

KONDA

Barometer

THEMES

Opinion on Foreign Policy
November 2016

KONDA
— ARAŒTIRMA VE DANIŒMANLIK



CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	4
2. THEME OF THE MONTH: FOREIGN POLICY	6
2.1. Why Foreign Policy?.....	6
2.2. Interest and Knowledge of Foreign Policy and Nationalism.....	7
2.3. Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy.....	13
2.4. Impact of Foreign Policy on Domestic Politics.....	21
2.5. International Alliances	23
2.6. Relations with Various Countries	24
2.7. The Middle East.....	27
2.8. Foreign Policy Assessment	31
2.9. Evaluation and Comments.....	42
3. RESEARCH ID.....	46
3.1. Overall Description of the Survey	46
3.2. The Sample	46
4. FREQUENCY TABLES	48
4.1. Profile of the Respondents	48
4.2. Foreign Policy.....	52
5. GLOSSARY of TERMS	61





1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey which forms the basis of this report was conducted on 5-6 November 2016 by face-to-face interviews with 2552 individuals in 152 neighborhoods and villages of 118 districts including the central districts of 31 provinces.

FOREIGN POLITICS

We decided to handle foreign politics as the theme of this month as the Ak Parti has been managing foreign politics and internal politics in an integrated way for a while and the relations with the West and the problems in the Middle East and the Arabic region as well as the possibility of the war leaping into Turkey has occupied daily life, gradually bringing Turkey towards a junction.

The level of information the society has about foreign politics is average and there are many people who do not know the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and that Turkey is a member to NATO or G20 who instead assume that Turkey is a member to the EU or the Shanghai Five. On the other hand, half of the society indicate that they are after all indifferent to foreign politics. The level of information and interest influences the view towards foreign politics together with the extent as to one sees himself/herself as a nationalist.

Even though diplomacy as a method is preferred over military power and economic success is considered more important than military power in foreign politics, the majority agree with the opinion that military power is the most important indicator in measuring the greatness of a country, and in the eye of the society, these two views are not contradictory.

As the most important opportunity for Turkey, a group of people consider membership to the European Union whereas another group consider leadership of Muslim countries and the Middle East. This differentiation may be considered as a typical example of the polarized views on foreign politics. As the most important danger, the desire of the Western countries to divide Turkey and getting involved in the war in Iraq and Syria come up. The possibility of the war leaping into Turkey and affecting the individual and his/her family is a fearful prospect for the majority of the society. As for cooperation in foreign politics, there is emphasis again on Muslim countries. One fourth of the society support cooperation with the Western countries whereas one eighth are in favor of cooperation with countries such as Russia and China. Despite the emphasis on Muslim countries and the Middle East, it is desired that Turkey resembles the West and especially the European countries in terms of standard of life.

There are different views on international cooperations: A little less than half of the society support membership to the European Union whereas more than half of the society support the continuation of membership to NATO. There is an overall neutral approach to relations with countries such as the U.S., Russia, Israel and Armenia. There is a dominating view that the U.S. is hostile but in a pragmatic approach, there are also those who wish that the political, military and economic cooperation continues. The society is somewhat more inclined to such cooperation with Russia.



Only half of the society approve the peace process with Israel. One in every three people support rekindling diplomatic relations with Armenia which shows that Turkey is not yet ready for such a move.

It is strongly believed that Turkey can be a role model in the Middle East. Moreover, although it is the view of about one in every two people in the society, there exists an active-assertive expectation about foreign politics for entering into Mosul-Kirkuk, meeting with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish administration and preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state in Syria. In consideration of various actors in the Middle East, it may be concluded that the dominant view is that the peace is prevented by not the administrations of the states themselves but foreign countries, especially the U.S. and the sharing of energy sources.

A combined evaluation of all these issues on foreign politics reveals several important points:

- Two third of the society consist of those we call **“militants”** who are more nationalistic and wary about the West, supporting an active role in the Middle East and leadership of Muslim countries, and believing that Turkey is a super power or great power at higher rates. The remaining cluster of one third of the society whom we call **“apprehensives”** are more tended to consider Turkey’s involvement into the Iraq-Syria war as a danger, pointing towards the European Union for cooperation, preferring cooperation with the Western world as well as diplomacy and cooperation in general. These two clusters are demographically very different which differences correspond to the political polarization axes of Turkey.
- Political polarization is felt in many aspects. For instance, the Ak Parti and MHP electorates are much more tended to see Turkey as a super power or great power in the world. As for the opportunities, although there are very different views in the political polarization axis, there is nevertheless a consensus as to what the dangers and threats are such as the Iraq-Syria war. For example, there is social consensus as to the fact that the Treaty of Lausanne should not be exploited for the sake of politics.
- **Although the Turks and the Kurds** are on the same page about the fact that the war in Iraq-Syria will negatively affect the Kurdish problem, they have opposing views as to what Turkey should do in the Middle East.
- The society on the one hand fears division and involvement into a war and on the other hand claims regional power such as being the leader of the Middle East and the Muslim countries and intervening in Mosul-Kirkuk.



2. FOREIGN POLICY

2.1 Why Foreign Policy?

We have chosen foreign policy as the monthly theme of the November'16 Barometer. We had several reasons for this decision. First of all, foreign policy and international political developments playing an increasingly bigger role in our lives. Ak Parti's foreign policy and domestic policy seems to be particularly intertwined with each other since the 2011 General Election. Since 2011, on the one hand relations with the U.S., EU, and the West in general, and on the other implications and repercussions of the conflict in Syria, the political developments and the coup in Egypt, the Arab Spring and other issues in the Middle East are making an increasingly bigger impact on our daily lives.

We will be addressing the topic of foreign policy within the context of a myriad of issues, including but not limited to the compulsory settlement of 3 million refugees fleeing the civil war in Syria, ISIS and its terrorist attacks in Turkey, the problems arising from Syrian Kurds, PYD and PKK, border security and the increasing presence and impact of terror, violence, security, and the erosion of law and order.

These issues and problems are pushing Turkey to a point of decision. A final decision about whether to continue or to completely rule out Turkey's candidacy is on the horizon, with increasingly deteriorating relations with the EU. On the other hand, the Operation Euphrates Shield appears to be becoming a full-scale war.

We thought that it was important to understand the opinion of the general public on foreign policy, international political developments, and the ongoing and imminent conflicts, and to observe the kinds of strategies ordinary citizens are coming up with to cope with these issues, as the country seems to be approaching decision points which affect everyone's lives. And thus, we chose foreign policy of the November'16 Barometer with these considerations in mind.

It should also be reminded that when the field survey was conducted, HDP Co-leaders Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ had not been yet arrested, Donald Trump had not been yet elected president of the U.S. and the European Parliament had not yet decided to indefinitely suspend accession negotiations with Turkey.



2.2 Interest and Knowledge of Foreign Policy and Nationalism


We have started out our evaluation of the opinion on foreign policy by asking some basic questions. What percent of society is interested in foreign policy? How many of us, and how much do we know about foreign policy? To what an extent do nationalist opinions and feelings shape opinion on foreign policy related issues?

