8	37.7	25.5	100.0	14.5	12.3	8.4	11.6
DP-DYP	28.5	29.8	41.7	100.0	4.1	3.5	5.0	4.2
GP	31.1	34.4	34.4	100.0	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.4
INDEPENDENT	29.5	34.7	35.8	100.0	5.3	5.2	5.4	5.3
OTHER	34.5	29.9	35.6	100.0	2.8	2.0	2.5	2.4
UNDECIDED	25.5	38.6	35.9	100.0	8.9	11.1	10.5	10.2
No vote–none	36.1	34.6	29.3	100.0	9.1	7.2	6.2	7.4
Total	29.4	35.5	35.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3. Vote Distribuion by Education

AKP reaches the highest percentage among voters who have an educational attainment level of middle school or less. On the contrary, it also gets the lowest percentage of votes from university-educated voters.

CHP partisans are the most educated group. The university-educated voters among CHP partisans are twice as many as the country average. Among voters with middle school education or less, CHP partisans have the lowest percentage.

MHP has the highest percentage of high-school educated voters.

	Mid-school or less	High School	University	Total	Mid-school or less	High School	University	Total
AKP	76.7	18.6	4.7	100.0	45.4	30.9	19.3	39.4
CHP	49.1	30.6	20.3	100.0	11.8	20.7	33.7	16.0
DP-DYP	60.9	29.1	9.9	100.0	3.8	5.2	4.3	4.2
GP	68.9	28.7	2.5	100.0	3.5	4.1	0.9	3.4
MHP	56.7	32.2	11.1	100.0	9.9	15.7	13.3	11.6
INDEPENDENT	74.2	16.3	9.5	100.0	5.9	3.6	5.2	5.3
UNDECIDED	68.5	20.1	11.4	100.0	10.5	8.7	12.1	10.2
OTHER	62.1	26.4	11.5	100.0	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.4
No vote–none	62.0	27.1	10.9	100.0	6.9	8.5	8.4	7.4
Total	66.6	23.7	9.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



4. Gender-Age-Education

Examining gender, age and education for partisans of all parties reveals a few basic characteristics:

First of all, university educated women above the age of 44 and following them men of the same age and education level are very clearly in favour of CHP. This picture is in accordance with the Republic Rallies. This picture also provides clues as to why CHP, despite being in opposition, cannot increase its vote share. CHP seems to be arrested in the segments integrated into modernisation.

			AKP	CHP	MHP	DP	GP	Ind.	Oth.	Und.	None-no v.	Total
Female	Ages 18–28	Mid-school or less	48.4	7.5	6.8	2.5	3.6	6.4	3.6	12.5	8.9	100.0
		High School	29.8	23.2	13.3	7.2	5.0	2.2	1.1	7.7	10.5	100.0
		Univ.	23.8	31.7	7.9	4.8	0.0	1.6	3.2	14.3	12.7	100.0
	Ages 29–43	Mid-school or less	44.9	11.8	9.5	2.8	3.9	4.7	1.7	12.7	8.0	100.0
		High School	28.2	27.4	13.7	3.4	3.4	2.6	0.0	10.3	11.1	100.0
		Univ.	12.2	46.3	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	19.5	14.6	100.0
	Ages 44+	Mid-school or less	45.6	11.7	7.7	4.4	2.6	5.6	2.2	13.3	6.9	100.0
		High School	20.5	30.8	15.4	10.3	0.0	2.6	0.0	12.8	7.7	100.0
		Univ.	10.0	70.0	6.7	3.3	0.0	3.3	3.3	3.3	0.0	100.0
Male	Ages 18–28	Mid-school or less	47.0	9.1	17.2	2.5	4.0	5.1	2.0	7.6	5.6	100.0
		High School	28.1	16.8	21.5	3.5	3.5	6.3	3.5	6.6	10.2	100.0
		Univ.	23.1	19.2	20.5	7.7	2.6	9.0	3.8	5.1	9.0	100.0
	Ages 29–43	Mid-school or less	45.0	11.1	13.1	3.6	2.8	8.0	1.8	9.0	5.7	100.0
		High School	37.9	14.8	16.5	6.0	4.4	2.2	3.8	9.3	4.9	100.0
		Univ.	23.5	23.5	17.3	3.7	1.2	7.4	3.7	13.6	6.2	100.0
	Ages 44+	Mid-school or less	43.8	15.6	8.8	5.6	4.3	5.7	2.5	7.4	6.3	100.0
		High School	35.1	26.0	3.9	3.9	6.5	3.9	6.5	11.7	2.6	100.0
		Univ.	13.0	42.6	13.0	3.7	0.0	5.6	0.0	16.7	5.6	100.0
Total			39.4	16.0	11.6	4.2	3.4	5.3	2.4	10.2	7.4	100.0

The second significant finding is that AKP is more prominently the party of the lesser educated. MHP is dominant among youngsters who have high school education.



