

elections'07

what determined the contents of the ballot box?

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electorate analysis
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WHAT DETERMINED THE CONTENTS OF THE BALLOT BOX? (1)

Days after elections, many people are still trying to understand and interpret the decision of voters in this country. As the basic findings of our surveys have been confirmed, we can write down some clues right away today. Later on, we shall be publishing a much longer profile of the electorate of Turkey. Attentive and curious readers may reach a summary report on our website (www.konda.com.tr) as of today. We must state that at least our explanations on our method and sample will be carefully scrutinized, that it will be useful for the “I-know-this-folk” and “my intuitions-are-more-accurate” opinion-leaders of science and media who prefer this attitude over scientific methods, that we will be more than glad to hear scientific criticism and contributions.

1. How Did We Do It?

KONDA conducted 8 surveys before elections. Aside from political preferences, each week we asked questions on different themes (some of them were repeated on several weeks). Voters were asked questions pertaining to their political preferences, as well as to problems, hopes and expectations in their personal lives; problems, hopes and expectations about the country; the European Union, globalization, foreign capital; family values and personal freedoms; state life and democracy; events surrounding the presidential elections.

All the surveys were implemented with the same sample method and conducted on different weekends. As the sample methods were the same and even though it was different Ahmets or Mehmetts on different weekends who gave the responses, we make a general analysis, believing that we found out about the opinions of like-minded Ahmets and Mehmetts.

2. What Determines the Preference of Voters?

When deciding on their votes, voters in Turkey base their decisions primarily on the economic situation that they are in and on the country’ s general economic situation. On two of the eight surveys mentioned, questions asked on this theme led us to this finding. Concerns about secularism and democracy have a less significant place in vote decisions. When voters were asked which two factors they take into consideration when deciding on their votes, “economic situation and expectations” (78.3 %) and the problem of corruption (38.9 %) seem to be more important than the others. Following those are problems of social order (14.7 %), concerns about democracy (13.9 %), and concerns about secularism (10.3 %) respectively.



This does not imply that “voters are not sensible about democracy and secularism.”

In fact, regarding questions asked on other weekends about democracy, freedom and perception of “others,” voters have a rather conciliatory and tolerant approach. However, the daily economic problems, problems of unemployment etc. directly effect the conditions, perceptions, expectations and preferences of voters.

When asked what influenced their party choice, 41.8 % of voters stated that the party they will be voting for has views closest to their own. Then, “approving of party’ s policies” (27.8 %) and “always voting for that party” (12.7 %) are mentioned.

Breaking down responses by partisanship, we can see that 77 % of AKP supporters vote for AKP either because they find its views closest to theirs or because they approve of its policies. The party receiving the highest amount of votes thanks to its policies is AKP by 36.1 %. DTP (61 %) and CHP (50 %) partisans give their support because they feel closest to their respective views. GP is the party of those who say “I wish to give this one a chance this time.” 30.4 % of voters saying this support GP and GP receives 29.4 % of its vote from people saying this. Among DP partisans, the reason for 23 % is that they always vote for this party. In a sense, the most emotionally motivated partisans are those of DP. The party preferences of those saying “This is the lesser evil” is parallel to general party preferences whereas those who “wish to try this one” would rather vote for GP (30.43 %), MHP (22.46 %) and CHP (21.01 %). Most of the voters who vote because of party policies prefer AKP (67.13 %).

3. Do they Believe their Party will Come to Power?

We asked voters if they have hope that the party they will be voting for can come to power and a significant portion of voters stated that they believe AKP will be receiving the most votes (62.8 %). Following AKP was CHP (9.4 %).

Breaking down responses by partisanship reveals interesting results. 91 % of AKP partisans believe their party will receive the highest votes; only 45.8 % of CHP partisans believe that their own party will receive the most votes; and 34.7 % of them were expecting AKP to receive the most votes.

As is evident, even CHP voters do not see much hope of their party ruling and see the continuation of AKP rule as natural.



4. Alternative Party of Voters

In most of this type of surveys, respondents are asked for their second choice as well as their party preference. This question is used to reveal which parties any indecision may be between and whether there is a second choice. We too asked this question in our surveys and reached results that were different from common knowledge, from what is memorized. While 28.3 % of AKP voters said that they would not vote in such a case, their second choices are MHP and other small parties.

Of CHP partisans, 18.8 % state that they would not vote in this situation. Their second parties are once again MHP and other small parties. Second party of DP partisans is MHP; that of MHP partisans is DP and AKP; and that of GP partisans is CHP. Thus the question of second party choice reveals four important points. First of all, a large part of voters are loyal to their parties, stating that “they would not vote in that case.” The second point is that MHP and AKP are the second party choices. One can see that both parties appeal to a wide voters base. Thirdly, CHP, whose leader stated even in the press conference after elections that it was social democrat, is viewed as alternative to MHP and GP in many voters’ eyes. Finally, there seems to be no potential of shifts from one party’ s base to another that could radically change the vote share of any party.

5. Party They Would Never Vote for

Responses to the question “Which party would you never/under no circumstance vote for?” also contain rather striking findings. This question was asked to respondents in order to reveal facts about polarization, an issue often discussed in public before elections.