2.2.1 Our knowledge on foreign policy

We asked 2 questions to measure the respondents' level of knowledge on foreign policy. The first question inquired whether the respondents knew the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or not, while the second question focused on which of the 6 provided international organizations Turkey was a member of. 38.6 percent of society know who the Minister of Foreign Affairs is. However, 64.8 do know not that Turkey is a member of the United Nations, and 56.9 percent are not aware that Turkey is a part of G20, just like the 29 percent who are not cognizant of the fact that it is a NATO member. Furthermore, 9.6 think that Turkey is a member of the European Union, 10.9 believe it is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while 3 is under the impression that it is a member of the Shanghai Five¹.

	Wrong answer	Right answer
Are we a member of the European Union?	9.6	90.4
Are we a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States?	10.9	89.1
Are we a member of the United Nations?	64.8	35.2
Are we a member of the G-20?	56.9	43.1
Are we a member of NATO?	29.0	71.0
Are we a member of the Shanghai Five?	3.0	97.0
The name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs	61.4	38.6

We have measured the knowledge of the respondents on a scale of 1 to 7 where each question is worth 1 point. For the purpose of carrying out the analyses in the following sections, we have accepted 1-2 point as “not knowledgeable”, 3-4 points as “slightly knowledgeable”, 5-6-7 points as “knowledgeable”. The Turkey average is slightly above average at 4.6 points.




¹ Although the official name of the organization is Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, we have opted to refer to it as the Shanghai Five in the survey, as it is predominantly done by the media and politicians.



Men vs. women, university graduates vs. the lesser educated, moderns vs. conservatives and higher-income earners vs. lower-income earners relatively have more knowledge of foreign policy matters.




Level of knowledge by demographics






2.2.2 Interest in foreign policy

When the responses to the statement, “Please indicate the extent of your interest in foreign policy on a scale of 1 to 5,” are categorized into three groups, we find out that nearly half the public (48 percent) is “not interested” (1-2 points) in foreign policy. On the other hand, 28 percent reply that they are “somewhat interested” (3 points) and 24 percent find themselves “interested” (4-5 points) in foreign policy.




When we examine interest in foreign policy is reference to foreign policy knowledge, we observe that 48 of every 100 people report that they are not interested in foreign policy, and out of this 48 people, only 7 are knowledgeable of foreign policy, while 38 are somewhat knowledgeable and 3 are not knowledgeable. On the other hand, out of the 23 people in every 100 people who state that they are interested in foreign policy, 12 are knowledgeable and 11 somewhat knowledgeable of foreign policy.



Although the respondents find themselves disinterested in and somewhat knowledgeable of foreign policy-related issues on average, the rate of those who do not provide a response to both questions about the statements on the current state of affairs and about what needs to be done stands at a low rate wavering from 2 to 7 percent.

2.2.3 Nationalism

When responses to the question “Please indicate how nationalist you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 10” are categorized into three groups, we find out that 66.3 percent of society identify themselves as “nationalist” (7-8-9-10 points), and 22.6 percent as “shy nationalist” (4-5-6 points) and 11.1 percent as “anti-nationalist” (1-2-3 points).




Although our aim in asking this question is not to measure the level of nationalism, but to see whether level of nationalism leads to a difference in opinion on foreign policy, an interesting finding attracts the attention among the responses. Compared to the findings of the June'16 Barometer, nationalist sensitivity seems have increased on average and among all voter groups. This finding implies that the July 15th Coup Attempt and all recent foreign policy related developments, including the Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria during the last 6 months may have boosted nationalist sentiments.

	Jun'16	Nov'16
Ak Parti	7.24	7.65
CHP	7.10	7.67
MHP	8.61	8.84
BDP/ HDP	3.86	4.49
Other parties	6.72	7.47
Swing voter	6.45	7.10
Non-voter	6.18	6.38
TURKEY	6.90	7.33

The level of nationalism observed in all demographic, cultural and economic groups is close to the Turkey average, when we analyze the responses by demographic characteristics and political preference. Nationalism also become stronger with older age and higher educational attainment and income levels. Expectedly, MHP voters are in the forefront in terms of how nationalist voters perceive themselves to be, while Ak Parti and CHP voters seem to have the same level of nationalism.




Level of nationalism by demographic groups






When we examine the responses by interest in and knowledge of foreign policy, we observe that all groups are nationalist, with nationalist sentiments getting stronger with higher level of interest in and knowledge of foreign policy related matters.



2.3 Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy


2.3.1 Method in foreign policy

In this section, we will address the general opinion of the respondents on the general principles of foreign policy and the country. In the following sections, we will focus on more specific foreign policy related matters. First, let's start out with methods deemed acceptable for conducting foreign policy in public opinion. As demonstrated in the graph below, nearly three out of every four people are in favor of the use of diplomacy in foreign policy, while one in four believes that the exercise of military power is more effective.






Method in foreign policy



Keener interest in and more knowledge of foreign policy leads to a stronger emphasis on diplomacy as the appropriate method of conduction foreign policy related affairs.

In order to shed more light on the findings, we have read two different statements to the respondents: One out of every two people ‘strongly agree’ with the first statement, “The mark of success in foreign policy is not military victory, but economic development,” while 8 out of every 10 people ‘agree’ with the statement to a varying extent.


The mark of success in foreign policy is not military victory, but economic development.



However, as it can be seen in the next graph, the great majority of the public think that military power is the best indicator of a country’s strength, as agreed by 7 out of every 10 people.



Military power is the best indicator of a country's strength.




The graph above, along with the previous graphs, demonstrates that the public sees economic power as the most important strength in foreign policy, and military power as what makes a country strong. These two opinions do not contradict, but instead in harmony with each other in public perspective. 50 percent prefers diplomacy, but also sees military power as an important indicator. 55 percent agrees with both opinions that success in foreign policy can be measured by economic power and that military power is the best indicator of successful foreign policy. *The public is generally in favor of a foreign policy based on diplomacy, but also emphasizes the importance of military power.*

2.3.2 Turkey as a power

At this point, we asked the respondents about how powerful they found Turkey in terms of its global power. As shown below, one out of every three people defined Turkey as a 'regional power'. One in four described Turkey as a 'mid-size power'. The contrasting opinions on two ends of the scale are preferred at similar rates. 12 percent describe Turkey as a 'superpower', while 10 percent indicated that 'none' of the provided statement defined Turkey.

In your opinion, which of the following defines Turkey in terms of its global power?




Political preference emerges as the most important factor from the survey results. The responses *highlight a different dimension of the ensuing political polarization in Turkey.*

Accordingly; 20 percent of Ak Parti voters define Turkey as a 'superpower' and 30 percent as a 'major power', only a mere 10 percent of CHP voters agree with any of these definitions in total. MHP voters are similar to Ak Parti voters in their responses, while 30 percent of HDP voters provided the response of 'none'.



Less knowledge of foreign policy matters and stronger nationalist sentiments are accompanied by an increase in the likelihood of perceiving Turkey as a superpower or major power.




2.3.3 Dangers and opportunities awaiting Turkey

The responses to the two questions about dangers and opportunities for Turkey that we have asked the respondents underline polarization. Becoming the leader of Muslim countries is seen as the most important opportunity for Turkey, with 35 percent in agreement with this opinion, and while becoming a member of the European Union is perceived as the second-most important opportunity. 21 percent, which makes up a substantial group of people, find becoming the leader of the Middle East as the most important opportunity for Turkey. One out of every two Ak Parti voters think that “becoming the leader of Muslim countries” is the most important opportunity for Turkey, one out of every two CHP voters have preferred the response option of “becoming a member of the European Union”. Similar to CHP voters, more than half of HDP voters think that becoming a member of the European Union is the most important opportunity for Turkey. The responses of MHP votes are more evenly distributed. 30 percent of MHP voters provided the response of “becoming the leader of the Middle East”, 27 percent opted for “reestablishing its *Misak-ı Milli* borders” and 26 percent chose “becoming the leader of the Middle East” as their response. Just like Ak Parti voters, “becoming a member of the European Union” is the least popular response option for MHP voters.