The third finding is that among GP supporters, university-educated voters are almost non-existent.

5. Vote Distribution By Household Size

Among AKP voters, households with 6-9 persons or more is relatively more common. CHP voters are quite the opposite with smaller households being more common than average.

Also among the undecided voters, smaller households are more common.

	1-2 Pers.	3-5 Pers.	6-9 Pers.	9 + Pers.	Total	1-2 Pers.	3-5 Pers.	6-9 Pers.	9 + Pers.	Total
AKP	14.5	57.7	20.8	7.1	100.0	37.4	36.7	45.6	58.1	39.4
CHP	18.1	69.6	10.8	1.6	100.0	19.0	18.0	9.6	5.2	16.0
MHP	13.0	65.1	19.7	2.2	100.0	9.9	12.2	12.7	5.2	11.6
DP-DYP	7.9	61.6	25.2	5.3	100.0	2.2	4.2	5.9	4.7	4.2
GP	13.9	75.4	9.0	1.6	100.0	3.1	4.1	1.7	1.2	3.4
INDEPENDENT	4.7	46.3	35.8	13.2	100.0	1.6	4.0	10.5	14.5	5.3
OTHER	16.1	70.1	10.3	3.4	100.0	2.6	2.7	1.4	1.7	2.4
UNDECIDED	21.7	63.0	13.0	2.2	100.0	14.6	10.4	7.4	4.7	10.2
No vote–none	19.9	64.3	12.8	3.0	100.0	9.7	7.7	5.3	4.7	7.4
Total	15.3	62.0	18.0	4.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



6. Vote Distribution by Employment

AKP receives above average votes from workers, people in marginal sectors (street seller, house cleaner etc.), farmers and housewives. The segments it receives the least votes from are public servants, private sector employees and the self-employed.

	Public Servant	Private sector employee	Worker	Small scale retailer	Tradesman, indust.	Self-Empl.	Marginal S.	Farmer, stockbreeder	Employed, Other	Retired	Housewife	Student	Unemployed	Unable to work	Not working, Other	Total
AKP	3.4	2.3	11.2	7.9	0.6	2.8	1.0	10.7	1.9	11.2	39.5	3.0	3.2	0.8	0.6	100.
CHP	9.7	5.7	8.9	7.5	0.3	5.0	0.3	5.0	2.1	15.1	26.6	8.7	3.3	0.3	1.4	100.
MHP	6.5	3.4	11.4	10.4	1.5	2.7	1.7	8.2	1.0	7.3	26.4	9.2	8.2	0.7	1.5	100.
DP-DYP	4.0	1.3	8.0	9.3	0.0	2.0	0.7	16.7	2.0	12.0	26.7	4.7	8.7	2.7	1.3	100.
GP	1.6	0.8	9.0	12.3	0.0	3.3	1.6	10.7	4.1	12.3	32.8	4.9	4.1	1.6	0.8	100.
IND.	3.2	2.6	15.8	6.3	0.0	2.1	0.0	7.4	1.1	11.6	34.2	7.9	4.2	1.6	2.1	100.
OTHER	3.4	1.1	10.3	8.0	1.1	9.2	1.1	8.0	3.4	12.6	27.6	4.6	8.0	0.0	1.1	100.
UNDEC.	6.3	3.8	7.6	5.7	0.5	6.5	0.0	3.5	3.0	12.0	43.8	2.7	3.3	0.8	0.5	100.
None-No V	3.0	6.0	12.5	4.9	0.4	3.0	0.0	4.5	1.5	11.3	36.2	8.3	5.3	0.0	3.0	100.
Total	5.0	3.3	10.6	7.8	0.6	3.6	0.8	8.3	2.0	11.6	34.8	5.4	4.4	0.8	1.1	100.

CHP has more ease receiving votes from public servants, public servant employers, self-employed people, retirees and students.

MHP has its voter base strong among public servants, small scale retailers, businessmen and students.

	Public Servant	Private sector employee	Worker	Small scale retailer	Tradesman, indust.	Self-Empl.	Marginal S.	Farmer, stockbreeder	Employed, Other	Retired	Housewife	Student	Unemployed	Unable to work	Not working, Other	Total
AKP	26.8	27.1	41.8	40.0	40.0	30.0	51.9	50.7	38.0	38.2	44.9	21.6	29.1	39.3	22.0	39.5
CHP	31.3	28.0	13.4	15.4	10.0	22.3	7.4	9.7	16.9	20.9	12.3	25.8	12.0	7.1	19.5	16.1
MHP	15.1	11.9	12.4	15.4	30.0	8.5	25.9	11.4	5.6	7.2	8.7	19.6	21.5	10.7	14.6	11.5
DP-DYP	3.4	1.7	3.2	5.0	0.0	2.3	3.7	8.4	4.2	4.3	3.2	3.6	8.2	14.3	4.9	4.2
GP	1.1	0.8	2.9	5.4	0.0	3.1	7.4	4.4	7.0	3.6	3.2	3.1	3.2	7.1	2.4	3.4
IND.	3.4	4.2	7.9	4.3	0.0	3.1	0.0	4.7	2.8	5.3	5.2	7.7	5.1	10.7	9.8	5.3
OTHER	1.7	0.8	2.4	2.5	5.0	6.2	3.7	2.3	4.2	2.6	1.9	2.1	4.4	0.0	2.4	2.4
UNDEC.	12.8	11.9	7.4	7.5	10.0	18.5	0.0	4.4	15.5	10.6	12.9	5.2	7.6	10.7	4.9	10.3
None-No V	4.5	13.6	8.7	4.6	5.0	6.2	0.0	4.0	5.6	7.2	7.7	11.3	8.9	0.0	19.5	7.4
Total	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.



