

KONDA

Barometer

THEMES

Social Mood: Security and Unhappiness
Perception of Future
September 2016

KONDA
— ARAŞTIRMA VE DANIŞMANLIK



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey which forms the basis of this report was conducted on 3-4 September 2016 by face-to-face interviews with 2776 individuals in 161 neighborhoods and villages of 106 districts including the central districts of 30 provinces.

THE MOOD OF THE SOCIETY

Half of the society feel safe in crowded places and when going out, and it is observed that the rate of those who feel safe has increased since March-April. Although there is not much change in regards to safety perception about the neighborhood, the city and the country, the perception of safety about the neighborhood and the country has slightly fortified. Even though half of the society express that they are happy, there has been a decrease in this rate since January 2012. Thus, according to the depression index we measured in December last year, Turkey had scored 2.10 in a scale of 1 to 4 whereas this month **the society seems to be more depressed** as the score is 1.97.

The feelings of both safety and happiness are directly related to the welfare level of the individuals, and this level is determined by not only monthly income but also educational level, lifestyle and one's own perception about his/her own state of wealth or poverty. Safety and happiness **should not be evaluated independently of social memory and political polarization**: for example, the perception of safety varies according to making a living, views on foreign politics or views as to whether there is a national consensus or not.

PERCEPTION OF FUTURE

According to the society, the future is 10.2 years later on average. Compared to 10.7 years measured in September 2013, the period has shortened in almost all clusters of the society with no significant differentiation. However, it is noteworthy that the perception of future has considerably shortened for public officers and that there is a tendency for leveling since the perception of the higher educational and income clusters has shortened and the perception of the lower educational and income groups has lengthened.

In order to measure the perception of future, we used the method of wisdom of the crowds and asked the interviewees to make an estimation about **the probable exchange rate of US dollar for the end of 2016** which revealed an estimation of **TRY 3.10 on average**. Political position might be influential in the estimations considering that those clusters closer to the government tend to estimate a lower rate and there is a great difference in estimations according to the TV channels preferred for obtaining the news.



2. SOCIAL MOOD: SECURITY AND UNHAPPINESS

After the general election on June 7, 2015 the overall mood in Turkey has slipped into a turbulent period. Explosions in various parts of the country, the ongoing political and social polarization and finally the failed coup attempt on July 15 profoundly transformed the imaginary and emotional connection of people with other individuals, the city they live in and the country. In this month's research, we addressed two different aspects of the social mood. On the one hand, we reflected on the social and political reasons behind the reigning mood, while on the other hand we examined the psychological changes directly experienced by the people.

Our research this month reveals the existence of a relation between the feeling of security and happiness that should not be overlooked. The findings of the research not only indicate that the feeling of security and happiness emerge under similar economic and social circumstances but also reveal that political polarization and ethnic identities have a similar effect on the feeling of security and happiness. In other words:

- ✓ The feeling of security enhances the feeling of happiness and vice versa.
- ✓ Both the feeling of security and happiness are closely related to welfare, and for the purposes of this research, level of welfare is identified not only by taking into account the monthly household income, but also by paying due attention to educational attainment level, lifestyle and how rich/poor individuals perceive themselves to be.
- ✓ Each individual's definition of security and happiness is closely related to their identity and opinions on politics; therefore, the feeling of security and happiness should be evaluated in isolation from social memory and political polarization.

When addressing the feeling of security and happiness, we also referred to the research we conducted in previous years in order to scrutinize the social change and transformation that has taken place. We took the March'16 and April'16 Barometers as reference in our analysis of the feeling of security, and the December'15 Barometer in our analysis of happiness.

2.1. Security


When we directed the question, "Have you been concerned about going out on the street or being in crowded places recently? Do security concerns affect your daily life?", roughly one out of every two respondents expressed that they feel secure, while one out every two respondents stated that they do not feel secure. In summary, society in Turkey is split in half in terms of feeling secure or not.

The graph below shows the course of the feeling of security over the last year, and it is evident that the rate of those "do not feel secure, but whose daily life is not adversely affected" has not changed at all. However, the rate of those who feel extremely secure and the rate of those who do not feel secure at all has fluctuated. In the March'16 and April'16 Barometers, published after the explosions in İstanbul



and Ankara in February and March, we observed how the feeling of insecurity had increased. However, it looks like the trend has been reversed since April and the rate of the respondents who feel secure has increased by 16 points, while the rate of those who do not feel secure decreased by about 15 points.


Have you been concerned about going out on the street or being in crowded places recently? Do safety concerns affect your daily life?



