

# **KONDA**

# **Barometer**

***THEMES***

**The July 15th Coup Attempt**  
***August 2016***

**KONDA**  
— ARAŞTIRMA VE DANIŞMANLIK



## **CONTENTS**

<b>1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2. THE JULY 15th COUP ATTEMPT .....</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1. Introduction: Society and Politics After 15 July Coup Attempt .....	5
2.2. Narrative of the Coup Attempt.....	9
2.2.1. Powerful images .....	13
2.3. Democracy Watch Research.....	15
2.3.1. Democracy Watch Research and the August'16 Barometer .....	19
2.4. What Did They Feel During the Coup Attempt? .....	22
2.5. Opinions on the Objective, Target and Aftermath of the Attempt .....	31
2.6. Possibility of a Future Coup Attempt.....	42
2.6.1. Will there be another coup in the future?.....	42
2.6.2. Who should defend democracy?.....	43
2.6.3. How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?.....	47
2.7. What Changed Mentally After July 15th? .....	53
2.7.1. May freedoms be restricted in the fight against terrorism?.....	53
2.7.2. Opinion on secularism .....	58
2.7.3. Reconsideration of the peace process .....	61
2.7.4. Constitutional principles .....	65
2.7.5. Public trust in the Turkish Armed Forces.....	69
2.8. Evaluation and Comment .....	73
<b>3. RESEARCH ID.....</b>	<b>81</b>
3.1. Overall Description of the Survey .....	81
3.2. The Sample .....	81
<b>4. FREQUENCY TABLES.....</b>	<b>83</b>
4.1. Profile of the Respondents .....	83
4.2. Theme of the Month: The July 15th Coup Attempt .....	87
<b>5. GLOSSARY of TERMS.....</b>	<b>94</b>
1.1. Questions and Response Options .....	95



## **1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The survey which forms the basis of this report was conducted on 6-7 August 2016 by face-to-face interviews with 2676 individuals in 160 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts including the central districts of 27 provinces.

The field survey was conducted 3 weeks after the coup attempt that took place on 15 July night.

### **THE JULY 15th COUP ATTEMPT**

On 15 July, a sudden and violent Coup Attempt took place with a death toll of more than 200 and we handled the views of the public in this regard in several aspects. Through the conceptual framework developed by Evren Balta, Murat Paker and Betül Çelik, we analyzed people's accounts of the events that night, their feelings, evaluations and expectations from the future, and we questioned as to whether this traumatic event created a breaking point about the main topics of social discussion such as freedoms, Kurdish problem and secularism.

Most of the public learned about the events on the Coup Attempt on television and half took to the streets at the night of 15 July or later. The Ak Parti and MHP supporters as well as more educated, younger and more religious clusters and groups with higher income took to the streets at the highest rates. The profile revealed through our Democracy Watch survey we conducted in 3 squares on July 26 is very similar to the profile revealed throughout Turkey.

On the news of the Coup Attempt, the first intense feelings of the society had been fear and anxiety whereas when the attempt was stopped, the dominant feelings had been pride and joy. The people felt pride and joy towards those who took to the streets for ending the attempt and attended the watch afterwards whereas they felt "nothing" towards those who did not go out and protest, namely the feelings of rage, disappointment or shame were secondary. Despite an initial diversity of feelings, an emotional collectivity took place during the process. Still, certain differentiation is observed in these feelings in terms of education, religiousness, lifestyle and party preferences.

As the target of the Coup Attempt, the president is considered at the highest level followed by the state. The views as to the aim of the attempt differ significantly. Three out of every four people agree that the attempt was halted by those who took to the streets. The idea that the president and the anti-coup section of the military halted the attempt is also widely held, differing according to the cluster. A cluster of 15 percent think that there was actually no attempt for a coup, that it was completely staged or allowed in a controlled manner.

Half of the society believe that another coup may be attempted. Even though the most widely accepted opinion is that it is the nation that should defend democracy against coups (36 percent), the second most common answer indicating "jurisdiction and law" (21 percent) is quite discriminating among the different clusters of the society. It is indicated that democracy should be fortified and the



military should be restructured in order to prevent further coup attempts, yet the option of transition into a presidential system is not supported widely despite the increase in the “yes” votes.

The 15 July Coup Attempt led to decreased support in the society for the idea that rights and liberties may be restricted for the sake of anti-terrorism as the rate of those who support such restrictions dropped to 30 percent from the previous rate of 50 percent calculated in March. This change is the most apparent among the Ak Parti and MHP electorates. Another significant change has occurred in the trust in the Turkish Armed Forces. In 2010, 30 percent of the society chose the armed forces among the elements that one may be proud of as a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, however this rate decreased to 10 percent after 15 July. The view on secularism is basically unchanged and there is even shrinkage in the small cluster of one tenth that involves those against secularism.

A question about the fundamental principles of the constitution shows that the rate of those who want an emphasis on equality has increased after 15 July whereas the rate of those who prefer an emphasis on the continuity of the state remain unchanged.

The 15 July Coup Attempt did not influence the view on the Kurdish Problem, as half of the society are still against any return to negotiation process. The fact that no change has occurred despite the consensus may be regarded positively. On the other hand, the experience the Kurds and especially the HDP supporters had on the coup attempt is rather different from that of the rest of the society in that the Kurds went out to protest at lower levels and they believe at higher levels that the event might be staged and that a new attempt may take place. Overall, they seem to be “distant” from the rest of the society.

The findings of the section on the 15 July Coup Attempt may be summarized by a quotation from the commentary and evaluation at the end of the section: “Our results show that half of the society think that they participated in ending the coup attempt or actively witnessed it and that therefore contributed to this “victory.” Participation in such street movements is strongly established in the personal and collective memories of the participants, deeply affecting the formation of their political identities and their view on fundamental problems. Taking into consideration the extent of violence experienced at the night of 15 July, it will be one of the most important problems in the coming term as to how and in which direction the politicization of the clusters that mobilized on an anti-coup common ground will contribute to the transformation of political identities in Turkey.”



## 2. THE JULY 15th COUP ATTEMPT

### 2.1. Introduction: Society and Politics After 15 July Coup Attempt

*Evren Balta (Assc. Prof., Yıldız Technical University)*

*Murat Paker (Asst. Prof., Istanbul Bilgi University)*

*Ayşe Betül Çelik (Prof., Sabancı University)*

The night of July 15<sup>th</sup> added a new coup to the rich history of coups and coup attempts in our country. This report shows that the recent coup attempt faced a great social resistance differently from the previous ones and a part of the society rushed out to stand in the tanks' way before the political leaders called for the streets. After the President's call, the resistance against the coup further enhanced. Moreover, the findings of this report show that almost no cluster of the society including the groups opposing to the current political government accepted the coup attempt which created similar emotional reactions and a common ground in the attitude against coups. Undoubtedly, the night of July 15<sup>th</sup> entailed a major social trauma. Such major social traumas first of all activate collective emotions, strengthen some common grounds, yet deepen certain gaps. Starting from this hypothesis, this survey aimed to measure the social perception about the coup, the collective emotions the coup has triggered and whether any transformation took place after the coup in the most important social/political issues of Turkey.

#### **Coup (attempt) and social perception**

In the final analysis of the term, a coup is based on the idea of a state of emergency. The act of the putschists is based on the belief that political problems cannot be solved through the ordinary politics and the obstructed politic channels can only be opened through a coup. At the same time, a coup is an attempt that changes political balances and paralyzes political will.

Even though putschist groups try to capture power through illegitimate means, they seek legitimacy just like almost all other groups that opt for political power. Hence, even actions such as coups cannot succeed without activating a social legitimacy and a feeling of righteousness but will fail without social support. Therefore, a coup is more probable in situations where unpleasantness towards civil politics is increased, it is believed that civil politics is unsuccessful at solving problems and the military intervenes in the political area (even upon the call of civilians) more often.<sup>1</sup>

Such situations create in the people the feeling that civil politics can no longer offer solutions thereby providing the putschists the legitimacy they seek. Especially polarizing/excluding populist policies create the illusion in the putschists that the unpleasant clusters may support the coup thinking that there is no other remedy. Sometimes due to this feeling of necessity and sometimes out of desperation or due to the

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<sup>1</sup> Wintrobe, R. Autocracy and coups d'état. *Public Choice*, no: 152 (2012) 115-130.



expectation that certain lifestyles or ideologies may come to the fore, a coup may generate excitement. For this reason, in order to prevent coups, it is important to identify how and upon which elements public support (or resistance) for the coup generates.

Based on this conceptual background, this survey considers the perceptions of different groups on the coup in relation to civil politics. How do different social political groups perceive the reasons and outcome of the coup? Are there any social groups that think that their problems may be solved through a coup? What are the main factors that determine opposition against the coup?

### **Coup (attempt) and emotional turn**

Although the disciplines of psychoanalysis and social psychology have for a long time allocated a causative place to emotions (such as rage, fear, shame and pride) behind individual and collective attitudes of people, the extent of importance of emotions in social sciences in general in terms of contribution to political processes and social movements has only recently been taken seriously.<sup>2</sup> According to this literature, individuals do not (always) participate in political processes and social movements for their own benefits; in many situations, they support political processes and social movements that are contrary to their benefits but that strongly stir their emotions.

Then how are these emotions stirred? Surely, there is a mutual relation between emotions and the participation of individuals in social movements and political identities. On the one hand, there is the life history of each individual which provides them with a certain personality and also an emotional framework experienced in certain contexts. For example, the fact that there had been many coups in the political history of Turkey (27 May, 12 March, 12 September and 28 February) resulted in direct or indirect memories in everyone regarding coups. Families have been separated, relatives have been subject to violence, left unemployed, and even in certain circumstances forced to leave the country. Personality is determinative in a more general sense whereas contextual memory and life history are determinative in a more specific sense in individuals' emotional reactions to certain (particularly traumatic) events.

However, on the other hand, emotions do not only consist of individual experiences. The opportunities of individuals on perception, experience and learning, the moral standards they develop, prejudices and comparisons are always shaped by a social context and determined by the political environment, social relations and power structures they are in.<sup>3</sup> Closeness to political power, sensitivity towards state authority and feeling of loyalty to various collectives directly effect how emotions are experienced by different groups. In short, factors such as political party membership or voting and ethnic group they feel they belong to play important roles in the shaping of past experiences. This answers the question as to what happens to them, thereby turning personal emotions to political identity.

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<sup>2</sup> Stets, Jan E., and Jonathan H. Turner, eds. *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*. Vol. 2. Springer, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment." *Annual review of sociology* (2000): 611-639.



The strongest (most successful) political identities are the types in which personal life histories and group narratives which a person feels a belonging to overlap<sup>4</sup> such as “this pain/this pride happens to you because you are Muslims” or “this happens to you because you are Kurds.” Successful political/social movements provide a strong and collective narrative framework regarding the emotions created by these life stories and their outcomes.<sup>5</sup> An important aspect of collective identities is that they function as the establishing features of the collective narrative by choosing certain victories and defeats in the history of the social groups.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, political identities that provide the overlap between the life history and the (assumed) experience of collective groups do not immediately change upon changes in power balance. They take a stable course. This is why recent traumatic events experienced by great collectives (violence, war and coup) are very important and effective in the establishment of political identities.

Going on with the example of coups, the narratives of political actors about the experiences of collective groups on past coups will be determinative in the emotions of the individuals when faced with a coup again. In other words, various coup narratives of political groups will affect the emotions about coups of the persons who are considered to belong to these groups. In this regard, individuals who are members of different social/political categories may experience the same activity in different ways due to different group experiences. Further, their interpretations of the present may also differentiate. Such experience types directly influence the types of social polarization/merge.

In this survey, based on this conceptual background, it was investigated as to whether it is possible to talk about any emotions about the coup that are common to different social groups. To what extent is the emotional reaction against the coup also related to the way individuals interpret the political environment of today, which political movements do they feel close to and what kind of a country do they imagine? Perhaps, the question should be formulated as follows: Do we, as a society, feel similarly after July 15<sup>th</sup>? Do different groups feel differently? What did different groups feel about those who took to the streets in order to stop the coup or those who did not go out? How did the public feel about the democracy watches conducted in the post-coup period? In terms of emotions, is the polarization/distance between political identities widening?

### **Coup (attempt) and institutional turn**

Another important aspect of this report is that right after July 15<sup>th</sup>, it measured whether the society in Turkey experienced breaking points in important faultlines such as the Kurdish problem, secularism and discussions on a new constitution.

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<sup>4</sup> Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements*. University of Chicago Press, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta. *Emotional dimensions of social movements*. London: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

<sup>6</sup> Volkan, Vamik D. "Psychoanalysis and diplomacy: Part I. Individual and large group identity." *Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies* 1, no. 1 (1999): 29-55; Volkan, Vamik D. "Psychoanalysis and diplomacy Part II: Large-group rituals." *Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies* 1, no. 3 (1999): 223-247.



Hence, significant traumatic events open important doors as to how the common identity of the society is imagined and what the common problems and their solutions are.<sup>7</sup> After such traumatic events, the society needs to reshape emotionally and fictionalize a common story in order to understand what has happened. Such need paves the way for re-shaping of politics and finding solutions to long-term problems.

