

KONDA

**November'15
Barometer**

Political and Social Survey Series

**Analysis of the Results of the November
1st Election and the Electorate**

KONDA
ARAŐTIRMA VE DANIŐMANLIK



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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This report comprises of the section on ballot box analyses from the November'15 Barometer report that KONDA Research and Consultancy shares with its clients as part of its Political and Social Research Series.

There were almost no institutions or persons that did not receive the results of the 2015 General Elections of November 1st as a surprise, or that could predict the ballot results accurately. The outcome was surprising for all. No one could foresee that Ak Parti would increase its votes by 9 points in 5 months, as compared to the last elections. Over 5 million voters changed their preference in the 5 months that lapsed since the last elections, and no one noticed, or even felt, this change beforehand.

As KONDA, we too should have been able to measure or predict this, but we failed. After November 1st, we began and are still continuing an investigation as to why we were faced with such a situation and what we could do to avoid it in the future, with a team that also includes academics. The initial results from this investigation was shared with our clients in the report section titled "Why did the surveys fail?"

However, on the whole, we have once again seen that politics, the society, and elections can always have an element of 'surprise', regardless of how much measurement and prediction systems develop.

As KONDA, our goal is to understand the everchanging structure that we call 'society'. Understanding political preferences and electoral forecasts constitute an important part of this effort. However, we also believe that to conceptualize society based only on political preferences does injustice. We also need to take into account that political polarization in Turkey has in recent years evolved into social polarization.

November 1st elections have not only caused us worry about our capacity to understand society, but also reminded us of the need to develop new methods, models, and systems towards this end. If we are to see the electoral body as a human composed of approximately 56 million cells, we need to recognize that we have both accurate as well as false assumptions regarding this person. If we are to understand the behavioral patterns of this person composed of 56 million cells, we need to understand and conceptualize not only the behavioral pattern of each individual cell, but also their interaction with each other. Therefore, as an institution that had a 7-point error in its election prediction, KONDA views the November elections as an opportunity to re-examine both itself and the paradigms with which it works. The report that you are reading has clues as to the beginnings of this process.

In our analysis, you will have the opportunity to examine in depth the political course that has been developing since 2002, the effect of participation rates, the differential performances of political parties in regions, cities, and districts, the expression of these differentials on geographical maps and the voter transition. As in our June 7th election report, we have included in our report the ecological inference method used to calculate voter transitions between elections by the Çilek Ağacı team's special



contribution. In addition, specifically for this report, cartograms, which are maps that show geographical areas scaled in size according to population size, have been used, providing a different means of explanation.

When we look at all these extensive ballot box analyses, the most prominent finding is that Ak Parti has increased its votes broadly down to the smallest administrative unit. We can understand that Ak Parti has attracted MHP's votes on the one hand, and those from HDP and other smaller parties on the other. Additionally, voters who did not go to the polls at the previous elections, from all parties, have votes for Ak Parti this time around. Contrary to many claims expressed following the November elections, HDP voters have not switched to Ak Parti. In the June elections, potential Ak Parti voters had not gone to the polls, and this time around, voter participation among HDP and MHP supporters has gone down. Thus, in the latest elections, Ak Parti managed to attract votes from the other parties, and also the decreased participation rates among other parties' voters worked to Ak Parti's benefit.

This report details the state of political scene that emerged from the November elections with all its dimensions in a clear manner, as part of our effort to 'understand society' which, we have once again recognized, is of infinite depth. We hope that it will prove illuminative for you, our readers, too.



2. ELECTION RESULTS

The results of the June 7th General Election required a coalition government. However, the attempts to form a coalition proved unsuccessful after various meetings between the parties, and a snap general election was called for November 1st, 2015. It is not possible to make a conclusive claim about how developments during the 5-month period between the two elections has affected the outcome of the snap election. Nevertheless, a comparison of the election results with those from previous elections reveals a more descriptive outlook.

The table below presents the distribution of the votes based on the number of voters in the last four elections.

	2015 GE* 1/11	2015 GE 7/06	2014 LE 30/03	2011 GE 12/10
	million			
Voters	55.36	54.5	52.7	52.8
Total votes cast	48.52	47.2	46.9	43.9
Valid votes	47.83	45.9	45.1	42.9
Ak Parti	23.66	18.7	20.5	21.3
CHP	12.1	11.4	12.5	11.1
MHP	5.69	7.5	6.9	5.5
HDP/BDP	5.14	6	2.7	2
Other	1.22	2.1	2.4	2.4

**This report was prepared before the official results were declared by the Supreme Electoral Council; therefore, the unofficial results and the data released by news agencies were used for the purposes of this report.*

The increase in the total number of Ak Parti voters is one of the most striking findings presented in the table. It is also noteworthy that the number of voters who vote for the small parties that are not represented in the parliament decreased by about 50 percent.

Over the 5-month period between June and November, Ak Parti attracted about 5 million additional voters. On the other hand, MHP lost 2 million votes and HDP lost more than half a million votes. The electoral shift that occurred in such a short period of time may be described as an exceptional situation which is not even common in the relevant literature.

In order to get a better grasp of the electoral shifts and the changes in electorate profiles, we will endeavor to examine the figures and the rates from different perspectives. The table above represents only one of these perspectives. According to this, the rate of voters who did not go to the polls did not change significantly. However, as it will




discussed in the following sections of the report, the unanticipated outcome of the November 1st General Election is due to low voter turnout among different party voters, while turnout rate for certain parties was higher than anticipated.

Party	Elections			
	Nov 1st, 2015 GE		Jun 7th, 2015 GE	
	Share of the vote (percentage)	Number of MPs	Share of the vote (percentage)	Number of MPs
Ak Parti	49.5	317	40.9	258
CHP	25.3	136	25.0	132
MHP	11.9	40	16.3	80
HDP	10.8	58	13.1	80
Other	2.5	-	4.7	-

2.1. Election Results and Distribution of the Votes

The results of the elections since the 2002 General Election, after which Ak Parti first came to power, are presented in the table below.

Elections results: 8 elections in 13 years



Even this graph alone presents many important findings. We have been emphasizing the downward trend in Ak Parti votes during the period from the second half of 2014 until the June 7th General Election. This trend was not only observed in a particular segment or group, and it was prevalent among the entire society. After all, the downward trend observed in the Barometer researches materialized when Ak Parti's



share of the vote decreased by 9 points in the June 7th General Election. However, Ak Parti recovered its votes almost by 9 points in the November 1st General Election which was held 5 months later.

The graph reflects the story of Ak Parti

After a turbulent process including the February 28th memorandum, the Marmara earthquake, 2000 and 2001 financial crises; the 2002 General Election resulted in the ejection of traditional parties from the parliament, while Ak Parti took office by receiving 34 percent of the votes, which secured an unanticipated number of MPs for the party. Due to the electoral threshold, 45 percent of the votes could not be represented in the parliament. Consequently, Ak Parti had the opportunity to form a powerful government, thanks to the social trauma of the time and the elevated excitement driven by the party's reformist cadre with a traditional Islamist background.

The party succeeded in appealing to a large segment of society, which was trapped in an experience that was more complicated due to countless local and global dynamics, such as the economic success achieved during 2002-2007 and the social policies adopted, extensive domestic migration after September 12th 1980, metropolitanism and the changes in daily life practices. In addition, Ak Parti's ability and capability to mobilize an electoral shift towards the party attracted a substantial amount of voters to Ak Parti.

The rise of Ak Parti continued with the 2004 Local Elections and the 2007 General Elections. Particularly the outcome of the 2007 General Election, in which Ak Parti received 47 percent of the votes, came as a surprise to many. Ak Parti succeeded to consolidate the right-wing and central right-wing voters.

In the 2009 Local Elections, which was held with the global and national financial crisis in the background, Ak Parti received less than 40 percent of the votes with an 8-point decrease in its votes. It is possible to suggest that until the 2009 Local Elections, Ak Parti voters did not manifest an ideological orientation like CHP and MHP voters, who are more likely to be ideologically oriented in general. The decline of Ak Parti's votes in the 2009 Local Elections implied that Ak Parti's core voter group is made up of a comprehensive coalition whose members behave rationally and make decisions based on economic factors. The impact of the financial crisis on the 2009 Local Elections implies that this could be the main driver of the vote loss experienced by Ak Parti during this period. The total share of the small parties continued to decrease in each subsequent election held before 2009. Indeed, the increase in Ak Parti's votes was mainly due to the decrease in the preference for the small parties. Small parties recovered a certain portion of their votes, thanks to the local dynamics of the 2009 Local Elections, and they were able to make their presence felt again in certain regions. However, they lost one third of their votes in the following elections.