The graph below demonstrates how secure respondents feel in their immediate neighborhood, in the city they live in and in the country overall. According to the graph, the feeling of security significantly diminishes as the scale moves from neighborhood towards city and city towards the country; in other words, individuals feel less secure in the country where they lack a tangible and one-to-one contact in comparison to their neighborhood where they experience one-to-one contact on a daily basis. This proves to verify a significant finding we have mentioned in numerous Barometers: Individuals in Turkey make a distinction between their own living space and the common living spaces, and this graph indicates that such distinction is expressed through different feelings on security.




My neighborhood/the city I live in/our country is a safe place to live in.



The graph below provides us with the opportunity to compare the most recent findings on the feeling of security at different scales (neighborhood-city-country) with the March'16 Barometer. There is not much difference between the findings of the March'16 and September'16 Barometers – the current trend where individuals perceive their neighborhoods the most secure, the city less secure and the country the least secure, persists in a similar fashion. Furthermore, the response rates have almost remained the same over the past six months.



My neighborhood/the city I live in/our country is a safe place to live in.




As the three graphs below demonstrate, there exists an apparent relation between the feeling of security in one’s neighborhood, city and the country, and feeling secure when going out on the street. The respondents who feel more reluctant and concerned about going out on the streets are more likely to feel insecure in their neighborhood, in the city they live in or in the country, and the feeling of insecurity intensifies as the scale moves from their neighborhood to the country.


- ✓ 10 percent of those who feel secure, 33 percent of those who feel somewhat secure, and 67 percent of those who feel extremely secure express that they feel secure *in the neighborhood they live in*.
- ✓ 17 percent of those who feel secure, and 56 percent of those who feel extremely secure express that they do not feel secure *in the city they live in*.
- ✓ 28 percent of those who feel secure express that they feel secure *in Turkey*. The corresponding rate reaches 55 percent among those who feel somewhat secure, and climbs up to 70 percent among those who feel extremely secure.




“The neighborhood I live in a safe place to live.”



“The city I live in a safe place to live.”



“Our country is a safe place to live.”



■ Strongly disagree
 ■ Disagree
 ■ Somewhat disagree
 ■ Somewhat agree
 ■ Agree
 ■ Strongly agree

In the graph below, we can observe how the rate of those who feel extremely secure is shaped by various demographic and social characteristics. According to the graph, the feeling of security intensifies when the respondents' place of residence become smaller in size (i.e. the respondents who live in rural areas feel more secure in comparison to those who live in metropolitan areas). 70 percent of the respondents who live in rural areas feel secure, while the corresponding rate drops to 50 percent




in metropolitan areas. Women in comparison to men, moderns in comparison to the other lifestyle clusters, the Kurdish in comparison to the Turkish, and Alevi Muslims in comparison to Sunni Muslims feel themselves less secure. While there is a 10-percent difference between women and men, the difference between the Turkish and the Kurdish reaches 20 percent and the difference between Sunni Muslims and Alevi Muslims climbs up to 30 percent.

When we take a look at the lifestyle clusters, it is evident that the feeling of security among moderns is 15 points less than it is among traditional conservatives and 20 points less than it is among religious conservatives. The feeling of security increases among the respondents who are more conservative. A similar trend is observed when we analyze the responses by degree of piety. The difference between the rate of non-believers who feel secure and the rate of pious who feel secure is about 45 percent.

When the responses are analyzed by political preferences, we can observe that Ak Parti voters feel the most secure, and HDP voters feel the least secure. While 65 percent of Ak Parti voters feel themselves secure, the corresponding rate declines to 57 percent among MHP voters, to 30 percent among CHP voters, and 19 percent among HDP voters.



Have you been concerned about going out on the street or being in crowded places recently? Do safety concerns affect your daily life?



2.2. Security: Welfare, Political Polarization and Happiness


Earlier in this section, we mentioned that the feeling of security is closely related to the level of welfare. In this respect, the graph below presents the degree of feeling secure by the responses provided to the question, “Were you able to afford a living during the past month?” Accordingly, the respondents who stated that they had difficulty in making both ends meet feel less secure, while those who easily made both ends meet feel much more secure. For example, 33 percent of the respondents who indicate that they went into debt do not feel secure when going out on the street, while 69 percent of those who could put some money aside feel secure.



The same graph also enables us to mull over the subjectivity of the matter. For instance, when we analyze the degree of feeling secure by the responses provided to the question, “How successful do you find Ak Parti's foreign policy performance?”, it becomes evident that political polarization leads to difference in how secure individuals feel. The respondents who think that Ak Parti’s foreign policy is successful feel more secure, whereas those who do not find Ak Parti’s foreign policy successful feel less secure.

Finally, when we look at the responses to the question on whether a national consensus was established after the failed Coup Attempt or not, which is another question that helps to illuminate political polarization, we find out that those who say “yes, there is a national consensus” are a lot more likely to find the country as a safe place to live, and that those who say “no, there is national consensus” are more insecure. In more concrete terms, those who said “yes” feel themselves twice more secure than those who said “no”.