Similarly, historical sociology indicates that the main paths that shape the society are determined after important traumatic events.<sup>8</sup> The effects of these events do not appear immediately. However, during such periods, especially those paths chosen by political actors will determine the future direction of the society. Generally, during such periods, politicians focus on the immediate agenda and design institutional reforms in order to cope with the existing threat/problem. However, the institutional design will have consequences not immediately predicted by politicians. This is why politics is mainly made up of unpredictable consequences rather than predictable ones.

Again starting from this theoretical background, this report questions as to whether the perception and support has changed in main social/political issues after July 15<sup>th</sup>. Can July 15<sup>th</sup> be considered as a critical junction in the solutions to important social problems and re-construction of institutional reforms by involving the society?

The discussion of the initial findings of the questions posed on these three main axes will be made at the end of the report.

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<sup>7</sup> Klein, Naomi. *The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism*. Macmillan, 2007.


<sup>8</sup> Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. "The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism." *World politics* 59, no. 03 (2007): 341-369.





## 2.2. Narrative of the Coup Attempt

In consideration of the Coup Attempt, to understand our respondents' experience of the events that happened on July 15th, we initially asked them how they became aware of the events and whether they took to the streets on the night of the event or later.




65 percent, i.e. two-thirds, of the general public were first informed about the Coup Attempt via television. 20 percent of the respondents, including people who became aware of the event by seeing the tanks on the streets, were informed via a friend or an acquaintance. While social media, which is in third place, was the news source for a relatively smaller part of the respondents, only the 2 percent of the general public, corresponding to approximately 1 million people, became aware of the Coup Attempt through the calls (sala prayers) from the mosques.

Although the rate of the respondents who received the news from social media is higher among respondents who are more likely to use social media, such as younger people, college graduates, higher level income group, television is the main news source with respect to the Coup Attempt, in all demographic groups.



**Did you personally take to the streets against the July 15th Coup Attempt? If you did, at which point during the course of the events did you decide to take to the streets?**




Half of the general public report that they had taken to the streets on the first night or afterwards. 13 percent took to the streets on the night of July 15th *before* the President called on the people to go out on the streets to protest, 26 percent went out on the streets on the same night *after* the President's call, and 10 percent joined the rest of the people on the streets from July 16th onwards, as part of the daily-held Democracy Watch rallies.

40 to 60 percent of all demographic groups went out on the streets at some point to protest the coup attempt. At first glance, it is notable that 39 percent of women compared to 59 percent of men took to the streets. Half of men reported having gone out on the first night, which is approximately double the rate reported by women (28 percent).

The differences between having taken to the streets or not are smaller between other demographic groups, but they are nonetheless illuminating. Compared to the elder, the younger; compared to the lesser educated, the better educated; compared to Moderns, Conservatives; compared to less religious, the more religious; and compared to lower income group, the higher income group are more likely to have taken to the streets.




### Did you take to the streets against the July 15th Coup Attempt?






### Did you take to the streets against the July 15th Coup Attempt?



There is great variability in the rates of taking to the streets among the different party voter groups: 53 percent of Ak Parti voters, 49 percent of MHP voters, 20 percent of CHP voters and 10 percent of HDP voters reports that on the night of July 15th they had taken to the streets against the Coup Attempt. While 14 percent of Ak Parti voters had gone out before the President’s call on the people to take to the streets, the corresponding rate for MHP voters is 24 percent.

### Political preferences of people who did or did not take to the streets



When we examine how the political preferences of the people who went out on the streets before the President’s call are distributed, as demonstrated on the graph above, we observe that although Ak Party voters constitute half of this group, MHP voters also have a notable presence, with a rate of representation twice higher (16 percent) than their country-wide average. Ak Party voters constitute two-thirds of the respondents who report having gone out after the President’s call on the people to



take to the streets. Among those who never took to the streets, CHP voters and HDP voters, as well as swing voters and non-voters, are represented at much higher rates than their corresponding country-wide averages, particularly due to the low rate of Ak Parti voters in this group.

### 2.2.1. Powerful images

In order to understand the public experience of the Coup Attempt and how the citizens' narrative of that night was shaped, we asked open-ended questions about the most significant event or image they recall from that night and the place they saw this event or image. Later, we grouped the responses into categories.


Which event or image from the night of July 15th do you recall as the most significant?			
Categories	Percent	Percent	Main categories
Military aircrafts, aircraft opening fire on buildings and the people	9.7	42.3	Images of attack
Military personnel opening fire on the people	9.1		
Images of tanks on the streets	7.1		
Bombing of the parliament	6.8		
Shutting down of the bridge, the image of tanks on the bridge	5.2		
Invasion of the national public broadcasting channel TRT, reading of the statement by the newsreader	4.3		
Killing and beating of surrendering, innocent soldiers	7.3	13.3	Images of armed conflict/fighting
Soldiers on the streets, confrontation between the soldiers and the police	6		
Images of martyrs, dying people	13.4	44.6	Images of resistance
People taking to the streets	7.1		
The moment the President appeared on TV	4.7		
Heroes	4.1		
People climbing on and stopping tanks	4.1		
Calls to prayer from mosques	2.2		
Other	9		
Total	100	100	Total

The responses show that no single event stands out as the most significant event, and that people recall very different images or events from the night during which many events took place simultaneously, in different parts of the country. Some of the respondents considered the actions of the people who attempted the coup as the most significant, powerful images, such as military aircraft and soldiers opening fire on citizens, tanks taking to the streets or the reading of the coup statement on the state channel (TRT). Some of the respondents paid attention to confrontations



between the military, and the people and the police. Still, other respondents considered the people's or the government's resistance against the coup attempt, such as people climbing and taking over the tanks, the actions and the death of various people like Ömer Halisdemir that are considered as heroic events, President's speech on television and calls for prayer, as the significant and powerful events.

### Through which means did you experience this event or image?



One in four people had come across the image they recalled on television. If people received initial news about the coup via a friend or an acquaintance, then, it is more likely that they personally saw or heard the image that they recall. If people received initial news about the coup on social media, then, it is more likely that they are referring to an image that they have encountered on social media. Still, the images seen on TV make up the great majority of the responses.

Through which means did you experience this event or image?	From which source did you first hear the news about the July 15th Coup Attempt?						
	Friends, acquaintances	Social media	Online news sites	TV	Text messages from Institutions	Mosques	Total
Personally	33	9	1	52	2	3	100
Social media	19	33	9	38	0	0	100
TV	18	5	3	70	1	2	100
Turkey	20	9	4	65	1	2	100

People who personally saw the recalled image and people who encountered the image on social media or TV prioritize different events. The table below presents the top three events for each group and the corresponding rates.



Which event or image from the night of July 15th do you recall as the most significant?	
<b>Respondents who personally saw or heard the Coup Attempt</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Military aircrafts, aircraft opening fire on buildings and the people	25
People taking to the streets	18
Calls to prayer from mosques	14
<b>Respondents who heard about the Coup Attempt on social media</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Killing and beating of surrendering, innocent soldiers	22
Images of martyrs, dying people	11
Military personnel opening fire on the people	9
<b>Respondents who saw or heard the Coup Attempt on TV</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Images of martyrs, dying people	14
Military personnel opening fire on the people	10
Military aircrafts, aircraft opening fire on buildings and the people	8

### 2.3. Democracy Watch Research

After the July 15th Coup Attempt, “democracy watch” rallies were launched throughout Turkey, following President Erdoğan called on the people to take to the streets. As KONDA, just like we did during the Gezi Park protests, we conducted a research in order to understand the profiles of democracy watch participants and shared the research results with the general public and our subscribers.

In this section you will find a short summary of the research that was conducted on the night of July 26th, 2016, from 9.00 pm to 00.00 am, by holding face-to-face interviews with 1875 people in Kısıklı, Saraçhane and Taksim squares, as three sample locations where people were called on to take to the streets for the Democracy Watch. You can access the full report from our website (<http://konda.com.tr/democracywatch>).

- ✓ Six out of ten people participating in the Democracy Watch rallies, received the first news about the Coup Attempt on TV. Approximately one fourth first heard about the event from a “friend or acquaintance”, while one in ten received the first news from social media.
- ✓ The majority of the participants are Ak Parti voters. 85 percent of the 1875 people whom we interviewed in these three squares, on July 26th, 2016, Tuesday night, from 9.00 pm to 00.00 am, state that they would vote for Ak Parti if a general election were held today.
- ✓ 44 percent of people we interviewed in the three squares report that they are affiliated with a political party. 41 percent are not only affiliated with a political party, but also they state they would vote for Ak Parti.



- ✓ 27 percent of the research participants report having gone out before President Erdoğan called on the people to take to the streets, whereas 53 percent of them report having taken to the streets after President Erdoğan called on the people to take to the streets. Only one in every five people state that they decided to take to the streets after July 16th.
- ✓ Regarding the time of taking to the streets, the most noteworthy data indicate that affiliation with a political party was the determining factor. 6 percent of those who went out before Erdoğan called on the people to take to the streets, 4 percent of those who took to the streets after Erdoğan's call, and 3 percent of those who joined the rallies after July 16th stated that they were members of a political party.
- ✓ Another significant finding is the fact that although approximately 60 percent of the respondents we interviewed as part of this research had attended a political rally before, only 23 percent had attended "a protest, demonstration or sit-in" before.
- ✓ In terms of ethnicity, the rate of people with Kurdish ethnic background, which we measure as around 14 percent in Turkey, who attended these watches comes out to be 12 percent.
- ✓ The overall educational attainment level of Democracy Watch participants is higher than the Turkey average. Although 28 percent of the population in Turkey are high school graduates and 14 percent are university graduates, the corresponding rates of high school and university graduates among the participants in democracy rallies are 35 percent and 21 percent, respectively.
- ✓ While housewives and retirees are less likely to take to the squares than the average Turkish citizen, public officers, private sector employees, workers and students were present at the squares at a rate higher than the Turkey average.
- ✓ When the respondents were asked about the objective of the coup attempt, the most popular responses were "To occupy Turkey", "To divide the country" and "An attempt against the President".


### From which source did you first receive the news of the July 15th Coup Attempt?








### At which point during the course of events did you decide to take to the streets?




- I took to the streets on the night of July 15th BEFORE the President called on the people to go out on the streets.
- I took to the streets on the night of July 15th AFTER the President called on the people to go out on the streets.
- I took to the streets on July 16th and afterwards.


### Which party would you vote for if elections were held today?






### Have you ever attended any political rallies before?




### Have you participated in any protests, demonstrations or sit-ins before last week?







### What do you think was the objective of the July 15th Coup Attempt?\*




\* This was directed as an open-ended question.

#### 2.3.1. Comparison of the Democracy Watch Research and the August'16 Barometer

We directed some of the previously used democracy watch survey questions to the respondents who were surveyed within the scope of the August'16 Barometer, and thus found the opportunity to compare the opinions of democracy watch participants on the Coup Attempt with the country-wide findings.

First, when we compare the democracy watch participants with the country-wide average, in terms of taking to the streets on the night of July 15th or later, 50 percent of the public in Turkey took to the streets on average, compared to, surely, all of the democracy watch participants.

#### People who took to the streets against the Coup Attempt




However, when we compare the democracy watch participants with people who only took to the streets, we observe that they went out at similar points during the course of



the events. This finding primarily implies above everything else that the survey conducted at the 3 different squares is representative of the country-wide democracy watch rallies.


This finding certainly does not mean that the two groups are identical in all of their characteristics. Because if the rate of respondents who report having taken to the streets on the night of July 15th exactly reflected the reality, then 20 to 25 million people would have been on the streets that night, which would be physically impossible. It should also be taken into account that there could be many respondents who may not have taken to the streets, despite stating that they did so. However, it is very difficult to estimate the number of these respondents or to identify them.

### Taking to the streets by political preference



Although the great majority of those who took to the streets throughout Turkey are Ak Parti voters, it should also be noted that other parties' voters are barely present in the findings of the democracy watch research conducted at the 3 squares of İstanbul.

### From which source did you "FIRST" receive the news of the July 15th Coup Attempt?




Another question that enables us to draw comparison between the two universes is about the source through which the coup was first learned about. In this respect, the country-wide average and the average of democracy watch attendants are quite parallel to each other. While 65 percent of the countrywide population report first hearing about the Coup Attempt on TV, the corresponding rate for those who attended the democracy watch rallies at the squares is 62 percent. The only



significant difference is that a larger portion of democracy watch attendants first learned about the ill-fated attempt from their friends or acquaintances. We may explain this finding with the fact that the people at the squares are more likely to have political affiliations than the average person, as it should be considered normal for a person with political engagement to first hear about such an event through their own network.

### Taking to the streets by educational attainment...



When we take another step forward in comparing of two different survey universes for a more in-depth analysis, we observe a significant relation between the tendency to take to the streets on July 15th and educational attainment level. In all three groups in the graph above, higher educational attainment level is accompanied by a higher likelihood of not only taking to the streets, but also going out to protest the Coup Attempt during the initial phase. While 40 percent of those with an educational attainment level lower than high school among Ak Parti voters report not having taken to the streets, this rate drops to 26 percent among university graduates. Also among democracy watch participants, higher educational attainment level leads to a higher likelihood of being one of those who took to the streets on the night of July 15th.