After all of the achievements in economy and public services, it was time to resolve the longstanding political and social problems in the country for the first time. The



majority of society also held similar expectations. 58 percent of “yes” votes in the 2010 Constitutional Referendum encouraged Ak Parti towards a new constitution.

Due to its declining votes due to the impact of the financial crisis, as well as the resurgence of the traditional military-based establishment to make its influence on politics felt again, the administrative cadre of Ak Parti headed towards a strategy where they steered their voters with the intention to create an “Ak Parti electorate”, and established a line of defense at the grassroots. As a consequence of a political style normalizing and legitimizing an aggressive and contentious political discourse, every debate led to increasingly intensified polarization.

In the 2011 General Election, Ak Parti received half of all votes. Politics in Turkey increasingly became trapped into identities and polarization. The opposition joined Ak Parti in intensifying the existing polarization rather than ameliorating the situation. Despite the implementation of some constructive steps such as the formation of the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, the call for proposals on the constitution from NGOs and citizens, the commission and the parliament achieved no results because of a political manner that looked like it was more interested in failing than succeeding. Furthermore, the domestic financial crisis continued to have its impact felt, both globally and locally.

As a result, Turkey has become stuck in the middle income trap and a mediocre democracy. As the country failed to overcome this trap and the associated political problems became more tangible, Ak Parti leaned on a discourse based on polarization and religious identity. During the third term of Ak Parti, concerns about restrictions on freedom and modern lifestyle have increased greatly among certain segments of society. Although some classified such concerns as part of a plot against the government, while all public institutions are under the close control of the central government. The Gezi Park Protests, which broke out in mid-2013, were also rooted in these concerns. Erdoğan and Ak Parti described the protests as an organized uprising against the government and drew a clear line between ‘their supporters’ and ‘their opponents’.

5 months after the Gezi Park Protests, and only 3 months before the 2014 Local Elections, the December 17th-25th operations and the allegations of corruption, which were later understood to be driven by the Gülen movement, hit the headlines. Erdoğan was able to identify and formulate a new enemy in the eyes of his voters. Ak Parti and Erdoğan defined the Gülen movement followers who were staffed in judicial institutions and security forces as the “parallel state”, a “betrayal organization” and a “terrorist group,” refusing the charges alleged to them by Gülen movement followers by taking a firm stand. Anticipations that the allegations of corruption would affect the outcome of the elections turned out to be premature misjudgments. Ak Parti received 45 percent of the votes in the local elections held in March 2014. Due to the politically polarized atmosphere, local dynamics did not play a major role in determining the outcome of the 2014 Local Elections. Local parties failed to increase their votes, and once again MHP’s and CHP’ votes remained more or less at the same rates.



In these elections, different fractions of Kurdish politics united to enter the election as a party for the very first time under HDP. The Presidential Election held in August of the same year was the first time when HDP showed a significant presence. HDP's co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş received 10 percent of the votes, implying that the Kurdish or in other words HDP could very well contest the election as a party. And so they did. However, whether HDP could pass the electoral threshold or not was quite critical for the outcome of the election for all parties in the parliament, as it could change the outlook in the parliament drastically. Erdoğan was elected president with 52 percent of the votes. However, surveys indicated a decline in the preference rate of Ak Parti under Davutoğlu. Particularly the Kurdish, more than half of whom have voted for Ak Parti in the past, started to voice that they were going to vote for HDP. The downward trend in Ak Parti's share of the vote was observed among all segments in society. Eventually, the surveys proved to be on target, and Ak Parti lost 9 points of its votes. Meanwhile, HDP's share of the vote was 3 points above the threshold, and HDP secured 18 seats more than MHP, which actually received 3 points higher than HDP. MHP voters are more dispersed throughout the country than HDP voters, but MHP was not prevalent enough at the provincial level to secure more seats than HDP, due to the D'Hondt method used in determining MPs at the local level. Meanwhile, CHP's share of the vote remained around 24-26 percent.

The outcome of the election necessitated a coalition. Erdoğan, who was not pleased with the outcome, was not hopeful that the coalition attempts would conclude with success, and he speculated that a repeat election could be held. Red lines were in the foreground during the coalition negotiations which failed to produce a positive result. In the meantime, violence dominated the agenda once again. PKK opted for a recourse to terrorism and bombs started to explode. Consequently, operations against terrorists were launched, followed by detonation of stronger bombs. In summary, a vicious cycle was initiated. As conflict spread into urban areas for the first time, which has significant implications, the perception of society on violence moved onto a new level. Coalition talks collapsed amongst the turmoil, and a snap general election was called for November 1st. The outcome of the snap election held 5 months later proved to be dramatically different than the one before.

Ak Parti recovered its votes over the 5-months

Although the majority of research companies stated that the outcome of the elections would not be quite different than the previous one, Ak Parti was able to increase its votes by 9 percent and to secure enough seats in the parliament to form a single-party government.

MHP lost one fourth of its votes

MHP, which has been presenting an upward trend over the last 4 years, lost 4 percent of its votes over the 5 months between the two elections. MHP's vote loss corresponds to more than 1.5 million voters, which in turn is equal to one fourth of MHP's vote potential. Suffice to say, the snap election on November 1st proved to be a failure for MHP.

CHP's votes stabilized around twenty-five percent...



CHP received the same share of the vote in the two subsequent elections. In the following sections of the report, the analyses performed to evaluate electoral shifts by using the ecological inference method indicate that CHP did not lose voters to other parties, but failed to attract voters from other parties.

HDP passed the threshold by 300 thousand votes


HDP lost about 1 million votes between the two elections. Such a loss is quite significant for a party which has reached 6 million votes. If HDP had received 300 thousand votes less, it would have remained below the election threshold, and would not have made it into the parliament.

Preference for small parties diminished further

Only 2.5 percent of the valid votes were cast for parties that are not represented in the parliament. In the previous election, the corresponding rate was 5 percent, and it represented more than 2 million voters. However, in the last election the number of voters who voted for small parties declined to 1 million 200 thousand. Consequently, the parties in the parliament represent 97.5 percent of the voters.

The graph below indicates that Ak Parti’s share of the vote increased by 15 points since 2002 when it first entered the elections. On the other hand, there has been a 29 percent decrease in the votes of small parties in the last 13 years. In other words, over the 13 last years, roughly 15 million voters have become consolidated in Ak Parti by shifting from either one of the four main parties.

Electoral shift in comparison to the November 1st General Election



The graph on the next page presents the political course over the last 13 years, in juxtaposition with the results of KONDA surveys. The graph presents the overall trend calculated by taking the average of the results from 8 elections and using data from more than 50 KONDA surveys.



It is observed in the graph that Ak Parti presented a downward trend until the June 7th General Election, but it was able to recover its votes in a period of 5 months. The 13-year course of the graph also demonstrates how votes of other parties have followed a continuously downward trend.


The graph clearly presents the upward trend of the Kurdish political movement, particularly over the last 2 years, during which Kurdish politics have begun to be identified with HDP.

Based on these findings, it is possible to suggest the following:

- ✓ *Politics in Turkey have been consolidated around four parties over the last couple of decades.*
- ✓ *Voters represented in the parliament have reached 98 percent for the first time in our history.*



13-year Course based on Election Results and KONDA Barometer Data






2.2. Voter Turnout Rates

Voter turnout rate was one of the critical factors that turned the scales in Ak Parti's favor in the November 1st General Election. Before we scrutinize how voter turnout rate in different groups and different geographic regions affected the election results, we would first like to analyze how voter turnout rate changed over time.

As we previously mentioned, 86 percent (47 million 800 thousand voters) of the 55 million 360 thousand registered voters were able to cast a valid vote. Roughly 7 million voters did not to the polls. About 700 thousand votes were invalid.

The graph below indicates that the rate of invalid votes was almost double in the previous election only five months ago.



In the June 7th General Election, about 1.3 million votes were invalid, and more than 500 thousand of these votes were cast in İstanbul. The crowded and confusing ballot design, which listed too many independent candidates may be the reason for the particularly high rate of invalid votes.



One of the highest voter turnout rates in the world

The 87-percent voter turnout rate is quite high in comparison to other countries around the world. Voter turnout rate varies by whether voting is compulsory or not. Among the countries where voting is compulsory, Turkey has the highest voter turnout. Belgium (87 percent) is the only country that has a higher voter turnout rate than Turkey. Although voting is compulsory, 82 percent of Swedish voters and 76 percent of Israeli voters also show up on the election day. Voter turnout rates stand at 54 percent in USA and at 52 percent in Japan. The lowest voter turnout rate, on the other hand, is recorded in Switzerland at 40 percent).¹

Voting is the only option for participation

There are various studies and arguments on why voter turnout rate was so high in the November 1st General Election. After all, we can suggest that elections are the only platform where voters can participate in modern politics. The inadequacy of civil society mechanisms in Turkey, or in other words, the seclusion of society from civil society mechanisms, may provide an explanation to why voter turnout rate is high.