Have you been concerned about going out on the street or being in crowded places recently? Do security concerns affect your daily life?



- I do not feel secure, and my daily life is adversely affected.
- I do not feel secure, but my daily life is not adversely affected.
- I feel secure.



Finally, let's take a look at the question of happiness, which we will also elaborate on in the section about the future. Half of those who report feeling very unhappy also feel themselves completely insecure, while this rate does down to 14 percent among those who feel very happy. Similarly, while 29 percent of those who are very unhappy report feeling completely secure, the same was registered twice or higher among the very happy. 66 percent of those who feel very happy, and 58 of those who feel happy also state that they feel secure.



As a result, feeling of security is based on various concrete, demographic, economic, political and more subjective reasons. Where one lives and the scale of the area one interacts where one lives is an important factor. Educational attainment and welfare status is the second important factor. It does not seem possible to evaluate the relation between identity and the feeling of security, which make up the third important factor, independently from the feeling of happiness.


2.3. Happiness and Depression

In this section of our report, we continue our exploration of the social mood in Turkey by focusing on a different aspect of the social mood in Turkey. In response to the question, “how happy do you feel yourself?”, one out of every two people reported that they were either happy or very happy. However, when we look at the course of feeling happy over the last seven years, we observe that happiness in Turkey has followed a fluctuating course, as it was the case in the case of the feeling of




security. For this reason, we do not see a particularly significant change in the last 18 months. The only major difference is observed in our March'10 research conducted right after the 2009 economic crisis. The number of people who feel happy or very happy decreased the most during that time period.

Happiness-Unhappiness in Turkey over Years





This month, we once again directed the same 8 questions we had asked in December'15, which were formulated based on the European Social Survey (ESS) in order to measure the level of depression in Turkey. At first glance, the changes in response rates in the graph appear to be minimal; however, it is possible to reach the conclusion that individuals in Turkey have become more depressed in the aftermath of the election.

"I was in depression, I felt depressed"



"I felt that everything I did was an effort."









When we analyze only two of the eight statements listed above by ethnic and sectarian background, we come across with an outlook that is worth to mull over. The rate of the Turkish who stated that they felt happy all or almost all of the time is almost three-fold of the corresponding rate among the Kurdish. On the other hand, the rate of the Kurdish who expressed that they never felt happy is 6 points higher than the corresponding rate among the Turkish.

Happiness by ethnic identity



The comparison of Sunni Muslims and Alevi Muslims reveal a similar social state of mind. The rate of Alevi Muslims who expressed that they never felt happy is 8 points higher than the corresponding rate among Sunni Muslims. On the other hand, the rate of Sunni Muslims who stated that they did not feel depressed is twice that among Alevi Muslims.


Happiness by sect



In order to evaluate the state of mind of different groups from a broader perspective and to achieve further clarity, we performed the factor analysis, re-evaluated these eight statements, and calculated the depression index based on the average scores. Based on the responses provided to the question on how often the respondents felt depressed during the week before the field survey, the average score in Turkey equals to 2.10. This score corresponds to “some of the time” on a scale where 1



refers to “never”, 2 refers to “some of the time”, 3 refers to “most of the time” and 4 refers to “all or almost all of the time.” This result is not extremely different from the score (1.97) we calculated in December’15; both scores correspond to “some of the time” in the scale.




On the following page, we can see how the depression index changes by educational attainment level, income, employment status, ethnic identity, sect and political preference. Accordingly, the depression index in certain groups (such as upper income group, small retailers, students and public officers) is below the average in Turkey (2.10), and they are less depressed. However, the depression index in various groups (such as the lower-educated, lower income group, unemployed, workers, Alevis, the Kurdish, CHP voters and HDP voters) exceeds the average at different rates. Thus, it is possible to suggest that the members of these groups are more depressed.

In any case, it is not sufficient to evaluate the groups only based on the data we collected in September’16. Over the past nine months, the most significant change can be observed among public officers, the retired and workers. The depression index among public officers increased by 0.3 points, while it increased by 0.2 points each among the retired and workers. In addition, the depression index among CHP voters and Alevis increased by 0.2 points each indicating that they also became more depressed. Although the depression index among HDP voters increased by 0.1 points, HDP voters prove to be the most depressed group with their score of 2.4.



Change in the depression index December'15 - September'16






As noted earlier, one’s feeling of happiness is not independent of their perception of the political outlook. Therefore, just as it was the case with the feeling of security, expression of one’s feeling of happiness or depression is determined through political polarization. As shown in the first graph below, when we place opinion on the presidential system on the depression index, we notice that “yes” voters are less depressed than “no” voters.