## **2.4. What Did They Feel During the Coup Attempt?**

In the survey that we conducted after the Coup Attempt, we asked the respondents what they felt during and after the Coup Attempt. We provided the same nine response options for all of the five questions we directed to them, In the order of their appearance in the survey form, these options are: ‘rage’, ‘fear’, ‘anxiety’, ‘shame’, ‘surprise’, ‘disappointment’, ‘joy’, ‘pride’ and ‘nothing’. We requested them to mark two options for every question (that is why the rates do not add up to hundred).

We initially asked them the question, “What did you feel when you first heard about the Coup Attempt?” According to the responses, the most widely shared emotions are ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’. Approximately one in every four people report feeling ‘rage’ and one in every five people reported feeling ‘surprise’. Still, 5 percent (i.e. approximately 3 million people) report that they felt “nothing” when they heard about the coup.

When we direct the question “What did you feel when you learned that the Coup Attempt was stopped?”, we observe an emotional solidarity throughout society. Three out of every four people report feeling ‘joy’ and one in every three people report feeling full of ‘pride’. However, 6 percent (i.e. approximately 3 and a half million people) report feeling ‘nothing’ against this development.

We observe that the feelings of ‘fear’ (43.5 percent), ‘anxiety’ (35.1 percent), and ‘rage’ (26.3 percent), which were most commonly felt emotions when the Coup Attempt was first heard, actually changed after the Coup Attempt was stopped. 83 to 85 percent of the respondents who felt ‘fear’, ‘anxiety’ or ‘rage’ when they first heard about the attempt felt ‘joy’ and 41 to 46 percent felt full of ‘pride’ when they learned that the Coup Attempt was foiled. Thus, we may claim that after the Coup Attempt was stopped, the different emotions that were initially evoked by the Coup Attempt were transformed into a widely shared mood and emotional state.

In response to the question, “What did you feel towards the people who took to the streets to stop The Coup Attempt on the night of July 15th?”, we observe that 57 percent of the society feels full of ‘pride’ and 42 percent feels ‘joy’. 12 percent (approximately 6 and a half million people) report feeling ‘nothing’.

We observe that the feelings of ‘fear’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘rage’, which were the most widely shared feelings by the public, when the Coup Attempt was first heard about, transform into a common mood and emotional state towards the people who took to the streets to stop the Coup Attempt (with one exception). According to the responses of those who felt ‘anxiety’ when they first heard the Coup Attempt, 69 percent felt ‘joy’ and 62 percent felt ‘pride’ towards the people who stopped the Coup Attempt. 50 percent of those who felt ‘rage’ when they first heard the Coup Attempt, also felt ‘joy’ and 68 percent felt full of ‘pride’ with respect to the people who stopped the Coup Attempt. On the other hand, 85 percent of those who felt ‘fear’ when they first heard the Coup Attempt, also felt ‘joy’ and 41 percent felt full of ‘pride’ about the people who stopped the Coup Attempt.



However, 12 percent of those who felt ‘fear’ when they first heard the Coup Attempt felt ‘nothing’ towards the people who took to the streets in order to prevent the Coup Attempt. Thus, we may claim that on one hand the different feelings which were first evoked by the news of the Coup Attempt, transformed into a common mood and emotional state, on the other hand the respondents emotionally may have distanced themselves from the people who took to the streets in order to prevent the Coup Attempt.

A very interesting picture comes up when we look at the responses to the question “What did you feel towards the people who did NOT take to the streets in order to prevent the Coup Attempt on the night of July 15th?” One in every two people in society reported feeling ‘nothing’ instead of feeling a negative or positive emotion towards the people who did not take to the streets. Still, a group of people constituting 15 percent reported feeling ‘rage’ and 12 percent reported feeling ‘disappointment’ towards the people who did not take to the streets.

We observe that the feelings of ‘fear’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘rage’, which were the most commonly felt when the Attempt was initially heard, partially transformed into a common mood and emotional state against the people who did not take to the streets. 60 percent of those who felt ‘anxiety’, 57 of those who felt ‘fear’, and 47 percent of those who felt ‘rage’ when they initially heard about the Coup Attempt, reported feeling ‘nothing’ towards the people who did not take to the streets. The feelings towards the people who did not take to the streets, may actually constitute the findings that provide the greatest perspective for future of the possibility of social consensus after the Coup Attempt. The main reason for this is that despite the various moods the respondents were in when they were informed about the Coup Attempt, they reported feeling ‘nothing’ towards the people who did not take to the streets. In other words, this situation may be interpreted in general as society not being accusative of the people who did not take to the streets.

Finally, responding to the question “What do you feel about the democracy watch rallies which have been ongoing after the Coup Attempt?”, one in every two people report ‘pride’ and 40 percent report ‘joy’, while one in every five people reported feeling ‘nothing’.


We observe that the feelings of ‘fear’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘rage’, which were felt when the Attempt was first heard, evolved to widely shared emotions about Democracy Watch rallies. According to the results, all of these feelings transformed into feeling ‘joy’ and ‘pride’ and an emotional solidarity was established.

In order to uncover which feelings were felt by which social segment during which stages and understand the relationship between the emotional states of the participants during and after the coup, we applied multiple correspondence analysis to the responses provided to these five questions measuring emotions. Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) places the available data into a predefined universe and shows the distances between them. In other words, rather than showing the social distance between people, this method shows the distance between their




responses. The initial graph below demonstrates the relationships between the responses provided to emotion questions.


**What did you feel when you first heard about the Coup Attempt?**




**What did you feel when you learned that the Coup Attempt was stopped?**




**What did you feel towards the people who did NOT take to the streets in order to prevent the Coup Attempt on the night of July 15th?**




**What did you feel towards the people who took to the streets to stop The Coup Attempt on the night of July 15th?**



**What do you feel about the democracy watch rallies which have been ongoing after the Coup Attempt?**








When we look at the MCA graph representing the emotions universe, two findings are noteworthy. First, in very general terms, feeling of 'surprise' and feeling nothing are concentrated on one side of the axis whereas feelings like 'joy', 'pride' and 'rage' are concentrated on the other side of the axis. Second, we observe that in the world of emotions, some emotions are more related to one another, even to the extent of overlapping with each other. For example, the feelings of 'anxiety' and 'fear' instigated by first hearing about the Coup Attempt overlaps with the feeling of 'joy' after learning that the coup was prevented, and these feelings are positioned closer to the central axes of the graph. Similarly, the feelings of 'pride' and 'joy' towards the people who took to streets in order to prevent the Coup Attempt and the



feelings of 'pride' and 'joy' towards the people who attended the Democracy Watch rallies are overlapping. However, these feelings are positioned a little farther from the main axes of the graph.

In the graph below, by looking into how various demographic and political preference data are respectively positioned in these universes of emotion, we may wonder about why some emotion clusters are far away from or close to the main axes. As educational attainment level increases, the graph progresses to lower part of the axis where the responses of 'surprise' and 'nothing' are more frequent. According to this distribution, university graduates are more likely to feel 'nothing' than the high school graduates.




We observe a similar pattern in terms of the level of religiosity. Higher level of religiosity leads to the feelings of 'pride', 'joy', 'rage', and 'fear' emerge, while lower level of religiosity leads to the feeling of 'surprise' and the response of 'nothing'. Non-believers are positioned so farther from the main axis that they are not visible on the graph. In other words, although the mood of the pious and the religious are similar, believers are emotionally very distanced to these groups, while non-believers is even further away from these groups.

When we analyze the responses by lifestyle cluster, we observe a similar vertical movement in the graph. Religious Conservatives are positioned above the axis of the graph while Traditional Conservatives are positioned almost to the intersection




of the axes and Moderns are positioned below the axis where educational status increases and religiosity decreases.

When we add political preferences to the graph, we observe that voters of different parties are also positioned differently. According to the results, while Ak Parti voters are mapped closer to the group located on the top part of the graph who felt 'pride', and 'joy', MHP voters are positioned right in the middle of the axis. We observe that the emotional state of swing voters is somewhere between MHP voters and CHP voters. In terms of mood, HDP voters are positioned outside on the outermost parts of the graph, farthest to the other parties.





However, this graph should not directly lead to thinking that voters of different parties are also differentiated in terms of their mood. In MCA, since every single response is added to the graph, every particular point on the graph may not directly represent different people. MCA shall give an idea only about the proximity of responses that were provided to the questions. Responses to different questions by every single respondent are visualized in the graph below. Every row shows changes in a respondent's emotions throughout the 5 questions. Since the participants were allowed to provide two responses to each question, two different colors indicating two different emotions may be depicted for the same question. Questions are respectively ordered by emotions and political preferences. According to the results, voters of almost all parties experienced feelings of 'fear' and 'anxiety' when they first received heard about Coup Attempt; the feeling of 'rage' was most intensely experienced by Ak Parti voters. However, society in general was in emotional solidarity in terms of their feelings after learning that the Coup Attempt was foiled. Another difference among the parties emerges in responses provided to the question "What did you feel towards people who did not take to the streets in order to prevent the Coup Attempt on July 15th?" Although some of Ak Parti voters reported feeling 'rage', in general, other party voters reported feeling 'nothing'.





## 2.5. Opinions on the Objective, Target and Aftermath of the Attempt

In addition to asking their experiences and feelings on the night of the Coup Attempt, we asked the respondents about their opinions on the attempt in order to understand how they ultimately made sense of the Coup Attempt. In this perspective, we inquired about their opinions about the real target of the attempt, the main motivation and perpetrators behind it, and the claim that the attempt was a fabrication.

Who was the main or the most important target of the July 15th Coup Attempt?	Percent
The President	43.6
The state	24.3
The republic	9.4
Ak Parti government	8.6
Democracy	7.1
Citizens	5.9
The parliament	1.0
Total	100.0

The President was the most popular response (43.6 percent) provided by the respondents to the question about the main target of the Coup Attempt. The respondents' second most popular response was the state (24.3 percent).

What was the main motivation behind this Coup Attempt?	Percent
Create chaos and overthrow the country	34.3
Opposition to the regime/state	18.0
Conflict between Ak Parti / the President & FETÖ	14.7
FETÖ and external powers	13.7
Opposition to the President	8.2
Serve the interests of Ak Parti and the President	2.7
Anti-secularism	1.2
Other	7.2
Total	100.0

In collecting the respondents' opinions about the main motivation behind the Coup Attempt, we did not offer them any response options. Instead, we collected the responses in an open-ended manner and then grouped them. One in every three people provided responses indicating that the main motivation was to create chaos and to overthrow the country. Half of the respondents reported a more general



motivation, with the second popular response of “Opposition to the regime/state”. Most of the remaining responses point out to Gülenist Terror Organization (FETÖ) or external powers as the main actors of the attempt, and to the President or Ak Parti and the conflict/opposition between these actors as the target of the attempt.

Who do you think actually stopped the Coup Attempt?	Percent
People taking to the streets	73.8
The President	28.1
Soldiers who did not participate in the Coup	18.8
The police	11.4
The government	4.1
Ak Parti voters	3.7
The parliament	1.2

On the night of July 15th, many events, in which numerous actors were involved, took place throughout the country and the Coup Attempt was stopped within a short time period. Therefore, it may be argued that different actors all played a role in thwarting the Coup Attempt. However, people’s perception of who stopped the Coup Attempt may play a significant role in shaping their narrative of the Coup Attempt in its aftermath. In directing the question on who actually stopped the attempt, we requested the respondents to choose two actors at maximum, as there were a lot of actors involved and since we expected to come across a high rate of agreement with the opinion that it was the people who took to the streets that thwarted the Coup Attempt. In agreement with our expectations, three out of four people reported that it was the people who took to the streets that night that stopped the Coup Attempt. We found out that the public also believes the President, the soldiers who did not partake in the attempt and the police played a role in foiling the Coup Attempt.

When we take a comparative look at the responses provided to these three questions in order to attain a better understanding of people’s narratives the Coup Attempt, we come across a wide array of opinions about the objective and the target of the attempt, as well as about who actually prevented the Coup Attempt. Therefore, it does not seem possible to speak of a common narrative shared by the overwhelming majority.






Who was the main or the most important target of the July 15th Coup Attempt?	What was the main motivation behind this Coup Attempt?								Total
	Create chaos and overthrow the country	Opposition to the regime/state	Conflict between Ak Parti / the President & FETÖ	FETÖ and external powers	Opposition to the President	Other	Serve the interests of Ak Parti and the President	Anti-secularism	
The President	16.2	5.6	5.7	7.1	6.9	2.5	0.5	0.04	44.6
The state	8.3	7.1	2.4	3.2	0.5	2.0	0.4	0.3	24.1
The republic	2.5	2.8	0.9	1.2	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.7	9.6
Ak Parti government	1.9	0.8	3.6	1.0	0.3	0.9	0.2	0.0	8.7
Democracy	2.5	1.2	1.2	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.1	6.5
Citizens	2.7	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.5		5.6
The parliament	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.9
Total	34.3	18.2	14.6	13.7	8.3	7.1	2.5	1.2	100.0

Who do you think actually stopped the Coup Attempt?	Who was the main or the most important target of the July 15th Coup Attempt?						
	The President	The state	The republic	Ak Parti government	Democracy	Citizens	The parliament
People taking to the streets	33.8	18.7	6.0	6.1	5.0	4.2	0.8
The President	16.9	5.7	1.3	1.7	1.3	1.4	0.1
Soldiers who did not participate in the Coup	5.2	6.1	3.6	1.3	1.7	0.9	0.2
The police	4.0	3.1	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.3
The government	1.3	1.2	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.04
Ak Parti voters	1.7	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.3	0.04
The parliament	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3		0.1



Who do you think actually stopped the Coup Attempt?	What was the main motivation behind this Coup Attempt?							
	Create chaos and overthrow the country	Opposition to the regime/state	Conflict between Ak Parti / President & FETÖ	FETÖ and external powers	Opposition to the President	Other	Serve the interests of Ak Parti and the President	Anti-secularism
People taking to the streets	27.1	14.5	9.7	10.7	6.7	4.5	1.2	0.7
The President	11.4	5.2	3.1	3.6	3.2	1.7	0.3	0.2
Soldiers who did not participate in the Coup	5.1	3.3	3.9	3.1	0.6	1.7	0.9	0.6
The police	2.9	2.1	2.0	1.9	0.7	1.4	0.3	0.2
The government	1.2	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.04
Ak Parti voters	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	
The parliament	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.04	0.1	0.04	


Having said this, the intersection of the most popular responses to each of the questions in the three tables above may be considered as the shared opinion of a significant portion of society. For example, according to the first table, 16 percent of society believe that both the target of the Coup Attempt was the President and the motivation was to create chaos in the country. According to the second table, 34 percent of society believe that the target of the Attempt was the President and the attempt was stopped by the people who took to the streets. Yet, according to the third table, 27 percent believe that the purpose of the attempt was to precipitate chaos and the Coup Attempt was stopped by the people who took to the streets.