2.2.1. Voter Turnout Rates by Region and District

It is apparent in the graph that voter turnout rate did not change significantly by region. It is striking that voter turnout rate in Central Anatolia and in Northeastern Anatolia has decreased with respect to the previous election. Further in the report, the analyses prepared by the Çilek Ağacı team based on the 'ecological inference' method clearly show that the voter turnout rate among Kurdish HDP voters declined. Even so, the voter turnout rate remained the same in eastern regions. Thus, we can draw the conclusion that while HDP voters tended to refrain from voting, a higher rate of Ak Parti voters also went to the polls.

¹ <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/06/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries>




Change in voter turnout rate by region



At this point, it will be helpful to take a look at the map below that presents findings by district, in order to understand their implications more clearly. In the map, darker greens signify increased voter turnout rate in the November 1st General Election. When we analyze voter turnout rates by district, we observe that voter turnout in İstanbul, Western and Eastern Marmara and the Aegean is above the average, and voter turnout in Northeastern, Eastern and Southeastern regions is below the average. Voter turnout rate was higher than 90 percent in 158 districts, and it was below 80 percent in 99 districts.




November 1st, 2015 General Election Voter Turnout by District



Voter turnout rate remained the same, but the geographic distribution of non-voters changed

In comparison to the general election held only 5 months ago, voter turnout rate in Turkey has increased by 1.1 points. The district-based map prepared by the Çilek Ağacı team demonstrates the difference between the voter turnout rates in the previous election and in, the November 1st General Election.

Changes in Voter Turnout Rate





It is once again evident in the map that voter turnout declined throughout the entire Central Anatolian region. This finding may indicate that the 2-point decrease in HDP votes occurred due to the decreased voter turnout rate rather than an electoral shift. In the following sections of the report, we will present other findings that reinforce this finding.

2.3. Rate and Distribution of Invalid Votes

The key factor that sets the November 1st General Election apart from the June 7th General Election is the incredibly low rate of invalid votes in the second election. The table below presents the number and the rate of invalid votes in all of the elections held during the multi-party period. The rate of invalid votes usually varies between 3 to 4.5 percent, while 2.9 percent of the votes were invalid in the June 7th General Election. On the other hand, only 1.4 percent of the votes were invalid in the November 1st General Election. As it will be discussed in detail in the following section, **the decline in the number of invalid votes is one of the factors that led to the unexpected increase in Ak Parti's share of the vote.**

General election	Invalid votes	Invalid votes (%)
1950	249,901	3.1
1954	142,916	1.6
1957	126,405	1.4
1961	384,681	3.7
1965	441,115	4.5
1969	429,681	4.5
1973	500,185	4.5
1977	531,038	3.5
1983	886,852	4.9
1987	631,912	2.6
1991	743,050	3.0
1995	974,476	3.3
1999	1,405,477	4.3
2002	1,239,378	3.9
2007	1,006,602	2.9
2011	1,101,052	2.5
2015 (Jun 7th)	1,329,616	2.9
2015 (Nov 1st)	682,742	1.4


One of the reasons behind the decrease in the number of invalid votes is the significant decrease in the number of independent candidates, probably due to the “the second round” feeling of the snap election. The decrease in the number of independent



candidates enabled a simpler ballot design. Consequently, the areas which voters are supposed to stamp became more clear and visible, which in turn may have led to a lower number of invalid votes due to erroneous stamping.

The analysis of invalid votes by district reveals that the number of invalid votes is higher in certain areas. The rate of invalid votes was higher than 4 percent in 17 districts. Kurdish voters constitute the majority in 11 of these districts (Diyarbakır/Çüngüş-Eğil-Hani-Dicle, Bingöl/Karlıova, Batman/Hasankeyf, Van/Bahçesaray-Gevaş, Siirt/Pervari, Bitlis/Hizan). On the other hand, the rate of invalid votes was 1 percent or less in 80 districts.

November 1st, 2015 General Election
DISTRIBUTION of INVALID VOTES by district



2.4. Prevalence and Performance of Political Parties by Region


As mentioned earlier, several findings indicate the significant role the voter turnout rate played in the shaping the results of the November 1st General Election. It is particularly important to compare the two elections held over the last 5 months. In this sense, it is necessary to analyze the relation between voter turnout and the distribution of the votes. The graphs below demonstrate the voter turnout rate by region and the rate of increase/decrease in a party's share of the vote.



2.4.1. Ak Parti's performance

According to the graph below, the voter turnout rate in İstanbul increased by 2 points (2 percent), while Ak Parti's votes increased by 8 points.

Difference in voter turnout rate and the change in Ak Parti's share of the vote




Ak Parti increased its overall share of the vote by 8.8 points. Even in the Aegean region, where the rate of increase in Ak Parti's votes is the lowest, Ak Parti enjoyed a 6.5-point increase in its votes.

Ak Parti also increased its share of the vote in the three eastern regions. It is particularly remarkable that its share of the vote increased by 14 points in the Northeastern Anatolia.

The graph below presents Ak Parti's share of the vote by region in the last two elections.



The change in Ak Parti's share of the vote by region



Ak Parti's votes are near 40-percent even where it is least favored

This graph reveals that the regions where Ak Parti had a strong or weak performance did not change between the two elections. In other words, Ak Parti received its highest share of the vote in Central Anatolia, in both of the last two elections. Western Marmara, on the other hand, is the region where Ak Parti's share of the vote was the lowest in both elections.


Distribution of Ak Parti's votes is in parallel with distribution of population

The third graph, which enables us to have a better grasp of the outcome of the election by analyzing the findings by region, presents the distribution of Ak Parti voters as well as the rate of valid votes. The purpose of this analysis is to comprehend the overall distribution of party votes in different regions. It is clear in the graph that Ak Parti votes are distributed in parallel with the distribution of valid votes. In other words, Ak Parti's votes move in proportion to valid votes by region in general. When we generate



the same graph for other parties, we can see that only the ruling party has this characteristic.



Distribution of Ak Parti's votes by region



We will now talk about the diagram below to explain each party's performance by province. Turkey's 81 provinces can be divided into four categories based on population. First of all, the total population of İstanbul and Ankara make up one fourth of the total number of voters. The total number of voters in the 9 metropolitan areas with 1-3 million inhabitants is roughly around the same level. Finally, the total number of voters in the remaining 17 metropolitan areas and the total number of voters in the 53 provinces which are not classified as metropolitan areas account for one fourth of the total number of voters. In these four different categories, both population densities and lifestyles are quite different from each other. Thus, this distribution of the votes based on these categories can lead us to important clues.




Distribution of the Votes by the Number of Voters in Provinces




The diagram provides a clear presentation of how provinces are distributed based on their population. The map below is also useful in understanding the geographical location of the provinces under these four categories.

Provinces by number of voters



When we observe how Ak Parti performed in each one of these four categories, it is evident that it is prevalent throughout the country. Ak Parti's share of the vote in each of the four categories based on population density is quite similar to its overall performance in the country. Ak Parti attracted half of the votes in İstanbul, in Ankara and in the 53 less populated provinces.



Further analysis on Ak Parti's share of the vote at the district level lead us to similar findings. The map below illustrates the change in Ak Parti's share of the vote from the June 7th General Election to the November 1st General Election. The districts in red signify a decrease in votes, while the districts in blue indicate the opposite. In the map for Ak Parti, there are no districts in red, or in other words, Ak Parti's votes did not decrease in any of the districts in the snap election.


The map, which shows the change in Ak Parti's share of the vote between the two elections, primarily indicates that the ruling party recovered its votes through the entire country over the last five months.

While analyzing the election performance by district, we can easily observe how prevalent Ak Parti is throughout the entire country. Making an analysis based on the number of districts where a party received less than 10 percent and more than 60 percent of the votes provides us with the opportunity to evaluate the election results from a different perspective. In the graph below, each box corresponds to one district. The boxes colored in lighter shades indicate the districts where the party in question




received less than 10 percent of the votes, and the boxes colored in darker shades indicate the districts where it received more than 60 percent of the votes.

Changes in Ak Parti's Share of the Vote



Ak Parti > 60% in 387 districts



Ak Parti < 10% 23 districts




Ak Parti received more than 60 percent of the votes in 387 of the 970 districts in Turkey. On the other hand, its share of the vote remained below 10 percent in only 23 districts.

2.4.2. CHP's performance

In order to evaluate how well Ak Parti performed, it is necessary to compare its performance against other parties. To begin with, when we analyze CHP's performance by using the same graphs, we do not observe CHP to be as widespread throughout the country.