CHP was stated most commonly (41 %) among voters as the party “never to vote for.” Following that are AKP (28.6 %), DTP (16.4 %) and MHP (14.8 %) respectively.

This finding reaffirms two points previously mentioned. Firstly, the debate around undecided voters and the assumption of “AKP supporters and opponents” are ill-founded. Secondly, there is no potential risk of serious vote shifts from one party to another because voters are quite clear about their preferences.

Voters were asked questions on several themes such as the problems in their own lives and general problems of the country, the most urgent problems, their worries and hopes. While we will be dwelling on these later on, at this point we will only analyse responses to the following questions: “Which party can solve these urgent problems that you have defined?” “Is a new party needed to solve these problems?” , “is a new leader needed to solve these problems?” .



Among voters, 39.1 % of them believe that none of the parties can solve the most urgent problems. Nonetheless, all parties have been mentioned: AKP (33.3 %), CHP (11.3 %) and MHP (8.7 %). These percentages can also be considered to be the core electorate of these parties.

32.8 % of voters have stated that “a new party is needed” (Table 1). As the table shows, those feeling this need most deeply are partisans other than those of AKP.

(Table 1) Is a new party needed to solve these problems?

Party to vote for	Yes	No	Total
AKP	11.9	88.1	100.0
CHP	34.8	65.2	100.0
DP (DYP)	34.5	65.5	100.0
GP	40.6	59.4	100.0
MHP	29.4	70.6	100.0
Undecided	47.8	52.2	100.0
Other	30.0	70.0	100.0
Independent Candidates	63.7	36.3	100.0
None-will not vote	47.0	53.0	100.0
Total	30.4	69.6	100.0

As shown, all voters except AKP partisans have taken their position somewhat reluctantly and emphasize the need for a new party. Voters were asked similarly whether “a new leader is needed for solving the urgent problems” and 41.8 % of voters have stated that they agree (Table 2). The request for a new leader seems to be higher than that of a new party.

Examined by partisanship, the highest percentage of request for a new leader came from supporters of independent candidates (61.2 %) and CHP supporters (59.6 %). These two tables clearly illustrate that CHP voters are aware of where the party stands, what it represents and what it should represent.

(Table 2) Is a new leader needed to solve these problems?

Party to vote for	Yes	No	Total
AKP	15.6	84.4	100.0
CHP	59.6	40.4	100.0
DP (DYP)	56.3	43.7	100.0



GP	53.8	46.2	100.0
MHP	42.9	57.1	100.0
Undecided	61.7	38.3	100.0
Other	46.3	53.8	100.0
Independent Candidates	61.2	38.8	100.0
None-will not vote	56.9	43.1	100.0
Total	41.8	58.2	100.0

Looking at the responses and findings up until this point, it is possible to note the following: Voters decide among the existing alternatives. Voters also have crystal clear opinions, preferences and criticism about the choices they have made.

6. Evaluation of AKP Rule

42.7 % of voters believe that the economic situation is getting better whereas 30.1 % believe that it is getting worse. Of AKP voters, 80.1 % claim it is getting better while 68.2 % of CHP-DSP voters claim that it is getting worse.

With regard to the fight against corruption, 39.8 % of voters think that the situation is getting better while 26.4 % believe it is getting worse. While 74.3 % of AKP voters say it is getting better, 63.3 % of CHP-DSP voters say it is getting worse.

Safety of lives and unemployment are the areas generally viewed as having deteriorated. While 33 % of all voters view safety of lives as having gotten worse, 58.9 % of AKP voters see it as having improved; 66.7 % of CHP voters as having gotten worse.

Unemployment is the area where AKP is considered most unsuccessful. Overall, 37.4 % think that the unemployment situation has gotten worse.

Despite differences in percentage between people who support the government and view things as having improved and those who believe the opposite, it is perfectly evident that an opposing perception and attitude between AKP supporters and supporters of other parties exist in evaluating the basic characteristic of the AKP rule.

A general overview shows that voters in Turkey, when evaluating the past five years and thus the AKP government, draw attention to the increase in problems of social order and the safety of personal lives but see an improvement in the general situation of the country. Their expectations about the future are also along this line. Even though they emphasize the burden



of problems in their personal lives, they hope and expect that the general improvement in the country' s situation will also be reflected in their lives and in their family.

7. Is AKP Reformist, Fundamentalist?

In order to understand how voters perceive and position AKP in their minds, respondents were posed two completely opposite questions:

- "It is said that very important and useful reforms/innovations/legal changes have been implemented during AKP rule. Do you find these claims to be correct or wrong?"
- "Do you agree or disagree that Islamic fundamentalism has increased during AKP rule?"

These two questions were asked exactly the same in six of our surveys with the aim of testing whether our survey method and sample methods had any mistakes. We contended that responses to these two questions would not change in reaction day-to-day events and would therefore be a good indicator of more basic characteristics and judgments (Table 3, Table 4).