7. Vote Distribution by Income

Even though respondents were asked for their household income by groups starting from up to 300 YTL and going up, due to people's tendency to state their income lower than it really is, the responses were evaluated not by the nominal YTL income groups but as income segments.

Looking at partisanship by household income, AKP receives more votes from the two lowest income segments. CHP however receives high percentages of votes from middle and upper income segments.

	Monthly Household Income					Total
	1st segment (poorest)	2nd segment	3rd segment (middle income)	4th segment	5th segment (richest)	
AKP	11.5	50.5	28.0	9.0	1.0	100.0
CHP	4.4	33.7	35.6	21.1	5.2	100.0
MHP	7.2	42.3	36.0	12.1	2.4	100.0
DP-DYP	12.6	41.7	33.8	10.6	1.3	100.0
GP	10.7	47.9	28.9	12.4	0.0	100.0
INDEPENDENT	21.6	43.2	24.7	10.5	0.0	100.0
OTHER	6.9	41.4	31.0	16.1	4.6	100.0
UNDECIDED	11.8	41.2	32.1	13.2	1.6	100.0
No vote–none	11.5	45.0	29.6	10.8	3.1	100.0
Total	10.3	44.4	30.9	12.3	2.1	100.0

While MHP has its voter base most in the middle income groups, independent candidates get more support from the poorest.

	Monthly Household Income					Total
	1st segment poorest	2nd segment	3rd segment middle income	4th segment	5th segment richest	
AKP	43.9	44.9	35.8	28.8	18.9	39.4
CHP	6.8	12.2	18.5	27.6	40.5	16.1
MHP	8.1	11.0	13.5	11.4	13.5	11.6
DP-DYP	5.1	4.0	4.6	3.7	2.7	4.2
GP	3.5	3.7	3.2	3.4	0.0	3.4
INDEPENDENT	11.1	5.2	4.3	4.6	0.0	5.3
OTHER	1.6	2.3	2.5	3.2	5.4	2.4
UNDECIDED	11.7	9.5	10.6	11.0	8.1	10.2
No vote–none	8.1	7.4	7.0	6.4	10.8	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



8. Vote Distribution by Place of Residence

Examining where voters live (urban-rural differentiation), most prominently DP and then AKP and independent candidates receive above average votes in villages.

CHP is an almost wholly urban party.

Urban voters are more undecided than rural ones.

	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
AKP	63.7	36.3	100.0	36.6	45.7	39.4
CHP	76.2	23.8	100.0	17.8	12.2	16.0
MHP	69.0	31.0	100.0	11.6	11.5	11.6
DP-DYP	56.3	43.7	100.0	3.4	5.9	4.2
GP	67.2	32.8	100.0	3.3	3.6	3.4
INDEPENDENT	59.5	40.5	100.0	4.6	6.8	5.3
OTHER	63.2	36.8	100.0	2.2	2.8	2.4
UNDECIDED	84.0	16.0	100.0	12.5	5.2	10.2
None-No Vote	73.3	26.7	100.0	7.9	6.3	7.4
Total	68.7	31.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As for the regional distribution of partisans, in regions east of Ankara, AKP's vote shares are quite high.

CHP meanwhile reaches above its own average in the western regions. MHP is more popular in the Mediterranean, Aegean and Central Anatolian regions.

Another striking finding is that GP's support is locked in very little educated voters of the Aegean and Marmara regions.

Nonetheless, this table below should not be taken as representative of the vote distributions for each region. Separate samples were not created for each region but each region's vote share in the overall sample of Turkey are shown. For a sample that is representative of each region, a much larger number of respondents would have been necessary.