The rate of increase/decrease in CHP's share of the vote by region indicates that CHP's share of the vote did not change considerably between the two elections. When it comes to the distribution of votes by region, CHP, whose share of the vote or electorate profile did not change in the last two elections, presents a different outlook in comparison to Ak Parti.


Difference in voter turnout rate and the change in CHP's share of the vote



The highest increase in CHP votes was recorded at 1 point, and the highest decrease was recorded at 2 points. In general, not only CHP's share of the vote did not change significantly between the two elections, but also the distribution of its votes by region remained the same. Indeed, the graph below illustrates that the 1-2 point difference in CHP's votes did not make an impact on the general outlook.



The change in CHP's share of the vote by region




CHP enjoyed the highest increase in its votes in Northeastern Anatolia. However, its votes remained below 10 percent in all three eastern regions. Therefore, it would not be accurate to draw any conclusions from these slight increases in CHP's share of the vote. Even so, we can suggest that CHP's positive and mild attitude on the terror attacks or the Ankara bombing got a response in regions densely populated by the Kurdish.

The graph below demonstrates the distribution of CHP's votes by region. In the previous section, we mentioned that the distribution of Ak Parti votes is in parallel with the overall outlook in Turkey. However, the distribution of CHP is different.




Distribution of CHP's votes by region



The graph demonstrated that CHP has very little presence in the eastern regions which have a considerable vote potential. For instance, 8 percent of the voters in Turkey live in Southeastern Anatolia, while only 2 percent of these voters prefer CHP. On the other hand, 14 percent of the voters in Turkey live in the Aegean region, and CHP receives 21 percent of its votes from this region. In general, CHP is not as distributed throughout the country as Ak Parti.

When we analyze the distribution of CHP's votes in different settlement categories, in a similar fashion to the previous section where we analyzed Ak Parti's performance, we come across a pattern that is different than that of the ruling party. Consequently, we can claim that CHP does not only perform better in certain geographic regions such as the coastal areas and the Thrace, but that it receives very low share of the vote in provinces, which are not metropolitan areas and which we can define as the 'rural' parts of the country.





While CHP receives 30 percent of the votes in İstanbul and in Ankara, its share of the vote decreases as the provinces become less populated. In 53 provinces which are not metropolitan areas, CHP's share of the vote stands at 17 percent.

The map that shows the change in the share of the vote by district clearly illustrates CHP's performance, which has remained more or less the same since the previous election. It is evident in the map that CHP was able raise its votes by more than 10 percent in some of the districts in Thrace and Northeastern Anatolia.




Changes in CHP's Share of the Vote



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When we take a look at the number of provinces where CHP received more than 60 percent or less than 10 percent of the votes, we observe that it failed to exceed 10 percent in almost one third of the districts.

CHP > 60% in 16 districts




CHP < 10% in 279 districts



2.4.3. MHP's performance

In the November 1st General Election, MHP lost one fourth of potential votes and failed to increase its votes in any region. MHP also lost votes in regions where its share of the vote is already at its lowest.


Difference in voter turnout rate and the change in MHP's share of the vote



The graph below presents the findings of the graph above in percentage. In Middle Eastern Anatolia, MHP lost 10 percent of its votes, and declined from 27 percent in the June 7th Election to 17 percent in the November 1st General Election. However, the graph that shows MHP's vote loss by region also reveals that MHP's vote loss in Middle Eastern Anatolia corresponds to only 1 percent of its total vote loss.




The change in MHP's share of the vote by region




On the other hand, MHP's share of the vote declined by 5 percent in the Mediterranean region, while it increased in the Mediterranean region. This finding indicates that despite losing votes in the Mediterranean region, MHP also attracted the majority of its votes from the Mediterranean region, thanks to the high number of voters in the region.



Distribution of MHP's votes by region



The graph above showing the distribution of MHP's votes by region reveals that MHP has a presence in a wider geography than CHP and HDP. Without the need for any further analysis, we can anticipate that MHP received a lower share of the votes in Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia in comparison the total number of voters in the region. However, it is clear that MHP's share of the vote is higher in the Mediterranean and Central Anatolia in comparison to the total number of voters in these regions. In İstanbul, MHP's performance can be considered poor, given the high number of voters in the city.




When we analyze MHP's performance by type and population of the provinces, it is not possible to assert that MHP is stronger or weaker in a specific category. On the other hand, the party received its lowest share of the vote in İstanbul and Ankara cumulatively. This was also visible in the previous graph. Indeed, MHP could receive only 14 percent of its votes in İstanbul, although 20 percent of the voters in Turkey reside here.

MHP was able to preserve its votes in few districts


The map that shows the change in MHP's share of the vote is almost monochrome in color. MHP increased its votes only in less than 10 of 970 districts, and its share of the vote declined in the rest of the districts. MHP's vote loss reaches 20 percent in various districts, particularly in Western and Central Anatolia.

Changes in MHP's Share of the Vote



According to the map, MHP preserved its share of the vote in eastern regions which was already low, maintained its votes at the same level in the Aegean and the Mediterranean regions and particularly in the coastal districts, and lost votes in the rest of the districts.

MHP > 60% in 0 districts




MHP < 10% in 352 districts



MHP's share of the vote is not above 60 percent in any of the districts. On the other hand, it received less than 10 percent of the votes in 372 districts. In the June 7th General Election, MHP's share of the vote was below 10 percent in 188 districts. The party was not able to attract more than 60 percent of the votes in any of the districts in June as well.

2.4.4. HDP's performance

The party-by-party analysis implies that HDP failed to maintain its remarkable success in the June 7th General Election.




HDP's vote loss reached significant levels in the three eastern regions where it attracted 53 percent of the votes. An 8-point loss in these regions is quite significant, and also a big risk for HDP that faces the potential risk of falling below the electoral threshold. HDP's vote loss is relatively lower in İstanbul where it received 18 percent of the votes, and in the Mediterranean where it received 10 percent of the votes.

Part of the Kurdish in the region did not go to the polls, while voter turnout among the Kurdish who migrated to metropolitan areas was higher

As mentioned earlier in this section, HDP lost 800 thousand votes in the recent election, and it would have remained below the election threshold should it have lost an additional 300 thousand votes. This could have been the scenario if the party had lost as many votes in the Mediterranean region and İstanbul as it did in eastern regions.




The change in HDP's share of the vote by region




However, the overall outlook in all of the regions reveal that HDP lost votes at all platforms from the regions where its share of the vote is already lower to the regions where it is the strongest. For example, HDP's share of the vote decreased even in the Black Sea region, where it is only able to attract less than 1 percent of the votes.



Distribution of HDP's votes by region



The graph also demonstrates that HDP is prevalent only in certain regions, while it fails to make its presence felt in certain regions, disproportionately to population. For instance, the voters in Southeastern Anatolia correspond to 8 percent of the total number of voters in Turkey, and HDP's share of the vote in the region is around 32 percent. On the other hand, the voters in the Black Sea region account for 14 percent of all voters, while HDP's share of the vote is struggles at 1.7 percent in this region.




When we analyze HDP's share of the vote in different categories of provinces, we can suggest that the party is more successful in smaller provinces than metropolitan areas. HDP attracted 14 percent of the votes in 51 smaller provinces, while its share of the vote was below 9 percent in İstanbul and Ankara. At this point, it should be reminded that the majority of the provinces where HDP received 14 percent of the votes and which have less than 500 thousand inhabitants are located in the eastern part of the country. Although the 53 provinces (shown on page 24) are dispersed throughout the country, the high population in these provinces may have led to the current outlook.

When we take a look at the map that shows the change in HDP's share of the vote by district, the decrease in the party's votes in eastern and southeastern regions is once again visible.




Changes in HDP's Share of the Vote



None of the districts in the map are colored in blue, or in other words, HDP could not increase its votes in any of these districts. It is also remarkable that the decrease in HDP's share of the vote declines and even reaches 0, as we move further into the Southeastern Anatolia. For example, HDP did not lose any votes in districts along the Iraqi border such as Silopi and Çukurca.

HDP > 60% in 60 districts



HDP < 10% in 774 districts



In the graph, HDP failed to make its presence felt in 80 percent of the districts where it received less than 10 percent of the votes. However, the number of districts where HDP attracted more than 60 percent of the votes is higher than that for CHP and MHP. As mentioned earlier, HDP secured 18 more seats than MHP thanks to its prevalence in certain regions.