In another topic of polarization, the emotional difference between those who find Ak Parti’s foreign policy performance can be identified by examining the depression index as well. Accordingly, there is a 0.4-point difference between those who find Ak Parti successful and those who find it unsuccessful.

We observe similar tendencies in society regarding the opinion on the military operation into Syria launched by Turkey. There is a 0.3-point difference between those who agree and those who disagree with the operation, and advocates of the operation are less depressed than the objectors.


Depression index by opinion on current politics



Finally, let’s take another look at the relation between the feeling of security and happiness. As it can be seen in the graph below, there is a strong relation between feeling secure and happy. The depression index score of those who feel completely secure is 1.9-points, those who feel completely insecure is 2.4-points.




Depression index by security concern going out on the street



In confirmation with the previous graph, 57 percent of those who stated that they feel secure also stated that they felt happy or very happy, while this rate falls down to 38 percent among those who feel insecure. What is striking here is that the rate of those who feel very unhappy among those who also feel themselves completely insecure is 3 times more than the same among those feel completely secure.

Have you been concerned about going out on the street or being in crowded places recently? Do safety concerns affect your daily life?






3. THEME OF THE MONTH: PERCEPTION OF THE FUTURE

3.1. How Many Years is the Future Away from Today?

How secure people feel or how unhappy or depressed they are is closely related to their social status. We thought that these two moods could complement people's perception of the future. The scale of time people base their perception of the future also allows us to make observations on their psychological state. In summary, the period of time people refer to by the concept of the "future" varies dramatically among different demographic clusters.

In this context, in the September'16 Barometer, respondents were directed a question that was previously used exactly 3 years ago. We collected open-ended responses to the question, "When you think of the future, how many years from today do you think about?" The distribution below shows the categorization of the responses.




One in four did not respond to this question. The average response rate is 10.2 years. Only 24 percent of society thinks about the future as being more than 10 years away. On the other hand, only 1 in 10 sees the future as being more than 20 years away from today.

It would be difficult to claim that there has been a significant change in people's perception of the future in the last 3 years. The perception of the future, measured as 10.7 years in 2013, was registered as 10.2 years in this research. On the other hand, although we do not observe a dramatic change on average, the significant increase in the rate of those who define the future as being at most 3 years away is noteworthy. The rate of those who perceive the future as a point in time that is 3 years away or less has increased from 28 percent to 35 percent.

However, we need to identify what has changed in the perception of the future according to demographic and lifestyle clusters. Furthermore, we also need to examine how the perception of the future changes among different social clusters and groups.




Before looking into how the perception of the future varies by different categories, when we observe how the overall perception of the future is distributed on the multiple correspondence analysis, having different ideas of the future in terms of how distant it is does not scatter into different directions on the social plane. People who think of the future being more short-term are located a little lower on the horizontal axis, while those who understand the future as being more than 20 years far away are located slightly above the axis. However, they are not located in different social spheres that are located in different points on the map.



Although this stands in contrast to the analysis above, examining the responses by different demographic and lifestyle clusters allows us to see significant differences. Educational attainment level, age, income level and lifestyle cluster emerge as important factors shaping the perception of the future. On the other hand, this differentiation has also changed in comparison to three years ago.



Change in the perception of the future by demographic group (2013-2016)



As noted earlier, we observe that the perception of the future has become slightly more short-term over time. However, an observation of the responses by educational attainment status showed that higher educational status leads to perceiving the future as being more distant 3 years ago, while we observe that the perception of the future has shortened considerably for university students, according to the latest research findings. In association with this observation, we also observe that the perception of civil servants and private sector employees of the future has become dramatically shorter. In general, we may claim that people with higher



educational status who work at mentally challenging jobs have been losing their hope in the future during the last 3 years. Particularly, we may think that increasing despair in the perception of the future among civil servants is related to dismissals in the aftermath of the July 15th Coup Attempt.

We observe that, in contrast to civil servants and private sector employees, the perception of the future among farmers has become considerably longer in its term. It is extremely difficult to determine the real cause of this change. However, granting certified farmers the right to benefit from Social Security Institute (SSI) retirement pension may have brought about this change in perception.

How the perception of the future has changed during the same time period by income level should also be monitored, in parallel to the finding above.

**Change in the perception of the future by income level
(2013-2016)**






When we observe income level in juxtaposition with economic class, we come across a finding: while the perception of the future among lower economic classes become longer, the same among higher economic classes become shorter in its time span.

By examining the two graphs together, we may claim that white-collar employees, who belong in the higher economic class, have decreased expectations from the future. As a result, we are able to observe that the perception of the future converges when all demographic and social clusters are taken into consideration to approach a common ground.