	İstanbul	West Marmara	Aegean	East Marmara	Central Anatolia	Mediterranean	Central Anatolia	West Black Sea	East Black Sea	Northeast Anatolia	Central East Anatolia	Southeast Anatolia	Total
AKP	31.7	30.7	34.6	35.2	42.8	33.5	60.1	47.6	18.8	58.2	63.0	51.3	39.4
CHP	16.2	25.7	22.1	15.5	18.9	15.6	6.1	17.2	16.7	4.4	13.6	6.3	16.0
MHP	6.6	7.3	15.1	10.6	10.8	25.4	14.6	13.2	7.6	9.9	1.2	3.7	11.6
DP-DYP	1.7	1.1	2.5	10.3	4.2	7.6	0.0	6.8	11.8	0.0	0.6	2.2	4.2
GP	3.6	11.2	6.0	5.0	3.1	0.9	1.5	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	3.4
IND	3.6	1.1	1.6	2.6	1.7	2.0	2.5	0.4	31.9	6.6	13.0	19.9	5.3
OTHER	3.8	0.6	3.3	4.1	1.4	1.8	2.5	1.6	2.1	0.0	0.0	2.2	2.4
UNDEC	20.7	16.8	8.7	8.2	6.9	7.1	6.6	6.0	5.6	6.6	6.8	8.9	10.2
None-No V.	12.0	5.6	6.0	8.5	10.3	6.0	6.1	3.6	5.6	14.3	1.9	4.1	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.	100.0	100.	100.	100.0



9. Summary

Looking at the profiles of partisans, we may summarise some of their main characteristics as follows:

In every demographic group evaluated, AKP is represented in significant amounts, even if it is somewhat above or below its averages. This finding points to the fact that AKP has become a solid mainstream party; that contrary to certain public discourse, it is not ground on a certain group.

Again AKP receives its votes from today's aggrieved, disadvantaged. Whether it is education, income, household size or region, AKP receives more votes from segments that are below the general standards of the country.

CHP seems to be arrested in the more developed segments of society (in terms of income, education and household).

It is fitting at this point to mention another finding that supports this opinion. In the 8 KONDA surveys mentioned previously, the responses to the statement "Fundamentalism has increased during AKP rule" contain a curious finding.

Those voting "CHP"			
University-educated voters			
		Fundamentalism Has Increased	%
		Less than age 28	44.3
		Ages 28-43	55.1
		Age 44 and over	65.7
Fundamentalism has not Increased			
		Less than age 28	8.5
		Ages 28-43	5.4
		Age 44 and over	0.0

CHP voters believe that fundamentalism has increased; they are sensitive about secularism and blame the ruling party for this. Evaluating this observation with the fact that they are mostly highly educated, from the upper income groups, above the age of 44, living in urban households with 5 or less people, all pointing to their inclusion in modernisation, demonstrates how CHP is stuck among these voters.

MHP is popular in the middle segment of society (in terms of income, education, household size).



E. VOTE CHANGES FROM 2002 ELECTIONS TO TODAY

Analysis of vote changes from the 2002 general elections to today provides rather interesting findings.

Party to Vote for	Party to Vote for in the 2002 Elections								
	AKP	CHP	DYP	DEHAP	GP	MHP	Other	No V.	Total
AKP	75.4	1.1	2.4	0.7	0.7	2.9	4.5	12.3	100.0
CHP	5.9	63.7	1.2	0.0	2.4	1.7	9.2	15.8	100.0
MHP	19.2	2.9	1.9	0.0	2.4	51.9	2.6	19.0	100.0
DP-DYP	15.9	2.6	45.0	0.0	2.0	9.3	14.6	10.6	100.0
GP	26.2	9.0	2.5	0.0	24.6	4.1	9.0	24.6	100.0
INDEPENDENT	14.7	5.8	1.1	28.4	0.0	0.0	34.7	15.3	100.0
OTHER	28.7	6.9	1.1	3.4	0.0	1.1	43.7	14.9	100.0
UNDECIDED	35.1	12.0	3.3	0.3	2.4	2.7	11.7	32.6	100.0
None-No V.	19.5	6.0	2.6	0.0	3.4	2.6	9.0	56.8	100.0
Total	41.0	13.5	4.0	1.9	2.4	8.5	9.2	19.6	100.0

AKP seems to retain 75.4 % of its votes since the 2002 elections. Also, 12.3 % of its votes come from first-time voters. Votes coming from other parties' previous voters do not seem to hold a significant place in AKP's votes.

Among those who voted for AKP in the 2002 elections, 72.6 % will be voting the same whereas 8.8 % of them are undecided at the moment and 5.4 % state that they will be voting for MHP.