What is the most important opportunity for Turkey that could be to its advantage?



One out of every three people perceive the most important threat Turkey is facing as “being partitioned by Western governments” and another one third as “getting involved in the war in Syria”. Falling out with the U.S. is seen as a significant threat as well. Breakdown of relations with the EU or falling out with Russia is not perceived as a danger. Nearly all segments of society more or less agree on the threats facing Turkey, with two exceptions. Half of HDP voters see “our involvement in Iraq and Syria” as the most important threat Turkey faces, while 12 percent of CHP voters, which correspond to twice the Turkey average, perceive the “breakdown of relations with the European Union” as the most important threat Turkey is facing in foreign policy.

What is the most important threat for Turkey?




Opinion on the threat for Turkey varies by level of interest in and knowledge of foreign policy matters. Greater interest and knowledge leads to less concern for falling out with the U.S., but increased concern that Turkey will be partitioned by Western powers. On the other hand, getting involved in the war in Iraq and Syria is becoming a bigger source of concern with lower level of nationalism.

Although we observe polarization in society with respect to opportunities, different segments of society seem to think similarly about perceived threats.



Threat for Turkey



2.3.4 Country aspired to


In the responses to the question, “If Turkey resembled which country below in terms of its structure, rule of law, economy and living standards, would you be happy?” the fear that Turkey will be partitioned by Western countries is replaced by an aspiration for Turkey to resemble Western countries. We have first categorized the responses to this open-ended question and then narrowed down the categories.

Countries	Percent	Percent	Countries
USA	7.9	7.9	United States of America
EU countries	6.6	31.0	European Union countries
Germany	9.4		
Scandinavian	7.1		
Switzerland	5.3		
France	1.5		
Holland	1.1		
UK	2.9	4.7	British Commonwealth of Nations
Australia, Canada, New Zealand	1.8		
Russia	2.5	2.5	Russia
Muslim countries	3.0	4.1	Muslim countries
Ottoman Empire	1.1		
Other countries	4.1	4.1	Other countries
There is no such country	18.6	18.6	There is no such country
No response	27.0	27.0	No response
Total	100.0	100.0	Total






60 percent of those who answered this question would like Turkey to become more like the U.S., European Union countries or the countries member to the Commonwealth of Nations. One fourth of the respondents state that there is no country they would like Turkey to resemble.



However, the cautious attitude towards Western countries resurfaces in the responses to the question, “Which country or countries do you think Turkey should act in coordination with in conducting its foreign policy affairs?” 35 percent, in other words one out of three people, believes that we should first cooperate with the Muslim countries. Support for cooperation with the U.S., EU and other Western countries stands at 24 percent. 14 percent think that it would be sufficient for Turkey to act on its own accord.



Let’s take a different perspective on the responses to the question above: One out of every four people are in favor of cooperation with Western countries, while one out of every two people think that Turkey should act in coordination with Muslim countries and Turkic republics, probably due to shared historical and cultural heritage. Political polarization observed in the responses to the previous question is the main factor that explains the distribution of responses to this question as well. Half of Ak Parti voters state that Turkey should act in coordination with Muslim countries. On the other hand, European Union countries are the most popular response option among CHP voters, with a preference rate of 35 percent. MHP voters are most likely to refer to the Turkic republics in their responses, with 40 percent in favor of the opinion that Turkey should act in coordination with the Turkic republics. HDP voters seem be divided on this issue. 30 percent of HDP voters prefer the ‘Muslim




countries” option, while the same rate of voters would like Turkey to cooperate with ‘European Union countries’ in foreign affairs.


2.4 Impact of Foreign Policy on Domestic Politics

2.4.1 Direct impact

In order to measure the potential impact of foreign policy on domestic politics, we first need to review the public opinion on the foreign policy performance of the government. As shown in the graph below, half of the public find the government’s foreign policy performance successful. One out of every four people think it is ‘neither successful nor unsuccessful’, while 29 percent find it unsuccessful. Expectedly, opinion on the government’s foreign policy performance is heavily influenced by political polarization. It is so much the case that the rate of those who find the government ‘very successful’ among Ak Parti voters reaches around 90 percent.




Although society is polarized in opinion on general political principles and issues, there are also issues on which the public is in consensus about. For example, one out of every two people think that the war in the Middle East will have a negative impact on the Kurdish issue. However, the distribution of the responses is more or less similar across of segments of society. More than half of Ak Parti, CHP, MHP and HDP voters voice that the war would have a worsening effect on the Kurdish issue in one way or another.



The graph below demonstrates that the recent debates and statements about the Treaty of Lausanne were not reflected in the public opinion. Three out of every four people think that the Treaty of Lausanne should not be used for political purposes and there is a broad consensus on this topic, as it was the case with the previous statement.




The Treaty of Lausanne should not be used for political purposes.



2.4.2 Alarming possibilities in foreign policy


Not only do the great majority of the public is agreement with the statement, “I am afraid of the war in Iraq and Syria to spread into Turkey,” but also different segments of society generally think similarly on this issue. For example, when we examine the voters’ reaction to this statement by political preference or ethnic identity, we do not come across a significant differentiation.

I am afraid of the war in Iraq and Syria to spread into Turkey.



However, when we look into the opinion on the potential war, we observe differences in the perception among different groups in society. The overwhelming majority agree with the statement, “I am afraid that entering this potential war would affect both me and my family.” However, Ak Parti and MHP voters are more reluctant to perceive a threat by a potential war in comparison to CHP and HDP voters. Nevertheless, Turkish vs. Kurdish and Sunni Muslims vs. Alevi Muslims are less likely to state that they have fears over Turkey entering a war.

I am afraid that entering this potential war would affect both me and my family.




The great majority of the general public is in agreement with the statement, “If we had not gotten involved in the problems of countries elsewhere in the world, the state of our country would have been much better.” However, Ak Parti voters, Sunni Muslims,



people with higher educational attainment and income levels, and Religious Conservatives are less likely to agree with this statement. The Turkish and the Kurdish seem to be in consensus on this matter.


If we had not gotten involved in the problems of countries elsewhere in the world, the state of our country would have been much better.




2.5 International Alliances

We have also directed the respondents questions about Turkey's NATO membership and its potential accession to the European Union, as part of our theme of foreign policy. As reflected in the two graphs below, although the majority of society is in support of the opinion that Turkey must maintain its NATO membership, the opinion on Turkey's potential membership to the European Union is slightly different. 63 percent of the public support Turkey's NATO membership, while the rate of those who say Turkey must become a member of the European Union lags around 45 percent.

Turkey should maintain its NATO membership.




Turkey should become a member of the European Union.





There are nuances between those who are in favor of both memberships. Moderns, people with higher income and educational attainment levels, Alevis, the Kurdish, and CHP and HDP voters are in favor of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. As for Turkey’s NATO membership, we observe greater support among Moderns, CHP voters, Alevis and groups with higher educational attainment levels. Difference in income level does not lead to a variation in support, and unlike the case for membership to the European Union, ethnic identity does not lead to a difference. HDP voters support Turkey’s membership to the EU, but they also have a more negative outlook on Turkey’s NATO membership.