On the other hand, as demonstrated by the graph below, perception of the future among the Kurdish and Alevis has also shortened considerably in its term during the last 3 years. For example, 3 years ago, the average perception of the future among Alevis corresponded to 11 years, while the same duration decreased to 8 years in this month's survey.


Change in the perception of the future by demographic group (2013-2016)






3.2. Prediction on the Dollar Exchange Rate for the end of 2016

In our endeavor to understand the social mood, we have also addressed predictions on the dollar exchange rate as a more tangible subject, in addition to the perception of the future. Taking into consideration that including as many people as possible in our evaluation would help us to attain a more accurate outcome, we have decided to utilize the method of wisdom of crowds in our analysis of the predictions on how much 1 US Dollar would cost in Turkish Lira at the end of the year.



First of all, it should be noted half of the respondents reported a prediction. However, we know that the actual rate of people whose business activities are related to the dollar or who invest in dollars is much lower than this figure. When we asked the respondents which instruments they use for investment purposes in the May'14 Barometer, we found out that only 1.2 percent invested in foreign currencies.




Generally speaking, we may tend to think that the prediction on the dollar exchange rate would not vary greatly across different social groups. We know the overall public opinion is based on the perception that a lower dollar exchange rate is better and a higher exchange rate is worse for the economic outlook, as society has went



through many periods of economic downturn in the past. We are also able to see that prediction on the year-end dollar exchange rate is based on this perception, as well as political opinion.

How much do you think 1 Dollar (USD) would cost in Turkish Lira (TRY) at the end of 2016?




Ak Parti voters and people who identify themselves as religious predict that the dollar exchange rate will be relatively lower, while people who identify themselves in the opposition think that the dollar exchange rate will be higher at the end of the year. It is not possible to know which of these predictions is more realistic or which of these predictions have been provided with the intention to be realistic. However, the fact that the prediction on the exchange rate differs between these two groups implies that political preference may be influencing this prediction and suggests that this subject should be examined in more detail.

When we assess the predictions by taking into consideration parameters which may be related to the dollar in particular, or investment in general, we observe that the prediction on the dollar exchange rate for the end of the year among higher economic classes is higher than the same among other groups.



Prediction on the dollar exchange rate by income level and employment status



The graph below demonstrates to what extent prediction on the dollar exchange rate is shaped by real data or by the reflected or instilled perception on the subject. The fact that the distribution of predictions on the dollar exchange rate is so similar to the distribution of TV channel viewership by political preference suggests that political preference is an influential factor. Viewers of anti-government channels claim that the dollar will end up higher at the end of the year, while viewers of pro-government channels make predictions that are lower than average.


On the other hand, while Twitter users, who are more likely to have access to more sophisticated information, make the prediction that the exchange of the dollar will be higher at the end of the year, those who do not engage with the internet at all think that the dollar will end up more favorably year end.

Suffice to say, the prediction on the exchange rate of dollar on average (as it is always the case with the wisdom of crowds) may have presented us with a rational/realistic data. However, in observation of the different social clusters, we may claim that the



media plays an effective role in shaping the perception on the dollar, or in other words, the perception on the economic atmosphere.

Dollar prediction by news source



3.3. Opinion on the Future

Within the scope of the September'16 Barometer, we have asked the respondents questions which were intended to explore the undercurrent that runs across society, though each question may individually appear different from others. We have endeavored to understand people's status of depression, their opinions on security and their perception of the future through these questions. When we analyze the public opinion on the economic indicators we come across an outlook that is familiar to us from other Barometer reports.

Social and political positions individuals take impact not only their daily life, but also their perceptions of the future. The voters of the ruling party reflect a profile that is more expectant of the future, with least likelihood to portray a negative scenario for the future. On the other hand, more in the opposition and in a disapproving state one is, the more he or she is likely to have a weaker hope or decreased expectations from the future, couple with an increased crisis expectation.



As devoted Barometer followers would be well acquainted with, as KONDA, we have emphasized time and again that political polarization leads to social polarization. However, this month's data shows that political polarization has moved beyond social disintegration and led to a disintegration of expectations from the future. We may think of hope and expectation from the future as the one of the fundamental aspects that form an individual's character. As a result, we can see that political identity influences the founding blocks of people's minds. In this case, the fact that people's predictions of the future, in other words, their descriptions of their hope from the future are diverged indicates that social polarization has reached a critical level.



4. RESEARCH ID

4.1. Overall Description of the Survey

The surveys that this report is based on has been conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.).

The field survey was conducted on 3-4 September 2016. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, within the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and to monitor trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey. The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.3 at 99 percent confidence level.