Party to Vote for	Party to Vote for in the 2002 Elections								
	AKP	CHP	DYP	DEHAP	GP	MHP	Other	No V.	Total
AKP	72.6	3.1	23.9	14.7	11.8	13.5	19.3	24.8	39.4
CHP	2.3	75.5	4.9	0.0	16.5	3.3	16.0	12.9	16.0
MHP	5.4	2.5	5.6	0.0	11.8	71.1	3.3	11.2	11.6
DP-DYP	1.6	0.8	47.9	0.0	3.5	4.6	6.6	2.3	4.2
GP	2.2	2.3	2.1	0.0	35.3	1.6	3.3	4.3	3.4
INDEPENDENT	1.9	2.3	1.4	79.4	0.0	0.0	19.9	4.1	5.3
OTHER	1.7	1.2	0.7	4.4	0.0	0.3	11.4	1.8	2.4
UNDECIDED	8.8	9.1	8.5	1.5	10.6	3.3	13.0	17.1	10.2
None-No V.	3.5	3.3	4.9	0.0	10.6	2.3	7.2	21.5	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



63.7 % of CHP voters also voted for CHP in 2002. First-time voters constitute 15.8 % of CHP's votes.

While 75.5 % of voters who previously voted for CHP continue to support this party, the preference of 3.1 % of them have moved to AKP and 9.1 % are undecided.

Among MHP voters, 51.9 % are previous MHP voters, 19 % are voting for the first time and 19.2 % come from AKP.

While 71.1 % of those voting for MHP in 2002 are once again voting for it, 13.5 % have shifted to AKP.

Between the two elections, except for the vote shift between AKP and MHP, no other significant vote shifts are evident. Yet, first-time voters constitute an important place in parties' votes.




F. THE COURSE OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES IN THE SURVEYS

KONDA has conducted a series of surveys since February 2nd, 2007. The course of voters' political preferences is outlined in the table below.

	02.Feb	19.May (1)	19.May (2)	10.Jun	01.Jul (1)	01.Jul (2)	8.Jul	15.Jul
AKP	41.1	44.3	42.6	41.9	41.1	38.9	38.4	42.6
CHP		14.3	15.0			17.3		17.3
MHP	11.4		8.6		12.7		13.4	12.5
DP (DYP)			3.8	3.6			4.4	4.5
GP		2.9			4.4			3.7
DTP- Independent				3.4			4.9	5.7
Other			3.5			2.5		2.6
Undecided	11.1	20.0	20.9	17.5	16.4	17.9	17.5	11.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	2.5	100.0	100.0

Due to confidentiality agreements with our clients for whom the surveys were conducted, some cells in the table have been left blank intentionally and the remaining figures are kept to show general trends.

Voter preferences can be seen in the graph below. The most significant point that the graph demonstrates is that voters' tendencies and changes have a very smooth progress.





Vote distributions of the 2002 general elections and 2004 local elections are presented in the table below.

	2002 General Elections	2004 Local Elections
AKP	34.3	41.7
CHP	19.4	18.2
MHP	8.4	10.5
DTP-Ind.	6.2	5.2
DYP	9.5	9.7
Other	22.2	14.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Interpreting the two tables and the graph, one can state the following about the main characteristics of voters' political preferences:

- Even though AKP is the ruling party, the trend of increase in its votes since the general and subsequent local elections continues.
- CHP share seems to continue somewhat lower than its local election vote share. Contrary to expectations of the public, its alliance with DSP does not seem to have paid off in terms of votes.
- One other party whose votes seem to continue to increase is MHP.
- None of the other parties stand the chance of passing the election threshold.



G. COMMENTARY ON THE FINDINGS

If elections were held on the 15th of July, the 3 parties with the highest votes would have been AKP, CHP and MHP. Even when the votes of the undecided are distributed, it is still these three parties to gather enough votes to enter the parliament.

AKP seems to be able to reach the sufficient number of parliamentary seats to come to power by itself. Even though AKP is in power, the upward trend of its votes since the general elections and subsequent local elections seems to continue.

The number of seats that independent candidates will gain is critical mostly for AKP but also for the arithmetics of the parliament. If votes continue to stay at their current levels, the number of independent member of parliaments is expected to be between 25 and 35.

In this case, AKP seats can be expected to number 325 ± 15 . Due to the election system and the “independent candidates” maneuver, it is difficult to convert general percentage of votes to number of seats.

In every demographic group evaluated, AKP is represented in significant amounts, even if it is somewhat above or below its averages. This finding points to the fact that AKP has become a solid mainstream party, that contrary to certain public discourse, it is not ground on a certain group.

Again AKP receives its votes from today’s aggrieved, disadvantaged. Whether it is education, income, household size or region, AKP receives more votes from segments that are below the general standards of the country.

CHP share seems to continue somewhat lower than its local election vote share. Contrary to expectations of the public, its alliance with DSP, the political debates and rallies in the past 3 months does not seem to have paid off in terms of votes. One can expect CHP to have 100 to 120 seats and MHP to have 70 to 90 parliamentary members.

CHP seems to be locked in the relatively more developed segments of society (in terms of income, education, household).

Participation levels of the elections will be high. About 80-90 % of voters will have the opportunity of being represented in the parliament.

Even if, there will initially be three parties and independents in the parliament, in the following year one can expect independents to form a DTP group and MPs of DSP to branch off from CHP, resulting in a 5-party parliament.