(Table 3) Important reforms were implemented during AKP rule.	19.05.07 (1)	19.05.07 (2)	10.06.07	01.07.07 (1)	01.07.07 (2)	08.07.07
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes, correct	48.8	48.5	43.3	51.2	46.3	54.1
In some cases			20.1			
No, incorrect	32.0	34.3	26.2	37.6	38.0	37.2
No opinion	19.2	17.3	10.4	11.2	15.7	8.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



(Table 4) Has fundamentalism increased during AKP rule?	03.02.07	19.05.07 (1)	19.05.07 (2)	10.06.07	01.07.07 (1)	01.07.07 (2)	08.07.07
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes, it increased	37.4	31.4	33.0	27.4	33.9	33.7	33.3
No, did not increase	33.1	44.5	45.0	48.5	51.4	49.8	53.6
Whether it did is unimportant	4.5			10.6			
No Opinion	25.0	24.1	22.1	13.5	14.7	16.4	13.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The general trend maintains its basic characteristics despite varying percentages. While about 45 to 50 % of voters find AKP to be reformist, 33 to 38 % find this to be wrong. On the other hand, those who believe that fundamentalism has increased and those who believe it has not have the exactly opposite percentages.

To us, this picture demonstrates that voters are politicized, that they have a preference and therefore the chance of their opinions changing during elections period quite low.

8. Preference of Voters

Even if the existing choices on the ballots do not match their expectations exactly, voters plan to cast their votes for the candidate closest to themselves, to their problems. Therefore, they will vote the way they will not because they approve of all of AKP' s policies or presumed intentions but rather because of their demand for change in the system which they see as the root of their problems. As this demand forms the basis of voters' main characteristic, AKP, while craftfully continuing its role of "system opponent," continues to increase its vote share since the previous general elections and subsequent local elections.



WHAT DETERMINED THE CONTENTS OF THE BALLOT BOX? (2)

The parties' and voters' profiles in this section are based on the data of the survey conducted on July 14th-15th, 2007 because we think that the picture closest to the day of election would be more accurate. In some of the tables, "undecided" and "none, will not vote" responses have been taken out and the rest of the data were recalculated without them. In others, data on those who will intentionally not vote have been kept as it would provide their profile. In this case, readers should take note of the fact that analyses of partisanship, of party choices have been made based on those who have clearly stated their choice.

1. When Were Decisions Made?

In the "Social Structure-Who are We?" survey conducted by KONDA in September 2006, the distribution of political preferences was AKP 45 %, CHP 20 %, MHP 15 %. In the first survey of the series we conducted, the distribution was AKP 46 %, CHP 19 %, MHP 13 %. Again in this survey dated February 2nd, 2007, DSP had 2.2 %, ANAP 3.6 % and DYP 6.1 %.

The figures demonstrate some very significant points, points which disrupt opinions which have become part of the public's rote memorisation:

First of all, AKP's votes were not formed in reaction to the communiqué of the general chief of staff. Viewing the issue as a struggle between AKP and the general chief of staff or speaking more generally the military is a perspective clearly not based on reality. On the contrary, as we will later elaborate, the public opinion on this matter shifted only somewhat following the general chief of staff's warning of Iraq. However, voters had decided much earlier, with the economic motives we mentioned in the previous section.

The second important finding is that alliance with DSP, contrary to expectations, did not pay off for CHP. In one of the surveys, in response to the question "which party should yours go into alliance with?", DSP partisans cited CHP by 60 % and other parties by 40 %. Thus, contrary to common perception, the CHP-DSP alliance did not reach the arithmetic total of their percentage. In any case, it would be wrong to expect such an outcome.

The third important finding is about the DYP-ANAP alliance. As the figures above also show, DYP's vote share was higher earlier than it is now. At the survey we conducted on May 19th,



2007, that is, one week after they made the alliance, DYP-ANAP' s vote share was 3.6 %. In other words, the alliance caused not an increase but a decrease in votes. Further developments caused DP votes to not increase or to go back to its previous situation. In fact, in our February 2nd survey, 48 % of ANAP partisans and 30 % of DYP partisans had stated that they held hope for passing the threshold only if they made an alliance with each other. These indications prove that the reason for DP receiving votes below expectations is not that whole alliance process was a flop but because of the alliance move itself.

These findings indicate once more that voters' opinions on parties and leaders are not superficial and commonplace but very cut-and-dried. Therefore, armchair engineering of politics have no chance of success in real life, so long as they do not take the public into account. In our opinion, these findings are also proof of how out of touch with reality public opinion leaders are, with regard to the way they define the people on behalf of people, with regard to the way they have analyzed the alliances and made suggestions during the elections process.

Therefore, without an attempt to re-define what the notions of "center" , "center right-wing" or "center left-wing" connote in practical terms, what they represent, without trying to understand how their meanings have changed in the changing rhythm of life, attempts at political engineering will, we fear, once again have to face disappointment in the near future.

2. Who do AKP's Votes Come from?

We had stated previously that a most significant indicator of these elections was AKP receiving votes from all demographic groups, from very different segments of society in significant amounts. Looking more closely, we can see these findings in numbers. The graphs below (Table 5-6-7-8-9) show parties' vote distributions by gender, age, income, education and household size.