2.4.5. Evaluation of parties' performances

The findings below are remarkable when we analyze the performances of political parties at different administrative levels:

- Ak Parti has high degree of presence at both provincial and district levels. The party has recovered its votes in all of the regions, and particularly in eastern regions, where its votes declined in the previous election. Ak Parti also achieved a widespread distribution in different provincial categories. In other words, it was not confined in a certain region or area.
- On the other hand, CHP and particularly HDP are stuck into certain regions. HDP received the majority of its votes from the eastern provinces, and CHP attracted the majority of its votes from metropolitan areas and coastal regions.
- HDP lost a significant part of its votes in eastern provinces where it received 53 percent of its votes from. In metropolitan areas, however, HDP's vote loss is less severe. The reason behind HDP's vote loss in eastern provinces is not a potential electoral shift towards Ak Parti. On the contrary, HDP voters appear to have refrained from going to the polls on the election day, which in turn has precipitated a decline in HDP's votes.
- MHP failed to increase its vote in any of the regions, provinces or districts. MHP managed to maintain its share of the vote in the eastern districts where it historically receives few votes.
- Voter turnout rate, which does not appear to have changed significantly from the previous election, played a critical role in the election results. In the general election in June, some of the Ak Parti voters did not go to the polls. In the last election, on the other hand, it was MHP and HDP voters who were more likely to refrain from voting. Voter turnout rate in eastern provinces declined considerably.

Another perspective on how parties performed in districts of different sizes is presented in the section titled "2.6. Mapping the Results of the Election".



2.5. Electoral Shifts / Ecological Inference

As mentioned previously, this reports also includes comments and analyses from other experts. We will present the findings of the analyses prepared by the Çilek Ağacı team by using the ecological inference² method.

We will first take a look at the explanation and the comments provided by the Çilek Ağacı team:

Electoral Shifts

We used the Sankey diagrams in order to visualize the electoral shifts we calculated by using the ecological inference method. According to the results, the following main factors have led to increase in Ak Parti's share of the vote:

- *Electoral shift from MHP towards Ak Parti.*
- *Additional votes Ak Parti attracted from the Saadet & BBP block.*
- *Voters who did not go to the polls in the previous election, but preferred to vote for Ak Parti in the last election.*

Vast majority of the increased valid votes in İstanbul were cast for Ak Parti. In this context, we can suggest that first-time voters did not play a decisive role in the last election, and votes which were invalid in the previous election played a critical in shaping the election results.


The results we obtained from this model are similar to those generated by the mapping method. In addition, the ecological inference model demonstrates that electoral shift from HDP towards Ak Parti is not as extensive as it may appear initially and that the decreased voter turnout rate among HDP voters is the main driver of the decrease in its votes.

Given that the districts where HDP's share of the vote decreased and where voter turnout rate declined are highly correlated, we were skeptical about these findings, and thus we made some further calculations to test its likelihood. Therefore, the graph that shows electoral shifts is intended to be more descriptive and visual than representative of actual figures.

² Ecological inference is the process of drawing conclusions about the behavior of a unit by observing the behavior within an ecology. For the purposes of the analyses presented in this report, ecology is made up of districts and voters correspond to the individual units. In this way, inferences are made about how the preferences of voters changed by looking at the changes in the distribution of the votes in districts.



Electoral Shifts June 7th, 2015 - November 1st, 2015



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Ecological Inference / Electoral Shifts Table								
Share of the vote in the Jun 7th Election	Share of the vote in the Nov 1st Election							
	Ak Parti	MHP	CHP	HDP	Other	Invalid	No show	Total
Ak Parti	99.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	100
CHP	0.1	0.2	99.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	100
MHP	9.6	70.0	1.0	0.4	6.0	2.4	10.7	100
HDP	1.4	0.5	1.3	85.4	0.8	1.7	8.8	100
Other	60.5	2.3	2.4	1.0	18.4	6.0	8.9	100
Invalid	32.8	5.1	3.8	1.6	20.9	23.6	12.4	100
No show	23.9	1.1	1.0	0.5	4.5	2.6	66.5	100
Turkey	42.0	10.2	21.5	9.5	2.8	1.7	12.2	100

Ecological Inference / Electoral Shifts Table								
Share of the vote in the Jun 7th Election	Share of the vote in the Nov 1st Election							
	Ak Parti	MHP	CHP	HDP	Other	Invalid	No show	Total
Ak Parti	81.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.3	34.1
CHP	0.0	0.5	97.1	0.2	1.0	1.6	0.5	21.1
MHP	3.1	95.2	0.7	0.6	29.4	19.0	12.1	13.8
HDP	0.4	0.5	0.7	97.6	2.9	10.6	7.8	10.9
Other	5.8	0.9	0.5	0.4	26.2	13.9	2.9	4.0
Invalid	1.9	1.2	0.4	0.4	18.3	33.7	2.5	2.5
No show	7.7	1.5	0.7	0.7	21.7	20.4	73.9	13.6
Turkey	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0


Various data and analyses we presented in previous sections confirm the validity of the hypotheses put forth by the Çilek Ağacı team. The numbers in the graph above are derived from a calculation which is based on certain assumptions and they may not represent the actual outlook precisely (the method used for calculation is presented in the report prepared by the Çilek Ağacı team). However, it is possible to make sense of the diagram with more detailed explanations.

In the two elections within 5 months, more than 4 million voters changed their preference. The diagram generated by using the ecological inference method reveals to a great extent the parties between which voters swing, and it is necessary to mull over the findings presented in the diagram.



In the evening on November 1st, many thought that Ak Parti attracted voters from MHP and HDP on account of the decline in MHP's and HDP's votes, and the recovery in Ak Parti votes particularly in eastern regions. However, the ecological inference diagram clearly demonstrates that there were no electoral shifts towards the ruling party, particularly from HDP, and that a certain rate of the voters who preferred HDP in the June 7th General Election did not go to the polls this time. The map that showed the changes in the voter turnout rate earlier in this section confirms this finding. The diagram clearly demonstrates the decrease in the voter turnout rates in eastern provinces where HDP received 53 percent of its votes.

Changes in Voter Turnout Rate



Nevertheless, the voter turnout rate alone is not sufficient enough to explain the decrease in HDP's votes and the increase in Ak Parti's share of the vote. Indeed, it is apparent in the diagram that Ak Parti was preferred by a large group who did not go to the polls in the previous election. These two findings enable us to suggest the following conclusion: The overall voter turnout rate has not changed considerably. In the June 7th General Election, voters who are likely to prefer Ak Parti normally refrained from voting. In the November 1st General Election, however, voters who are more likely to vote for HDP and MHP did not go to the polls.



Not the number of non-voters but their profile has changed

In summary, the results of the general election held on November 1st is an outcome of various factors: HDP and MHP voters did not go to the polls, Ak Parti voters showed a very high voter turnout, a certain rate of MHP voters shifted towards Ak Parti, and roughly 1 million voters who would otherwise vote for small parties or independent candidates preferred voting for Ak Parti.

Once again, small parties became consolidated: the majority of BBP and SP voters shifted towards Ak Parti

The share of the vote received by the small parties is another remarkable finding in the diagram. We have often emphasized in past KONDA Barometers how Ak Parti gradually consolidated the small parties (particularly the right-wing small parties) and incorporated them in its own voter base over the last 13 years. However, for the first time with this election, it has become clear that small parties' voters have now become Ak Parti voters. According to the findings of the ecological inference method, more than half of the voters who voted for the small parties in the previous election preferred voting for Ak Parti in the last election. Saadet and Büyük Birlik Partisi voters account for the majority of these voters. Based on our observations in the past, voters who abandon small parties and shift towards Ak Parti do not return.

In summary, the election saw Ak Parti attract more votes than it had lost in the June 7th General Election. There are very few districts where Ak Parti has not increase its votes. Ak Parti not only recovered its votes in all of the geographic regions, but it also attracted voters with very different profiles. In this election, Ak Parti drew voters from small parties as well from MHP and HDP. In addition, it had an advantage over other parties due to the fact that a certain rate of MHP and HDP voters did not go to the polls. After all, there are many factors that enabled Ak Parti to recover the votes that it had lost 5 months ago, in each and every district and region.



2.6. Mapping the Results of the Election


In general, geographic and administrative boundaries are taken into consideration when statistical data is represented on a map. A universal map of Turkey is usually sufficient in reflecting the results we would like to highlight. However, conventional mapping techniques may be inadequate in certain occasions, for instance, when showing the distribution of the votes where the number of voters is of critical importance.

The boundaries of provinces on conventional maps do not change by other parameters, such as population or number of voters. Consequently, provinces with a large land area such as Konya visually dominate the map, regardless of what is being represented on the map. On the other hand, İstanbul, which accommodates one out of every 5 people in Turkey, is confined to a tiny area in visual representations. Thus, the symbols and colors on a conventional map may not necessarily demonstrate the actual distribution of the votes. In order to tackle these issues, *cartograms*, where another mapping variable is substituted for land area or distance, were developed.