H. POLITICAL COMMENTARY

When deciding on their votes, voters in Turkey makes the decision based primarily on the economic conditions that they themselves are in and on the general economic conditions of the country. Two of our surveys reaffirm this observation. Worries about democracy and secularism have a less significant place in voting behavior. This does not imply “voters do not have any sensitivity on democracy and secularism.”

In fact, regarding questions asked on other weekends about democracy, freedom and perception of “others,” voters have a rather conciliatory and tolerant approach. However, the daily economic problems, problems of unemployment etc. directly effect the conditions, perceptions, expectations and preferences of voters.

When asked to evaluate the past five years and thus the AKP rule, voters in Turkey draw attention to the fact that the problem of social order and of the safety of lives continues to increase, but also believe that the general situation has improved. Their expectation for the future is also on the same track. Even though problems in their personal lives burden them, they hope and expect that improvement in the general situation of the country will also be echoed in their lives and their families’ lives.

The immense changes in the world and in life in general in the past fews years and the changes our country is going through on its way to the European Union (even if insufficient) are reflected directly on voters. Migration, which is said to be a main characteristic of ours for ages, has not only accelerated but is also affecting all areas of our daily lives much more intensely that we think. Factors such changes in communication, acceleration of life and increase in access to all information add up on top of these, naturally creating significant changes in the material and intellectual worlds of voters.

The enormous gap between the economic situation of cities and rural areas is well known. It is also a generally accepted theory that material living conditions determine the thought world of people. However, our findings indicate that despite such a gap in material living conditions, the gap in the intellectual worlds of rural and urban people is not that great. On questions regarding family values and personal freedoms, the percentage difference between responses of urban vs. rural voters is no more than + /- 5 %.

This finding alone indicates recent changes in voters’ capacity to learn and change. Therefore, voters in Turkey complement years of accumulated experience, sensibility and tolerance with newly gained information and no longer favor parties which offer quick and easy solutions for tomorrow morning. Discourses built on quarrels and despair, surges of temper tantrums no longer impress voters.



Even if the existing choices on the ballots do not fit their expectations perfectly, voters plan to cast their votes for the candidate closest to themselves, to their problems. Therefore, they will vote the way they will their voting behavior is not because they approve of all of AKP's policies or presumed intentions but rather because their demand for change in system which they see as the root of their problems. As this demand forms the basis of voters' characteristic, AKP, while craftfully continuing its role of "system opponent," continues to increase its vote share since the previous general elections and subsequent local elections. Also AKP receives its votes from today's aggrieved, disadvantaged. Whether it is education, income, household size or region, AKP receives more votes from segments that are below the general standards of the country.

In every demographic group evaluated, AKP is represented in significant amounts, even if it is somewhat above or below its averages. This finding points to the fact that AKP has become a solid mainstream party, that contrary to certain public discourse, it is not rooted on a certain group.

CHP, however, seems to be locked in the relatively more developed segments of society (in terms of income, education, household).

The fact CHP voters believe that fundamentalism has increased; that they are sensitive about secularism and blame the ruling party for this is one of the most important findings about the profile of voters in Turkey. This group of voters are mostly highly educated, from the upper income groups, above the age of 44, living in urban households with 5 or less people, indicating their inclusion in modernisation. CHP seems to be arrested in these groups and detached from the other, more disadvantaged groups.

Voters who favor freedom when it comes to personal and family values but manifest a rather conservative approach when it comes to issues on democracy are mostly voters who state that they will vote for CHP. On the other hand, voters who are more conservative regarding family values but sound more democratic are those who will be voting for AKP. This by itself points to a problem, to a serious impasse in political representation.

In fact, a significant portion of voters and almost half of CHP voters do not see existing parties as "a chance for solving the country's urgent problems" and emphasize the need for a new party-a new leader.

The profile of MHP voter base is relatively mid-level educated, more rural middle class. Its main characteristic is conservatism with regard to both family values and democracy.

MHP voters seem to be stuck in an in-between position both holding on to modernisation but also left outside. Voters in the ghetto areas of bigger cities whose emotional state is transformed to bitter anger are likely to shift to GP.



This emotional state of being unable to hold on to change, of blaming change strengthens the public opinion that “nationalism is increasing.”

On the morning of July 23rd, even if our surveys were incorrect about the vote shares of parties, the basic characteristics and main characters of our political life from that day on are certain.

Urgent solutions to the internal and foreign problems that Turkey is currently facing are demanded by all of society. Voters in Turkey wish for more quality in democracy, in the economy and in social life. Quarrels in the past 4 months and during the election process are unfortunately quite detached from these targets. Even if the means for reaching these targets may be different for each party, it is everybody’s common hope that the country’s targets are shared, that a political climate can flourish on peace and reconciliation, not on enmity against different ethnicities, religions, political views and lifestyles in society.

Therefore, beginning on July 23rd, parties and leaders who can properly manage the political processes will be accepted more easily by the public at large.