As shown in this and the next pages, when the responses to the question about the target of the Coup Attempt and about who was behind the Coup Attempt are placed onto the MCA, i.e. the “social fabric map”, which was created with the demographic data obtained in this month’s survey, we immediately notice the close proximity of the responses to each other. None of the responses are embraced by a marginal group within society. When we look at the map more carefully, we notice that for both of the questions, the President is positioned below the vertical axis, not only as the target of the Coup Attempt, but also as the actor who stopped it, within a region in which almost 60 percent of the society are represented. We observe that the responses of democracy, the Republic, and government as the target of the Coup Attempt and the soldiers who did not participate in the Coup Attempt as the actor who stopped it, are positioned above the vertical axis, in closer proximity to the




responses which indicate decreasing religiosity and increasing socioeconomic status.



After July 15th, there have been conjectures and allegations regarding as to what exactly happened on the night of the Coup Attempt, with claims that the Coup Attempt was not actually real, but a prefabricated string of events that are designed to fail ultimately. There have been other claims that the government and President Erdoğan were indeed informed beforehand about a potential Coup Attempt and that they allowed the Coup Attempt to unroll in a controlled manner. Yet some other opinions, though they did not question the reality of the Coup Attempt, included criticism that the President or the government turned the attempt into an advantage which they abused by announcing a state of emergency and by unleashing a purge of unprecedented proportions.



**Which of the following response options that I will read best describes your opinion on the claim that the Coup Attempt was a fabrication?**




According to the responses to the question that we directed the respondents with the aim to understand to what extent these claims are shared among society, 9 percent of the society believe that there was no Coup Attempt in reality and it was completely fabricated, while 6 percent believe that the President or the government was informed about the Coup Attempt beforehand and that they allowed it to take place in a controlled manner. 11 percent comment that although they believe that the Coup Attempt was real, they also think that the President or the government turned it into an advantage. The remaining three-fourths of society, which constitute the majority, believe that the Coup Attempt was real and that it was thwarted.

As shown in the graph below, when we investigate the opinions of the respondents who disagree with the widespread assumption that the Coup Attempt was real and that it was averted somehow, about the purpose, target and prevention of the Coup Attempt, it becomes apparent that their experiences and perceptions of the events also vary from each other. First of all, the probability that they took to the streets is much lower. Although they are more likely to think that the target of the Coup Attempt was the President or the state, they are also more inclined to provide the responses such as Ak Parti, the Republic, democracy and citizens. In answering the question about the motivation behind the Coup, quite a few respondents also name the conflict between Ak Parti / President & FETÖ and serving the interests of Ak Parti and the President, instead of going for the explanation of unleashing chaos in the country. Even, for example, 16 percent of the respondents, more than 5 times the country-wide average, who think that the events were fabricated also prefer the explanation that it serves the interests of Ak Parti and the President. Although the view that the people who took to the streets and the President stopped the Coup Attempt prevails among the respondents who believe that the attempt was real, the respondents who hold the opposite view are less likely to agree with this opinion, while the respondents who believe that the coup was stopped by the soldiers are more likely to believe the same.




### Did you personally take to the streets against the July 15th Coup Attempt?


- There really was a Coup Attempt, which was averted.
- There really was a Coup Attempt, but the President / the government are manipulating this to their own ends.
- The President / the government allowed it to take place in a controlled manner.
- There really was not any Coup Attempt and it was a complete fabrication.
- Turkey




### Who was the main or the most important target of the July 15th Coup Attempt?



### What was the main motivation behind the Coup Attempt?



### Who do you think actually stopped the Coup Attempt?






Different groups in society are critical about the reality of the Coup Attempt to varying degrees. Although educational attainment level and income level make a difference to a certain extent, it is noteworthy that both lifestyle, religiosity and perception of the economic make a significant difference.

Compared to 53 percent of the Moderns, 89 percent of the those who affiliate with being Religious Conservative believe that the Coup Attempt was real and it was somehow prevented. 86 percent of the pious and 41 percent of the non-believers also share the same opinion. Similarly, there is a difference of 28 points between those who became more pessimistic in their expectation of an economic crisis and those who became more optimistic, which increases to 32 points after July 15th.

### Opinion on the claim that the Coup Attempt was a fabrication




- There really was a Coup Attempt, which was averted.
- There really was a Coup Attempt, but the President / the government are manipulating this to their own ends.
- The President / the government was informed about the Coup Attempt beforehand and that they allowed it to take place in a controlled manner.
- There really was not any Coup Attempt and it was a complete fabrication.




Political party preference and vote decision in a potential referendum on the introduction of the presidential system seem as much influential as lifestyle and economic expectations. While 95 percent of Ak Parti voters and 70 percent of MHP voters believe the widely shared opinion about the nature of the Coup Attempt, the same rate decreases to 29 percent among CHP voters and to 21 percent among HDP voters. 23 percent of CHP voters and 40 percent of HDP voters interpret the events of July 15th clearly as a fabrication. Similarly, while only 6 percent of those who are in favor of the “yes” vote in a potential referendum on the presidential hold the same view, 55 percent of those in the “no” camp are critical about the real nature of the Coup Attempt.

### Opinion on the claim that the Coup Attempt was a fabrication



The graph in the next page that shows the responses to the question on the claims about the reality of the Coup Attempt, on the social fabric map (MCA) confirms that responses that reflect a critical opinion speak to a different social base and are located away from the region where the majority of society are present. Therefore, it is understood that similar to the questions we used throughout the Barometer surveys to measure political polarization, questions on subjects such as opinions on the Ergenekon trial or the Gezi protests, as well as the evaluations on the general state of affairs in the country, this question measures the level of polarization and it may provide insight into its magnitude in the near future.








## 2.6. Possibility of a Future Coup Attempt and the Institutions to Prevent a Potential Coup

### 2.6.1. Will there be another coup in the future?

One of the most frequently asked questions after the July 15th Coup Attempt was whether there would be another Coup Attempt in Turkey in the future or not. We asked this question in a general sense, without providing a time restriction, as “Do you think there is a possibility that another Coup Attempt will happen in Turkey?” 46 percent said “yes” and 54 percent said “no” in response to this question. In other words, we may state that the Turkish society is equally divided on this topic.

**Do you think there is a possibility that another Coup Attempt will happen in Turkey?**




An analysis of political party preference reveals that Ak Parti voters find it least likely that another Coup Attempt will happen. Still, even among Ak Parti voters, 40 percent think that another coup is possible. A little more than half of CHP voters and a little less than half of MHP voters also agree that there may be another coup in the future. In short, despite the differences, we do not observe a major disagreement between the voters of the three parties in their responses to the question “Do you think there is a possibility that another coup attempt will happen?” Even swing voters and non-voters do not reflect a much different profile than the other political party voters.

Meanwhile, HDP voters diverge completely from the other voter groups in this respect. Three out of every four HDP voters think that another coup attempt is likely in Turkey.

Kurdish compared to Turkish, “no” voters compared to “yes” voters in a hypothetical referendum on the presidential system, college graduates compared to high school graduates and lesser educated think it is more likely that another coup attempt could take place in the future.




### Do you think there is a possibility that another Coup Attempt will happen in Turkey?



### 2.6.2. Who should defend democracy?

Democracy became the most emphasized concept after the July 15th Coup Attempt. While who prevented the attempt was being discussed, we asked the respondents “Which of the options that I am going to read to you now should defend democracy against coup attempts?” and requested them to choose one of the options provided.

### Who should defend democracy against coup attempts?




One out of every three respondents think that the people should defend democracy against coup attempts, while one fifth hold the political parties, and another one fifth hold



the judiciary and the legal system responsible of defending democracy. These are followed by the responses of the military, powerful political leaders and the police.

### Who should defend democracy against coup attempts?



Approximately four out of every ten Ak Parti voters answer this question with “the people” as their response. After HDP voters, Ak Parti voters provide this response at the highest rate. On the other hand, Ak Parti voters are least likely to opt for “justice and law” among all the voter groups. Although this very low response rate of “justice and law” among the voters of the ruling party that has been in power since 2002 should indeed be considered as a critical problem, investigating this problem is out of scope of our current research.

We observe that CHP voters provide the response “justice and law” at the highest rate. 29 percent of CHP voters choose “the people” as their response, which is the lowest among all voter groups. Additionally, while CHP voters are the most likely to think that “the military” should defend democracy, the approval rating for this response option still remains at only 15 percent.


MHP voters’ attitude towards this question is somewhere between that of Ak Parti voters and CHP voters. One of noteworthy findings is that 29 percent of MHP voters favor “justice and law” as their response. Ak Parti voters diverge the most from CHP and MHP voters regarding the opinion that “justice and law” should defend democracy.

We observe that almost half of HDP voters preferred “the people” as their response to this question. We may positively interpret this response as an indication of confidence in the people, while it would also be possible to see it as a sign that while HDP voters



do not trust state organizations and institutions, they do trust the people in their capacity to defend democracy.


While swing voters and non-voters reflect a similar pattern, they are more likely to choose “the people” than CHP and MHP voters, and “justice and law” than AKP voters.



An analysis of the responses by prospective vote preference in a “potential referendum on the presidential system” reveals a clearer picture than the analysis by political party preference. 11 percent of “yes” voters give the response of “justice and law”, while the same rate is 28 percent for “no” voters. The findings indicate a political difference between the respondents who choose “the people”, and the respondents who prefer “justice and law” as their response.



## Who should defend democracy against coup attempts?




Compared to other respondents, the respondents who provide the answer “there was an actual Coup Attempt and it was averted” in response to claims that the Coup Attempt was not real, are less likely to choose “justice and law” and more likely to emphasize “powerful political leaders” and “the police” in their response to this question.

When we investigate different demographic clusters, we find out that the Turkish are more likely to prefer “justice and law” than the Kurdish, as the latter are more likely to choose “the people” as their response than the Turkish. Higher educational attainment level is accompanied by a lower likelihood to choose “the people”, and a higher likelihood of preferring “justice and law”, while the tendency to select “the police” as the response gets weaker. Compared to Traditional Conservatives and Religions Conservatives, Moderns are more likely to opt for “justice and law” and less likely to choose “the people” as their response. Although compared to other lifestyle clusters, Moderns respond as “the people” at a lower rate, one out of every three Moderns report that it is the people who should defend democracy against potential coup attempts. We observe a similar pattern in terms of religiosity. Higher level of religiosity is accompanied by a higher likelihood to choose the responses of “the people” and “the police”, and a lower likelihood to prefer “justice and law”.



### Who should defend democracy against coup attempts?




### 2.6.3. How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?

The successful prevention of the Coup Attempt was immediately followed by debates on whether there would be another coup attempt in Turkey in the future. In this context, we asked the respondents, “What should be done to prevent another Coup Attempt from happening again?” and allowed them to provide up to two answers.



### How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?



We observe that the responses of “strengthening democracy” and “restructuring the army” are preferred at a much higher rate than the other response options.


When we analyze political party voters, we find Ak Parti voters to make up the largest voter group for each response, as the Ak Parti voter group are proportionally larger than the other party voter group. Out of the 42 percent who think that new coup attempts can be prevented “by strengthening democracy”, 16 percent are Ak Parti voters, 8 percent are CHP voters, 4 percent are MHP voters, 8 percent are swing voters and 3 percent are non-voters.

Other noteworthy observations include the fact that HDP voters are represented in very few of the options, and that 8 of the 9 percent who think that new coup attempts may be prevented “by a transition to the presidential system” is made up of Ak Parti voters, with swing voters accounting for the remaining 1 percent.





### How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?



When we take a look at the responses by political party preference, we find out that “by restructuring the army” is the most popular response option among Ak Parti voters. Furthermore, Ak Parti voter group is almost the only political party voter group to provide the response of “by a transition to the presidential system”.

CHP voters prefer the response “by strengthening democracy” the most, and provide the response of “by restructuring justice” more than other party voter groups.


MHP voters are the most likely to choose the response option of “by restructuring the army” among all voter groups.