4.2. The Sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the data on population and educational attainment level of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS), and the results of the November 1st 2015 General Election in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 2776 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 161 neighborhoods and villages of 106 districts - including central districts - of 30 provinces.

| | |
|--------------------------------|------|
| Provinces visited | 30 |
| Districts visited | 106 |
| Neighborhoods/villages visited | 161 |
| Number of respondents | 2776 |

Among the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas on age and gender were enforced.

| Age group | Female | Male |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Between 18-32 | 3 respondents | 3 respondents |
| Between 33-48 | 3 respondents | 3 respondents |
| 49 and above | 3 respondents | 3 respondents |



| | Level 1 (12 regions) | Provinces visited |
|----|-------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1 | İstanbul | İstanbul |
| 2 | Western Marmara | Balıkesir, Tekirdağ |
| 3 | Aegean | Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya |
| 4 | Eastern Marmara | Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli |
| 5 | Western Anatolia | Ankara, Konya |
| 6 | Mediterranean | Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin |
| 7 | Central Anatolia | Kayseri, Sivas |
| 8 | Western Black Sea | Samsun, Tokat |
| 9 | Eastern Black Sea | Giresun, Trabzon |
| 10 | Northeastern Anatolia | Erzurum, Kars, Erzincan |
| 11 | Middle Eastern Anatolia | Malatya, Van, Elazığ |
| 12 | Southeastern Anatolia | Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa |

The distribution of the respondents by region and place of residence is shown in the table below.

| | Survey location | Rural | Urban | Metropolitan | Total |
|----|-------------------------|-------|-------|--------------|--------|
| 1 | İstanbul | | | 21.6% | 21.6% |
| 2 | Western Marmara | | 3.0% | | 3.0% |
| 3 | Aegean | 0.6% | 8.9% | 5.7% | 15.2% |
| 4 | Eastern Marmara | | 3.2% | 5.9% | 9.1% |
| 5 | Western Anatolia | | 3.1% | 7.6% | 10.7% |
| 6 | Mediterranean | | 6.2% | 6.5% | 12.7% |
| 7 | Central Anatolia | 0.6% | 1.8% | 1.4% | 3.8% |
| 8 | Western Black Sea | 1.3% | 4.6% | 0.2% | 6.1% |
| 9 | Eastern Black Sea | 0.6% | 1.8% | 0.6% | 3.1% |
| 10 | Northeastern Anatolia | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 2.0% |
| 11 | Middle Eastern Anatolia | 0.6% | 2.8% | 0.6% | 4.1% |
| 12 | Southeastern Anatolia | | 5.2% | 3.3% | 8.6% |
| | Total | 4.6% | 41.2% | 54.2% | 100.0% |



5. FREQUENCY TABLES

5.1. Profile of the Respondents

| Gender | Percent |
|--------|---------|
| Female | 47.6 |
| Male | 52.4 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| Age | Percent |
|---------------|---------|
| Between 18-32 | 33.4 |
| Between 33-48 | 35.6 |
| 49 or above | 31.0 |
| Total | 100 |

| Educational attainment level | Percent |
|------------------------------|---------|
| Illiterate | 6.9 |
| Literate without degree | 2.9 |
| Primary school graduates | 32.7 |
| Secondary school degree | 14.3 |
| High school degree | 26.6 |
| University degree | 15.2 |
| Masters/PhD | 1.4 |
| Total | 100 |

| Household size | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| 1-2 person(s) | 18.7 |
| 3-5 people | 62.6 |
| 6-8 people | 15.6 |
| 9 people or more | 3.1 |
| Total | 100 |

| Lifestyle Cluster | Percent |
|--------------------------|---------|
| Modern | 25.2 |
| Traditional conservative | 45.0 |
| Religious conservative | 29.8 |
| Total | 100 |



| Employment status | Percent |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|
| Civil servant | 5.3 |
| Private sector | 7.2 |
| Worker | 10.5 |
| Small retailer | 7.5 |
| Merchant/businessman | 0.9 |
| Self-employed | 1.9 |
| Farmer, agriculturist, stock breeder | 4.3 |
| Employed, other | 6.0 |
| Retired | 13.3 |
| Housewife | 29.0 |
| Student | 8.3 |
| Unemployed | 4.5 |
| Disabled | 1.2 |
| Total | 100 |

| Head cover status | Percent |
|--------------------------|----------------|
| No head cover | 26.9 |
| Headscarf | 48.9 |
| Turban | 9.4 |
| Chador | 1.0 |
| Bachelor male | 13.8 |
| Total | 28.5 |

| Ethnic identity | Percent |
|------------------------|----------------|
| Turkish | 79.2 |
| Kurdish | 15.3 |
| Zaza | 1.0 |
| Arab | 2.0 |
| Other | 2.5 |
| Total | 100 |