In the new parliament to be formed, for the first time, Kurds will be represented and the opportunity of taking a major step towards societal peace will present itself. If members of the parliament do not work for the country’s and society’s good, but instead adopt an attitude of narrow group interests and of pomp; if they choose annihilating each other over compromise, they will miss a historical chance.

It is our opinion that when voters in Turkey cast their votes, they will highlight the inevitability of compromise instead of the domination of one person, and they will also point to their demands of change, demands coming from their aggravation.



I. **ANNEX 1: COMMENTARY BY TARHAN ERDEM** (*Radikal* Daily/19.07.2007)

“ ... in the Ballot Box ”

General Introduction

I write this article in order to provide the findings of the surveys that KONDA conducted during the election process, of which we have reached the last few days.

Starting in February 2007 until last Sunday (July 15), more than 25 thousand people were interviewed in 8 surveys.

Each survey had a different sample. Twice, two surveys were conducted on the same days and the remaining 5 were conducted on separate weekends.

Taking into consideration the requests of their owners (clients), these surveys were designed so as to aim to “measure the political tendencies of voters in Turkey on the days of the surveys.” During the measurement, information on respondents’ ages, genders, employment status, places of birth and other similar information was also collected. Moreover, several questions were asked to respondents in order to find out their opinions about various events and propositions. Three to five questions were repeated in some surveys.

Different samples prepared with the same technique were used in the surveys. If the results of these political tendency polls are confirmed three days later on July 22nd, then the data of the surveys will become an extensive and substantial resource. Once the results that we expect are announced, we are planning to collect all data of the 9 surveys in a publication.

Results of the Latest Survey:

The results of the fieldwork conducted last weekend (July 14-15) are outlined in Table: 1. The percentage of “Undecided”, 11 %, is not negligible. Evaluating the responses to the question “If elections were tomorrow” along with the responses to some other questions, we were not able to find clear and simple characteristics that the undecided people have in common. In our opinion, these people are not “undecided” but “keeping their decision to themselves.”




	Party	Percent
1	AKP	42.6
2	CHP	17.3
3	MHP	12.5
4	Independent	5.7
5	DP	4.5
6	GP	3.7
7	SP	1.3
8	BBP	0.0
9	ÖDP	0.1
10	Other	1.2
11	Undecided	11.1

With this in mind, the “undecided” votes have been distributed among parties relative to their vote share and Table: 2 and Graph: 1 have been prepared to show the July 22 election results according to the latest survey.

	Party	Percent
1	AKP	47.9
2	CHP	19.5
3	MHP	14.1
4	Independent	6.4
5	DP	5.1
6	GP	4.1
7	Other	2.9
8	Total	100.0

According to the survey data, about 80 to 90 percent of voters will be represented in the parliament. Remembering that 44 % of the votes were not represented in the the previous elections, it is understood that in this election we will be taking a positive step forward in terms of representation.





It is not possible to derive accurately the number of members of parliament from data for the whole of Turkey but software is available for making estimations. When the percentages are entered in two of such software, the number of members of parliament for AKP comes out to be 334 and 337.

We, as colleagues at KONDA, find it suitable to provide the ranges in Table: 3 for the number of seats, based on the latest survey results.


Party	Number of MPs
AKP	310-340
CHP	100-120
MHP	70-90
Bağımsız	25-35

If these results are confirmed by the official ballot tabulations, then AKP will come to power by itself and AKP, CHP, MHP along with independents will enter the parliament. If, as expected, the “independents” who were DTP members before elections go back to their party, there will be 4 parties initially.

Whether DSP members elected from CHP lists will seize the opportunity to form a group continues to be a question mark.

Developments During the Process:

The course of vote percentages of parties by survey dates are presented in Graph: 2.



Except for small and temporary differences in the surveys we conducted from February 2nd to July 15th, there have not been any developments changing the main characteristics of the distribution.



The survey on May 18th, which was two weeks after the official start date of the election period, AKP's vote share increased in what can be called a sharp manner, whereas DP and MHP's votes saw a decrease. We view this increase and decrease as voters' reaction to all that happened around the presidential election process. However, after one or two weeks the rise, in AKP's votes and the fall in MHP's mostly receded. As for DP, most probably due to the misfortunes in the alliance with ANAP, its share did not go back to its position at the beginning of February.

According to the 5 surveys from June 7th to today, the vote percentages that parties will receive on July 22nd have continued in the values given in Table: 4.

	Least (%)	Most (%)
AKP	44	49
CHP	18	22
MHP	11	16
DP	4	8
GP	2	6

If the data provided in Table: 4 and Graph: 2 are examined with the margins of error in mind, it is possible to see that during the election period, especially since the beginning of June to today, there have not been important changes or oscillations in voters' party choices.