Higher degree of interest in and knowledge of foreign policy matters leads to broader support for both NATO and EU memberships. Expectedly, lower levels of interest and knowledge are accompanied by lower support for Turkey to maintain its NATO membership. What is interesting here is greater interest in and knowledge of foreign policy matters leads to slightly less support for EU membership.


2.6 Relations with Various Countries

Our examination of the public opinion on Turkey’s relations with countries that are significant for foreign policy reasons starts out with a focus on the U.S.-Turkey relations. The negative opinion about this relation reflected in the first two graphs becomes more balanced out in the third graph. 85 percent of the public is in favor of the opinion that the U.S. is not friendly towards Turkey, and similarly around 80




percent think that the U.S. is displaying hostility towards Turkey by not extraditing Fethullah Gulen and aiding the Kurdish in Syria.

The United States is friendly towards Turkey.




Using a direct question about extradition of Gulen or Syrian Kurds leads to differentiation in responses. For example, the Turkish are more likely to believe that the United States is acting with hostility towards Turkey than the Kurdish. Ak Parti and MHP voters are also more likely to believe that the United States is treating Turkey with hostility than HDP voters, while CHP voters are closer to the median in terms of their opinion on the matter.

The United States is acting with hostility by not extraditing Fethullah Gulen and by helping the Kurdish in Syria.



However, we observe that the respondents are divided in their reaction to the statement, "Political, military and economic cooperation with the U.S. should be strengthened," while disagreement with the statement in majority at 59 percent. HDP voters are more likely to agree and MHP voters are more likely to disagree with the statement. Ak Parti voters and MHP voters reflect a similar distribution of opinion, while CHP voters are closer to the median again.

Political, military and economic cooperation with the U.S. should be strengthened.






It may be stated that finding the United States hostile towards Turkey and supporting the idea of strengthening the United States-Turkey relations are not in contradictory with each other in the public opinion. One out of every three people does not find the attitude of the United States friendly and favors the improvement of the relation between the two countries.


We also observe that cooperation with Russia is not necessarily seen as an alternative to cooperation with the United States. The public is more or less divided into two on the topic of cooperation with Russia. 57 percent are in support of this cooperation, and 43 percent in objection. However, the apparent polarization here is not fueled by politics as it usually is the case, and positive or negative opinion on cooperation with Russia does not lead to a divergence among society. The divergence is economic-based, as higher income level leads to stronger support for improved cooperation with Russia.

Political, military and economic cooperation with Russia should be strengthened.



The two graphs below illustrate the public opinion on Turkey-Israel relations. 65 percent of the public is favor of the opinion that Turkey should play a role in the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict, but we observe a divergence of opinion among different social groups. Moderns are less likely to support Turkey's potential role in the resolution of the conflict than Traditional Conservatives and Religious Conservatives. The statement is most supported by Ak Parti voters, respectively followed by MHP voters and HDP voters. CHP voters are the least likely voter group to support the idea of Turkey playing a role in the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict.

Turkey should play a role in the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict.




The second statement we provided the respondents with was “It is the right thing to do for Turkey and Israel to make peace.” The public appears divided into two again in their




opinion on this statement, with 57 percent in agreement and 43 percent in disagreement with making peace with Israel. At first glance, we may fall under the impression that this is a case of polarization, but a more detailed examination of the responses by political preference, ethnic identity, sect or lifestyle does not yield a notable differentiation.

It is the right thing to do for Turkey and Israel to make peace.



For the last topic that will we address in this section, we have decided to examine the public opinion on the opening of the border with Armenia, which we find to be an important issue although it may not be considered as an urgent matter within the context of Turkey's already quite loaded foreign policy agenda. As demonstrated in the graph below, 66 percent of the public is not in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia and of opening the border between the two countries. The greatest divergence in the responses to this question is observed by political preference, ethnic identity and sect. HDP voters, the Kurdish and Alevis are more positive about establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border with Armenia than the other voter groups.

Diplomatic relations should be established with Armenia and the border should be opened.




2.7 The Middle East

As part of our investigation of the public opinion on foreign policy related matters, we have also focused on various foreign policy issues related to the Middle East. For this reason, we first read the statement, "Turkey is a role model for Middle Eastern countries," to the respondents. As shown in the graph below, one out of every four people in Turkey agrees with this statement to a varying extent. However, a higher tendency of seeing oneself as Modern is accompanied by a lower likelihood of perceiving Turkey as a role model for Middle Eastern countries. A similar differentiation is observed by ethnic identity and sect as well. The Turkish and Sunni Muslims are more inclined, and the Kurdish and Alevis are slightly more reluctant to see Turkey as a role model for countries in the Middle East. Political party




preference reveals a similar divergence. Ak Parti voters are most likely to agree with the statement, followed by MHP voters as usual, While HDP voters are the least likely to agree.

Turkey is a role model for Middle Eastern countries.



We asked the respondents the question, “Which of the following is the greatest barrier to peace in the Middle East?” As demonstrated by the graph below, one in every three people preferred the response of ‘meddling of foreign countries’. Close to 30 percent opted for ‘the war over energy resources’, 25 percent chose ‘sectarian and religion wars’. The most interesting point here is that among the response options provided as the greatest barrier to peace in the Middle East, “national governments” is the least popular one, with a preference rate of 9 percent. It appears that *society in Turkey generally think that various ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are caused by ‘external’ reasons.*

What is the greatest barrier to peace in the Middle East?




We followed this question up by asking the respondents, “Which state, organization or political person is the greatest barrier to peace in the Middle East?” According to the findings, ‘USA’ is the most popular response, with a preference rate of 41 percent. When we take this rate into consideration with the 4 percent who provided the response of ‘Western countries’, we find out again that one out of every two people in society sees actors outside the Middle East as the greatest barrier to peace.

As for actors from within the Middle East, ISIS/DAESH stands at 15 percent and Israel at 12 percent. Since this question was directed as an open-ended question, the response of ‘other answers’ indicates various different actors. ‘Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’, ‘Russia’ and ‘Iran’ are among these actors, each corresponding to around 2 percent. ‘Terrorist organizations’ and ‘FETÖ’ are less popular options.




“Which state, organization or political person is the greatest barrier to peace in the Middle East?”




The following three graphs demonstrate the responses to the questions directed to the respondents about Iraq and Syria, which concerns Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East directly, and which may even be considered as part of its domestic policy concerns. In the first graph, one out of every two people agree with the statement, “It is the right thing to have friendly relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq”, and the other person disagrees. The biggest difference is observed between the Turkish and the Kurdish. The Kurdish are much more in support of having friendly relations with the KRG. Alevis also support this statement more than Sunnis. An overview of party voter groups reveals that Ak Parti voters and CHP voters move in parallel, and think similarly. Both Ak Parti voters and CHP voters are more likely to disagree with maintaining friendly relations with the KRG, while HDP voters are more likely to support such friendly relations.

Maintaining friendly relations with the Kurdish Regional



Out of every two people, one agrees and the other disagrees with the second statement, “Turkey should engage in military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk.” The Kurdish, HDP voters particularly, strongly oppose such an intervention, while the Turkish, Ak Parti voters, and MHP voters particularly support intervention.