(Table 5) Political Tendency by Gender

	AKP	CHP	MHP	DP	GP	IND	OTH	Total
Female	51	21	12	5	4	6	3	100
Male	45	19	16	5	4	7	3	100
Total	48	19	14	5	4	6	3	100

(Table 6) Political Tendency by Age

	AKP	CHP	MHP	DP	GP	IND	OTH	Total
Ages 18-28	45	18	18	5	4	6	3	100
Ages 29-43	49	19	15	4	4	6	2	100



Ages 44+	49	21	10	6	4	6	3	100
Total	48	19	14	5	4	6	3	100

(Table 7) Political Tendency by Educational Attainment

	AKP	CHP	MHP	DP	GP	IND	OTH	Total
Less than high school	55	14	5	4	12	7	3	100
High School	37	25	6	5	19	4	3	100
University	24	42	5	1	17	7	4	100
Total	48	19	5	4	14	6	3	100

(Table 8) Political Tendency by Size of Household

	AKP	CHP	MHP	DP	GP	IND	OTH	Total
1-2 Persons	49	25	13	3	4	2	3	100
3-5 Persons	45	22	15	5	5	5	3	100
6-9 Persons	52	11	15	7	2	12	2	100
9 Persons +	64	6	6	5	1	16	2	100
Total	48	19	14	5	4	6	3	100

(Table 9) Political Tendency by Income

	AKP	CHP	MHP	DP	GP	IND	OTH	Total
1st segment, poor	55	8	10	6	4	14	2	100
2nd segment	54	15	13	5	4	6	3	100
3rd segment, middle income	43	22	16	6	4	5	3	100
4th segment	35	33	14	4	4	6	4	100
5th segment, rich	23	50	17	3	0	0	7	100
Total	48	19	14	5	4	6	3	100

The distribution of AKP votes by demographic data can be summarized as follows:

- AKP received 45 % of men' s votes and 51 % of women' s votes.
- It received votes of 45 % of those aged 28 or less, 49 % of those aged 28-44 and 49 % of those aged 44 or over.
- It received 55 % of the votes from those with secondary school education or less, 37 % of the votes from high-school educated people and 24 % of votes of those with university degrees.
- Among the households with 1 or 2 persons, AKP received 49 % of the votes, of those with 3 to 5 people, 45 % of the votes; of those with 6 to 8 people, 52 % of the votes; and of households with 9 people or more, 64 % of the votes.



- It received 55 % of the votes of the poorest segments, 54 % of the second, lower-middle income segment, 43 % of the mid-level income segment, 35 % of the fourth, upper-middle income level and finally 23 % of votes of the wealthiest segment. (The income levels employed in our surveys for the segments were 300 TL and less, 301-700 TL, 701-1200TL, 1201-3000 TL and 3001 TL and over.)

The most salient feature of these figures and graphs is that AKP receives the highest amount of votes from lowest, poorest, deprived demographic groups. Thus AKP is the choice of the aggrieved.

When examined along with the yesterday' s section of findings on "how voters make their decisions" and remembering that voters think with concrete economic problems and demands in mind, it is necessary to see that these elections progressed, not on the secular-antiseccular axis as generally claimed, but rather on an axis of aggravation.

Obviously, many reasons, many factors caused women to prefer AKP. Although it will be examined in a separate survey, if we look at the matter from the perspective of conservatism, along with the debates about the rise of nationalism, one wonders whether the following has some significance:

Given the changing rhythm of the world, of the country, given the point that modernization has reached, how strong or weak do people feel in the face of this new life, how do their levels of poverty and deprivation, such as education, income or social security come into play? Do individuals try to cope with the problems of modern life by clinging to sentiments such as religion and nationalism? In face of the basic management problems in our country, social order problems, problems such as the fast-spreading use of drugs and to a certain extent with ethic concerns, emphasis on religious values is increasing.

All these Quran courses, all the request for religious education, are they spreading in response to the problems of the modern world, to ethic problems or are they fed by the supposed tension of secular versus antiseccular fronts? In the face of degeneration and of the reign of "lawlessness,"

is it possible that mothers look for support in religious references for issues regarding their children, such as drugs, alcohol, prostitution, diligence, honesty, virtue? If a party which upholds an effective legal system based on universal human rights to find solutions to these problems of ethics, would that party not have produced an answer to these requests? Or is it possible that, in an election environment where demands for the gallows, for war were voiced, mothers preferred to cast their vote for life, not for death?



Doubtlessly, we do not know to what extent these factors played a role in the decisions but we believe that each and every one of them have been effective to some extent. The public discourse about the rise of nationalism and the role that the request for a government that considers problems and seeks solutions plays are also worth researching on.

3. *Vote Shifts Since the 2002 Elections*

Table 10 shows vote shifts from 2002 to 2007, with votes to parties in 2007 taken as 100. Out of every 100 votes cast for AKP, 75 of them were sustained from 2002. Of AKP' s current votes, the new source of votes is primarily first-time voters, with 12 %. Following that are previous voters of other parties (5 %), previous MHP partisans (3 %) and previous DP partisans (2 %).

(Table 10) Vote Shifts		2007 Elections							
		AKP	CHP	MHP	DP	GP	IND	OTH	Total
2002 Elections	AKP	75	6	19	16	26	15	29	44
	CHP	1	64	3	3	9	6	7	14
	DYP	2	1	2	45	2	1	1	4
	DEHAP	1	0	0	0	0	28	3	2
	GP	1	2	2	2	25	0	0	2
	MHP	3	2	52	9	4	0	1	10
	Other P	5	9	3	15	9	35	44	9
	Not age-no vote-blank	12	16	19	11	25	15	15	15
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Looking at the table from the other side, that is looking at what previous AKP voters did now, we see that 83 % of AKP voters once again voted from AKP, 6 % moved to MHP and others to other parties with each 2 % or less.