In order to offer a solution to the restrictions posed by administrative boundaries and to take a fresh look at the electoral geography, we prepared a series of *cartograms*. These maps were produced by redrawing the boundaries of districts in proportion to the number of voters. We prefer using the districts instead of provinces as the smallest unit for two reasons. First of all, **in contrary to what most people think, the political outlook in Turkey is shaped at the district level rather than the provincial level.** The second reason is to make more accurate measurements by producing maps at the district level. On the cartograms we produced, provinces and districts with the highest number of voters cover the largest area.



Cartogram showing the districts in Turkey resized according to number of voters



The cartogram above was produced by resizing the districts in Turkey in proportion to the number of voters in each district. Our main purpose was to overcome the limitations imposed by the administrative boundaries and to visualize the electoral districts to reflect their actual vote potential. The cartogram above was generated based on these calculations. Darker shades represent districts with higher number of voters. Lighter color shade means smaller number of voters and district size. As anticipated, Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir cover the largest area on the map.

We presented the distribution of the votes by party, in both the November 1st and the June 7th general elections, as well as the changes in the distribution of both on a conventional map and on a *cartogram*.

These maps enable us to observe the political preferences of the voters in populated areas. In addition, we can observe which parties increased/decreased their votes in the more populated districts over the five months, by looking at the maps that show the changes in the distribution of the votes in the June 7th and the November 1st general elections.

At this point, we would like to briefly explain how these maps can be read: On the map showing the distribution of the votes, darker shades indicate a higher share of the vote. On the map showing the changes in votes between the June and November general elections, darker shades of green signify an increase in votes, while darker shades of blue indicate a decrease in votes. The cartogram that represents the same results is presented following the conventional map with administrative boundaries.





2.6.1. Changes in Ak Parti's share of the vote

The maps that show the results of the November 1st General Election reveal that **Ak Parti received a very high share of the vote in almost entire Turkey, with the exception of Southeastern Anatolia.** Ak Parti received its highest share of the vote in the Eastern Black Sea and Central Anatolian regions that reflect the darkest shades. The *cartogram*, on the other hand, demonstrates that, Ak Parti's performance in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir is actually worse than its overall average rate of 49 percent.

The map that shows the changes in share of the vote between the two elections indicates that Ak Parti diverged from the other parties in the last election. **Green is the dominant color on the map, which means that Ak Parti increased its votes almost throughout the country since the June 7th General Election.**





**November 1st, 2015 General Election
Distribution of Ak Parti's Share of the Vote by District**





**June 7th - November 1st, 2015 General Elections
Change in Ak Parti's Share of the Vote by District**






2.6.2. Changes in CHP's share of the vote

When the same maps are prepared by using the data for CHP, it is evident that the party **failed to attract any votes in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, but secured a much high share of the vote in Thrace and along the Aegean coast.** The *cartogram* tells a different story: The districts in Southeastern Anatolia accommodate a lower number of voters, and thus, have lower significance. Therefore, the large gaps in the administrative map lose their importance. The cartogram clearly demonstrates that the votes CHP attracts in big cities play a critical role in its total share of the vote.

On the second pair of maps, which show the changes in CHP's share of the vote by district, it is evident that the party maintained its votes in metropolitan areas, but lost votes in Black Sea and Central Anatolia. The accumulation of the shades of blue on the administrative map indicates to low share of the vote, while the *cartogram* highlights the districts where CHP maintained its votes. The fact that CHP did not lose votes in regions with a high number of voters enabled the party to maintain its votes more or less at the same level.







**November 1st, 2015 General Election
Distribution of CHP's Share of the Vote by District**





**June 7th - November 1st, 2015 General Elections
Change in CHP's Share of the Vote by District**







2.6.3. Changes in MHP's share of the vote

The maps prepared with the data pertaining to MHP demonstrate the same color scheme with those for CHP. MHP attracted a high share of the vote in the Mediterranean districts and particularly around Adana and Osmaniye. Similar to CHP, MHP's share of the vote is quite low in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. However, when we analyze the outlook by looking at the *cartogram*, it is evident that, **unlike CHP, MHP does not receive the majority of its votes from metropolitan areas.**

The maps that show the changes in MHP's share of the vote are quite helpful as they show the big difference that occurred in MHP's share of the vote between June and November. It is evident in the maps that while MHP lost votes all over Turkey, it was more or less able to maintain its share of the vote in İstanbul and İzmir. Although it looks like MHP's share of the vote did not significantly decrease in Southeastern Anatolia and MHP performed “well” in this region, such a perception would be misleading. MHP's share of the vote was already quite low in Southeastern Anatolia, and any analysis of its performance in this region can be rightfully dismissed.







**November 1st, 2015 General Election
Distribution of MHP's Share of the Vote by District**





**June 7th - November 1st, 2015 General Elections
Change in MHP's Share of the Vote by District**







2.6.4. Changes in HDP's share of the vote

Finally, the maps prepared for HDP demonstrate that HDP received the majority of its votes from Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The *cartogram* showing resized districts in Turkey draws attention to a different aspect: **In addition to its prevalence in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, HDP also received a major percentage of its votes from İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir.**

HDP has lost votes mainly in its own region. At this point, the low voter turnout rate in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in the aftermath of the June 7th General Election should be emphasized again. Votes lost in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and in metropolitan areas provide an explanation to the 3-point decline in HDP's share of the vote between the two elections. The prevalence of light blue on the administrative map indicates that the decline in HDP's share of the vote was quite high throughout Turkey. This is a consequence of the fact that HDP's share of the vote is quite low apart from the three metropolitan areas and the geographic regions where it is dominant. Similar to MHP's share of the vote in Southeastern Anatolia, HDP's share of the vote in Central Anatolia does not fluctuate in general, but its share of the vote is already very low in this region.





**November 1st, 2015 General Election
Distribution of HDP's Share of the Vote by District**





**June 7th - November 1st, 2015 General Elections
Change in HDP's Share of the Vote by District**




2.7. Where Do Parties Receive Their Votes From?

In the previous section, we analyzed parties' share of the vote and the changes in their votes through conventional maps and cartograms.

In this section, we will try to identify the major “vote hubs” of each party. For this purpose, we once again made use of *cartograms*. In these *cartograms*, we resized the districts in Turkey in proportion with the size of different voter groups.

The *cartograms* generated enabled us to understand where each party receives the majority of their votes from.


2.7.1. Map of Turkey redrawn according to Ak Parti voters



When the districts are resized in proportion with the number of Ak Parti voters, it is observed that Southeastern and Aegean districts have less weight than average. In these districts, the number of Ak Parti voters is relatively lower. **Apart from this difference, the distribution of the voters in Turkey is almost identical to the distribution of Ak Parti voters.** This cartogram reveals that what sets Ak Parti apart from other parties is the fact that it is able draw a similar rate of votes from all over the country.




2.7.2. Turkey redrawn according to CHP voters



When we take a look at the *cartogram* prepared based on the number of CHP voters, Eastern and Southeastern regions are observed to shrink significantly in size. CHP receives a significant portion of its votes from Thrace and İzmir. The party also receives high votes throughout the Aegean region, in İstanbul (particularly the Asian side), Ankara (Çankaya district which is the darkest in the map) and Eskişehir. As we move eastward on the map, an imaginary boundary seems to separate CHP from the Eastern, Southeastern and Eastern Black Sea regions. Districts in these regions differ from the actual distribution on the cartogram based on the number of CHP voters.


2.7.3. Turkey redrawn according to MHP voters



While the *cartogram* drawn based on the number of MHP voters shows similarities to the *cartogram* for CHP voters, the great difference between the numbers of absolute votes clarifies the reason for the significant difference between the two parties' share of the vote. The maps presented in this section presents the distribution of the votes by party. When we take a careful look at the legend, we can see that the highest number of votes MHP attracted in a district is 85 thousand, while CHP and Ak Parti received more than 200 thousand votes in many districts. MHP is not very popular in the Aegean region and Thrace. The party shows significant existence in and around Adana and in Ankara. In addition, Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia is quite small in size on the *cartogram* prepared for MHP.



2.7.4. Turkey redrawn according to HDP voters



Finally, the *cartogram* based on the number of HDP voters presents a very different outlook. Coastal Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Thrace, the Aegean region (except İzmir) and the Mediterranean region are quite small on this map, and it is observed that HDP attracts the majority of its votes from two different hubs: Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, and the three biggest metropolitan areas (particularly İstanbul). If we had generated the *cartogram* in proportion with the percentage of the votes, Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia would have definitely dominated the map. However, the *cartogram* above enables us to demonstrate the considerable number of HDP voters in metropolitan areas.