Turkey should engage in military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk.



67 percent agree with the third statement, “Kurds should be prevented from establishing their own state in Syria.” On the other hand, two thirds of the Kurdish, and three



fourths of HDP voters disagree that the Kurdish should be prevented from founding their own state in Syria.



The fourth statement, “Turkey should make peace with Assad if necessary,” is opposed by the great majority. 66 percent of the public is in disagreement with this statement. In similar fashion to their response to the previous statement, the Kurdish and HDP voters think that Turkey should make peace with Assad if necessary, in contrast to the Turkish and other party voter groups. A similar differentiation is also observed by sect: Alevis are more likely than Sunnis to see peace with Assad as a possibility.



2.8 Foreign Policy Assessment

2.8.1 Factor analysis

When we perform a *factor analysis* on the 20 scaled questions about foreign policy, we come across 7 questions and 3 dimensions that are statistically meaningful.

All 4 questions in the first dimension are about situations that have an impact on the country and on personal lives, and that are sources of concern. It is notable that military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk leads to a negative outcome. The second dimension is shaped by the opinion on two global powers, USA and Russia. The third dimension is composed of the question about the Palestine-Israel conflict.


Component Matrix ^a			
	Component		
	1	2	3
I am afraid that entering this potential war would affect both me and my family.	0.812	0.041	0.310
I am afraid of the war in Iraq and Syria to spread into Turkey.	0.780	0.065	0.327
Turkey should engage in military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk.	-0.568	0.241	0.534
If we had not gotten involved in the problems of countries elsewhere in the world, the state of our country would have been much better.	0.567	0.118	0.184
Political, military and economic cooperation with Russia should be strengthened.	0.030	0.788	-0.272
Political, military and economic cooperation with the U.S. should be strengthened.	0.182	0.756	-0.320
Turkey should play a role in the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian problem.	-0.394	0.446	0.610
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.			
a. 3 components extracted.			

When the significance of these dimensions by different clusters is analyzed, we come across several interesting findings.

Greater interest in and knowledge of foreign policy matters leads to a higher likelihood of being concerned. Also, decreased level of nationalism also leads to increased concern among the respondents. In addition, the likelihood of feeling concerned is slightly higher among the respondents who have family members/relatives serving in the military, in comparison to those who do not. However, it is striking that almost all of the clusters are positioned at the 'concerned' side of the scale.



Level of concern in interest, knowledge and nationalism clusters



The analysis of the data by political preference yields a remarkable difference. Although all four voter groups are concerned overall, the level of concern among CHP and HDP voters is significantly higher than that among Ak Parti and MHP voters.

When it comes to the second dimension (i.e. relations with the U.S. and Russia), voters in Turkey wish for improved relations with both the U.S. and Russia, while the desire for improving relations with Russia is much stronger.


The graph below presents that the rate of the respondents who would like improved relations with Russia is at similar rates among all four voter groups. On the other hand, the desire for reinforced cooperation with the U.S. is weakest among MHP voters and strongest among HDP voters.

Better knowledge on foreign policy issues leads to increased desire for stronger cooperation with Russia, whereas the respondents wish for improved relations with not only Russia but also the U.S. with less knowledge of foreign policy related matters.

The rate of respondents who think that relations with Russia should be improved increases with higher levels of interest in foreign affairs and nationalist sensitivity. On the




other hand, weaker interest in foreign policy and lower level of nationalism leads to increased desire for stronger cooperation with the U.S.



2.8.2 Clusters by Opinion on Foreign Policy and the Profiles of the Clusters

A clustering analysis, which is performed by using these three statistically significant dimensions as well as the questions that address the core principles in foreign policy, reveals that voters in Turkey can be classified into two statistically significant and well-defined categories.


Clusters by opinion on foreign policy





According to the clustering analysis, 35.6 of the voters in Turkey make up the first cluster that we call as the “concerned”, while 64,4 percent are part of the “proactive” cluster. These two clusters not only have very distinct opinions on foreign policy, but also reflect distinct differences in their demographic, political, cultural and economic profiles.

Profiles of Foreign Policy Clusters






Higher educational attainment level and income lead to an increase in the rate of the concerned. The rate of the concerned is higher among Moderns, young people and women.

The Kurdish vs. the Turkish, Sunni Muslims vs. Alevis are more likely to fall into the concerned cluster.

Analysis of the data by political preference shows that two thirds of CHP and HDP voters are classified as concerned.

When the two foreign policy clusters are compared based on their level of interest in foreign policy, political sophistication and nationalism, the “proactive” cluster comes out to be more nationalist and more interested in foreign policy, while members of the “concerned” cluster are more sophisticated and feel more concerned with respect to foreign policy matters.



2.8.3 Opinion of Foreign Policy Clusters on Foreign Policy

Dangers and opportunities awaiting Turkey

There are noteworthy differences in opinion about the dangers and opportunities awaiting Turkey between the two clusters.


For the “**proactive**”, the “intention of Western governments to break up Turkey” (42 percent) and “getting involved in the war in Iraq and Syria” (26 percent) are the major threats Turkey is faced with. The “**concerned**”, however, think that “getting




involved in the war in Iraq and Syria” (41 percent) and “falling out with the U.S.” (25 percent) are the major dangers to watch out for in foreign policy.

For the “**proactive**”, “becoming the leader of Muslim countries” (51 percent) and “becoming the leader of the Middle East” (30 percent) represent major opportunities for Turkey. On the other hand, 82 percent of the “**concerned**” believe that “becoming a member of the European Union” is the most significant opportunity in front of Turkey.


What is the most important threat for Turkey?



Which of the following is the most important opportunity for Turkey?



In your opinion, which of the following defines Turkey in terms of its global power?



Turkey as a power


Among the “**proactive**”, 40 percent think that Turkey is a regional power, 22 percent think that Turkey is a major power, and 21 percent think that Turkey is a mid-size power. On the other hand, among the “**concerned**”, 30 percent think that Turkey is a mid-size power, 28 percent think that Turkey is a regional power, and 25 percent think that Turkey is “none” of these.



Which countries should Turkey act in coordination with?

The two clusters are also in disagreement about this topic. The “**proactive**” think that Turkey should act in coordination with Muslim countries (46 percent) and Turkic republics (20 percent). The “**concerned**”, however, think that Turkey should act in coordination with the European Union (34 percent) and the U.S. (15 percent).


Which countries should Turkey act in coordination with



Which country would you like Turkey to resemble?

35 percent of the “**proactive**” would like Turkey to resemble European Union countries, while 31 percent do not think that there is any country that can be a role model for Turkey. 57 percent of the “**concerned**” consider the European Union countries as a role model.

Which following country would you like Turkey to resemble?




Power and indication of success in foreign policy...

When inquired about the method that is more suitable and more effective in foreign policy, both groups indicate that they favor diplomatic methods. One fourth of the “**proactive**” prefer exercising of military power.




Which method is more suitable and more effective in foreign policy?



Yet, both clusters appear to be in agreement about the importance of military power. However, the groups diverge in their opinions about whether military victory or economic development indicates success in terms of foreign policy. According to the “concerned”, the mark of success in foreign policy is economic development, which the “proactive” disagree with.

Power and strength in foreign policy




Foreign policy in domestic politics

Both clusters think that the Treaty of Lausanne should not be manipulated for gains in domestic politics and that war in the Middle East will negatively affect the Kurdish issue.