4. *Evaluation on Democratic Values*

On one of the weeks of the survey series, we asked questions on democratic values. Table 11 illustrates overall voters' responses to these questions.

In some situations, for the solution of some problems, 26 % of voters maintain that more authority or a dictator is necessary. While 17.9 % say it depends on the situation, 47.7 % are



against the idea. In response to a similar question, 22.9 % of voters state that in some situations, military regime is necessary instead of elected politicians.


Voters are more democratic when it comes to state support of ethnic and religious minorities and difference and as high as 60 % of them are in favor of such support.

(Table 11) Democratic Values	Yes	Depends	No	No Op.	Total
Is more authority or a dictator necessary?	26.0	17.9	47.7	8.5	100.0
Can our rights be limited in some situations?	11.9	19.7	60.0	8.3	100.0
Do ethnic minorities have the right to preserve their customs and traditions?	68.3	--	22.2	9.5	100.0
Should the state support other citizens so they can develop their religious beliefs?	64.5	--	24.5	11.0	100.0
Is it acceptable for military regime to solve problems in certain situations instead of elected politicians?	22.9	--	62.9	14.2	100.0
Do you think the practice of election threshold is correct?	57.2	--	24.6	18.2	100.0
Are elections carried out freely and legally in this country?	61.1	--	27.5	11.4	100.0

“Some say that our society needs authority and some say that we need more freedom. In your opinion, for problems to be solved is more authority or a dictator necessary?” 43.3 % of MHP partisans gave the answer “yes” to this question and for AKP and CHP partisans this percentage was around 20 %.

“Do you think that in some situations and at certain times, can our rights such as holding meetings or rallies, as stating, publishing or discussing our opinions be limited?” The lowest percentage of “no” answers, those least against limitations were AKP partisans, with 54.9 %. Similarly, 14.9 % of them approve of such limitations, this rate being the highest.

(Graph 1) Evaluation of Democratic Values by Partisanship



Voters say “yes” by 68.3 % to the the question “In our country, is it the right of ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Circassians and Arabs to preserve their customs and traditions, to use their own language and to develop their culture?” Those most tolerant towards other ethnic identities are partisans of DTP, CHP and AKP.

“Should or should not the state support and facilitate our citizens such as Jewish, Assyrian, Orthodox, with religions or sects other than your own so that they can freely practice their own religious beliefs and rules?” This question is responded positively (“yes”) by 64.5 % of voters while 24.5 % say “no.”

“Sometimes it is said that politicians chosen through elections are useless, that they cannot solve our problems. Do you think in some cases, it is correct for the military regime to solve the country’ s problems instead of elected politicians?” Among voters, 22.9 % approve of military regime. As can be seen, this percentage is rather close to those who agree to the proposition “a dictator is necessary.” Those with the highest percentage of “yes” replies are MHP partisans (36.2 %) and CHP partisans (27.0 %).



As Graph 1 also shows, CHP partisans who are assumed to be more libertarian and democratic have given opposite responses to some questions and have a position rather close to MHP. Again the same graph shows that with regard to democratic values and attitudes, there is not a clear-cut distinction between partisans of CHP and AKP. Therefore, this party, claiming to be social democrat but acting rather anti-libertarian in many cases such as the 301th article debates, has problems with its electorate. We think that this finding itself points to a problem, an impasse in political representation in our country.



WHAT DETERMINED THE CONTENTS OF THE BALLOT BOX? (3)

5. Who did CHP Votes Come from?

Using the graphs from yesterday which showed the demographic distribution of AKP votes, we may summarize the distribution of CHP votes based on demographic data as follows:

- It received 19 % of men' s votes and 21 % of women' s votes.
- It received votes from 18 % of people aged less than 28, 19 % of people aged 28-44 and 21 % of people aged over 44.
- 14 % of those with middle school education or less, 25 % of high-school educated people and 42 % of those with university level education voted for CHP.
- Among households with 1 to 2 people, 25 % of the votes; among households with 3 to 5 people 22 % of the votes; among households with 6 to 8 people 11 % of the votes and among households with 9 people or more 6 % of the votes went to CHP.
- CHP received 8 % of the votes of households with lowest income, 15 % of those with lower middle income, 22 % of those with mid-level income, 33 % of those with upper middle income and 50 % of those with the highest level income. (Once again, for the income segments, the income levels used in the surveys were 300 TL and less, 301-700 TL, 701-1200TL, 1201-3000 TL and 3001 TL and over.)

These five pieces of information suffice to demonstrate the problem that CHP is facing. The elementary principle of leftist, social democratic philosophy is to take sides with the disadvantaged, aggrieved. One can easily see, without any need for deeper analysis, that CHP has become the party of the established, of the winners of the system, of those integrated into modernisation.