2.8. Party Performance by Province

2.8.1. Correspondence Analysis

The graph below is generated by performing the *Correspondence Analysis* (defining the position of provinces based on the distance/proximity, similarities/differences) with the election results by province. Which axes and which characteristics define the distribution in this scattergram? In other words, which relations and similarities does proximity of provinces imply?

It is easier to explain the horizontal axis in the graph. This axis defines whether the Turkish or Kurdish are higher in number. In other words, ethnic identity is the first axis that sheds light on the political outlook in Turkey and on the results of the November 1st General Election.



The vertical axis can define several characteristics. First of all, the provinces and the parties are positioned along an axis by socioeconomic development level. In other words, the provinces located above the vertical axis are more developed, and the provinces located below the axis are relatively less developed. The second characteristic that the vertical axis may define is educational attainment. The third characteristic defined by the vertical axis is degree of piety (defined by KONDA). The provinces



where degree of piety is higher are located below the axis, and the provinces where the degree of piety is lower are located above the axis.

After all, we can suggest that the four corners of these two axes represent the identities that are prevalent in the politics in Turkey: Turkish nationalism, Kurdish nationalism, secularism and Islamism. Nevertheless, the graph may provide explanations about various other characteristics as well.


2.8.2. Provincial clusters based on the election results

The map below that we have generated by clustering provinces by elections results, as we have done in the previous section, enables us to make sense of the vertical axis.

There are a total 6 different provincial clusters. However, we could presume that there are four different provincial clusters, since the first three clusters are mainly made up of provinces dominated by Ak Parti. In the 4th cluster, Ak Parti-CHP-MHP exist together. CHP votes are dominant in the 5th cluster, and as HDP is in the 6th cluster.



November 1st, 2015 General Election Results
Political Preference by Province



Political Preferences in Clusters	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5	Cluster 6	Turkey (%)	Ak Parti	CHP	MHP	HDP	Other	Total
Ak Parti, MHP, Other Parties	67.9	65.0	53.8	50.1	42.8	28.8	49.5	67.9	9.1	13.3	6.7	2.9	100
Ak Parti, Other Parties	17.5	18.3	27.9	34.8	2.8	25.4	17.5	17.5	17.5	10.5	4.0	2.9	100
Ak Parti, MHP, Other Parties	18.3	27.9	34.8	2.8	25.4	11.9	18.3	18.3	18.3	22.6	1.9	3.4	100
Ak Parti, CHP, MHP	27.9	34.8	2.8	25.4	11.9	8.0	27.9	27.9	13.9	5.6	2.5	2.5	100
CHP	9.1	17.5	18.3	27.9	34.8	2.8	9.1	9.1	9.1	11.9	8.0	2.4	100
HDP	6.7	4.0	1.9	5.6	8.0	64.2	6.7	6.7	2.0	11.9	10.8	2.2	100
	2.9	2.9	3.4	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	10.8	2.5	100



In the provinces that are Ak Parti strongholds, Ak Parti secured 67.9 percent of the vote from a total of 7.3 million voters (13 percent of all voters). The second cluster has 5.9 million voters (10.5 of all voters), and Ak Parti's share of the vote rises to 65 percent. In the third cluster, Ak Parti's share of the vote among a total of 1.7 million voters (3 percent of all voters) is 53.8 percent. These three cluster account to 26.5 percent of all voters, and Ak Parti derives 37.5 percent of its vote from the provinces in these clusters.

Clusters	Total Number of Voters	Number of Valid Votes	Ak Parti	CHP	MHP	HDP	Other Parties
1	7,293,105	6,265,882	4,256,004	570,076	835,239	421,170	183,393
2	6,924,133	5,903,141	3,844,932	1,033,546	624,502	234,415	165,746
3	1,709,687	1,451,842	780,266	266,733	327,466	28,287	49,090
4	9,607,186	8,443,405	4,227,196	2,362,807	1,170,392	467,084	215,926
5	25,622,127	22,328,412	9,570,923	7,778,567	2,663,637	1,780,120	535,165
6	4,212,742	3,444,895	990,612	97,072	69,799	2,213,032	74,380
Total	55,368,980	47,837,577	23,669,933	12,108,801	5,691,035	5,144,108	1,223,700

Ak Parti received 50.1 percent, CHP 27.9 percent and MHP 13.9 percent of the vote in the fourth cluster, all three parties registering higher shares of the vote than their county-wide average. Ak Parti won 48, CHP 26 and MHP 10 of the 89 MP seats allocated to these provinces.

The fifth cluster incorporates 45 percent of the voters in the country. In this cluster, Ak Parti received 42.8 of the votes and CHP reached a 34.8 percent share of the vote. CHP is well above its country-wide average in this cluster, where it received 64.2 percent of its vote. CHP won 89 of its 134 MP seats in these provinces.


In the sixth cluster, HDP received a remarkable 64.2 percent of the vote, while Ak Parti remained at 28.8 percent. HDP won 42 of its 59 MP seats from the provinces in this cluster.

Clusters	Number of Ak Parti MPs	Number of CHP MPs	Number of MHP MPs	Number of HDP MPs	Total Number of MPs
1	72	3	5	3	83
2	57	12	3	2	74
3	15	3	3	0	21
4	48	26	10	2	86
5	109	89	19	10	227
6	16	1	0	42	59
Total	317	134	40	59	550

2.8.3. Political clusters and socio-economic development level by province


The first map below shows the economic development level of provinces in Turkey, according to the data from the Ministry Development. Brown areas represent the underdeveloped regions and purple areas (darker color means higher level) indicate a comparatively higher economic development level.

Socio-economic development level by district



The second map below was generated by coloring the 26 sub-regions according to the corresponding TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) figures for the increase in household income per household member. Sub-regions in light blue represent areas with the lowest income and dark blue areas are the most affluent.

Household income per household member





These two maps derived from socio-economic data and the political cluster maps in the previous section reflect a similar pattern and overall character.

- *Eastern and Southeastern districts make up the poorest regions of the country, where HDP is the dominant party, and parties other than Ak Parti are next to non-existent. It should be reminded that the patterns of economic development in the maps are a result of a nearly 150 year-long history of development and modernization. Therefore, HDP is the party of economically underdeveloped districts and voters, as much as it is the party of those with a Kurdish ethnic identity.*
- *The geography where Ak Parti is the dominant party reflects certain cultural identities and indicators, revealing a general picture that represents an economic history that supports the view that it is party with a demand from the future. In a similar fashion, MHP manages to maintain its existence in this geography, commensurate with its vote capacity.*
- *CHP is only present in regions which are comparatively more economically developed, such as the coastal areas, while it is nearly non-existent in other regions. It should also be reminded that Ak Parti still manages to get more than 40 percent of the votes in the geography where CHP is able to maintain its existence.*



2.9. Political Clustering of Districts According to the Election Results

In order to analyze the performances of the parties throughout Turkey, we prepared a synthesis map with the contribution of Prof. Dr. Murat Güvenç³, just like we did for the June 7th election report. In order to produce this map, we grouped the election results at the district level in 7 categories based on the “chi square” values, and then we utilized the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) and processed the clusters so as to generate maps by using the proximity values between groups. Since we worked at the district scale, we were able to observe the performance of the parties, both in Turkey overall and in the outskirts of the metropolitan areas.

The synthesis map is important in that it provides us with some relationships that other maps are not sufficient in demonstrating. While looking at the leading party in a particular district may provide a lot of clues, it does not yield any information about the second best party or any other parties that may be considered as “successful” in that district. The synthesis map not only shows party dominance by district, but also demonstrates the party groups that swing together and the parties which do not cohabit the same district.


In the map, yellow and its shades represent Ak Parti, red and its shades represent CHP, and green and its shades represent HDP. If a party is successful in a particular district, it means that they have achieved a greater success in the district in comparison to the overall Turkey average.

The political map of Turkey’s districts, generated by the aforementioned analyses and coloring, incorporates important characteristics:




- ✓ *Ak Parti is the dominant party throughout the entire geography, with the exception of coastal areas of Aegean and Marmara regions and the Southeastern region.*
- ✓ *CHP appears to be stuck in the coastal districts of Aegean and Marmara regions.*
- ✓ *HDP is the leading party in Mid-Eastern Anatolian and Southeastern Anatolia regions.*

³ Kadir Has University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

1 Kasım 2015 Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri
İLÇE DÜZEYİNDE AYIRT EDİCİ SİYASİ TERCİH PROFİLLERİ
 Parliamentary Elections, 1 November 2015
 DISTINCTIVE POLITICAL PREFERENCES BY CONSTITUENCIES (DISTRICTS)



LEJANT / LEGEND



1 Kasım 2015 seçimi, ilceler itibarıyla gaym resmi sonuçları
 Yurtdışı oyları dâhil değildir
 Unofficial results of the election of November 1st, 2015.
 Excludes overseas votes.