However, they differ in terms of finding Ak Parti's foreign policy performance successful and unsuccessful. The “proactive” find Ak Parti's foreign policy performance successful, while the “concerned” think otherwise.



Foreign policy in domestic politics




International relations

Both clusters agree that “relations with Russia should be improved” and that “it is the right thing to do for Turkey and Israel to make peace”, albeit to a varying degree. The two clusters are also in agreement that Turkey should play a role in the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict, while the “proactive” take a stronger stance. Similarly, the two clusters agree that cooperation with the U.S. should be strengthened, while the “concerned” take a stronger stance. When it comes to establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia, however, it is not possible to observe an agreement between the two clusters. While the “proactive” take a stance against establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia, the “concerned” are in favor of building diplomatic relations.



International relations




Issues in the Middle East

Both clusters are in agreement that Turkey sets a role model for Middle Eastern countries and that Kurds should be prevented from establishing their own state in Syria; however, the “proactive” agree with these statements at higher rates. The two clusters also agree that friendly relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq should be maintained. Yet, this statement is supported at higher rates by the “concerned”.

The clusters prefer opposite camps when inquired about the statements, “Turkey should make peace with Assad if necessary” and “Turkey should engage in military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk”. While the “proactive” are against making peace with Assad and in favor of engaging in military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk, the “concerned” are in favor of making peace with Assad and oppose engaging in military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk.



Issues in the Middle East



- Kurds should be prevented from establishing their own state in Syria.
- Maintaining friendly relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq is the right thing to do.
- Turkey should make peace with Assad if necessary.




2.9 Evaluation and Comments

Interest, knowledge and nationalism

Expectedly, people's level of interest in and knowledge of foreign policy matters play an important role in shaping their perspectives and opinions on foreign policy. In other words, interest in and knowledge of foreign policy matters makes a difference in opinion, rather than age, income level or place of residence. Naturally, political preference and level of nationalism also play a role.

Our second finding is that nationalism moves along the Turkish-Kurdish axis, instead of varying by demographic and economic group. The graph generated by *multiple correspondence analysis* demonstrates this clearly. The graph reflecting the outcome of this analysis, which we call the "topographic map of society", indicates that differentiation in public opinion is best explained by two axes. The first is the Turkish-Kurdish axis (horizontal axis), and the second (vertical axis) is the socioeconomic development axis. As observed in the graph and as analyzed in detail in the related section earlier, intensity of nationalism moves along the Turkish-Kurdish axis, rather than level of socioeconomic development. In other words, people with different educational attainment or income levels, and political preferences follow a parallel course in terms of nationalist feelings.





Impact of politics on opinion and the limits politics in shaping opinions

As noted above, political preference is a significant indicator of opinion on foreign policy.

This should be viewed as natural since the public is not immune to the effects of the ensuing political polarization, and the attitude and actions of politicians. It is not possible to presume that the provided responses are independent opinions of the respondents that are not influenced by the dominant political discourse on foreign policy, in an intensifying political atmosphere during the last five years and by the imminent threat of entering a war.

Therefore, although voters have a relatively low level of interest in and knowledge of foreign policy matters, it looks like their opinions on dangers and opportunities Turkey is facing are significantly influenced by the dominant political discourse.

For example, 20 percent of Ak Parti voters see Turkey as a 'superpower' and 30 percent as a 'major power', while only 10 percent of CHP voters in total are in agreement with either of these statements. MHP voters are similar to Ak Parti voters in their responses, while 30 percent of HDP voters provided the response of 'none'.

On the other hand, the findings indicate that there is a limit to the capacity of politics and politicians influence, steer and manipulate the public opinion. For example, there is a broad consensus on the opinion that the Treaty of Lausanne should not be used for the purpose of gaining leverage in domestic politics. 58 percent of Ak Parti voters, 84 percent of CHP voters, 69 percent of MHP voters and 54 percent of HDP voters agree that the Treaty of Lausanne should not be used towards gains in domestic politics.

In summary, while it is true to that we observe a social polarization on the topic of opportunities for Turkey in the arena of foreign policy, we also see that different groups in society think along similar lines in terms of their threat perception.

Society strikes a balance in one way or another.

The public sees both economic power as the most important factor in foreign policy and military power as the most important indicator of a country's strength. In this case, these two opinions are not in contradiction, but are compatible with each other. The public is generally most in favor of a foreign policy based on diplomacy, but also emphasizes the importance of military power for a country.

60 percent would like Turkey to become more like a Western country. At the same time, more than half of the public also thinks that Turkey should strive to become the leader of Muslim countries or the Middle East.

Domestic concerns and regional aspirations

31 percent of the voters think of becoming the leader of Muslim countries, and 21 percent believe becoming the leader of the Middle East represent an opportunity for Turkey. The corresponding rates among Ak Parti voters are higher; half of them see becoming the leader of Muslim countries, and one fourth perceive becoming the leader of the Middle East as an opportunity. The Western powers' perceived




intention to partition Turkey forms the basis of all voters', and particularly Ak Parti voters' definition of dangers awaiting Turkey. The West is working towards breaking Turkey up, according to 40 percent of Ak Parti voters and 43 percent of MHP voters. This concern is shared by 25 percent of CHP voters. On the other hand, 77 percent of Ak Parti voters and 55 percent of MHP voters desire Turkey to become the leader of Muslim countries or of the region. In addition, 56 percent of Ak Parti voters, 62 percent of MHP voters and 25 percent of CHP voters support a prospective military operation to Mosul and Kirkuk.

The fear that the Western countries want to break Turkey up and the claim for Turkey's leadership of Muslim countries or the Middle East are compatible with each other in the public opinion. This fear is not expressed as a tendency for self-insulation, but a claim for regional leadership.

Opinion on the Kurdish is an important indicator

Both the impact of the conflicts in the Middle East on the Kurdish issue and the outlook on the process of the Kurds' achieving statehood in Iraq and Syria underline the fact that one of the major problems of Turkish foreign policy stems from the outlook on the Kurdish and the Kurdish issue.

As shown in the multi-correspondence analysis below, and as observed in many other foreign policy related issues, positions and attitudes are mainly shaped or oriented along the Turkish-Kurdish axis.



The rate of those who agree with the opinion that a war in the Middle East would have a negative impact on the Kurdish issue is 48 percent among Ak Parti voters, 60 percent among CHP voters, 52 percent among MHP voters and 55 percent among HDP voters. Nearly half of all party voter groups are in consensus about this risk.

On the other hand, half of the public is against the establishment of a Kurdish state in Syria and improving relations with the Kurdish government in Northern Iraq. Therefore, differentiation in public opinion both takes place with reference to political polarization, along the Turkish-Kurdish axis, and originates from the outlook on the Kurdish issue.



3. RESEARCH ID

3.1. Overall Description of the Survey

The surveys that this report is based on has been conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Arařtırma ve Danıřmanlık Ltd. řti.).

The field survey was conducted on 5-6 November 2016. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, as observed on the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and to monitor trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey. The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.3 at 99 percent confidence level.

3.2. The Sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the data on population and educational attainment level of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS), and the results of the November 1st 2015 General Election in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 2552 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 152 neighborhoods and villages of 118 districts - including central districts - of 31 provinces.

Provinces visited	31
Districts visited	118
Neighborhoods/villages visited	152
Number of respondents	2552

Among the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas on age and gender were enforced.