| Religion/sect | Percent |
|---------------|---------|
| Sunni Muslim | 92.2 |
| Alevi Muslim | 5.2 |
| Other | 2.7 |
| Total | 100 |

| Level of religiosity | Percent |
|----------------------|---------|
| Non-believer | 3.2 |
| Believer | 25.7 |
| Religious | 56.7 |
| Pious | 14.4 |
| Total | 100 |

| Which social media channels do you use? | Percent |
|---|---------|
| Facebook | 48.4 |
| WhatsApp | 18.3 |
| Instagram | 40.4 |
| YouTube | 20.0 |
| Twitter | 22.7 |
| Other | 1.5 |
| I use the Internet, but I am not a social media user. | 8.5 |
| I do not access the Internet | 35.5 |

| Monthly household income | Percent |
|--------------------------|---------|
| TRY 700 or less | 5.3 |
| TRY 701 - 1200 | 10.4 |
| TRY 1201 - 2000 | 42.6 |
| TRY 2001 - 3000 | 21.4 |
| TRY 3001 - 5000 | 15.9 |
| TRY 5001 or more | 4.4 |
| Total | 100 |



| Where do you see yourself in terms of your level of income and welfare? | Percent |
|--|----------------|
| Poor | 9.2 |
| Below median | 54.0 |
| Above median | 36.1 |
| Rich | 0.7 |
| Total | 100 |

| TV channel preferred to watch the news | Percent |
|---|----------------|
| Does not watch | 6.7 |
| A Haber | 7.4 |
| ATV | 19.4 |
| CNN Turk | 5.5 |
| Fox TV | 13.0 |
| Haberturk | 2.8 |
| Halk TV | 2.2 |
| IMC TV | 2.1 |
| Kanal 7 | 1.7 |
| Kanal D | 7.9 |
| Kanaltürk | 0.2 |
| NTV | 4.2 |
| Roj/Nuçe/Sterk | 0.6 |
| Show TV | 0.0 |
| Star | 3.5 |
| TRT | 3.4 |
| Ulusal | 14.3 |
| Local channels | 0.6 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| Do you own a car in your household? | Percent |
|--|----------------|
| Yes | 48.0 |
| No | 52.0 |
| Total | 100.0 |



| Type of housing | Percent |
|--|---------|
| Squatter / apartment without external plastering | 6.5 |
| Single family, traditional house | 31.6 |
| Apartment | 54.8 |
| Housing complex | 6.8 |
| Very luxurious apartment, villa | 0.3 |
| Total | 100 |

| Economic class | Percent |
|----------------|---------|
| Lower | 19.7 |
| Lower middle | 30.9 |
| New middle | 24.8 |
| Upper | 24.6 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| Which hand do you usually use? | Percent |
|--------------------------------|---------|
| I use my right hand. | 84.4 |
| I use my left hand. | 7.6 |
| I use both hands. | 8.0 |
| Total | 100.0 |

5.2. Social Mood: Security and Unhappiness

| I felt depressed. | Percent |
|-------------------|---------|
| Never | 30.9 |
| Some of the time | 42.6 |
| Most of the time | 17.4 |
| Always | 9.1 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| I felt that everything I did was an effort. | Percent |
|---|---------|
| Never | 45.0 |
| Some of the time | 33.2 |
| Most of the time | 14.7 |
| Always | 7.1 |
| Total | 100.0 |



| How much of the time during the past week your sleep was restless? | Percent |
|---|----------------|
| Never | 36.8 |
| Some of the time | 37.7 |
| Most of the time | 17.2 |
| Always | 8.3 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| I felt happy. | Percent |
|----------------------|----------------|
| Never | 13.7 |
| Some of the time | 42.8 |
| Most of the time | 32.1 |
| Always | 11.4 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| How much of the time during the past week you felt lonely? | Percent |
|---|----------------|
| Never | 50.2 |
| Some of the time | 31.3 |
| Most of the time | 12.2 |
| Always | 6.3 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| How much of the time during the past week you enjoyed life? | Percent |
|--|----------------|
| Never | 16.3 |
| Some of the time | 42.9 |
| Most of the time | 27.6 |
| Always | 13.2 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| I felt sad. | Percent |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Never | 25.5 |
| Some of the time | 50.5 |
| Most of the time | 16.6 |
| Always | 7.4 |
| Total | 100.0 |



| I was tired. | Percent |
|---------------------|----------------|
| Never | 36.9 |
| Some of the time | 36.9 |
| Most of the time | 17.2 |
| Always | 9.0 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| How happy do you feel yourself? | Percent |
|--|----------------|
| Very unhappy | 2.7 |
| Unhappy | 9.0 |
| Neither happy nor unhappy | 38.9 |
| Happy | 43.8 |
| Very happy | 5.5 |
| Total | 100.0 |