(Table 12) gender, age, education, party distribution (%)			AKP	CHP	MHP	IND	OTHER	Total
Female	Ages 18-28	Mid-school or less	62	10	9	8	12	100
		High School	36	28	16	3	16	100
		University	33	43	11	2	11	100
	Ages 29-43	Mid-school or less	56	15	12	6	11	100
		High School	36	35	17	3	9	100
		University	19	70	7	0	4	100
	Ages 44+	Mid-school or less	57	15	10	7	11	100
		High School	25	38	19	3	16	100
		University	10	72	7	3	7	100



Male	Ages 18-28	Mid-school or less	54	10	20	6	10	100
		High School	34	20	26	8	13	100
		University	27	22	24	10	16	100
	Ages 29-43	Mid-school or less	53	13	15	9	10	100
		High School	45	17	19	3	16	100
		University	29	29	22	9	11	100
	Ages 44+	Mid-school or less	51	18	10	7	14	100
		High School	41	30	5	5	20	100
		University	17	55	17	7	5	100

Examining gender, age, education and party preferences together (Table 12), CHP' s impasse becomes clearer. 72 % of women over 44 with university degrees and 55 % of men over 44 with university degrees are CHP partisans. These figures also help explain the Republic rallies.

While AKP' s votes among young women with mid-school education or less reach up to 62 %, it is only 10 % for CHP. Again among younger men with the same education, AKP receives 54 %, CHP 10 % and MHP 20 % of the votes.


Table 13 – regional distribution of votes (%)		AKP	CHP	MHP	IND	OTHER	Total
Marmara	Urban	42	21	10	4	23	100
	Rural	36	22	11	0	31	100
Aegean	Urban	36	26	19	0	19	100
	Rural	42	16	19	1	23	100
Mediterranean	Urban	36	14	30	4	16	100
	Rural	36	22	23	0	20	100
Central Anatolia	Urban	49	11	15	3	21	100
	Rural	57	7	14	1	22	100
Black Sea	Urban	32	28	16	6	17	100
	Rural	48	6	6	20	19	100
East Anatolia	Urban	55	16	8	8	13	100
	Rural	80	5	0	16	0	100
Southeast Ana.	Urban	56	9	3	19	13	100
	Rural	57	4	6	27	6	100
3 metropolises	Urban	39	26	10	4	21	100
	Rural	42	19	12	2	27	100
Total		42	21	10	4	23	100

In the regional distribution of votes, in order to grasp the characteristics of the three metropolises (İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir), distributions of 7 regions and 3 metropolises have been used (Table 13). It is evident from the table that CHP support has almost disappeared in rural

areas and has almost become nonexistent in some areas. For example, there is virtually no support in the Southeastern region and in the Central Anatolian and Mediterranean regions, it has shrunk tremendously as a result of MHP influence.

As to how CHP votes are distributed by regions within themselves, Graph 2 shows that CHP is stuck in the three metropolises and Marmara region.

Graph 2: Regional Distribution of CHP votes



The disappearance of CHP from the Southeast region results from the party' s perspective on the Kurdish issue. The social structure survey we conducted in September 2006 had the same sample method. Since the distribution of political tendencies of that survey is almost the same as today, we would like to recollect some its data. Citizens' political tendencies by the "ethnic identity they feel" is displayed in the table below (Table 14).

(Table 14) Political tendency by ethnicity	AKP	CHP	MHP	DTP	Other	Total
Turkish	48	17	15	1	19	100
Of Turkish origin*	44	20	14	2	20	100
Kurdish and Zaza	36	7	0	46	10	100
Arabic	65	23	5	2	6	100
General terms	49	18	8	2	22	100
Other	41	19	10	1	30	100

(* Local identities, Balkan origins, Caucasian origins, immigrants etc.)



The table shows that CHP support among Kurdish and Zaza citizens falls to 7 % while AKP' s support is 36 %. Such a result is only natural for a party which claims to be social democrat but hold anti-libertarian views with regard to identity problems and democracy, for a party which disregards the Kurdish issue and has turned to the discourse of "the people of the region."

Another point to be underlined in this table is that 46 % of the votes of Kurds and Zazas go to DTP and 36 % to AKP. Contrary to arguments that all Kurdish citizens are in favor of terror, these figures hint at something else.

6. Problem of CHP Much Deeper and Complicated than the Leader

One basic result emerges from all this analysis. CHP is not merely weakened in a certain segment or region; it is completely arrested in certain groups and geographies. While hotly debated these last few days, this problem can be solved only through radical measures, not merely by replacing certain staff.

To be able to renew itself, to regain people' s trust, CHP must renew its vision and programme, change its style of politics, and completely restructure its organisation and staff.

The picture CHP gives is that of an elitist party of the "successful" and "established" having education, profession and income. Indeed, the primary emphasis in all that was said after elections, all declarations by party representatives were grounded on blaming the voters, the people.

CHP voters' views on the European Union and intervention in Iraq also provide clues about their main characteristics. 55 % of CHP voters are in favor of immediate intervention in Iraq; 29 % of CHP supporters are definitively against joining the EU; 72 % believe that the EU will not accept us anyways. Only 26 % of them believe that life will be better in our country in the next 5 years and 33 % think that their own lives will improve.

To recuperate from the first section of the series, only 65 % of its voters believe that CHP can solve the country' s problems, only 40 % find their leader capable of solving these problems.