Age group	Female	Male
Between 18-32	3 respondents	3 respondents
Between 33-48	3 respondents	3 respondents
49 or above	3 respondents	3 respondents



	Level 1 (12 regions)	Provinces visited
1	İstanbul	İstanbul
2	Western Marmara	Edirne, Tekirdağ
3	Aegean	Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya
4	Eastern Marmara	Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli, Uşak
5	Western Anatolia	Ankara, Konya
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri, Sivas
8	Western Black Sea	Samsun, Tokat
9	Eastern Black Sea	Giresun, Trabzon
10	Northeastern Anatolia	Erzurum, Erzincan
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	Malatya, Van, Elazığ
12	Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mardin

The distribution of respondents according to the regions and place of residence is shown in the table below.

	Survey location	Rural	Urban	Metropolitan	Total
1	İstanbul			19.6%	19.6%
2	Western Marmara	0.3%	3.5%	0.7%	4.5%
3	Aegean	2.1%	6.5%	5.4%	14.1%
4	Eastern Marmara	1.4%	2.8%	6.2%	10.4%
5	Western Anatolia		2.0%	7.0%	8.9%
6	Mediterranean	1.8%	5.2%	5.3%	12.3%
7	Central Anatolia	0.7%	2.4%	1.4%	4.5%
8	Western Black Sea	1.9%	3.4%	0.6%	5.9%
9	Eastern Black Sea	1.4%	2.1%		3.6%
10	Northeastern Anatolia	1.5%	1.4%		2.9%
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	1.4%	2.8%	0.7%	4.9%
12	Southeastern Anatolia	2.2%	2.6%	3.5%	8.3%
	Total	14.7%	34.8%	50.5%	100.0%



4. FREQUENCY TABLES

4.1. Profile of the Respondents

Gender	Percent
Female	44.3
Male	55.7
Total	100.0

Age	Percent
Between 18-32	34.0
Between 33-48	37.1
49 or above	28.8
Total	100

Educational attainment level	Percent
Illiterate	4.5
Literate without degree	2.2
Primary school graduate	30.0
Secondary school degree	16.9
High school degree	29.1
University degree	15.8
Masters / PhD	1.5
Total	100

Household size	Percent
1 - 2 person(s)	18.6
3 - 5 person(s)	65.7
6 - 8 person(s)	13.2
9 people or more	2.4
Total	100

Lifestyle cluster	Percent
Modern	25.8
Traditional conservative	45.7
Religious conservative	28.5
Total	100



Employment status	Percent
Civil servant	5.0
Private sector	6.4
Worker	10.5
Small retailer	8.5
Merchant/businessman	1.3
Self-employed	2.8
Farmer, agriculturist, stock breeder	4.4
Employed, other	5.8
Retired	12.7
Housewife	26.9
Student	9.6
Unemployed	4.7
Disabled	1.4
Total	100

Head cover status	Percent
No head cover	26.1
Headscarf	45.7
Turban	12.4
Chador	1.0
Bachelor male	14.8
Total	100.0

Ethnic identity	Percent
Turkish	79.0
Kurdish	14.3
Zaza	1.1
Arab	2.6
Other	3.0
Total	100.0



Religion/sect	Percent
Sunni Muslim	93.7
Alevi Muslim	4.2
Other	2.2
Total	100.0

Level of religiosity	Percent
Non-believer	3.1
Believer	24.9
Religious	56.9
Pious	15.2
Total	100.0

Economic class	Percent
Lower	17.0
Lower middle	33.8
New middle	26.5
Upper	22.7
Total	100.0

Do you own a car in your household?	Percent
Yes	47.4
No	52.6
Total	100.0

Monthly household income	Percent
TRY 700 or less	4.2
TRY 701 - 1200	10.4
TRY 1201 - 2000	47.2
TRY 2001 - 3000	20.5
TRY 3001 - 5000	13.2
TRY 5001 or more	4.5
Total	100.0



TV channel preferred to watch the news	Percent
Does not watch	4.4
A Haber	8.5
ATV	16.5
CNN Turk	4.2
Fox TV	15.2
Haberturk	3.6
Halk TV	2.0
IMC TV	0.3
Kanal 7	1.9
Kanal D	6.3
Kanaltürk	0.2
NTV	4.0
Roj/Nuçe/Sterk	1.1
Show TV	0.1
Star	5.2
TRT	3.6
Ulusal	16.2
Local channels	0.6
Total	100.0

Type of housing	Percent
Squatter / apartment without external plastering	7.7
Single family, traditional house	32.2
Apartment	51.5
Housing complex	8.5
Very luxurious apartment, villa	0.2
Total	100



4.2. Theme of the Month: Foreign Policy

What is the most important threat for Turkey?	Percent
Falling out with the U.S.	24.7
Breakdown of relations with the European Union	5.8
Intention of Western governments to break up Turkey	32.9
Entering the war in Iraq and Syria	31.8
Falling out with Russia	4.7
Total	100.0

What is the most important opportunity for Turkey that could be to its advantage?	Percent
Becoming a member of the European Union	29.1
Reestablishing its Misak-ı Milli borders	15.7
Becoming the leader of Muslim countries	34.7
Becoming the leader of the Middle East	20.6
Total	100.0

Which of the following organization is Turkey a member of?	Percent
European Union	9.6
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	10.9
United Nations	35.2
G-20	43.1
NATO	71.0
Shanghai Five	3.0

Please indicate the extent of your interest in foreign policy on a scale of 1 to 5.	Percent
Very uninterested	27.3
Uninterested	21.0
Neither interested nor uninterested	28.1
Interested	13.0
Very interested	10.7
Total	100.0



How successful do you find Ak Parti's foreign policy performance?	Percent
Very unsuccessful	13.6
Unsuccessful	14.6
Neither successful nor unsuccessful	24.5
Successful	31.7
Very successful	15.6
Total	100.0

In your opinion, which of the following is more suitable and more effective in foreign policy?	Percent
Employ diplomatic methods	77.1
Exercise military power	22.9
Total	100.0

In your opinion, which of the following defines Turkey in terms of its global power?	Percent
Superpower	11.9
Major power	19.3
Regional power	34.1
Mid-size power	24.7
None	10.0
Total	100.0

I am afraid of the war in Iraq and Syria to spread into Turkey.	Percent
Strongly disagree	13.4
Disagree	5.5
Somewhat disagree	7.6
Somewhat agree	8.1
Agree	15.1
Strongly agree	50.3
Total	100.0



Military power is the best indicator of a country's strength.	Percent
Strongly disagree	10.4
Disagree	7.6
Somewhat disagree	12.5
Somewhat agree	13.2
Agree	18.4
Strongly agree	37.9
Total	100.0

If we had not gotten involved in the problems of countries elsewhere in the world, the state of our country would have been much better.	Percent
Strongly disagree	17.5
Disagree	9.2
Somewhat disagree	11.1
Somewhat agree	9.6
Agree	15.1
Strongly agree	37.6
Total	100.0

I am afraid that entering this potential war would affect both me and my family.	Percent
Strongly disagree	14.1
Disagree	5.0
Somewhat disagree	6.5
Somewhat agree	6.7
Agree	15.0
Strongly agree	52.6
Total	100.0