HDP voters have a very different profile in this context than the other party voters. HDP voters prefer the response options of “by strengthening the democracy” and “by preparing a new constitution” at the highest rates, in comparison to the other party voters.

When we look at the entirety of the graph below, we observe that political party voters are least divided with respect to the response of “by preparing a new constitution”. Therefore, although “by preparing a new constitution” is the third most popular response option, it is considered to be “coup-preventive” with the least difference among all political party voters. In short, we may state that party voter groups are the most in consensus in terms of thinking of “preparing a new constitution” as a “coup-preventive method”. The response option of “by restructuring justice” presents a similar pattern.




### How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?



Higher educational attainment level leads to a lower preference rate for the response that new coup attempts can be prevented “by strengthening the police” and a higher preference rate for the response option of “by strengthening democracy”. We do not notice a noteworthy difference by educational attainment level for other response options.

### How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?




Traditional Conservatives are more likely than Moderns, and Religious Conservatives are more likely than Traditional Conservatives to agree that new coup attempts can be prevented “by restructuring the army”, “by strengthening the police” and “by a




transition to presidency system”, and to think that the same can be achieved by “by strengthening democracy”.

### How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?



When we look the responses by level of religiosity, we find out that higher level of religiosity is accompanied by a higher likelihood to opt for the responses options of “by strengthening the police” and “by a transition to the presidential system”. We do not observe any other noteworthy difference in this respect.

### How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?



When we analyze the responses by party preference, i.e. when we take the responses in favor of the opinion that future coup attempts can be prevented by “strengthening democracy” to be 100, we observe that Ak Parti votes decrease. Although the Turkey average for people who state that they will directly vote for Ak Parti is 41 out




of every 100 people, the corresponding rate drops to 30 percent among those in favor of “strengthening democracy” in order to prevent future coup attempts. On the other hand, CHP voters are more likely to agree with the same opinion. The rate of HDP voters is lower among the respondents who preferred the response option of “by restructuring the army”. Apart from these findings, we observe a similar pattern to average results for Turkey.

Ak Parti voters constitute 48 percent, swing voters constitute 16 percent, CHP voters constitute 13 percent, HDP voters constitute 12 percent and MHP voters constitute 7 percent of those who responded that new coup attempts can be prevented by “preparing a new constitution”. Ak Parti voters, HDP voters and swing voters agree with this opinion at a higher rate than the Turkey average.

However, 81 percent of the respondents who think that new coup attempts can be prevented “by transition to presidency system” are Ak Parti voters, while 9 percent are swing voters.

We observe that while the Turkey average with HDP voters included is “by preparing a new constitution”, the overall consensus in Turkey, excluding HDP voters is in favor of “restructuring the army” as the solution to prevent future coup attempts.

### How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?






## 2.7. What Changed Mentally After July 15th?

We may describe the July 15th Coup Attempt and its aftermath as a serious trauma for any country that may be faced with such events. When we take a general look at all of the Barometer surveys conducted during the last 6 years, we observe that society at large is restrained towards unexpected surprises, regardless of how serious these surprises may be. However, we think that we need to understand the impact the coup attempt has made on the public opinion about major issues such as the Kurdish issue, secularism, and the constitution, and whether or not this event is a breaking point in any of these issues. In this context, in the first survey we conducted after the Coup Attempt, we directed some of the questions that we had asked during previous months, with the aim to identify what has changed and what has remained the same in the public opinion.

### 2.7.1. May freedoms be restricted in the fight against terrorism?

Terrorism and the fight against terrorism in Turkey moved up on to a new level since July of last year. Curfews, forced depopulation, armed conflict, and increasing number of killings and martyrs in the Southeastern regions and bombs exploding in urban areas caused the society's perception of terror to move to a new level. Within the scope of March'16 Barometer, which we had conducted 6 months ago, we had tried to identify how society viewed the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms in the fight against terrorism.




We observe that the public opinion on this subject has changed significantly during the last six months. While half of the respondents in March had stated that fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted in the fight against terror, this rate seems to have declined to 30 percent in the first survey conducted after the Coup Attempt.

It is hard to claim that the only reason for this shift is the Coup Attempt and its aftermath. However, as noted earlier, we do not frequently witness a change of this extent within the scope of Barometer survey series. We may think that this shift has been instigated by the mental change that has taken place after the Coup Attempt.



**Fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens may be restricted in the fight against terror and crime.**




When we focus on the percentages, we notice that approximately one-fourth of Ak Parti voters have changed their opinion about this subject. On the other hand, the opinions of CHP voters and MHP voters have also changed in favor of the opinion that freedoms may not be restricted in the fight against terror. However, it is noteworthy that even the opinions of MHP voters, who—as we know from previous Barometer reports—have very harsh views on the fight against terror, have softened to a certain degree.

On a scale of 6 where “strongly disagree” is 1 and “strongly agree” is 6, the average response rate for Turkey is 2.7 (located between “disagree” and “somewhat disagree”).




**Fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens may be restricted in the fight against terror and crime if necessary.**



When we consider averages, we may find out that Ak Parti and MHP voters have switched to a negative opinion in terms of their outlook on the restriction of freedoms in the fight against terror. We may claim that such a transformation within a period of 6 months is an unusual development within the scope of Barometer surveys.

It is also noteworthy that HDP voters have shifted in the opposite direction. HDP voters were also against the restriction of freedoms in the fight against terror to a greater extent than other party voter groups four months ago. However, this month's field survey shows that their opinions have slightly shifted towards the opinion that the freedoms may be restricted.

**Fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens may be restricted in the fight against terror and crime.**





When we separate the Kurdish into two distinct groups as HDP voters and Ak Parti voters in order to investigate whether this predicament is specific to HDP voters or the Kurdish or not, the resulting picture may encourage us to think that the difference of opinion is not independent of being a HDP voter. Indeed, Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic background used to think very differently about this issue than Ak Parti voters in general. However, according to this month's survey results, average Ak Parti voters are pretty much in the same opinion as Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic background.


Considering the fact that this has been the most apparent change after July 15th, we should also look into how it is reflected in different demographic profiles. It is very hard to encounter a demographic group that has not changed their opinion about the restriction of freedoms during the last 6 months. Some demographic groups which do not appear to be divided in opinion today, have been in favor of freedoms before, such as "students" or "Moderns".

We may claim that this change in opinion has been caused mainly by the conservative but better educated clusters among Ak Parti voters and MHP voters. We are able to find lifestyle clusters to be very explanatory in this context, just as they are in other contexts. The second graph below demonstrates the change in opinion on freedoms by lifestyle cluster among different voter groups.






**Fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens may be restricted in the fight against terror and crime.**





**Fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens may be restricted in the fight against terror and crime if necessary**




We observe that, in general, Traditional Conservatives in every voter group, except HDP voters, have gone through a very significant change in opinion. As a result, we may conclude that the demographic group, which corresponds to approximately half of the population and whose members identify their lifestyle as Traditional Conservative, have made a noteworthy negative impact on the opinion in favor of restricting freedoms.

**2.7.2. Opinion on secularism**

Some people claim that the night of July 15th and thereafter, the squares were “dominated by a religious discourse”. The directions to call for prayer (*sela*) from the mosques and frequent *Allāhu akbar* cries (*Takbir*) in democracy watch rallies aroused suspicion as to whether the status of secularism was about to change or not. To this end, we found it necessary to determine opinions on secularism have changed or not. So, in this first survey we conducted after the Coup Attempt, we asked a question that we had used for the March’16 Barometer.



### Which of the following statements about secularism do you agree with?




- Secularism should be a part of the constitution, but it should be redefined with equal distance to all religions.
- Secularism should remain in the constitution without any alterations.
- Secularism should not be a part of the constitution.

We are first able to identify that there has not been a change similar to what was observed for the previous question, and even that the number of proponents of the opinion that secularism should not be a part of the constitution has actually further declined. Therefore, we may claim that there has not been any change in the public opinion on the subject of secularism.

The most striking change is observed among HDP voters. Among HDP voters, the rate of the respondents who favor changing the definition of secularism in the constitution so as to include all religions has increased to 68 percent. It should be expected for the HDP voter group to be in support of such an inclusive understanding of secularism since the party brings Alevis and other religious groups under its umbrella, as well as the Kurdish.




### Opinion on secularism



During four-month period, we observe that the greatest change among Ak Parti voters again. While 17 percent of Ak Parti voters stated “secularism should not be a part of the constitution” in March, this rate has dropped to 10 percent and the rate of Ak Parti voters who think that the definition of secularism in the constitution should be changed to include all religions has increased by 8 points.

### Opinion on secularism




Among HDP voters, the rate of the respondents who want secularism to remain in the constitution without any alterations has declined by half, while the rate of those who



want the definition of secularism to be modified has increased to 68 percent from 44 percent. In consideration of these findings, we may claim that a change has taken place in the voter base of HDP, rather than a change in the opinions of the people who define themselves as HDP voters. Indeed, we may assume that HDP voters, whose overall rate has slightly declined recently, are composed of patriotic Kurdish people to a greater extent than before.

When we compare the opinions on secularism to those on the Coup Attempt, we do not observe a major disparity. No major difference in opinion on secularism is observed between people who took and people who did not take to the streets on or after July 15th, nor between the people who think and people who do not think the Coup Attempt was a fabrication. Level of religiosity is still the decisive factor. In the graph below, people's opinion on secularism is displayed along with the size of the clusters by level of religiosity.

For example, 70 percent of the respondents who define themselves as “a person who does not believe in the requirements of religion” are proponents of the idea that the definition of secularism should be changed. But, this group constitutes only 2 percent of society.




### 2.7.3. Reconsideration of the peace process

In our opinion, if we want to understand the potential for change in the mentality of Turkish society, we undoubtedly have to investigate the Kurdish issue. For this purpose, in this survey we directed the question about negotiations towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue, which we had previously used in the survey for May.



**The negotiations should be resumed for the resolution of the Kurdish issue**




Apparently, from before the Coup Attempt to its aftermath, there has been no change in the support to the idea of resuming the negotiations towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue. While the rate of the respondents who think that negotiations should be resumed was a little above one-fourth 3 months ago, it has stayed more or less the same after July 15th.

While significant shifts are observed in opinions on secularism and fundamental rights and freedoms, it would be useful to analyze how this lack of change in the opinion on the Kurdish issue is reflected in different clusters. Although the country average appears to have remained the same, small differences within different party voter groups are noticeable.




**The negotiations should be resumed towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue**



While CHP voters seem to have become more determined about not resuming the negotiations with Kurdish, the opinion of Ak Parti voters appears to have somewhat softened on this subject. Among CHP voters, the rate of the respondents who think that negotiations should be resumed fell from 38 percent to 31 percent during the 3-month period, whereas among Ak Parti voters, the same rate increased from 20 percent to 23 percent during the same period. As seen the graph below, which demonstrates the average response values, the most dramatic shift in opinion on the Kurdish issue is observed among CHP voters.



### **The negotiations should be resumed towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue**




Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic background have developed a different attitude than that of HDP voters who have a Kurdish ethnic background. Although such HDP voters have not changed their opinion on the resumption of the negotiations, the opinion of Ak Parti voters with a Kurdish ethnic background, which was closer to being hesitant on the subject, seems to have moved closer to being in favor of resuming the negotiations. However, the fact that HDP voters with a Kurdish ethnic background have slightly backed away from supporting relaunching of the negotiations indicates a sharpening of their views and an encapsulation of the HDP voter group into a purely patriotic Kurdish profile. However, it would be misleading to diagnose this as a persistent trend only based on the slight differentiation observed within a period of 3 months. Nonetheless, it would be useful to monitor this profile in upcoming months.





### The negotiations should be resumed towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue




#### 2.7.4. Constitutional principles

In this section, we will be evaluating opinions on the constitutional principles, with the aim to determine whether there has been any change in the public opinion about which principles should be a part of the Constitution after July 15th.

We directed the respondents the same question about which principles should be emphasized to a greater extent in the Constitution, and provided them with 4 response options, as we have done twice before, first in February 2015, 4 months before last year's general election, and then again 3 months ago in May 2016.


#### In your opinion, which of the constitutional principles should be emphasized to a greater extent than others?





At first glance, we do not observe a dramatic change in society’s preference among these four response options. However, we may consider the 7-point increase in rate of the respondents in favor of the opinion that the principle of equality should be emphasized to a greater extent than others in the prospective new constitution, to be an important indicator. The preference rate for the response option, “continuity of the state”, has decreased by 2 points while preference for “justice” has declined by 3 points. On the other hand, the rate of the respondents opting for “freedom” in their response has decreased by about 2 points. In light of this outlook, we may argue that after July 15th, the principle of equality, which we may consider to be in parallel with the concept of ‘democracy’ is now being emphasized at a much higher rate. In the graph below, we can see whether or not this increase originates from a specific voter group or not.