General Findings

a) AKP receives votes from every geography, demographics and identity, in significant amounts, albeit above or below its own averages. This finding indicates that AKP, at least for today, has become a solid mainstream party, that contrary to some public discourse, it does not depend on a certain group.

b) AKP receives its votes from segments of society which are in the middle and lower brackets in terms of education, income, household size and other indicators, that is, from the "powerless," from the aggrieved.

c) Throughout the election period, CHP's votes have been lower than its share in the local elections. Alliances with, rallies and the political arguments in the past month have not yielded increase in CHP's votes.

d) Voters who are included in modernisation; who have higher-level education and above average income; who live in small households and in cities; and who are sensitive about secularism and blame AKP for the "increase in fundamentalism" will once again support CHP "despite the leader." This choice even clearer for those among them who are above the age of 44. Another characteristic of these groups is that they are relatively more developed. This situation gives the impression that CHP is "stuck" in a limited segment.

e) There are signs that the participation rate in the elections will be high.

f) A significant amount of voters (over 70 percent), regardless of the party that they will be voting for, expect AKP to rule.



J. ANNEX 2: TABLES

	Feb 02	May 19 (1)	May 19 (2)	Jun 09	Jul 01 (1)	Jul 01 (2)	Jul 08	Jul 15
Gender								
Female	46.7	48.19	47.15	47.02	47.86	47.28	48.11	47.90
Male	53.3	51.81	52.85	52.98	52.14	52.72	51.89	52.10
Total	100.0	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Age								
Ages 18-28	31.1	30.09	30.64	29.71	30.40	30.30	29.92	29.42
Ages 29-43	35.3	34.08	34.62	35.51	34.28	34.81	35.15	35.49
Ages 44+	33.6	35.83	34.73	34.79	35.32	34.89	34.93	35.10
Total	100.0	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Size of Household								
1-2 Persons	14.9	14.02	13.97	13.73	14.33	13.14	14.24	15.25
3-5 Persons	60.0	62.04	61.48	61.14	60.44	60.37	62.29	61.95
6-9 Persons	22.5	19.09	19.55	21.05	20.06	21.02	18.77	18.01
9 Persons or More	2.6	4.85	5.01	4.08	5.17	5.46	4.70	4.79
Total	100.0	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Income								
Less than 300 TL	11.3	11.75	12.48	9.95	10.48	10.09	9.19	10.34
301-700 TL	41.3	44.07	44.35	46.27	46.76	45.59	45.77	44.44
701-1200 TL	29.8	29.54	27.46	29.13	29.43	30.76	29.70	30.87
1201-3000 TL	15.0	12.68	13.76	12.27	11.58	12.26	12.84	12.28
3001 YTL or more	2.6	1.96	1.95	2.38	1.75	1.30	2.50	2.07
Total	100.0	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Education								
Illiterate	6.1	8.28	7.83	9.04	8.72	7.54	7.06	7.43
Literate, no diploma	4.0	2.99	3.62	2.75	3.91	3.88	3.89	3.62
Primary School	36.7	40.62	40.85	39.50	41.12	39.88	40.43	42.00
Secondary School	15.7	15.32	15.10	15.42	13.06	15.29	14.82	13.58
High School	26.8	23.72	24.42	24.66	24.69	25.17	24.25	23.71
University	9.9	8.31	7.22	7.68	8.02	7.42	8.34	8.82
Graduate level	0.9	0.75	0.97	0.94	0.48	0.81	1.20	0.83
Total	100.0	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Job / Profession								
Public Servant	0.2	5.07	4.48	4.58	3.64	4.61	4.37	4.99
Private Sector Employee	3.5	3.16	3.48	3.32	4.06	3.94	4.34	3.29
Worker	11.2	10.00	8.82	10.02	9.76	9.03	10.13	10.59
Retailer / Craftsman	8.3	8.37	8.90	8.18	7.59	8.19	8.90	7.80
Tradesman / Industrialist	0.8	0.64	0.72	0.70	0.85	0.68	0.59	0.56
Self Employed	3.8	4.52	5.06	4.13	5.19	5.12	3.39	3.62
Marginal Sector		0.61	0.69	0.84	0.68	0.87	0.67	0.75
Farmer / Agriculturalist	8.8	8.04	7.94	8.79	8.49	9.31	7.81	8.31
Employed, other	3.5	1.39	1.11	1.42	1.64	1.80	2.77	1.98
Retired	10.9	11.39	11.06	11.91	11.45	10.52	11.00	11.59
Housewife	33.6	33.61	33.10	33.79	33.85	32.74	34.57	34.78
Student	7.7	6.21	6.66	6.53	5.61	6.92	5.18	5.41
Unemployed, Seeking	5.8	4.52	5.23	4.30	4.94	4.28	4.62	4.40
Unable to Work	0.8	0.75	0.91	0.78	0.56	0.56	0.67	0.78
Not Employed, Other	1.0	1.75	1.83	0.73	1.69	1.43	0.98	1.14
Total	100	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00