Which country or countries do you think Turkey should act in coordination with in conducting its foreign policy affairs?	Percent
The U.S. and other Western countries	8.7
European Union countries	14.7
Muslim countries	35.3
Eastern countries such as Russia and China	11.5
Turkic republics	15.4
It should act on its own	14.4
Total	100.0

Turkey must definitely become a member of the European Union.	Percent
Strongly disagree	27.5
Disagree	11.1
Somewhat disagree	15.8
Somewhat agree	10.0
Agree	11.3
Strongly agree	24.3
Total	100.0

The U.S. is approaching Turkey with benign intentions.	Percent
Strongly disagree	58.6
Disagree	16.9
Somewhat disagree	11.7
Somewhat agree	4.2
Agree	3.8
Strongly agree	4.8
Total	100.0

Turkey must definitely continue to be a NATO member.	Percent
Strongly disagree	12.0
Disagree	6.5
Somewhat disagree	18.4
Somewhat agree	12.7
Agree	19.2
Strongly agree	31.2
Total	100.0



Diplomatic relations should be established with Armenia and the border should be opened.	Percent
Strongly disagree	36.6
Disagree	14.4
Somewhat disagree	15.3
Somewhat agree	10.1
Agree	10.6
Strongly agree	13.0
Total	100.0
Political, military and economic cooperation with the U.S. should be strengthened.	Percent
Strongly disagree	29.2
Disagree	12.6
Somewhat disagree	16.9
Somewhat agree	10.5
Agree	13.1
Strongly agree	17.8
Total	100.0
Political, military and economic cooperation with Russia should be strengthened.	Percent
Strongly disagree	16.5
Disagree	9.9
Somewhat disagree	16.4
Somewhat agree	12.5
Agree	17.9
Strongly agree	26.8
Total	100.0
The U.S. is acting with hostility by not extraditing Fethullah Gulen and by helping the Kurds in Syria.	Percent
Strongly disagree	8.9
Disagree	4.5
Somewhat disagree	7.2
Somewhat agree	6.2
Agree	13.9
Strongly agree	59.3
Total	100.0



The mark of success in foreign policy is not military victory, but economic development.	Percent
Strongly disagree	5.7
Disagree	3.8
Somewhat disagree	10.7
Somewhat agree	11.1
Agree	19.1
Strongly agree	49.5
Total	100.0

What is the greatest barrier to peace in the Middle East?	Percent
National governments	8.9
Meddling by foreign countries	36.5
The war over energy resources	29.5
Sectarian and religious war	25.2
Total	100.0

How would a war in the Middle East affect the Kurdish issue?	Percent
Positively	14.7
No effect	33.6
Negatively	51.8
Total	100.0

Turkey is a role model for Middle Eastern countries.	Percent
Strongly disagree	9.2
Disagree	5.6
Somewhat disagree	11.1
Somewhat agree	12.5
Agree	20.7
Strongly agree	40.9
Total	100.0



Turkey should play a role in the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian problem.	Percent
Strongly disagree	14.0
Disagree	8.9
Somewhat disagree	11.7
Somewhat agree	12.0
Agree	17.5
Strongly agree	36.0
Total	100.0

Turkey should engage in military intervention to Mosul and Kirkuk.	Percent
Strongly disagree	25.4
Disagree	9.1
Somewhat disagree	12.5
Somewhat agree	9.8
Agree	14.5
Strongly agree	28.8
Total	100.0

Turkey should make peace with Assad if necessary.	Percent
Strongly disagree	39.8
Disagree	12.6
Somewhat disagree	13.3
Somewhat agree	8.4
Agree	10.7
Strongly agree	15.2
Total	100.0

Maintaining friendly relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq is the right thing to do.	Percent
Strongly disagree	24.7
Disagree	11.7
Somewhat disagree	13.4
Somewhat agree	10.5
Agree	14.5
Strongly agree	25.3
Total	100.0



Kurds should be prevented from establishing their own state in Syria.	Percent
Strongly disagree	17.0
Disagree	7.2
Somewhat disagree	9.9
Somewhat agree	7.7
Agree	12.7
Strongly agree	45.5
Total	100.0

It is the right thing to do for Turkey and Israel to make peace.	Percent
Strongly disagree	24.6
Disagree	12.7
Somewhat disagree	19.4
Somewhat agree	12.2
Agree	14.0
Strongly agree	17.1
Total	100.0

The Treaty of Lausanne should not be used for political purposes.	Percent
Strongly disagree	11.1
Disagree	4.7
Somewhat disagree	10.5
Somewhat agree	8.4
Agree	14.2
Strongly agree	51.2
Total	100.0

Who is the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs currently?	Percent
Correct answer	38.6
Incorrect answer	61.4
Total	100.0



Please indicate how nationalist you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 10.	Percent
1	6.2
2	1.5
3	3.4
4	3.3
5	12.3
6	7.0
7	10.9
8	13.6
9	6.6
10	35.3
Total	100.0

Are there any soldiers or military officers in your family or among your close relatives?	Percent
Yes	32.5
No	67.5
Total	100.0

Which following country would you like Turkey to resemble?	Percent
United States of America	10.8
European Union countries	42.5
British Commonwealth of Nations	6.4
Russia	3.5
Muslim countries	4.1
Other countries	7.1
There is no such country	25.5
Total	100.0



5. GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements”, are shortly identified as “believers” in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms.

Term	Definition
Alevi Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim
Lower middle class:	Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car
Lower class:	Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment
Arab:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab
Headscarf:	A woman who does not cover her head or a man with a headscarf or whose spouse does not cover her head with a headscarf
Chador:	A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a chador
Religious:	A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion
Religious conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative
Traditional conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative
Ideological:	A person who states a party as the closest to his/her political view
Believer:	A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely
Non-believer:	A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion
Urban area:	Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Rural area:	Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Kurdish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish
Leader follower:	A person who states that he/she trusts in or favors the leader of a certain party



Metropolitan:	Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)
Modern:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern
No cover:	A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head
Non-partisan:	A person who states that none of the parties represent him/her
Pious:	A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely
Late-decider:	A person who states that he/she makes a decision based on the election campaigns
Sunni Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim
Partisan:	A person who states that he/she/they always vote for that party
Turban:	A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a turban
Turkish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish
Upper class:	Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment
New middle class:	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment and which own a car
Zaza:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)	It is a data analysis technique for nominal categorical data, used to detect and represent underlying structures in a data set. It is used for applying Correspondence Analysis (CA) to large data sets with more than two variables. MCA was shaped with the work of mathematician and linguist Jean-Paul Benzécri in 1960s, and MCA-related studies and publications proliferated after the translation of research on Jean-Paul Benzécri and MCA in the 1980s and the use of this method by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.

5.1. Questions and Response Options

Which of the three lifestyle clusters below do you feel you belong to?

Modern

Traditional conservative

Religious conservative



Do you cover your head or does your spouse cover her head when going out of your home? How do you cover your head?

No head cover

Headscarf

Turban

Chador

Bachelor male

We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you belong to?

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

Which religion or sect do you feel you belong to?

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

Which of the below describes you in terms of piety?

A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely

Which of the reasons below influence/determine your political preferences?

I/we always vote for that party.

It is the party closest to my political view.

I trust/favor its leader.

None of these parties represent me.

I make a decision based on the election campaigns.

Total



Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample)

Rural

Urban

Metropolitan

Economic classes (determined by using household size, household income and car ownership)

Lower class

Lower middle

New middle

Upper class