**In your opinion, which of the constitutional principles should be emphasized to a greater extent than others?**






When we look at the responses that different voter groups give to this question, we may find out that there is increased emphasis on the principle of 'equality' among society. It looks like those in favor of emphasizing the principle of 'equality' in the constitution have increased among Ak Parti, CHP and MHP voter groups since March. On the other hand, we also recognize a decline in the number of specifically Ak Parti and MHP voters who give the response, 'continuity of the state'. Before proceeding with the analysis of this finding, we should first take a look at the change that has taken from February of last year to May 2016. We obtained this finding 4 months before the June 7th General Election. After that, elections were held, with an outcome calling for a coalition. Then, suddenly the agenda became dominated by terrorist attacks, declaration of the state of emergency in the Eastern provinces, and military operations accompanied by great losses. After the November 1st General Election, Ak Parti reclaimed the government, but terror attacks and military operations continued. Looking at this entire process makes it more sensible as to how the emphasis on the concept of equality grew weaker, while the emphasis on continuity of the state became stronger. When we directed the same question in this month's survey, that is after July 15th, the results showed that support for 'continuity of the state' has declined and the emphasis on the concept of equality concept has become more dominant. The concept of equality may have been expressed at a higher rate due to increased identification with the concepts of 'democracy', 'unity' and 'solidarity' among society, after July 15th. Time will show whether this perception will take hold in the public opinion.

The graph below shows the preference rates for the four principles by opinion on the Coup Attempts. When we investigate the distribution of these four principles according to the different responses given to the two questions on whether or not the streets were taken to and how the attempt was perceived, we observe the most explicit change again in the response option of "equality".



**In your opinion, which of the constitutional principles should be emphasized to a greater extent than others?**



Higher likelihood of believing that the Coup Attempt was real or stronger participation in the rallies is accompanied by a lower likelihood of pronouncing the principle of equality. For example, while among the respondents who reported to have never taken to the streets against the coup on or after July 15th and who make up for half of society, the rate of those who emphasize the principle of equality is 37 percent, the same rate drops to 31 percent and 27 percent among respondents who took to the streets on the night of July 15th. On the other hand, while 46 percent of the 10 percent in favor of the opinion that the whole thing was a fabrication emphasized the principle of equality the most, only 30 percent of those who believe that the attempt was real think the same.


Still, the respondents who without any “buts” stated that the Coup Attempt was real, are also the respondents who attach the greatest importance (21 percent) to the ‘continuity of the state’.

It would be useful to remind that the vast majority of HDP voters not only did not take to the streets on or after the night of the Coup Attempt, but also believe the coup to be a fabrication at a high rate.



Finally, we focus on the political profiles of each response for these four principles. As shown in the graph below, we can see that the respondents in favor of “continuity of the state” have the most conspicuous profile.

**Political preference by most important principle**



Among the voter group in favor of “continuity of the state” as their response, Ak Parti voters are represented 14 points and MHP voters are represented 6 points higher than the corresponding Turkey average. Additionally, the rate of MHP voters among this group seems to have decreased during the 3-month period. CHP voters are among the mostly likely to emphasize “freedom”. HDP voters, on the other hand, are most likely to prefer “equality” as their response.


### 2.7.5. Public trust in the Turkish Armed Forces

The question on what arouses the pride felt about being a citizen of the Turkish Republic is yet another question that helps us to understand the change in mentality that has occurred after July 15th. If the question of to what extent the July 15th Coup Attempt affected the public trust in or the opinion on the military was asked directly, it may not have led to unreliable results. Therefore, we aimed to identify the change in opinion on the military indirectly by querying the source of such nationalistic



pride. We had used the same question in December 2010 in our research on the subject of nationalism, and had asked the respondents to choose up to two of the below provided response options.

### Which of the following makes you feel proud to be a citizen of the Turkish Republic?



The graph above demonstrates striking differences in responses from 5 and a half years ago and today. It should be noted that it is impossible to ascertain to what extent this change was brought about by the July 15th Coup Attempt and its aftermath. Still, we are able to observe that pride in the armed forces has grown considerably weaker. Although 5 years ago, one in three people considered the armed forces as a source of pride, this rate has fallen below 10 percent after July 15th.


On the other hand, while the leading source of pride about being a citizen of the Turkish Republic is our history, with a rate of 42 percent 5 years ago, this rate has now increased to around 60 percent. Another source of pride with a noteworthy increase in preference is being Muslim. While a considerable portion of society (40 percent) already considered being Muslim as a source of pride in 2010, this rate has now increased to 52 percent. The very low rate of respondents who explicitly stated that there is nothing to feel proud about being a Turkish Republic citizen has remained the same. The rate of the respondents who feel proud of our geographic and cultural heritage has decreased slightly. Similarly, the rate of the respondents who think that Turkey is an influential global actor and that we should be proud of this has slightly increased. Yet, the most striking change is observed in the rate of the respondents in favor of the opinion that the armed forces is a source of pride.

We can understand the extent to which this change has permeated society from the graphs below. First of all, when we analyze the source of pride in being a Turkish



citizen by political preference, we observe noteworthy differences between voter groups.

### Which of the following makes you feel proud to be a citizen of the Turkish Republic?




The respondents who think there is nothing to feel proud about being a Turkish citizen are represented at the highest rate among HDP voters. Nearly one third of the 10 percent who state that they would vote for HDP state that there is nothing to feel proud about being a Turkish Republic citizen.

MHP voters are most likely to emphasize our history (83 percent), while Ak Parti voters are most likely to prefer Islam (69 percent) in their response. The respondents who consider geographical and cultural heritage as a source of pride are comparatively represented to a greater degree among CHP voters and HDP voters. This rate is only 13 percent among Ak Parti voters.

Opinion on the armed forces has changed the most among MHP voters and CHP voters. While 50 percent of MHP voters felt pride in the armed forces in 2010, this has decreased by 27 points, slumping to 13 percent since then. Similarly, pride in the armed forces deteriorated by 24 points among CHP voters to fall from 40 percent to 16 percent, while we can talk about a decrease of 19-points decline among Ak Parti voters, with those feeling proud of the armed forces dropping from 27 percent to 8 percent. While HDP voters (i.e. BDP voters at the time) did not consider armed forces as a source of pride in 2010 as well, their opinion has even become adamant since then. On the other hand, when we analyze the respondents who



report feeling proud of the armed forces as a separate group, we do not find out any demographically significant particularities. In other words, we may conclude that no segment of society is proud of the armed forces at the moment. Repeating this measurement, which was performed 3 weeks after the Coup Attempt, after the ongoing restructuring of the army is completed—i.e. a couple of months later—would allow us to gain a better understanding of whether public trust in armed forces has eroded or not.



In conclusion;

**Freedom and equality; excluding the Kurdish issue...**

In this section, we have endeavored to understand whether there has been any change in our social mentality after the Coup Attempt, with the help of the various questions used in previous surveys before July 15th. When we analyze a few questions together, we observe that the statist and totalitarian atmosphere that the Coup Attempt may have brought about is not reflected in the responses. Instead, we see freedoms and equality are emphasized to a greater degree by society. In conclusion, since the survey for this month’s report was conducted at a time when the dramatic impact of July 15th and its aftermath was still felt strongly, it would be difficult to argue that this change will be lasting. However, it is noteworthy that the positive change in opinion about freedoms and equality is not reflected in the opinion on the Kurdish issue. The fact that opinion on the Kurdish issue has not changed at all, unlike the opinion on freedoms and equality after July 15th may indicate two possibilities. Either the Kurdish issue is becoming a taboo that is taken into consideration in isolation from other concepts, or the currently increasing trend of emphasizing equality and freedoms is not real or lasting.





## 2.8. Evaluation and Comment

*Evren Balta (Assc. Prof., Yıldız Technical University)*

*Murat Paker (Asst. Prof., Istanbul Bilgi University)*

*Ayşe Betül Çelik (Prof., Sabancı University)*

This survey aims to measure the social perception about the coup, the collective emotions created by the coup and whether the coup created a transformation in the important social/political issues of Turkey. The report shows that the 15 July coup attempt has been rejected through a very comprehensive social consensus and many people took to the streets against the coup attempt even before the President called for the streets. Again, according to the findings of this report, the coup attempt created similar emotional reactions in the majority of the society including groups that oppose to the government albeit with significant differences and created a common ground for opposition against a coup in Turkey. The success of coup attempts depends upon the level of social support/resistance as much as the armed force that gains control. Coups aim to create a feeling of fear and necessity for obedience in the society in order to achieve the planned political and social transformation. Therefore, it is very important to understand as to how coups are interpreted and what kind of emotional reactions the societies have against them.

In this final section, we shall try to interpret the main findings of this survey.

### **Coup Attempt and Emotional Turn**

The results of this study show that the majority of the society in Turkey did not support the 15 July coup attempt. In almost all clusters of the society, the coup was initially met with rage, fear and anxiety. Undoubtedly, it is inevitable that such emotions dominate in this society as the memory of the previous coups of 12 March, 27 May, 12 September and 28 February still remains in their minds.

Social psychology points to the importance of consistency of emotions, thoughts and behavioural patterns. It is a likely behavioural pattern to act in rage against a person or event that creates rage. This study shows that the likelihood of a citizen who feels rage at the first news of the coup attempt to take to the streets before the President called for the streets is 70% higher than not taking to the streets at all. Similarly, in those who felt disappointment over the news on the coup attempt, the likelihood of taking to the streets before the President made a speech is 62% higher than not going out. It is shown that the coup attempt triggered rage and disappointment in one cluster (mainly the Ak Parti supporters) and the resistance against the coup had started before the President called for the streets and gradually increased with the President's call.

#### *Coup and the streets*

During or after the coup attempt, half of the adult population stated that they took to the streets against the coup attempt, whereas the other half indicated that they did not. 13 percent of the participants stated that they took to the streets before the President's call whereas 27 percent did so right after and 10 percent in the following days. This means that at the night of the coup attempt, namely at the hours with the highest risk, a very large cluster of the society, i.e. 40 percent mobilized for opposition against the coup. Even if we



consider that not all individuals within this 40 percent showed active resistance or had close contact with the putschist soldiers, this in any case is a very high rate.

Our results show that half of society think that they participated in foiling the coup attempt or were active witnesses to it therefore contributed to this “victory.” Participation in such street movements is strongly established in the personal and collective memories of the participants, deeply affecting the formation of their political identities and their view on fundamental problems. Taking into consideration the extent of violence experienced at the night of July 15<sup>th</sup>, it will be one of the most important problems in the coming term as to how and in which direction the politicization of the clusters that mobilized on an anti-coup common ground will contribute to the transformation of political identities in Turkey.

Even though the rate of taking to the streets against the coup is very high in general, the differences among various social groups is highly remarkable. It is observed that men (2.4 times more than women), people leading a traditional conservative lifestyle (2.3 times more than the others), the Ak Parti supporters (4.2 times more than the electorates of other parties), the MHP supporters (2.9 times more than the electorates of other parties), young people (1.3 times more than the other age groups) and higher income groups took to the streets at higher rates. It is interesting that higher income groups who we less frequently appear in social movements showed higher rates of mobilization. When the coup attempt was first heard, the possibility of taking to the streets was increased by rage (2.1 times), disappointment (1.8 times) and surprise (1.3 times) compared to other emotions.

Despite the diversity of the mass that took to the streets, it may be concluded that it mainly consisted of the Ak Parti and MHP supporters in terms of political identity. It was observed that the Kurds who in the recent years took to the streets at the highest rates in social events somewhat stayed behind in this particular event. Such differentiation, as shall be discussed below, may be related to the perception as to against whom the coup attempt was conducted and the fact that the leaders of the Ak Parti directly called for the streets against the coup. Another factor might be that the Kurds who have had a more conflicting relationship with the security forces of the state recently (and of course in the previous coup period of 12 September 1980) abstained from taking to the streets against the coup attempt. Thus, the HDP electorate stated that they felt fear (29.7%), anxiety (21.9%) and surprise (22.7%) when they first heard of the coup attempt.

#### *Polarized Politics, Common Emotions?*

For some time, public polls and social science studies have been drawing attention to social polarization in Turkey. Such separation is also obvious in the results of this study. For example, the HDP electoral base consisting mainly of a Kurdish electorate (95.1% in this survey) stated at remarkable rates that they did not feel anything when they first heard of the coup or when they learnt that it was foiled (15.6% and 20.3% respectively). This finding is indeed worthy of deliberation and discussion. It may be considered that the Kurdish problem that started with the 1980 coup and reached its peak in the 90's caused many traumas, and that a cluster that has always felt the existence of armed units such as the military, gendarmerie and police in their lives, have a feeling of emotional indifference towards weapons and/or more probably, a significant part of the Kurds are now in a state of political/emotional alienation. In fact, even though the weapons and the threat of an anti-democratic regime created fear (29.7%) and anxiety (21.9%) in the Kurds as well, it



may be that pain and fear have been normalized as the Kurds have already been going through such traumas for decades or that there exists a perception that regardless of a coup, the suffering will remain for the Kurds.

Another prominent outcome of the emotional analysis of the coup attempt are the positive feelings towards those who took to the streets. They were met with pride (Ak Parti electorate 73.4%, MHP electorate 55.4%) and joy (Ak Parti electorate 50.2%, MHP electorate 43.6%). This rate is half as low among the CHP and HDP electorates but still high. Yet, the rate of those who felt nothing towards those who took to the streets is also noteworthy (CHP 27%, HDP 39%). This partial distance in the CHP and HDP electorates towards those who took to the streets might be explained by the fact that the activists were dominantly Ak Parti and MHP supporters and the symbolism in the street protests was built primarily on the President and the Ak Parti.