5.3. Perception of Future

| When you think of the “future”, how many years from today do you think about? (grouped) | Percent |
|--|----------------|
| Less than 1 year | 16.6 |
| 1-3 years | 17.9 |
| 4-5 years | 17.3 |
| 6-10 years | 24.0 |
| 11-20 years | 13.9 |
| More than 20 years | 10.3 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| Which of the TWO (2) groups I will count now do you see the most? | Percent |
|--|----------------|
| Neighbors, people from the immediate vicinity | 72.2 |
| Class/School mates | 17.6 |
| People with shared place of origin | 29.9 |
| Friends with shared political affiliation | 4.4 |
| Fan group | 1.8 |
| Hobby group | 6.3 |
| Religious groups | 5.2 |
| Colleagues | 29.2 |



| Have you been concerned about going out on the street or being in crowded places recently? Do safety concerns affect your daily life? | Percent |
|--|----------------|
| I do not feel secure, and my daily life is adversely affected. | 21.5 |
| I do not feel secure, but my daily life is not adversely affected. | 27.4 |
| I feel secure. | 51.2 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| The neighborhood I live in a safe place to live. | Percent |
|---|----------------|
| Strongly disagree | 6.5 |
| Disagree | 3.9 |
| Somewhat disagree | 7.5 |
| Somewhat agree | 10.6 |
| Agree | 20.4 |
| Strongly agree | 51.1 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| The city I live in a safe place to live. | Percent |
|---|----------------|
| Strongly disagree | 10.1 |
| Disagree | 6.9 |
| Somewhat disagree | 14.3 |
| Somewhat agree | 13.9 |
| Agree | 19.0 |
| Strongly agree | 35.9 |
| Total | 100.0 |

| Our country is a safe place to live. | Percent |
|---|----------------|
| Strongly disagree | 17.5 |
| Disagree | 11.0 |
| Somewhat disagree | 16.1 |
| Somewhat agree | 12.8 |
| Agree | 13.8 |
| Strongly agree | 28.9 |
| Total | 100.0 |



6. GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms.

| Term | Definition |
|---------------------------|--|
| Alevi Muslim: | A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim |
| Lower middle class: | Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car |
| Lower class: | Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment |
| Arab: | A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab |
| Headscarf: | A woman who does not cover her head or a man with a headscarf or whose spouse does not cover her head with a headscarf |
| Chador: | A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a chador |
| Religious: | A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion |
| Religious conservative: | A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative |
| Traditional conservative: | A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative |
| Ideological: | A person who states a party as the closest to his/her political view |
| Believer: | A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely |
| Non-believer: | A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion |
| Urban area: | Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the official definition) |
| Rural area: | Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the official definition) |
| Kurdish: | A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish |
| Leader follower: | A person who states that he/she trusts in or favors the leader of a certain party |



| | |
|--|--|
| Metropolitan: | Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition) |
| Modern: | A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern |
| No cover: | A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head |
| Non-partisan: | A person who states that none of the parties represent him/her |
| Pious: | A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely |
| Late-decider: | A person who states that he/she makes a decision based on the election campaigns |
| Sunni Muslim: | A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim |
| Partisan: | A person who states that he/she/they always vote for that party |
| Turban: | A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a turban |
| Turkish: | A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish |
| Upper class: | Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment |
| New middle class: | Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment and which own a car |
| Zaza: | A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza |
| Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) | It is a data analysis technique for nominal categorical data, used to detect and represent underlying structures in a data set. It is used for applying Correspondence Analysis (CA) to large data sets with more than two variables. MCA was shaped with the work of mathematician and linguist Jean-Paul Benzécri in 1960s, and MCA-related studies and publications proliferated after the translation of research on Jean-Paul Benzécri and MCA in the 1980s and the use of this method by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. |

6.1. Questions and Response Options

Which of the three lifestyle clusters below do you feel you belong to?

Modern

Traditional conservative

Religious conservative



Do you cover your head or does your spouse cover her head when going out of your home? How do you cover your head?

No head cover

Headscarf

Turban

Chador

Bachelor male

We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you belong to?

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

Which religion or sect do you feel you belong to?

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

Which of the below describes you in terms of piety?

A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely

Which of the reasons below influence/determine your political preferences?

I/we always vote for that party.

It is the party closest to my political view.

I trust/favor its leader.

None of these parties represent me.

I make a decision based on the election campaigns.

Total



| |
|--|
| Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample) |
| Rural |
| Urban |
| Metropolitan |
| Economic classes (determined by using household size, household income and car ownership) |
| Lower class |
| Lower middle |
| New middle |
| Upper class |