Maybe in this case the real question is this: How come a leftist party managed to conjure up so much despair in its electorate? Or looking at it from the reverse, how would it be possible for a government to come out of such a gloomy voters base?



7. Who are MHP Voters?

Summarising the distribution of MHP votes according to demographic data:

- MHP received 16 % of men' s votes and 12 % of women' s votes.
- It received 18 % of votes from those under the age 28, 15 % of the votes from those aged 28-44 and 10 % of the votes of those above the age of 44.
- It received 5 % of the votes of those with mid-school education or less, 6 % of the votes of those with high-school education and 5 % of votes of university-educated people.
- Among households with 1 to 2 people, 13 % of the votes; among households with 3 to 5 people 15 % of the votes; among households with 6 to 8 people 15 % of the votes and among households with 9 people or more 6 % of the votes went to CHP.
- MHP received 10 % of the votes of households with lowest income, 13 % of those with lower middle income, 16 % of those with mid-level income, 14 % of those with upper middle income and 17 % of those with the highest level income.

MHP is quite noticeably the party for men, especially younger men and for people with high-school education. By region, its support is rather strong in Central Anatolia, the Mediterranean and the Aegean.

One interesting finding about MHP is that it is the second choice party for both AKP and CHP voters. 22 % of AKP supporters, and 26 % of CHP supporters and 32 % of DP voters have stated that they could vote for MHP as a second choice.

Among MHP partisans, 29 % of them believe that a new party is needed for solving the country' s urgent problems and 43 % that a new leader is needed.



(Table 15) Intervention in Iraq

	Yes	No	No Opinion	Total
AKP	34.1	48.7	17.2	100.0
CHP	53.5	32.3	14.2	100.0
DP	52.1	37.0	10.9	100.0
GP	63.2	28.3	8.5	100.0
MHP	66.7	24.2	9.0	100.0
Other	50.0	37.5	12.5	100.0
Independent	15.5	71.8	12.6	100.0
Total	42.8	39.6	17.6	100.0

As shown in Table 15, MHP voters are the most hawkish, the most belligerent when it comes to intervention in Iraq: 67 % are in favor of intervention. Following MHP, GP and CHP voters have the highest percentage of voters in favor.

Table 16 shows responses to the question of whether intervention in Iraq would solve the problem of terror. 45 % of MHP voters believe that it will. Following that are GP voters with 37 %. Of CHP voters, 26 % and of AKP voters, 16.5 % hold the same opinion.

(Table 16) Will intervention in Iraq solve the problem of terror?

	Yes	Partially	No	No Opinion	Total
AKP	16.5	18.6	49.8	15.1	100.0
CHP	26.0	30.2	30.0	13.8	100.0
DP	25.2	32.8	33.6	8.4	100.0
GP	36.8	21.7	30.2	11.3	100.0
MHP	45.2	21.7	25.1	8.0	100.0
Other	17.3	27.2	39.5	16.0	100.0
Independent	8.7	5.8	71.8	13.6	100.0
Total	21.8	21.6	40.0	16.7	100.0

With regard to European Union membership, those who least think that we should become a member are MHP voters. While 27 % of them say "yes" to membership, 44 % say that we should definitely not become a member.

Supporters of independent candidates are the strongest proponents of EU membership with 64 %. 47 % of AKP voters and 41 % of CHP voters also support the idea of membership.

(Table 17) Should we Join the European Union?

	Must definitely join the EU	We may or may not join	Must definitely not join the EU	Total
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AKP	46.9	37.4	15.7	100.0
CHP	40.6	33.9	25.5	100.0
DP	37.3	44.9	17.8	100.0
GP	36.2	33.3	30.5	100.0
MHP	27.1	29.0	43.8	100.0
Other	14.8	34.6	50.6	100.0
Independent	64.1	25.2	10.7	100.0
Total	39.0	37.1	24.0	100.0

8. View on Family Values


While 25.3 % of voters think that civil marriage is enough, 2.8 % think that religious marriage is and 67.2 % maintain that both civil and religious marriage are necessary. While 52.5 % of CHP voters believe that civil marriage is enough, 78.5 % of AKP voters believe that both religious and civil marriages are necessary. Those with highest percentage believing that only religious marriage is enough are DTP supporters, at 11.7 %.

As for divorce, 62.4 % of voters consider it to be normal and 34.1 % do not. Those disapproving of divorce are mostly DTP voters with 45.5 % against and AKP voters with 41.4 % against.

While 26.4 % of voters believe that having a son is important, 72.8 % de-emphasize it. It is normal for women to work according to 82.2 % of voters and 69.1 % of them believe that there is no difference between men and women for becoming a leader.

Traditionalism is felt heavily when it comes to family elders' roles and rules. 58.1 % of voters say that family elders can have their say in planning children's future and 66.2 % say that they obey rules set by their elders.

Graph 3: Family Values of AKP, CHP and MHP Partisans



Graph 3 above illustrates that CHP voters are more libertarian and AKP and MHP voters are more traditionalist.