On the other hand, the prevalence of negative emotions against those who avoided the streets is infrequent. The dominant emotion towards them has been nothing. This finding is significant for avoiding further deepening of the current state of polarization. Still, one fifth of the Ak Parti and MHP electorates express rage towards those who did not take to the streets. Considering that small but decisive groups are sufficient for aggression, it must be kept in mind that this angry lot making one fifth of the Ak Parti and MHP electorates have significant potential. A similar social consensus is also observed in the emotion towards the Democracy Watch. The main emotions towards this activity have been expressed as pride (47.9%) and joy (40.8%). However, interestingly, the CHP electorate has shown hesitant emotions towards the watch in that a part of the CHP electorate felt pride and joy and another part felt nothing. This is due to the heterogenous structure of the CHP electorate as well as the CHP leader's call for the watch after the coup. On the other hand, the HDP electorate (32.4%) kept its distance als in the case of the democracy watch.

The factors that increase positive emotions such as joy or pride upon the news that the coup was foiled are as follows: identifying oneself as a Turk (1.7 times higher than those who do not identify themselves as Turks), being an Ak parti supporter (4.9 times), being a MHP supporter (1.7 times) and leading a traditional conservative lifestyle (2.2 times). To sum up, the prevention of the coup attempt was very suitable to be coded as a kind of chosen victory in the traditional conservative and right electorate represented by the Ak Parti and the MHP whereas the CHP electorate has showed mixed feelings while the HDP electorate kept an emotional distance, experiencing the prevention of the coup as neither victory nor defeat since they probably considered that the situation before or after the coup attempt would not change their hardship/pain.

### **Coup Attempt and Social Perception**

As indicated in the introductory section, coups may find support due to a feeling of necessity about the incapability of civil politics in finding solutions in situations of polarization, or a feeling of desperation or the fear that certain ideologies or lifestyles may take over the society. Therefore, it is important to understand the society's ideas as to why the coup has happened and what kind of political life is requested in the future.

#### *Target of the coup*

The majority of the society disesteem the allegations made right after the coup attempt that the coup was a hoax. However, a considerable part of particularly the HDP (40.5%)



and CHP (22.9%) electorates believe that the coup attempt was a hoax. Again, a remarkable part of the CHP electorate (27.1%) and the electorate outside of those of the four big parties (32.4%) believe that the coup attempt was genuine but also think that the President or the government manipulated the coup attempt for their own advantage.

The opinion that the coup attempt was indeed real and foiled is 12 times more frequent among religious conservatives than those clusters that identify themselves with other lifestyles, 8 times more frequent among Ak Parti supporters than those of the other parties and 5 times more frequent among traditional conservatives. The probability of believing that the attempt was real is 63% lower in the CHP electorate and 93% lower in the HDP electorate. This differentiation of perception gives an idea as to the depth of the social gap.

The coup is mostly considered as an attempt against the President (43.7%). The second most common answer by the participants is the state (24.1%). Especially the majority of the CHP electorate think that the main target in the coup was the state. This might be a factor explaining as to why a part of the CHP electorate felt joy (36.1%) and pride (43.6%) towards the Democracy Watch.

The highest rate of adopting the opinion that the coup was conducted against the public, i.e. the citizens is observed among the HDP electorate (18.2%). This rate is 4.6% among the Ak Parti electorate, 6.8% among the CHP electorate and 5% among the MHP electorate. The CHP electorate considers the reasons of the coup mainly as the conflict between the Ak Parti/President and the FETÖ (22.9%), stirring up and destroying the country (26.2%) and opposition against the regime/the state (19.6%) whereas the Ak Parti supporters consider the reasons as stirring up and destroying the country (38.7%), opposition against the regime/state (17.7%) and the FETÖ and foreign powers (13.9%). This shows that the CHP electorate acknowledges the connection between the coup attempt and the FETÖ.

#### *Who foiled the coup?*

The question allowed for two answers and all major party electorates dominantly indicated that the coup attempt was foiled by those who took to the streets. The Ak Parti electorate named the President as the second answer (40.7%) thereby differentiating from the electorates of the other three parties who mostly pointed to the part of the military that did not support the coup. These results show a great difference of opinion between the Ak Parti and the other parties about the President's role in stopping the coup.

When asked as to which institution should defend democracy, a significant part of the society (36.6%) answered that the greatest power against the coup is the nation (public, citizens). In this question, those who chose the answer choice "nation/public/citizens" at the highest level were the HDP electorate (46%) whereas those who chose this alternative at the lowest level were the CHP electorate (29%). This might somehow be associated with the HDP electorate's history of seeking and defending rights and freedoms. The second most frequent answer is jurisdiction and law (20.5%) and the third is political parties (19.2%). When asked who would defend democracy against coups in general, the participants mentioned the powerful leaders who are considered to have foiled the 15 July coup attempt at low rates (8.2%). Again, the military and the police which were mentioned by the CHP electorate at the highest level about foiling the 15 July coup attempt were indicated at low rates by all political party electorates when asked as a part of the question



on defending democracy against coups. It is observed that the CHP electorate trusts justice and law at the highest level for defending democracy.

In short, the nation is considered as the greatest power against coups followed by the jurisdiction and law and then political parties and the parliament. This shows a social consensus about democratic institutions. However, the concept of nation as emphasized by particularly the Ak Parti and HDP electorate might mean different things to these electorates. There is a need for more research on the relationship between the nation and democracy.

Another important finding is that in the wake of the July 15<sup>th</sup> coup attempt, a significant part of society anticipates another coup attempt (45.9%). This rate is quite high particularly among the HDP electorate (74.9%) and CHP electorate (54%) whereas the Ak Parti electorate expect a new coup attempt at relatively low rates (39.9%). In the formation of this low rate, the reason might be the intense feeling of victory the Ak Parti electorate has been experiencing. Most of the participants think that a new coup attempt might be prevented by re-structuring the army and strengthening democracy. The Ak Parti and MHP electorates dominantly suggest re-structuring of the military in order to prevent a new coup attempt whereas among the CHP and HDP electorates, strengthening of democracy prevails.

#### *Remembering the coup attempt*

Support for social movements is also related to the way the news spread and reach the masses. In this regard, it is interesting to compare the street protests against the July 15<sup>th</sup> coup with the 2013 Gezi events. As is known, participation to the Gezi events boosted predominantly by the reaction against the news that spread in social media about police violence while the mainstream media did not broadcast this news for a long time. On the other hand, at the night of July 15<sup>th</sup>, the news were mostly obtained from mainstream media (77.8%). Interestingly, the most dominant memory about the coup night was not only the public going out into the streets and the deaths (about 10%) but also the killing and beating of the surrendering and innocent soldiers (10%) the images of whom were mostly provided by the social media rather than the TV channels. However, what is important here is that the first two images (the public going out into the streets) mostly stayed in the memory of the Ak Parti electorate whereas the second image (innocent soldiers getting killed/beaten) mostly stayed in the memory of the CHP and HDP electorate. This is yet another indication that the memory is shaped over political identities and the events to be remembered are chosen according to these identities.

Analyzing all these images, it is possible to see the differences created by political identities about the reasons and the target of this coup and against whom it was conducted despite the fact that anti-coup stand and thought is common in the society. However, there is also a potential for partnership among different political identities about embracing the major democratic institutions such as political parties, jurisdiction and law. Undoubtedly, making use of such potential is directly related to the route politics will follow.

#### **Coup Attempt and Institutional Turn**

As indicated in the introduction section, significant traumatic events such as coups/coup attempts open important doors as to how the common identity of the society is imagined



and what the common problems and their solutions are. After such traumatic events, a collective need may come up for new methods for solving problems. Such events may lead the way to the handling of significant political problems with a new point of view and changes in the political perception/stand towards such events. Such need and renewal may pave the way for re-shaping of the politics and finding solutions to long-term problems.

When asked as to whether democratic institutions in Turkey have strengthened after 15 July, the majority of the participants answered that they did (50.9%). The rate of those who think that they have weakened is 21.6%. However, the rate of those who think that the democratic institutions have strengthened is high because of the dominance of the Ak Parti and MHP supporters. The remaining lot (even though the majority of the MHP electorate think that democracy has strengthened, this rate nevertheless remained at 46.2%) think that the democratic institutions have weakened after the coup. Particularly, most of the HDP electorate (63.2%) think that the democratic institutions have weakened after the coup attempt.

#### *Kurdish problem and Negotiations*

The results show that the 15 July coup attempt did not create any social transformation about the solution of the Kurdish problem through negotiations. Just like the case has been before the coup attempt, the social support for the solution of the Kurdish problem through negotiations is low. For example, support for negotiations had been measured as 28.3% for, 52.6% against and 19.1% undecided in May 2016 according to KONDA data, and the findings of this study also yielded similar results: 27.5% for, 50.9% against and 21.6% undecided. Solution of the Kurdish problem through negotiation is not strongly supported by any electoral base other than that of the HDP. 56% of the Ak Parti, 75% of the MHP and 46% of the CHP find returning to negotiations “absolutely wrong” or “wrong.” Analyzing the situation according to the axis of being for or against negotiations in the Kurdish problem, the features that increase the likelihood of having an anti-negotiation attitude are Turkishness (59% more than other ethnical identities), MHP partisanship (56%), Ak Parti partisanship 23% and male gender (13%), respectively. The features that increase the likelihood of having a pro-negotiation attitude are HDP partisanship (98%), Kurdishness (50%) and belonging to lower income group (16%), respectively. Even though particularly the HDP supporters and generally the Kurds have an intense desire for resuming negotiations, in a social majority consisting mainly of the Ak Parti and MHP supporters, this desire cannot be met.

#### *Freedoms and Secularism*

The society’s negative attitude towards negotiations is given up when it comes to rights and freedoms. For example, among the principles of the constitution that should be emphasized the most, justice is the most commonly named (37.2%) followed by the principle of equality among all kinds of differences such as being Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni or Alevi (32.6%). Compared to the May 2016 data of KONDA, the emphasis on the principle of equality has increased by 7 points. This is a very significant change. The fact that the continuity of the state as a main principle of the constitution remained at 17.7% which is a rather low rate, necessitates more profound research about the course of the statist reflex which is claimed to dominate the society in Turkey.



Similarly, the majority of the participants (69.7%) think that the basic rights and liberties of the citizens must not be restricted for the sake of struggle against terror and crime and this rate has increased at a rate of 19% compared to the March 2016 data of KONDA. Considering the severe and common violation of rights experienced in Turkey every day as well as the general social indifference and widespread acceptance towards such violations, this finding is surprising and requires further investigation in order to be fully understood.

Finally, the rate of those who do not want secularism to appear in the constitution at all is only 6.2%. This rate shows that the society in Turkey has no problems against secularism. Those who think that secularism should remain in the constitution as it is makes 46.3% of the society. The rate of those who think that secularism should remain in the constitution but should be re-defined in a way to allow the state to keep equal distance to all religious is 47.1%. This rate has increased about 10% since May 2016 (37.9%). This is a significant increase that has happened in a very short time. It must be considered as the most important finding of this report that a social consensus on secularism might have been reached in Turkey.

### *Presidential System*

The support for presidential system which has been a major part of the agenda in Turkey before the coup attempt is one of the important questions that this survey seeks an answer for. It might be expected that the pursuit for authority and leadership in the society increases right after the coup, especially considering the popular idea that the coup was against the government and the President. Hence, according to the June 2016 data of KONDA, the society did not support a presidential system as 43% was against and 34% was in favour of it, however for the first time in one and a half years, this balance turned the opposite in August 2016 providing support for a presidential system as 38% was in favor and 35% were against it. From June to August, 4% of those who had previously been against a presidential system shifted towards the undecided lot whereas 4% shifted towards those who support a presidential system. It is observed that the greatest factor in such shift is the gradual decrease in the opposition against a presidential system within the MHP electorate. On the other hand, it is uncertain as to what extent this shift in preferences is related to the coup attempt, because even among the Ak Parti electorate only 16.5% think that transition into a presidential system will be precautionary against coups. Therefore, there is a probability that this shift of preferences may at least partially be a tendency unrelated to the coup.

### **Conclusion**

This survey reveals that the society has had a common resistance and stand against the coup. Again, there is a wide social consensus about the utilization of concepts such as political parties, law and democracy for the prevention of coups. On the other hand, about the return to negotiations in the Kurdish problem, the significant reluctance of the majority of the electorate other than that of the HDP remains the way it had been before the coup attempt. It is observed that the level of support for a presidential system has somewhat increased compared to the rate measured before the coup. A significant social support for secularism, basic rights and freedoms as well as justice and equality as the basic principles of the constitution do exist. All these might be considered as a potential that the coup attempt might possess for developing the democratic maturity of the society in



Turkey. How this potential will be utilized will surely be a subject of political struggle in the coming term.

Regarding how the coup was perceived and experienced, it has been determined that the Ak Parti and MHP electoral base form the majority with intense permeability, that the CHP electoral base shows a confused state of emotions and the HDP electorate experiences an emotional separation from the electorates of the other parties or rather, the separation which has already been going on for some time also prevails about the interpretation of the coup. All these determinations are important for providing a source for further studies.

Findings which seem to be in conflict with each other and with social observations such as opposition against negotiations, emphasis on the principle of equality and equal distance to all religions in secularism as well as concepts intensively used by different actors of the political polarisation such as democracy and nation deserve further research, both quantitative and qualitative, in order to find out the society's understanding of basic subject matters such as equality and secularism.