Tasarım ve haritalama: Ebru Şener
 Design and cartography by Ebru Şener



2.10. November 2015 Election Analysis and Vote Shifts

This section of the report was prepared by Amaç Herdağdelen, Eser Aygün and Deniz Cem Önduygu, who are members of the Çilek Ağacı team, and Onur Altındağ, who collaborated with them in the preparation of this section. This young team has been producing eye-opening works in big data analysis and information architecture, and we would like to thank them for the valuable contribution they have made to our report. ⁴

2.10.1. Summary of Findings and Inferences

When we analyze the results at the district level, we can see that the difference between net changes in the votes of the opposition and Ak Parti account for 1.6 million votes. This finding indicates that 1.6 million voters, who refrained from going to the polls in the previous election, participated and voted in the last election. When we take this into consideration with other findings, we can assert that a significant portion of these 1.6 million votes were cast in favor of Ak Parti. It is not possible to explain the votes gained by Ak Parti, only by looking at the vote loss of the parties other than Ak Parti.

When we compare the differences in shares of the vote at the district level, between the elections in June and in November, we observe that Ak Parti gained two votes for every one vote lost by parties other than Ak Parti on average. This ratio increased in electoral districts, and shot up to three votes for every one vote lost by a party other than Ak Parti, in the districts of İstanbul.

In contrast to the overall trend, total votes lost by the parties other than Ak Parti is more than the increase in Ak Parti's votes in districts which are HDP strongholds. Therefore, we think that the main factor that led to the decrease in HDP's votes was the increase in the number of people who did not go the polls, and not a vote shift between HDP and Ak Parti.

We estimate that Ak Parti has lost a lot more votes than the other parties in the previous election due to invalid votes. In the last election, however, the number of invalid votes decreased dramatically. We suspect that this may be related to the change in the design of the ballot, which may have contributed to the surge in Ak Parti's favor.

Votes which have shifted to Ak Parti from the diminishing MHP, SP and BBP bloc make up nearly half of the increase in Ak Parti's votes.

Our results appear to be in line with a voter profile, which moves along the axis of identity politics and which reflects its reaction by not changing one's party, but by not going to the polls.

We made use of widely-used statistical methods [1] and software libraries [2, 3]. The first section introduces district-level mapping, the next section presents predictions on vote shift through the ecological inference method, and the last section contains

⁴ For the Çilek Ağacı report, please see <http://cilekagaci.com/2015/11/05/kasim-2015-secim-analizi-ve-oy-gecisleri/>.



detailed visualizations, statistical calculations, and testing and confirmation of previous findings. The entire report has been written with the assumption there has not been an irregularity in the election results.


2.10.2. Vote Shifts at the District Level

The maps below demonstrate the changes in shares of the vote, voter turnout and the number of valid votes. The findings below are noteworthy:


- Ak Parti has increased its votes nearly throughout Turkey. The increase in its votes in Eastern Anatolia is comparatively high, while it is more or less homogeneous for the rest of Turkey.
- HDP has lost a huge amount of votes in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, and MHP suffered a dramatic decline throughout Turkey. Neither of the parties were successful in increasing their votes in any of the regions.
- While CHP reflect some variance here and there, it is not possible to talk about a systematic shift in votes geographically.
- Voter turnout has declined significantly in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. It has increased particularly in Middle and Eastern Black Sea regions. We do not observe a tangible trend in the other regions.
- The number of invalid votes in İstanbul decreased by 430,000 votes, which represents a deviation from the country-wide average. We suspect that the change in the ballot design for İstanbul may have had an impact on this result. In other words, we think it is highly likely that the majority of these valid votes were cast for Ak Parti.




Changes in Share of the Vote June 7th, 2015 - November 1st, 2015




AKP




CHP




MHP




HDP



Voter Turnout



Rate of Invalid Votes





2.10.3. Electoral Shifts

We used the Sankey diagrams in order to visualize the electoral shifts we calculated by using the ecological inference method. According to the results, the following main factors have led to the increase in Ak Parti's share of the vote:

- Electoral shift from MHP towards Ak Parti.
- Additional votes Ak Parti attracted from the Saadet & BBP block.
- Voters who did not go to the polls in the previous election, but preferred to vote for Ak Parti in the last election.
- Vast majority of the increased valid votes in Istanbul were cast for Ak Parti. In this context, we can suggest that first-time voters did not play a decisive role in the last election, and votes which were invalid in the previous election played a critical in shaping the election results.


The results we obtained from this model are similar to those generated by the mapping method. In addition, the ecological inference model demonstrates that electoral shift from HDP towards Ak Parti is not as extensive as it may appear initially and that the decreased voter turnout rate among HDP voters is the main driver of the decrease in its votes.

Given that the districts where HDP's share of the vote decreased and where voter turnout rate declined are highly correlated, we were skeptical about these findings, and thus we made some further calculations to test its likelihood. Therefore, the graph that shows electoral shifts is intended to be more descriptive and visual than representative of actual figures.



Electoral Shifts

June 7th, 2015 - November 1st, 2015



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2.10.4. The Comparison of the Difference in Votes of the Ruling Party and the Opposition

The scatterplot below compares the total votes lost by the parties other than Ak Parti against the increase in the valid votes cast for Ak Parti. Each circle represents a district and the size of a circle is directly proportional to the number of voters residing in that district.

First of all, the increase in Ak Parti votes is higher than the average decline in other parties' votes. In other words, the decrease in the other parties' votes is not sufficient alone to explain the surge in Ak Parti's votes. When the number of votes for the other parties decreased by 1, Ak Parti's valid votes increased by 2. This ratio increased in electoral districts, and shot up to three votes for every one vote lost by a party other than Ak Parti, in the districts of İstanbul. If the increase in voter turnout and the number of valid votes had not played an important role in shaping the elections results, then the trend curve would have been closer to 45 degrees. However, the deviation is quite big.



Another outstanding characteristic of the scattergram is that nearly all of the dots are above the 45 degree curve. This means that in many districts the total loss of votes by the opposition is below the increase in Ak Parti's votes. In this case, the most reasonable scenario is that Ak Parti was able to increase the turnout of its own voters, while the voter turnout for the other parties declined.

As a result, the dynamics of the change in the voter turnout emerge as one of the main factors that contributed to the big increase in Ak Parti's share of the vote. This could also help to explain as to why the majority of the opinion polling companies failed, as they often tend not to measure expected voter turnout. This overall picture contains a significant characteristic of voter behavior in Turkey. Voters demonstrate their dissatisfaction by not changing their vote, but by not going to the polls. It is very likely that the lack of alternatives and polarization in Turkish politics is driving voters into such a behavior.



Change in Ak Parti Votes and Other Parties' Votes June 7th, 2015 - November 1st, 2015

Each circle corresponds to a district, and the size of the circles are directly proportional to the number of voters. The fact that the trend line is inclined more than 45 degrees implies that voter turnout and the increase in the number of valid votes play a critical role.



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2.10.5. The Role of the New Votes and HDP's Loss of Votes

In the most populated 5 electoral districts, the changes in the votes for the opposition parties and Ak Parti support our findings above. The graph shows clearly that the votes lost by the opposition in most districts do not account for all the votes gained by Ak Parti during the same time period. We observe that Ak Parti has gained nearly three votes for every one vote lost by the opposition in some districts.


The top line in the same graph shows the changes in the votes of the opposition parties and Ak Parti in the five districts where HDP received the most votes. In contrary to the overall trend in the country, the increase in Ak Parti's votes is far behind the decrease in the votes of the opposition parties. In other words, a significant portion of the opposition votes seems to have stayed outside the ballot box and therefore did not really shift to Ak Parti.

These observations are also aligned with a voter profile which tends to show its reaction to a political environment dominated by identity politics and polarization, by not changing the party it votes for, but by not going to the polls.




Change in the Number of Ak Parti's and Other Parties Votes June 7th, 2015 - November 1st, 2015

Each line represents a district.
The height of the line's left end shows the amount of decrease in other parties' share of the vote (converted to a positive value), while the right end represents the amount of increase in Ak Parti votes. The districts in Turkey are divided in two columns. The districts where the amount of increase is higher than the amount of decrease (in other words, districts where voter turnout and the increase in the number of valid voted made a difference) are shown in the column on the right. Names of the districts where the difference in more than 20,000 are included in the graph (all of the districts other than Ankara-Keçiören are in İstanbul).






5 Provinces where HDP Received the Highest Vote



5 Provinces where HDP Received the Lowest Vote



Provinces where the Number of Voters in High