In evaluating this section, if we also take into account the earlier section on questions of democracy, we must point to the following observation:

People who defend more authority *and* approve of limitation of rights *and* consider divorce as not normal constitute 2.9 % of voters. However, those maintaining the exact opposite, that is, those who approve of neither more authority nor the limitation of rights and find divorce to be normal constitute 23.3 % of the electorate.

In a similar fashion, those approving of more authority and of military regime to solve problems and the limitation of rights make up 2.45 % while those disapproving of all three are 27.27 %. Between these two extremes, those approving of one of the authoritarian views and disapproving of the other two make up 15.03 % and those approving two authoritarian views and disapproving of one make up 8.99 %. In other words, the core group with most extreme fascist views make up 2.45 % of voters.




9. Views on Foreign Capital

When we examine responses to several questions on foreign capital, we see that partisanship plays a critical role on the matter. Graph 4 shows voters' positive views about propositions on foreign capital by partisanship. Quite strikingly, AKP voters have diametrically opposite views with MHP and CHP voters, almost resembling a mirror.

While AKP voters have more positive views on foreign capital, CHP and MHP voters are more negative.

Graph 4: View on Foreign Capital by Partisanship





Voters who are against foreign capital coming are 36.9 %; those against foreigners buying property are 59.2 %; those who are against domestic companies being sold to foreigners are 63.5 % and those who are against foreigners working freely in Turkey are 40.5 %.

Partisans who are most against foreign capital on all these four matters are those of MHP and then of CHP. Among MHP voters, 50.3 % are against the influx of foreign capital, 78 % are against the idea of foreigners buying land and property, 80.2 % are against domestic companies being sold to foreigners and 51 % are against foreigners working freely in Turkey.

(Table 18) Views on Foreign Capital	Against	Depends	Not Against	No Opinion	Total
Are you against foreign capital?	36.9	18.5	35.3	9.3	100.0
Are you against foreigners buying land, property in Turkey?	59.2	12.5	21.7	6.6	100.0
Are you against the practice of our companies being sold to foreigners?	63.5	13.0	16.4	7.2	100.0
Are you against foreigners working freely in Turkey?	40.5	16.3	36.5	6.6	100.0

CHP voters are against the influx of foreign capital by 38.7 %, against foreigners buying property by 62.9 %, against our companies being sold by 69.3 % and against foreigner working in Turkey by 43.2 %.

10. CONCLUSION

In this 3-day series, we summarized the findings on 8 surveys, based on the same sample method: Right after elections, we must repeat this summary as if the cornerstone of elections.

Voters make their decision of which party to vote for or not vote for, based on the economic problems and corruption. Voters are informed and opinionated about problems. Naturally, their level of information depends on many factors such as their education and living conditions but we must repeat that they have a definite opinion about the party that they will be voting for.

Voters' decisions have been shaped not in response to the presidential election process or to the communiqué of the general chief of staff but rather, much earlier. In the mentioned



process, there has been an increase reactionary votes but with time, voters have gone back to their commonsensical decision and preferences.

AKP has become a mainstream party, receiving votes from all segments, groups and regions of the society. CHP' s low vote share is due to the discourses and policies caused by its arrestation in certain segments and groups.

The changes in the world and in life in general in the past fews years and the changes our country is going through on its way to the European Union (even if insufficient) are reflected directly on voters. Migration, which is said to be a main characteristic of ours for ages, has not only accelerated but is also affecting all areas of our daily lives much more intensely that we think. Factors such changes in communication, acceleration of life and increase in access to all information add up on top of these, naturally creating significant changes in the material and intellectual worlds of voters.

The enormous gap between the economic situation of cities and rural areas is well known. It is also a generally accepted theory that material living conditions determine the thought world of people. However, our findings indicate that despite such a gap in material living conditions, the gap in the intellectual worlds of rural and urban people is not that great. On questions regarding family values and personal freedoms, the percentage difference between responses of urban vs. rural voters is no more than + /- 5 %.

This finding alone indicates recent changes in voters' capacity to learn and change. Therefore, voters in Turkey complement years of accumulated experience, sensibility and tolerance with newly gained information and no longer favor parties which offer quick and easy solutions for tomorrow morning. Discourses built on quarrels and despair, surges of temper tantrums no longer impress voters.

The only thing we are doing is to try and understand voters, to listen to them. We strived to see not what we think but that which is. If we continue to work painstakingly on these findings and on newer researches by other friends and colleagues, we hope that it would be easier to understand and seize the changing rhythm of life.

Urgent solutions to Turkey' s problems, whether domestic or foreign, is everybody' s desire. Voters in Turkey demand better democracy, a stronger economy and a better quality of life. The events of the past four months and of elections are unfortunately quite distant from these targets. Even if the means for reaching these targets may be different for each party, it is everybody' s common hope that the country' s targets are shared, that a political climate can



flourish on peace and reconciliation, not on enmity against different ethnicities, religions, political views and lifestyles in society.

Therefore, beginning on July 23rd, parties and leaders who can properly manage the political processes will be accepted more easily by the public at large.

In the new parliament to be formed, for the first time, Kurds will be represented and the opportunity of taking take a major step towards societal peace will present itself. If members of the parliament do not work for the country's and society's good, but instead adopt an attitude of narrow group interests and of pomp; if they choose annihilating each other over compromise, they will miss a historical chance.