### 3. RESEARCH ID

#### 3.1. Overall Description of the Survey

The surveys that this report is based on has been conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.).

The field survey was conducted on 6-7 August 2016. This report presents the political trends, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, within the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and to monitor trends and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey. The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.3 at 99 percent confidence level.

#### 3.2. The Sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the data on population and educational attainment level of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS), and the results of the November 1st 2016 General Election in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 2676 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 160 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts - including central districts - of 27 provinces.

Provinces visited	27
Districts visited	101
Neighborhoods/villages visited	160
Number of respondents	2676

Among the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas on age and gender were enforced.

Age group	Female	Male
Between 18-32	3 respondents	3 respondents
Between 33-48	3 respondents	3 respondents
49 and above	3 respondents	3 respondents



	Level 1 (12 regions)	Provinces visited
1	İstanbul	İstanbul
2	Western Marmara	Balıkesir, Tekirdağ
3	Aegean	Denizli, İzmir
4	Eastern Marmara	Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli
5	Western Anatolia	Ankara, Konya
6	Mediterranean	Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri, Sivas
8	Western Black Sea	Samsun, Tokat
9	Eastern Black Sea	Giresun, Trabzon
10	Northeastern Anatolia	Erzurum, Kars
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia	Malatya, Van
12	Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa

The distribution of the respondents by region and place of residence is shown in the table below.

	Survey location	Rural	Urban	Metropolitan	Total
1	İstanbul			23.2%	23.2%
2	Western Marmara		2.7%		2.7%
3	Aegean		9.3%	5.7%	14.9%
4	Eastern Marmara		4.3%	7.4%	11.7%
5	Western Anatolia		1.9%	8.3%	10.2%
6	Mediterranean		7.4%	6.7%	14.2%
7	Central Anatolia	0.4%	3.7%	0.5%	4.7%
8	Western Black Sea	1.3%	2.8%		4.1%
9	Eastern Black Sea		2.0%		2.0%
10	Northeastern Anatolia	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	2.1%
11	Middle Eastern Anatolia		2.1%		2.1%
12	Southeastern Anatolia		4.7%	3.4%	8.1%
	Total	2.5%	41.5%	56.0%	100.0%



## 4. FREQUENCY TABLES

### 4.1. Profile of the Respondents

Gender	Percent
Female	46.3
Male	53.7
Total	100.0

Age	Percent
Between 18-32	32.6
Between 33-48	34.6
49 or above	32.9
Total	100

Educational attainment level	Percent
Illiterate	5.1
Literate without degree	2.4
Primary school degree	32.1
Secondary school degree	15.9
High school degree	29.6
University degree	13.5
Masters/PhD	1.5
Total	100

Household size	Percent
1-2 person(s)	18.1
3-5 people	64.7
6-8 people	15.1
9 people or more	2.1
Total	100

Lifestyle cluster	Percent
Modern	26.8
Traditional conservative	47.7
Religious conservative	25.6
Total	100



<b>Employment status</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Public officer	5.5
Private sector	8.1
Worker	10.9
Small retailer	7.4
Merchant/businessman	1.4
Self-employed	1.8
Farmer, agriculturist, stock breeder	3.8
Employed, other	5.1
Retired	13.1
Housewife	29.5
Student	7.6
Unemployed	4.2
Disabled	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Employment status (grouped)</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Senior level employees	16.8
Worker, small retailer, farmer	27.3
Retired	13.1
Housewife	29.5
Student	7.6
Unemployed	5.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

<b>Head cover status</b>	<b>Percent</b>
No head cover	28.5
Headscarf	47.1
Turban	9.8
Chador	1.4
Bachelor male	13.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.5</b>



<b>Ethnic identity</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Turkish	77.9
Kurdish	14.0
Zaza	2.4
Arab	2.4
Other	3.3
Total	100

<b>Level of religiosity</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Non-believer	3.1
Believer	24.0
Religious	61.3
Pious	11.6
Total	100

<b>Which social media channels do you use?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Facebook	48.9
WhatsApp	35.9
Instagram	21.7
YouTube	21.4
Twitter	18.0
Other	1.5
I use the Internet, but I am not a social media user.	8.7
I do not access the Internet	33.6

<b>Monthly household income</b>	<b>Percent</b>
TRY 700 or less	3.2
TRY 701 - 1200	10.3
TRY 1201 - 2000	45.7
TRY 2001 - 3000	23.9
TRY 3001 - 5000	13.5
TRY 5001 or more	3.3
Total	100



TV channel preferred to watch the news	Percent
Does not watch	3.3
A Haber	9.6
ATV	21.4
CNN Turk	6.5
Fox TV	10.0
Haberturk	2.3
Halk TV	3.2
IMC TV	1.0
Kanal 7	1.2
Kanal D	5.6
Kanaltürk	0.2
NTV	4.8
Roj/Nuçe/Sterk	1.3
Show TV	3.3
Star	3.3
TRT	17.3
Ulusal	1.2
Local channels	4.4
Total	100.0

Do you own a car in your household?	Percent
Yes	48.6
No	51.4
Total	100.0

Type of housing	Percent
Squatter / apartment without external plastering	4.6
Single family, traditional house	35.8
Apartment	49.3
Housing complex	9.9
Very luxurious apartment, villa	0.4
Total	100



Economic class	Percent
Lower	19.9
Lower middle class	31.9
New middle	26.8
Upper	21.5
Total	100.0

## 4.2. Theme of the Month: The July 15th Coup Attempt

Did you personally take to the streets against the July 15th Coup Attempt?	Percent
I did not take to the streets.	50.2
I took to the streets on the night of July 15th BEFORE the President called on the people to go out on the streets.	13.2
I took to the streets on the night of July 15th AFTER the President called on the people to go out on the streets.	26.6
I took to the streets on July 16th and afterwards.	10.0
Total	100.0

From which source did you "FIRST" receive the news of the July 15th Coup Attempt?	Percent
Friends, acquaintances	19.7
Social media	8.8
Online news sites	3.5
TV	65.0
SMS messages from the authorities	0.8
Mosques	2.2
Total	100.0



<b>What did you feel when you first heard about the attempt?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Rage	26.3
Fear	43.5
Anxiety	35.1
Shame	7.2
Surprise	19.5
Disappointment	5.2
Joy	1.0
Pride	0.3
Nothing	4.7

<b>What did you feel when you learned that the Coup Attempt was averted?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Rage	1.2
Fear	1.3
Anxiety	2.8
Shame	0.8
Surprise	6.3
Disappointment	1.2
Joy	77.1
Pride	34.2
Nothing	5.9

<b>What did you feel towards the people who took to the streets on the night of July 15th to prevent the attempt?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Rage	1.6
Fear	1.5
Anxiety	5.0
Shame	1.2
Surprise	4.5
Disappointment	1.0
Joy	41.6
Pride	57.0
Nothing	12.3





<b>What did you feel towards the people who did not take to the streets on the night of July 15th?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Rage	15.6
Fear	2.0
Anxiety	3.3
Shame	8.5
Surprise	7.1
Disappointment	11.8
Joy	1.5
Pride	2.2
Nothing	55.0

<b>What do you think about the ongoing Democracy Watch rallies?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Rage	1.4
Fear	0.9
Anxiety	2.7
Shame	1.4
Surprise	3.7
Disappointment	1.9
Joy	40.8
Pride	47.8
Nothing	21.2



<b>Which event or image from the night of July 15th do you recall as the most significant? (grouped)</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Images of martyrs, dying people	13.4
Military aircrafts, aircraft opening fire on buildings and the people	9.7
Military personnel opening fire on the people	9.1
Killing and beating of surrendering, innocent soldiers	7.3
Images of tanks on the streets	7.1
People taking to the streets	7.1
Bombing of the parliament	6.8
Soldiers on the streets, confrontation between the soldiers and the police	6.0
Shutting down of the bridge, the image of tanks on the bridge	5.2
The moment the President appeared on TV	4.7
Invasion of the national public broadcasting channel TRT, reading of the statement by the newsreader	4.3
Heroes	4.1
People climbing on and stopping tanks	4.1
Calls to prayer from mosques	2.2
Other	9.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Through which means did you experience this event or image?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
I personally saw/heard it.	12.2
I saw/read about it on social media.	10.3
I saw/heard it on TV.	77.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>



<b>Who was the MAIN or the MOST IMPORTANT target of the July 15th Coup Attempt?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Ak Parti government	8.6
The President	43.6
The republic	9.4
The state	24.3
Democracy	7.1
The parliament	1.0
Citizens	5.9
Total	100.0

<b>What was the main motivation behind this Coup Attempt? (grouped)</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Create chaos and overthrow the country	34.3
Opposition to the regime/state	18.0
Conflict between Ak Parti / the President & FETÖ	14.7
FETÖ and external powers	13.7
Opposition to the President	8.2
Serve the interests of Ak Parti and the President	2.7
Anti-secularism	1.2
Other	7.2
Total	100.0

<b>Who do you think actually stopped the Coup Attempt?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
People taking to the streets	73.8
The President	28.1
Soldiers who did not participate in the Coup	18.8
The police	11.4
The government	4.1
Ak Parti voters	3.7
The parliament	1.2



<b>Which of the following response options that I will read best describes your opinion on the claim that the Coup Attempt was a fabrication?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
There really was a Coup Attempt, which was averted.	74.3
There really was a Coup Attempt, but the President / the government are manipulating this to their own ends.	11.1
The President / the government was informed about the Coup Attempt beforehand and that they allowed it to take place in a controlled manner.	5.5
There really was not any Coup Attempt and it was a complete fabrication.	9.2
Total	100.0

<b>Which of the options that I am going to read to you now should defend democracy against coup attempt?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Political parties and the parliament	19.0
Justice and law	20.6
The military	10.3
Powerful political leaders	8.3
The police	5.5
The people	36.3
Total	100.0

<b>How can we prevent future coup attempts from happening?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
By strengthening democracy	42.5
By restructuring the army	41.3
By preparing a new constitution	17.8
By strengthening the police	14.3
By restructuring the judiciary	14.2
By a transition to the presidential system	9.4

<b>Do you think there is a possibility that another Coup Attempt will happen in Turkey?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Yes	45.9
No	54.1
Total	100.0



<b>To what extent do you agree with the statement that “Fundamental rights and freedoms of people are taken away in the fight against terror and crime.”</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Strongly disagree	24.2
Disagree	32.4
Somewhat disagree	13.1
Somewhat agree	12.6
Agree	13.0
Strongly agree	4.8
Total	100.0

<b>Which of the following statements about secularism do you agree with?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Secularism should be a part of the constitution, but it should be redefined with equal distance to all religions.	47.1
Secularism should remain in the constitution without any alterations.	46.7
Secularism should not be a part of the constitution.	6.2
Total	100.0

<b>In your opinion, which of the constitutional principles should be emphasized to a greater extent than others?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
JUSTICE against unfairness	37.2
EQUALITY between all kinds of people such as the Turkish, the Kurdish, Sunnis or Alevis	32.6
FREEDOM for everyone to live without restrictions	12.8
SURVIVAL OF THE STATE against separatism and destruction	17.4
Total	100.0

<b>Which of the following makes you feel proud to be a citizen of the Turkish Republic?</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Our history	58.9
Being Muslim	51.6
Our geography and cultural heritage	20.7
The armed forces	9.8
The fact that we are an influential global actor	9.0
None, there is nothing to be proud of about being a Turkish citizen.	3.7



## 5. GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms.

Term	Definition
Alevi Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim
Lower middle class:	Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car
Lower class:	Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment
Arab:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab
Headscarf:	A woman who does not cover her head or a man with a headscarf or whose spouse does not cover her head with a headscarf
Chador:	A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a chador
Religious:	A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion
Religious conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative
Traditional conservative:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative
Believer:	A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely
Non-believer:	A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion
Urban area:	Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Rural area:	Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the official definition)
Kurdish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish
Metropolitan:	Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)
Modern:	A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern



No cover:	A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head
Pious:	A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely
Sunni Muslim:	A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim
Partisan:	A person who states that he/she/they always vote for that party
Turban:	A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a turban
Turkish:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish
Upper class:	Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment
New middle class:	Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent segment and which own a car
Zaza:	A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)	It is a data analysis technique for nominal categorical data, used to detect and represent underlying structures in a data set. It is used for applying Correspondence Analysis (CA) to large data sets with more than two variables. MCA was shaped with the work of mathematician and linguist Jean-Paul Benzécri in 1960s, and MCA-related studies and publications proliferated after the translation of research on Jean-Paul Benzécri and MCA in the 1980s and the use of this method by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.

## 1.1. Questions and Response Options

Which of the three lifestyle clusters below do you feel you belong to?

Modern

Traditional conservative

Religious conservative

Do you cover your head or does your spouse cover her head when going out of your home? How do you cover your head?

No head cover

Headscarf

Turban

Chador

Bachelor male



**We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you belong to?**

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

**Which religion or sect do you feel you belong to?**

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

**Which of the below describes you in terms of piety?**

A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely

**Which of the reasons below influence/determine your political preferences?**

I/we always vote for that party.

It is the party closest to my political view.

I trust/favor its leader.

None of these parties represent me.

I make a decision based on the election campaigns.

Total

**Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample)**

Rural

Urban

Metropolitan

**Economic classes (determined by using household size, household income and car ownership)**

Lower class

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper class